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1. INTRODUCTION 
a. Overview of Research 
The following thesis seeks to provide a rigorous analysis of the various ‘human factors’ 
behind counter-terrorism activities, based on original primary source interviews, rather than 
relying on previous secondary or tertiary source academic and professional publications or 
open source material. Such ‘human factors’ can be defined as the sociological aspects 
associated with counter-terrorism, such as personal relationships, individual capabilities, 
effective leadership, technical interface, organisational culture and community engagement. 
Examining counter-terrorism through these ‘human factors’ – relevant to the counter-
terrorist police officer, intelligence official, military operator1, or indeed member of the 
community – differs significantly from much of the previous research in the field, which has 
been focussed on counter-terrorist systems and structures. Such a human-centric approach 
in examining counter-terrorism, and the specific ‘factors’ which form the chapter headings, 
‘emerged’ from subjecting the interview data, which forms the basis of this research, to 
textual analysis through a variant of ‘Grounded Theory’, which is detailed in the following 
methodology chapter.   
This use of the phrase ‘human factors’ to describe the personal relationships, individual 
capabilities, effective leadership, technical interface, organisational culture and community 
engagement, is different from its more common usage in the field of ergonomics, the study 
of the efficiency of persons in their working environment in relation to engineering and 
design (see Stedman & Lawson 2015). This has been defined as “an applied science 
concerned with designing and arranging things people use so that the people and things 
interact most efficiently and safely – called also biotechnology, human engineering, human 
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factors” (Merriam-Webster/ Encyclopedia Britannica).  In the case of this research, ‘human 
factors’ has been used to describe those human relationships, skills, capabilities, knowledge, 
experience, expertise, leadership, psychology, mind-set and culture inherent to the 
individual, group or community.  This human-centric approach is reflected in the title ‘Mark 
1 Counter-Terrorist’, which is based on the military use of the words ‘Mark 1’ to refer to 
inherent human capabilities, eg. Using the ‘Mark 1 eyeball’ to observe something.  
Given the difficulty of accurately measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures, 
particularly when due to security the more effective a measure is, often the less is heard 
about it in the public domain, the use of the word ‘significance’ in this research is quite 
specific. Rather than referring to mathematical or scientific ‘significance’, in this case the 
word ‘significance’ is used to refer to the ‘perceived significance’ and effectiveness of 
particular counter-terrorist measures from the perspectives of the counter-terrorist 
practitioners interviewed for this research, those actually involved in implementing and 
delivering it. Cleary such ‘perceived significance’ varies significantly between practitioners in 
different countries and perhaps more significantly, from the different fields, particularly 
with the dichotomy between policing and military responses to terrorism. As a result this 
research is multi-case, multi-field and comparative in nature.  
Consequently the research behind it draws on extensive practitioner based interview data 
collected over eight years, comparatively examining counter-terrorist responses and ‘best 
practice’ in seven countries: the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, France, Spain, Israel, Turkey 
and the United States (US). Where military practitioners have also discussed overseas 
counter-insurgency measures during interviews, the material has been included, as 
terrorism forms a key aspect of such wider insurgencies. This original primary source data, 
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drawn from over 170 ‘key informant’ interviews and responses of police officers, 
intelligence officials and military operators in the seven countries, has been analysed in 
order to identify key emerging themes and issues, both positive and negative, relevant to 
‘human factors’ in the individual countries and more generically across countries. The thesis 
incorporates data based on the informed operational experiences and insights of the 
interviewees, while seeking to provide examples of successful measures in counter-
terrorism, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. 
Although an increasing amount of research has been published on the general subject field 
of terrorism, particularly since the 9/11 attacks, much has been based on earlier academic 
papers and publications, official documents or open source materials. In contrast this thesis 
is deliberately constructed around the input of ‘experienced’ knowledge from specialist 
policing, intelligence and military practitioners, those actually involved in countering 
terrorism.2 Thus, within the field of terrorism research, the thesis seeks to counter the risk 
of ‘circular-reporting,’ by commentators continually quoting and referencing previous work 
from other academics, through its basis on such primary source counter-terrorism field 
research.3 Nevertheless, this agenda necessarily involves a thorough acquaintance with, and 
appraisal of, the academic and professional literature in the field.  
Much of the over-reliance on previously published material in the field of terrorism research 
has been due to the difficulties, costs and indeed in some cases dangers, faced by 
researchers in gaining access to current or former terrorists and counter-terrorist officials. 
At the same time within the specific field of counter-terrorism (and counter-insurgency), 
practitioners have often been loath to speak to researchers including academics, due to 
both the operational and methodological sensitivity of their work and the concern that what 
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they are discussing will be misunderstood or misrepresented by those who have not 
themselves experienced it operationally. The flipside is that there is also a tendency for 
some practitioners to immediately denigrate or ‘write off’ academic research as being of no 
practical use to them, without properly examining its potential benefits and insights. Thus 
while there are contacts between academic researchers and counter-terrorist practitioners, 
these tend to be based on one off or limited bi-lateral, rather than broader links, failing to 
bridge this ‘divide’ between academics and practitioners. However, in conducting the 
research behind this thesis, the researcher benefited from a previous operational 
background in both the Army and Police, including overseas service, which opened many 
doors and provided a level of credibility and access necessary to conduct such research.  
Consequently, the thesis aims to provide an empirical practitioner based analysis of the 
‘human factors’ behind various countries’ counter-terrorist systems, structures and 
responses, with case studies drawn from the UK, Ireland, France, Spain, Israel, Turkey and 
the US. Where relevant, some examples are also drawn from outside the case study 
countries. The focus will be on the impact of ‘human factors’ on the various measures 
utilised to minimise, counter and control the threat of terrorism in the specific case study 
countries concerned. The emphasis will thus be on the ‘human factors’ behind effective 
policing, intelligence and military responses to terrorism and any lessons to be learned from 
them, while taking a critical and reflective approach, and being attentive to human rights 
considerations and the dysfunctional effects of policy and practice.  
b. Research Inception 
While a wealth of material has been published on terrorism, particularly since the events of 
9/11, much of the historical academic research in the subject field has been based around 
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the use of secondary source data from previously published research or open source 
material (Schmid & Jongman 1988). The background to this over-reliance in the terrorism 
research field is highlighted by Silke, who states that “due to reasons of personal safety, 
political sensitivity and perceived methodological difficulty, researchers have largely shied 
away from action and actor-based research, largely leaving those topics to a handful of 
individuals who encounter the terrorists as part of their professional work and for whom 
research is both a peripheral and generally sporadic activity” (Silke 2004: p.9). As a result, of 
the more limited amount of original primary source research which has been conducted, 
most has been focused on interviewing terrorists or former terrorists, rather than those 
policing, intelligence and military practitioners involved in countering terrorism (Atran 
2010). Part of the reason for the latter is the lack of access many academics have to 
operational counter-terrorist practitioners, the practitioners’ concerns about the security of 
operationally and methodologically sensitive information and their reluctance to discuss 
even the non-sensitive aspects of their work with academic researchers.  
Having read Silke’s edited book Research on Terrorism (2004) in particular his chapter ‘The 
Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’ and Horgan’s chapter ‘The 
Case for Firsthand Research’, this researcher became increasingly aware of the significant 
gap in the research field. This was both in terms of the lack of empirical primary source 
research in the broader subject field itself and more specifically, a lack of such focus on 
counter-terrorism, due to the obstacles previously highlighted. Given the researchers own 
operational background in both Policing and Army service, he was in the privileged position 
of being able to overcome many of these obstacles through contacts, a level of trust and 
being a ‘known quantity’, which helped facilitate the primary source interviews of such 
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counter-terrorist practitioners. Consequently the researcher’s own relevant operational 
background proved critical in providing a level of motivation, personal insight and access.  
c. Need for Primary Research in the Subject Field 
As mentioned, one of the primary drivers behind the research detailed in this thesis is the 
lack of original primary source research in the subject field. In general terms, it can be 
argued that there are four main data sources of written material in the wider field: personal 
memoirs of both former terrorists and counter-terrorist practitioners, journalistic books and 
articles, some of which are extremely well researched and documented, official government 
publications and specific academic research, in the form of books, papers and in peer 
reviewed journals, such as ‘Terrorism and Political Violence’ (TPV) and ‘Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism’ (SICAT).  
Each of these has its own merits and failings. The memoirs written by police and security 
force practitioners and former terrorists are based on the ‘experienced’ knowledge of their 
subject, as distinct from the abstract knowledge ‘acquired’ through academic study or 
research (Dey 1999 pp.100-1). Similarly, many journalistic publications are based on either 
first-hand knowledge or close primary source contacts. Nevertheless, despite their proximity 
to, and experience of, the linked subject fields of terrorism and counter-terrorism, these 
sources of literature often lack the depth and rigour of academic research, sometimes 
aggravated by their use of emotive and subjective styles of writing or having a particular 
agenda. On the other hand, government and security force publications on terrorism, while 
based on unique access to information, clearly tend to start from a given premise and a 
particular moral standpoint, often providing a ‘narrow’ and subjective, official perspective. 
Such publications sometimes propagandise an official policy or measure, which in reality is 
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far less effective than stated, or portray an event or incident to the benefit of the 
authorities. In addition, issues of sensitive, classified and legal Sub Judice material clearly 
limit the nature of information contained in such publications.4 
By comparison, much current academic research in the fields of terrorism and counter-
terrorism, while providing more of the depth and rigour so often missing in memoirs and 
journalistic accounts, still appears to be lacking in empirical grounding, tending to be overly 
reliant on previously published material. Indeed, Schmid and Jongman go so far as to state 
that, “there are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is 
written on the basis of so little research” (Schmid and Jongman 1988: p.179). Horgan (2004) 
likewise argues that much of the previous academic research into the subject of terrorism 
has been based predominantly on secondary and sometimes tertiary source material, rather 
than the first-hand research generated through interviews with those directly involved in 
terrorist behaviour. These highlight the apparent weakness of publications within the 
subject field, in particular their over reliance on previous research and media reports, which 
contrasts with the first-hand information generated by practitioners and journalists. Finally, 
much of the previous academic research on both terrorism and counter-terrorism, 
particularly the flood of publications following the watershed events of 9/11, has focused on 
exploratory and descriptive knowledge, who, where and when, rather than more detailed 
explanatory knowledge based around questions of how and why (Silke 2001). Consequently, 
there is a significant gap in the subject research which this thesis, at least in part, hopes to 
bridge.  
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d. Context of the Research 
To place the research behind this thesis in context, it is necessary to provide a brief 
overview of previously published research within the wider subject field of terrorism, which 
will be examined in more specific detail in the literature review which follows. As has been 
highlighted, while a great deal of material has been published on the subject field, 
particularly since the 9/11 attacks, much of the academic research has been based on 
secondary source data analysis. Nevertheless there has been a more limited amount of 
primary source based research on the subject of terrorism, most being based on qualitative 
interview data from former and current terrorists. Examples include Horgan (2005 and 
2009), Bjorgo & Horgan (2009), Atran (2010) and Silke (2011). 
Despite the previously highlighted lack of empirical research in the subject field, there are a 
number of respected publications on the more general subject of terrorism, which consider 
aspects of counter-terrorism. These include Crenshaw (1995), an edited publication which 
contains fourteen chapters by experts on various types of terrorism and responses, from 
historical revolutionary to modern nationalist terrorism, Wilkinson (2006), who examines 
the dilemmas liberal democracies face in introducing various responses to counter terrorist 
threats and Richardson (2006), who examines terrorist motivations, objectives and the 
rationales behind them. While Hoffman (2006) provides a broad overview of terrorism and 
various issues associated with it, such as the problems of defining terrorism and terrorist 
tactics, targets and technologies, Wardlaw (1989) divides his publication into two sections, 
the first examining the development of terrorism, the second exploring problems associated 
with various counter-terrorist responses.   
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As well as these significant publications on the more general subject of terrorism, there 
have also been a number of others specifically examining counter-terrorism. Some of these 
analyse counter-terrorism in a particular country, such as Hewitt (2003) and Wilkinson 
(2007), while others examine themes and aspects of counter-terrorism. Examples of the 
latter include Bolz et. al. (2005), English (2009), Ganor (2005a) and Steven and Gunaratna 
(2004). There have also been edited publications with academics and experts writing 
chapters on specific countries, such as Alexander (2002b) and (2006), von Hippel (2005), van 
Leeuwen (2003) and Reinares (2000). Finally there have been a number of edited 
publications with academics and experts writing on specific themes and aspects of counter-
terrorism, such as Cronin and Ludes (2004), Harmon et. al. (2011) and Howard and Sawyer 
(2004). Material from these publications will be drawn on and referenced in the thesis 
where relevant. 
While all these publications are based on solid research, as far as the researcher is aware, 
they have not been predominantly based on empirical data obtained directly from 
interviews with practitioners in the overlapping fields of policing, intelligence and the 
military. The continuing need for original primary research in this field has already been 
detailed and highlighted, more recently in Dolnik (2013). While other academics such as 
Horgan (2009) have interviewed former terrorists, and Foley (2013) has interviewed 
counter-terrorist officials in both the UK and France, there is still a need for a wider 
empirically based and academically rigorous comparative analysis of counter-terrorism, and 
in this case, the ‘human factors’ behind it. This thesis contains original research in the 
subject field, which in part responds to this need.  
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However, to fully understand the wider context of the research and review relevant 
literature in the subject field, it is important to firstly understand the problems and disputes 
concerning the definition of ‘terrorism’, the historical background of such terrorism, the 
various types of terrorist threats, and finally the nature of the various responses introduced 
by nations to counter these threats. Consequently, all these areas and the relevant 
literature pertaining to them, will be covered in the following literature review chapter.  
e. Data Collection and Justification of Research 
As examined in more detail in the following methodology chapter, the researcher’s 
operational background helped facilitate the completion of over 170 ‘key informant’ 
interviews amongst operational practitioners. These interviewees primarily comprised three 
main groups, police officers, intelligence officials and military operators who came from the 
seven case study countries of the UK, Ireland, France, Spain, Israel, Turkey and the US. These 
three main groups of practitioners were chosen because within the wider field of counter-
terrorism, they are those most directly involved at an operational level on the ground, 
effectively ‘at the coal face’. Consequently, their perceptions and insights were primarily 
sought for this ‘explanatory’ research. Likewise, the seven case study countries were chosen 
because both historically and more recently they have suffered from significant levels of 
various types of terrorism, resulting in widely differing forms of counter terrorist measures. 
Additionally, the case study countries represent a variety of different political systems, 
foreign policy agendas, histories and cultural/religious backgrounds, adding to the 
generalisability and validity of the research.  
Once collected through the use of a semi-structured interview plan, the interview data was 
subjected to a variant of ‘Grounded Theory’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967) This was constructed 
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around a synthesis of textual analysis (Boyatzis 1998), the population of data tables based 
on the emerging independent variables (counter-terrorist measures) and frequency analysis 
of that data to allow the tiering of counter-terrorist measures based on their perceived 
effectiveness, or lack of it, and the ‘human factors’ behind them. The resultant tiered and 
thematic data tables, based on the perceived effectiveness of measures raised in the 
practitioner interviewees, were used to inform the structure, content and writing up of this 
thesis on the significance of ‘human factors’ to effective counter-terrorism. Consequently 
this thesis is based on a multi-case research model, which will be examined in greater detail 
in the methodology chapter which follows the literature review.    
f. Aims of the Research   
This thesis aims to negate the over-reliance of previous research in this subject field on 
secondary and sometimes tertiary source material, by combining the primary source and 
‘experienced’ knowledge of policing, intelligence and military practitioners with the rigour 
of academic research. It also seeks to generate explanatory knowledge through the 
utilisation of ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in the interviews, while the use of the same 
interview plan for each interviewee in the different case study countries enables a broader 
range for comparative analysis compared to a single country sample. Consequently, having 
identified the previously mentioned gap in the research and published literature on the 
subject field of counter-terrorism, this research has been designed with the intention of 
generating original, explanatory knowledge in the subject field, in part to bridge this gap. 
This explanatory knowledge will be utilised to comparatively analyse and examine the 
‘human factors’ behind a number of countries’ counter-terrorist responses with the 
intention of identifying examples of ‘best practice’ in the minimisation, prevention and 
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control of terrorist threats, cases where policy and/or practice is dysfunctional and any 
lessons to be drawn from them. The lessons and concepts which emerged from the wider 
research are examined in detail at the end of the thesis in Chapter 11, the Conclusion.  
It is submitted that the thesis makes a substantive contribution to knowledge in the field, by 
examining the subject of counter-terrorism from the perspectives of the operational 
‘counter-terrorists’ rather than secondary source publications. This primary source 
interview data, processed through a variant of ‘Grounded Theory’, and the emerging 
concepts outlined in this thesis, can be built upon and developed further, providing a basis 
for future research, through more detailed statistical analysis of the original data, or the 
development of additional country based case studies and comparative analysis through 
further practitioner interviews.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
a. Introduction 
Although numerous publications have been written about the general subject of 
‘terrorism’5, particularly following the watershed events of 9/11, many are dated, form 
personal memoirs, are government publications, have been completed by journalists, 
pursue a particular agenda, or are written in an emotive style, “books in which the word 
‘terrorist’ is certainly used, but in such a way as to indicate that a moral standpoint has 
already been taken” (Gearty 1991: pp.5-6). Whilst some of this material remains useful for 
research, particularly the personal memoirs of ‘practitioners’ and well researched 
journalism, the actual amount of genuinely analytic literature relating to terrorism and 
counter-terrorism, though growing, is somewhat more limited. Consequently, within these 
linked fields, there appear to be four main sources of literature: personal memoirs from 
both counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’ and former terrorists, journalistic books and articles, 
some of which are well researched, official government publications and specific academic 
research, both in the form of books and in peer reviewed journals such as ‘Terrorism and 
Political Violence’ (TPV) and ‘Studies in Conflict and Terrorism’ (SICAT). To facilitate the 
present research, an extensive personal collection of relevant literature based on all these 
sources, including foreign language publications, was built up by the researcher. 
With the sheer quantity of publications from these various sources regarding terrorism, 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, and the number of issues, themes, debates and 
factors involved, it would be impossible for this review of literature to effectively do justice 
to all aspects of the subject field in detail, without reaching truly encyclopaedic proportions 
(Chalk 2012, Dietl 2006, Thackrah 2004, Chaliand & Blin 2004, Kushner 2003, Baud 2003, 
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Pimlott 1997). Consequently this literature review is analytically driven, focusing on those 
issues and their associated publications which appear most pertinent to the proposed 
research, a comparative analysis of the ‘human factors’ behind various countries counter-
terrorist measures, from the perspective of their national policing, intelligence and military 
practitioners. As a result, this research will not specifically examine the wider issues of the 
historical use of ‘terror’ in warfare (Sinclair 2003, Pimlott 1997), its use as a means of 
‘internal control’ (Pettiford & Harding 2003, Segaller 1987) and state sponsorship of 
terrorism (Byman 2005, Crenshaw 1990, Wardlaw 1989, Horchem 1986). However, given 
the overseas experience of many of the military interviewees, it will consider aspects of 
terrorism’s role as part of wider forms of conflict such as ‘guerrilla warfare’ and 
‘insurgencies’ which “have an alternative vision of how to organize societies, and… use a 
variety of instruments, ranging from public service to terror, to realize that vision”(Gompert 
& Gordon 2008: p.xxix) (Boot 2013, Marston & Malkasian 2008, Long 2006, Schulz & Dew 
2006, Rooney 2004, Harclerode 2001, Thompson 1994). It is submitted that this specific 
analytically driven focus, allied with interview based and empirically grounded research will 
result in significant pay offs in the quality of the research.6 There are thus six sections which 
logically follow on from each other within the literature review; this Introduction, History & 
Definitions, Typologies of Terrorism, Counter-Terrorist Measures, Critical Review & Gaps in 
the Literature (Gap Analysis), and the Conclusion. 
b. History & Definitions 
Perhaps one of the most contentious issues in the subject field which must be discussed 
prior to embarking on the wider research, is the definition of terrorism, which has been 
likened by some to a quest for the ‘Holy Grail’.7 While the origin of the word itself lies in the 
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Latin terrere meaning ‘to cause to tremble’, its recent usage dates back to the period of the 
Regime de la Terreur during the French Revolution from 1793-4 (Schama 1989). However, 
“unlike terrorism as it is commonly understood today, to mean a revolutionary or 
antigovernment activity undertaken by non-state or sub-national entities, the Regime de la 
Terreur was an instrument of governance wielded by the recently established revolutionary 
state” (Hoffman 2006: p.3).  
 Historical Overview 
Thus, having initially been used to describe the use of terror by the state against the 
individual, by the end of the nineteenth Century, following attacks by the ‘Fenian’ Irish 
Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and ‘Dynamiters’ of Clan Na Gael (McGladdery 2006, 
Clutterbuck 2004a), the Russian Narodnaya Volya ‘People’s Will’ (Ivianski 2001, Pomper 
1995) and international Anarchists (Flood 1997, Miller 1995), the term was commonly being 
used to describe the use of terror by such individuals and sub-state groups against the state 
(Guelke 2006). Citing the example of such groups, Laqueur argues that “systematic terrorism 
begins in the second half of the nineteenth century” (Laqueur 1977: p.11), while Rapoport, in 
his ‘Wave Theory’, states “memoirs reveal that there always has been an international 
component in terrorist activity and that characteristics of that component change in time” 
(Rapoport 2001: p.33). Subsequently he highlights four ‘waves’,  the first being the Russian 
revolutionaries and social anarchists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the second 
being the anti-colonial nationalist separatists of the 20th, the third being the Marxist 
revolutionary groups beginning in the 1960’s and the fourth being based on modern 
religious extremist groups (Rapoport 2004). Despite such arguments, a number of authors 
have proposed that the start of modern international terrorism can be traced to more 
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recent developments, specifically the rise of Palestinian nationalist terrorism in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, and its use of aircraft hijacking (Hoffman 2006, Gero 1997, Segaller 
1987), which developed into an ‘archetypical terrorism campaign’ (Wilkinson 2006). While 
fully accepting the importance of comprehending the historical roots of terrorism (Sinclair 
2003), this research will follow the conventional academic wisdom that ‘modern’ 
international terrorism effectively began in the late 1960’s. This will not only help facilitate 
the research, based around interviews with current counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’ rather 
than analysis of historical records and writings, but will also set an appropriate historical 
boundary, delimiting the research and keeping it within manageable chronological bounds. 
 Definitions  
Despite the Concise Oxford Dictionary definition of a terrorist as “a person who uses or 
favours violent and intimidating methods of coercing a government or community” (Allen 
1990: p.1261), Thackrah points out that, “the concepts of terror and terrorism are vague and 
much abused, and their relation to other forms of political violence and to criminality is often 
ambiguous” (Thackrah 2004: p.71). As Laqueur argues, the only characteristic generally 
agreed upon is terrorism’s use or threat of violence, stating that “after thirty years of hard 
labour, there still is no generally agreed definition of terrorism” (Laqueur 2003: p.232). 
Shafritz et. al. go further, predicting that “it is unlikely that any definition will ever be 
generally agreed upon…formal efforts to define terrorism often end in exhaustion” (Shafritz 
et. al. 1991: p.ix). This ambiguity is reflected by the long running historical debate on the 
distinction between ‘terrorists’ and ‘freedom fighters’ (Napoleoni 2004, Tavin & Alexander 
1986), the discussion over whether terrorism is a form of political crime or a tactic of 
warfare and the current number and variety of definitions. Schmid and Jongman previously 
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listed 109 definitions, arguing that, “the question of definition of a term like terrorism cannot 
be detached from the question of who is the defining agency…the best we can hope for is a 
definition which is acceptable to social science analysts, leaving the political definition to the 
parties involved in terrorism and counter-terrorism” (Schmid and Jongman 1984: p.6). 
Consequently, there appear to be three broad categories of definition: Analytic attempts by 
academics in a number of disciplinary fields to objectively define terrorism, value laden 
definitions used by political actors to label opponents, and purely legislative definitions 
enshrined in local, state and national law.  
o Analytic Definitions 
With regard to analytic attempts, due to the inherent ambiguity of ‘terrorism’, there is a 
continuing divergence in the subject field between two main groupings of academic 
disciplines. Those academics in the fields of sociology and criminology, tend to have a more 
internally focussed view in relation to wider society, based around social science, crime, 
policing and security, while those in the fields of international relations, politics, and war 
studies, have more of an external perspective, based around diplomacy, warfare and the 
use of the military. While the former tend to perceive of terrorism as a socially and 
politically motivated form of criminality, the latter tend to view it in terms of a form of low 
intensity or unconventional warfare. Consequently some academics argue that the only way 
to fully comprehend the multiple aspects of the terrorist phenomenon is through an 
interdisciplinary approach (Ganor 2005a). 
Hoffman questions whether, “if it is impossible to define terrorism, as Laqueur argues, and 
fruitless to attempt to cobble together a truly comprehensive definition, as Schmid admits, 
are we to conclude that terrorism is impervious to precise, much less accurate definition?” 
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(Hoffman 2006: p.34). He concludes that we can at least differentiate terrorism from other 
forms of violence, identifying five key characteristics: political aims and motives; violence or 
the threat of violence; psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim; a chain of 
command or cell structure; and perpetration by a sub-national or non-state group (p.40). 
Consequently Hoffman defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear 
through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change” (p.40). 
Richardson likewise suggests that ‘terrorism’ contains a number of characteristics, the most 
significant of which is the deliberate targeting of civilians, which “sets terrorism apart from 
other forms of political violence, even the most proximate form, guerrilla warfare” 
(Richardson 2006: p.22) and Ganor argues that it is this deliberate a priori targeting of 
civilians which distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence (Ganor 2005a).8 
From more of an international relations perspective, Wilkinson argues that “terrorism may 
be used on its own or as part of a wider unconventional war…it can be employed…as an 
accompaniment in all types and stages of warfare” (Wilkinson 2001: p.13) and Horgan 
likewise views terrorism as a tactical tool, arguing it is “something that one ‘does’, as 
opposed to …something that one ‘is’” (Horgan 2005: p.22). Schmid meanwhile suggests that 
“terrorists have elevated practices which are excesses of war to the level of routine tactics” 
(Schmid 1993: p.12), arguing that it distinguishes itself from conventional and even ‘guerrilla 
warfare’, through its disregard of international legal principles contained in The Hague and 
Geneva Conventions (Combs 2006).  
o Political Labelling 
The phrases ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ have also historically been used in a value laden way, 
as derogatory labels to be attached to political and military opponents. Hoffman points out 
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that “this imprecision has been abetted partly by the modern media,9 whose efforts to 
communicate an often complex and convoluted message in the briefest amount of airtime or 
print space possible have led to the promiscuous labelling of a range of violent acts as 
‘terrorism’” (Hoffman 1998: p.13). Gearty also argues that “the words ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ 
have come to be regarded as such powerful condemnations that all those looking for a 
suitable insult have wanted to appropriate them” (Gearty 1991: pp.4-5), while Chomsky 
states that “alongside the literal meaning of the term…there is also a propagandistic usage, 
which unfortunately is the standard one” (Chomsky 2002: p.90). Consequently, Richardson 
suggests that, “the term terrorism has become so widely used in so many contexts as to 
become almost meaningless. The only universally understood connotation of the term is that 
it is pejorative” (Richardson 2000: p.209). As Jenkins concludes, in its ‘political’ usage, “what 
is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a 
moral judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the label ‘terrorist’ to its 
opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint” (Jenkins 
1980: p.10).  
o Legislative Definitions 
As well as analytic attempts to define ‘terrorism’, and its use as a value laden political label, 
there are also purely legislative definitions enshrined in law. Within the UK a single 
definition was utilised in the various Prevention of Terrorism Acts (POTA 1974-89), which 
stated that ‘terrorism means the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear’ (Walker 
1992), however Lord Lloyd of Berwick was concerned that the definition “is too narrow 
because, being limited to political ends, it might be said not to apply to acts of terrorism 
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perpetrated by single issue or religious fanatics” (Lord Lloyd 1996: p.25). Consequently the 
Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) definition stated that ‘terrorism means the use or threat of action 
where…the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public 
or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a 
political, religious or ideological cause’ (Walker 2002). Other countries have multiple legal 
definitions, such as the United States, whose definitions tend to reflect the priorities of the 
organisation which framed them. Two of the key definitions being those of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)10 (Whittaker 2001) and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)11 (Hoffman 2006).  
There are also those countries which although they have not explicitly defined terrorism, 
have created a series of ‘terrorist’ offences which effectively frame terrorist actions. Thus 
“France does not have an offence of terrorism, nor a specific definition, but has a list of 
specific offences linked to terrorism” (Home Office 2004: p.12), which operates “by 
combining two criteria…first, the existence of an offence or serious crime under ordinary 
criminal law…second, the connection between these offences or serious crimes and an 
individual or collective undertaking whose aim is to cause a serious disturbance to public 
order by means of intimidation or terror” (O’Brien, K. 2005: p.23). Likewise, in Ireland, while 
“the Offences Against the State legislation does not create an offence of terrorism per 
se…it…does create a number of offences that might typically be committed by terrorist 
organizations” (Walsh 2003: p.46 and see Hogan and Walker 1989). This use of specific 
offences to ‘define’ terrorism has also been utilised at an international level in the EU 
framework decision for ‘Combating Terrorism’, (EU 2001-2).  
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 Conclusion of Section 
Having examined various publications, concepts and arguments regarding types of 
analytical, political labelling and legislative definitions of ‘terrorism’, it is contended that the 
reason for such definitional ambiguity is the phenomenon’s essential combination of a 
number of distinct, and sometimes contradictory, elements: ideological motivation, 
psychological justification, military style tactics and criminal intent: Thus there are a number 
of broad types of terrorism, predominantly motivated by extreme forms of various 
ideologies, religious, political, nationalist or racist (Franks 2006, Bjorgo 2005, Laqueur 2004, 
Reich 1998). As a result of such motivation, both individuals and groups have psychologically 
justified (Horgan 2005, Silke 2003) their use of military style tactics and weaponry 
(Oppenheimer 2009, Baud 2005, Nance 2003, Griset & Mahan 2003, Marret 2002, Gander 
1989), to achieve their aims and objectives. These aims and objectives are generally criminal 
in nature and intent, indeed, as Clutterbuck states, “an act of terrorism is a crime, and the 
perpetrator of the act is a criminal whom we also designate as a terrorist” (Clutterbuck 
2004b: p.140). It is argued that this criminal intent and the symbiosis between terrorism and 
crime, have led to numerous examples of a crime-terrorism nexus, either where terrorists 
have used criminal methods to fund their terrorism (Napoleoni 2004, Ehrenfeld 2003, 
Harnden 1999, Taylor 1993, Adams 1986) or conversely, where organised criminals have 
used terrorist methods to defend their criminal networks (Jamieson 2005 & 2000, Williams 
2004 & 2002, Bowden 2001, McCauley 2001, Rabasa & Chalk 2001, Eddy 1988). 
Consequently, these elements, and their concomitant ambiguity, have led to the evolution 
and inherent dichotomy of two main theoretical paradigms, ‘terrorism as crime’ and 
‘terrorism as warfare’, which in turn are respectively mirrored by the ‘Criminal Justice 
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Model’ and the ‘War Model’ of counter-terrorism, affecting definitions, concepts and the 
various responses based around them (Clutterbuck 2004b).12 Waddington however argues 
that “terrorism blurs that distinction: it differs significantly from the generality of crimes: it is 
committed by those who believe themselves to be dedicated to a higher cause…yet, if 
terrorism is distinguishable from crime, it also fails to fit standard definitions of warfare that 
reflect the kind of armed conflicts between ‘Westphalian’ states”13 (Waddington 2007: p.3). 
This recurring tension and dichotomy between policing and military perspectives of 
terrorism and resulting responses, was highlighted by interviewees throughout the course 
of the research, perhaps most notably in the discussion concerning the difference in mind-
set and response between police tactical firearms units and military special forces detailed 
in Chapter 9. However, although terrorism arguably contains elements of both crime and 
warfare, it is submitted that neither perspective on its own can do the phenomenon 
complete justice. As Cronin states, “the debate over whether terrorism is a crime or an act of 
war is an old argument that is fundamentally artificial: Terrorism is both of course and the 
response must include law enforcement and military means, depending on the situation” 
(Cronin 2004: p.8). As stated, this argument concerning the nature of terrorism, whether 
crime, warfare or a mixture of both, was reflected in various interview responses and is 
addressed in greater detail in the thesis conclusion. Consequently, for the purposes of this 
research the working definition of ‘terrorism’ will be ‘The use or threat of violence, against 
civilians or non-combatants (including police officers and off duty or unarmed military 
personnel), for political, religious, racial or ideological objectives, by a sub-state group, cell 
or individual, with the intention of putting in fear an audience far greater than its initial 
victims.’ 
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c. Typologies of Terrorism 
In addition to the issue of definition, the identification of various typologies of terrorism and 
the factors by which such categorisations should be based has also proved contentious. 
Schmid and Jongman state that “typologies order a multitude of objects and/or phenomena 
and make them manageable for analysis” (Schmid and Jongman 1988: p.39), consequently a 
number of typologies were examined (Combs 2006, Baud 2005, Schmid & Jongman 1988, 
Chaliand 198714). Of these, Wilkinson argues that, “one useful way of categorising non-state 
terrorist movements or groups is by their political motivation” (Wilkinson 2006: p.4), while 
Pimlott (1997) utilises such an ideologically oriented framework, in a section on ‘types of 
terrorism’, examining religious, nationalist, revolutionary, far-right, and single issue 
terrorism.  
While such political and ideologically based typologies appear useful, the boundaries of such 
categorisations can become blurred, as many terrorist organisations have attributes of more 
than one category: PIRA though nationalist has a strong Catholic religious element to it 
(Tanner 2001), while Loyalist terrorist groups are equally linked to Protestant non-
conformism (Wood 2003); ETA while nationalist has previously adopted a Marxist-Leninist 
ideology (Alexander et. al. 2001b: pp. 6-7), as did the PKK (Mango 2005: pp.31-57); HAMAS 
is both an Islamist extremist and nationalist organisation (Levitt 2006), while far right 
terrorism in the USA often incorporates elements of Christian extremism (Hewitt 2003: 
pp.41-3). There are also numerous examples where terrorist organisations have entered 
into ‘marriages of convenience’ with other terrorist organisations, some with different 
ideologies, which “appears in the form of shared members, training camps, weaponry and 
tactics. It is obvious in the propaganda being disseminated by the groups… the most obvious 
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linkage – funding.” (Combs 2006: p.101). Finally terrorist groups have either utilised criminal 
activities or cooperated with organised criminal groups, in order to achieve their objectives, 
particularly in relation to fundraising and the acquisition of weaponry (Napoleoni 2004, 
Adams 1988). 
Even though the al-Qaeda network as a whole is motivated by Islamist extremism, there are 
many affiliated or ‘franchise’ groups (and now successor groups), based in various countries 
who, while assisting in international attacks as part of al-Qaeda’s global Jihad, have their 
own political and nationalist agendas at the national, regional or local level (Vidino 2006, 
Schanzer 2004, Gunaratna 2003, Ressa 2003, Alexander and Swetman 2001a) “These far-
flung groups increasingly set the agenda, and are redefining the threat we face. They are not 
all creatures of bin Laden, and so their fate is not tied to his. They have autonomous 
leadership, they pick their own targets, they plan their own attacks.”15 Such a structure has 
more in common with the concepts of networks, netwar and information age terrorism 
highlighted by Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001).  
Nevertheless, despite such factors, an ideologically oriented typology most closely reflects 
the classifications utilised by counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’ in their work, as demonstrated 
by the typology utilised by Europol’s annual reports (Europol 2014). Since ‘practitioners’ 
inputs form the core of this research, the research design needed to accommodate such a 
threat, understood as having five dimensions: Islamist extremist/religious16, nationalist–
secessionist, extreme right, extreme left and other/single issue. Consequently, since it can 
be argued that these terrorist ‘threats’ play a part in the factors shaping the ‘responses’, a 
brief overview of publications, issues and arguments regarding these five types of terrorism 
follows:  
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 Religious 
The ancient lineage and diversity of religiously motivated terrorism is highlighted by 
Hoffman (1995) and Rapoport’s (1984), analysis of the Thugs, Assassins and Zealots.  
Hoffman argues that while for much of the twentieth century nationalist and political issues 
have predominated, ‘the pendulum has swung back’ to religion, and currently such groups 
pose a greater threat than other forms of terrorism, as their beliefs “sanction almost 
limitless depths of violence, and anyone…may be seen as a legitimate target” (Hoffman 
1997: p.220). The events of 9/11 and more recent and continuing global attacks against the 
general public appear to confirm this. However, while such concerns are echoed by 
Juergensmeyer (2001a), Dolnik questions both Hoffman and Juergensmeyer’s conclusions, 
arguing that while religion has grown as the philosophical basis for terrorism, the 
“underlying motives…have not changed…it is still the perception of humiliation, victimization 
and injustice that drives the so called ‘religious terrorist’” (Dolnik 2003: p.168). 
The various forms of religiously motivated terrorism are examined by Ranstorp (1996): 
Jewish extremism such as Baruch Goldstein’s 1994 killing of Muslim worshippers in Hebron 
and Yigal Amir’s assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 (Shahak & Mezvinky 2004, 
Sprinzak 2000); Sikh extremism, with the siege of the Golden Temple, Amritsar in 1984 
(Juergensmeyer 2001b, Wallace 1995); the Aum Shinrikyo sect and their 1995 Sarin gas 
attack on the Tokyo Subway17 (Murakami 2003, Reader 2002); white Christian identity 
supremacists linked to the American Militia movement and Timothy Mc Veigh’s 1995 
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma (McGarrell et.al. 2007, Combs 2006, 
Hamm 2004, White 2001); and various attacks associated with Sunni and Shi’ite Islamist 
extremism (Rabasa 2006b, Kepel 2003, Stern 2003, Hiro 2002, Wright 2001, Rapoport 1998). 
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Consequently, Ranstorp concludes that such “religious fanaticism has manifested itself in 
spectacular acts of terrorism across the globe.” (Ranstorp 1996: p.125).  
McTernan states that “in each faith tradition one can find sufficient ambiguity in its founding 
texts and stories to justify killing for the glory of God” (McTernan 2003: p.76), while 
Juergensmeyer argues that “in many of these cases, religion has supplied not only the 
ideology but also the motivation and the organizational structure” (Juergensmeyer 2001a: 
p.5). Sim meanwhile suggests that although religious fundamentalism has provided a sense 
of security in a disorientated world “it does so at the expense of cultivating an intolerance of 
others” (Sim 2004: p.59). Consequently, Townshend submits that, “at the end of the 20th 
Century, the world faced a revival of religious fundamentalism, quite puzzling to many 
people who had assumed that the process of secularization was, although perhaps erratic, 
an irreversible one” (Townshend 2002: p.96). He concludes that while in the 1980’s, 
terrorism was still the work of a small number of radical revolutionaries and more well-
known nationalists, by the late 1990’s the main imperative was such religious 
fundamentalism and the events of 11th September 2001 merely confirmed this (Scheuer 
2006, Wright 2006, Greenberg 2005, Denece 2004, Bergen 2001). 
 Nationalist Separatist 
“While the popular image of terrorism today is that of a religiously motivated suicide 
bomber18, much of the violence that actually occurs in the world is based in disagreements 
and dissidence in ethnic and national communities“, argue Lutz & Lutz (Lutz and Lutz 2004: 
p.90), with many of these issues rooted in bitter ethnic, racial, cultural and historical 
legacies (Fernandez-Armesto 1994, Brogan 1989, Janke 1983). Townshend also points out 
that historically “nationalist movements have shown much greater resilience and destructive 
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capacity than the small and fissiparous left-wing revolutionary groups” (Townshend 2002: 
p.75), consequently Gal-Or (1997a) concludes that while political nationalism is a relatively 
recent historical phenomenon, arguably the prime causal factor in the two world wars19, it 
has led to the creation of some of the most significant and enduring modern terrorist 
organisations. 
Thus, she examines: the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), involved in an active 
terrorist campaign against the UK for thirty years (English 2003, Moloney 2002, O’Brien 
1999, Taylor 1998, Smith 1997); the enduring Basque Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), which 
ran a campaign of violence for nearly half a century (Mata 2005, Reinares 2003, Alexander 
2001b, Shabad & Ramo 1995, Janke 1986); the long running actions of Corsican and Breton 
separatists in France, (Farrugia & Serf 2004, Follorou & Nouzille 2004, Baud 2003, Moxon-
Browne 1988 & 1986); the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), considered by many 
the original ‘modern’ terrorist organisation (Hirst 2003, Pimlott 1997, Lustick 1995); and The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Mendis 2006, Kaarthikeyan 2005). One further 
enduring terrorist group, examined by Rathmell (1997) in the same publication, is the 
Kurdish Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), which despite the capture of its leader in 1999, 
continues to launch attacks against the Turkish state and its representatives (Mango 2005, 
McDowall 2004, Criss 1995). 
The endurance of such groups is explained by Post who states that the “causes of the 
nationalist-separatist terrorist groups and organisations are particularly intractable, for the 
bitterness and resentment against the dominant ethnic group have been conveyed from 
generation to generation, hatred has been ‘bred in the bone’ “(Post 2005: p.56). Crenshaw 
suggests that, “a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an 
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identifiable subgroup of a larger population…terrorism is then the resort of an extremist 
faction of this broader movement” (Crenshaw 1981: p.383). However, Reinares argues that, 
“nationalist separatism does not in itself explain nationalist separatist terrorism. There has 
to be something else in between” (Reinares 2005: p.119). He identifies three such factors: to 
compensate for the shortage of members with ‘spectacular’ attacks, to violently 
differentiate one group from other similar groupings, and as a means of ‘advertising’ 
separatist demands when these have become marginalised by the general public (p.127). 
 Extreme Right 
While the extreme right reached its zenith with the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships and other 
movements in Europe between the 1920’s and 1940’s (Woolf 1981, Laqueur 1979, Rogger & 
Weber 1974) and saw a revival in the 1970’s (Wilkinson 1981a), Griffin argues that 
“conditions in post-war Europe have precluded the formation of a micro-climate in which 
fascism could thrive as a significant oppositional force…as a political sub-culture, however, it 
has shown a tenacious capacity not merely for survival, but for adapting to the transformed 
environment in which it finds itself” (Griffin 1991: p.161). Consequently, Bjorgo states that 
“since the late 1980’s, particularly after the collapse of communism, both nationalist 
movements and rebellious youth cultures have increasingly turned to… right wing and even 
fascist ideologies…noticeable in Europe…through electoral support for xenophobic and 
radical right parties…and…increased violence against asylum seekers and other minorities” 
(Bjorgo 1995: p.2). Both Paxton (2005) and Roxburgh (2002) also identify more recent 
events such as the collapse of Communism, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and 
increased European immigration as catalysts for the growth in electoral support of extreme 
right wing parties and rising ‘skinhead’ violence. 
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Such random and indiscriminate violence is highlighted by Hoffman who argues that, “right-
wing terrorism has often been characterized as the least discriminating, most senseless type 
of contemporary political violence…that in recent years have increasingly targeted 
immigrants, refugees, guest workers, and other foreigners in many European countries” 
(Hoffman 2006: p.236). As a result, Bjorgo points out that “the far right can be difficult to 
define…many groups and individuals who carry out acts of violence for far-right or racist 
motives may turn out to have no connections with political organizations” (Bjorgo 1997: 
p.206).20 Bjorgo subsequently refers to a typology developed by Sprinzak (1995) of six sub-
types of right wing terrorism: revolutionary terrorism such as Italian Fascism and German 
Nazism, reactive terrorism, vigilante terrorism, racist terrorism, Millenarian terrorism and 
youth counterculture terrorism, exemplified by the ‘Skinhead’ movement (Anti-Defamation 
League 1995).  
However, Heitmeyer critiques Sprinzak’s typology, questioning whether all the forms 
mentioned are ‘terrorist’. Rather, he proposes four ‘terrorism constellations’, as catalysts: 
violent right wing extremism is more likely when there is no political representation 
available, to survive right wing extremist violence needs the support of a sympathetic 
population, the greater the level of violence used the less their political credibility, and 
finally, political marginalization may lead to increased radicalisation and violent action 
(Heitmeyer 2005: p.146). Henderson concludes that despite electoral gains and 
indiscriminate violence, “large scale organized right-wing terrorism comparable to the leftist 
terrorism of the 1980’s did not emerge in Europe during the 1990’s” (Henderson 2004: p.50), 
however he raises the concern that growing fears of Islamist extremism and significant 
future economic downturns could lead to a major resurgence of extreme right-wing 
terrorism. Where the extreme right has shown itself more of a significant threat, albeit in an 
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eclectic and multifaceted way, is in the various armed militia groups, anti-Semitic and racist 
organisations and Christian identity extremists found in the United States (Hewitt 2003).    
 Extreme Left 
The historical roots of such groups are highlighted by Henderson who states that, “since the 
nineteenth Century, European anarchists, socialists, or communists have sometimes carried 
on a violent struggle against the capitalist system, particularly…when workers suffered harsh 
economic and social conditions” (Henderson 2004: p.49). Along with Sargeant (2003), he 
identifies the emergence of modern left wing terrorism amongst a small number of radicals 
involved in the student protest movements and ‘New Left’ of the late 1960s. Sargeant 
(2003) and Post (1990) argue that as these groups became distanced from the mainstream 
protest movement they crossed an ‘irrevocable boundary’ by going underground, further 
isolating themselves from mainstream society. Waldmann states that most stemmed “from 
the academic middle classes, partly also from a bourgeois milieu” (Waldmann 2005: p.156), 
arguing their situation had nothing to do with the interests of the working classes they 
claimed to be fighting for and was more a rupture with the previous generation (p.156).21 
Post likewise argues that such groups identified their parents’ generation with the 
establishment and through acts of terrorism, struck out at that parental generation (Post 
1990: p.30). 
While different factors are applicable to similarly ideologically motivated South American 
groups (Waldmann 2005)22, as Alexander and Pluchinsky (1992) point out, in Europe such 
factors ensured that “for almost a quarter of a century…their terrorist campaigns have 
caused the deaths of scores of prominent and influential businessmen, politicians, judges, 
police officials, and military officers.” (Alexander and Pluchinsky 1992: p.ix). They examine, 
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amongst others:23 the French Action Directe, which between 1979 and 1987 was responsible 
for a series of high profile bombings and assassinations (Dartnell 1995, Hamon & Marchand 
1986), the Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (GRAPO), which continues 
to pose a threat, having emerged from the Spanish Communist Party during the Franco 
period (Brotons & Esposito 2002, Jimenez 1993) and the active Devrimci Halk Kurtulus 
Partisi / Cephesi (DHKP/C or DEVSOL), which regularly launches bomb attacks and 
assassinations in Turkey (Dilmac 2005 & 1997, Caglar 2005, Aktan & Koknar 2002). 
 Such groups argues Townshend “have relied on pure terrorism mainly as a result of political 
weakness or marginality... they demonstrated that however resilient societies may be in 
objective terms, they remain psychologically fragile” (Townshend 2002: p.73).24 The reason 
for their attacks argues Gal-Or is that extreme left groups “see the system as an impersonal 
force victimizing working people” (Gal-Or 1997b: p.203), consequently, Hoffman states their 
violence is “typically directed against governmental or commercial institutions, or specific 
individuals who they believe represent capitalist exploitation and repression…left wing 
violence tends to be highly discriminate, selective and limited…equally ‘symbolic’” (Hoffman 
2006: p.231).  
 Single Issue  
In many cases of single issue terrorism, there is a fine line between legitimate 
demonstration and violent protest, and between violent protest and terrorism. 
Consequently, Dodge argues that “most single issue groups have their origins in the 
democratic process. “They turn to violent tactics only when they believe that the issues they 
promote become too urgent for the slow progress of traditional campaigning…their violent 
acts are justified because they are morally superior to those who hold a different view” 
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(Dodge 1997: p.209). He presents several examples, anti-abortion groups (Hewitt 2000, 
Jenkins 1999), ecological direct action groups (Combs 2006, Bolz 2005), and animal 
liberation extremists (Pearl 2005, Monaghan 2000, Laqueur 1999). Silke (2003) states that 
activists in such groups often have involvement in more legitimate protest organisations, 
giving them an awareness of, and access to, such secretive extremist groups. While the lack 
of central organisation, ‘leaderless resistance’ and cell like network of such groups, have 
proved a problem for the authorities (Combs 2006, Thackrah 2004), Seger suggests that 
“their activities are more predictable because they have a narrow focus of interest…one need 
only visit their web sites…they…provide the reader with information on the tactics they use, 
and may even suggest targets” (Seger 2003: p.259-60). 
An obstacle in the classification of such single issue groups as ‘terrorist’, is the fact that most 
of their attacks are directed at a diverse range of property, such as animal laboratories, 
logging equipment and abortion clinics (Bolz 2005, Martin 2003), however, Combs highlights 
the serious injury of a mountain biker with a spike and the injury of a logger while cutting a 
‘monkey wrenched’25 tree, following the actions of environmental extremists in the United 
States (Combs 2006: p.180). Within the United Kingdom “a previously unheard of group, the 
Animal Rights Militia (ARM) claimed responsibility for the sending of letter bombs to the 
leaders of the four main political parties in 1982…six minor bomb attacks on scientists’ 
homes in 1985 and four car bombs in January of the following year were also claimed by the 
ARM” (Monaghan 2000 p.161). White points out that “during the 1980’s, the United States 
witnessed almost forty bombings of abortion clinics in various states, and the 1990s brought 
new trends. Individual workers were attacked, arsons and bombings increased and in a few 
incidents, militant religious fanatics murdered abortion clinic workers” (White 2002: p.217). 
Stern estimates that in the United States “since 1993 antiabortion activists have shot and 
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killed seven people and attempted seventeen other murders since 1991” (Stern 2003: p.155). 
The growing international threat posed by such terrorism is highlighted by Combs, who 
concludes that having originally developed in Europe and now created similar cells in 
America, such single issue terrorism “appears to be increasingly prevalent and spans a wide 
range of issues” (Coombs 2006: p.181). 
 Conclusion of Section 
Having examined the literature and issues pertaining to the five types of terrorism within 
the ideologically based typological framework, it can be argued, that each of the five forms 
poses a key type of threat dimension, which the various countries’ authorities must attempt 
to counter, and which the research design will address: Religious Extremist’s indiscriminate 
use of multiple, mass casualty, often suicide attacks against the ordinary public, Nationalist’s 
intractable and inter-generational campaigns of violence, fuelled by hatred that has been 
‘bred in the bone’, the Extreme-Right’s use of random, senseless and indiscriminate violence 
to target minority groups or individuals because of their racial demographics, religious 
beliefs or sexual orientation, the Extreme-Left’s discriminate and often selective targeting of 
institutions, officials and representatives of the state, and the Single Issue groups’ infliction 
of massive economic damage and loss, far out of proportion to their numbers. 
It can also be argued that the nature of modern terrorism itself, and the concomitant threat 
it currently poses at the start of the 21st Century, has changed significantly since its 
inception in the late 1960’s26. There has been a shift from predominantly hierarchically 
structured politically and nationalistically motivated groups, often referred to as ‘Old’ 
terrorism, to now include the small independent networks of religiously motivated cells 
(Sageman 2004, Gunaratna 2003) in so called ‘New’ terrorism (Ganor 2005b, Laqueur 1999), 
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utilising multiple mass casualty suicide attacks (Gambetta 2006) and potentially threatening 
the use of CBRN weaponry in an act of ‘technological terrorism’ (Stern 1999). This change in 
the nature of terrorism and the concomitant increase in both the threat and the counter-
terrorist response needed to control or mitigate it, is reflected in the research design, which 
will be orientated to consider prospective as well as historic and current threats.  
This mutation in the nature of terrorism reflects a growing shift in the ideological motivation 
behind a number of currently active terrorist groups away from the more coercive political 
or nationalist positions, towards terrorism driven by religious extremism (Stern 2003). As 
Juergensmeyer points out, “in 1980 the US State Department roster of international terrorist 
groups listed scarcely a single religious organisation. In 1998 US Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright, listed thirty of the world’s most dangerous groups; over half were 
religious” (Juergensmeyer 2001a: p.6). It is suggested that such religiously motivated 
terrorism poses a greater threat than its more secular political and nationalist equivalents 
for several reasons… 
Firstly, whilst some political or nationalist groups have restraining concerns (such as the 
opinions of their support base), are conscious of negative publicity27 and have more of an 
emphasis on causing economic damage and gaining publicity through their attacks,28 most 
religious groups have a focus on inflicting the maximum number of casualties, demonstrated 
by large scale (often suicide) attacks with no warning. Secondly, political or nationalist 
groups tend to have more tangible temporal objectives, such as an independent Palestine, 
Basque homeland, or a united Ireland, which allow some, albeit often limited, interface and 
dialogue with the authorities (Wilkinson 2006, Bregman 2005, Rowan 2003, Institute for 
Palestine Studies 1994). Religious groups however, often have a set of intangible 
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theological, spiritual or eschatological goals, based on a different ‘worldview’ providing little 
or no opportunity for common interaction or negotiation. Finally, although political and 
nationalist groups are traditionally typically geographically localised by the very nature of 
their campaigns, religious extremism tends to present a nebulous global phenomenon 
(Rabasa 2006a, Rodier 2006, Sirrs et.al.2004, Schweitzer & Shay 2003), much harder to pin 
down and isolate (Gompert 2007). This in turn means that while many political and 
nationalist groups are domestic in nature, leading to a more manageable internal threat, a 
number of religiously motivated terrorist groups are truly international (Harik 2005, 
Gunaratna 2003, Jaber 1997), blurring or breaking down traditional divisions between 
internal and external, domestic and international, and posing an increased cross border and 
trans-national level of threat, even when their active cadres are ‘home-grown’.  
d. Counter-Terrorist Measures 
In relation to countering the threats posed by the various types of terrorism previously 
examined, Lutz & Lutz argue that “it is important to recognize from the outset that no one 
solution exists…what works in one place or time could fail in another…terrorism is far too 
complex for one solution to be effective in dealing with all the possible threats” (Lutz and 
Lutz 2004: p.224). Wilkinson concludes that “there is no universally applicable counter-
terrorism policy for democracies… every conflict involving terrorism has its own unique 
characteristics…the tightrope between under-reaction, or toleration of terrorism, on the one 
hand, and draconian overreaction, leading to serious infringement of civil liberties, on the 
other, is pitched at a different height and angle in each case” (Wilkinson 2001: p.229-30). 
The seven countries examined as case studies for this research have introduced a wide 
range of counter-terrorist measures both offensive and defensive,29 consequently an 
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element of the research interview design was constructed around nine key categories of 
response: diplomatic/political, legislative, security, policing, intelligence, 
military/paramilitary, technical and economic measures, and their concomitant impact on 
civil liberties and the wider public. As these measures, and the associated ‘human factors’ 
behind them, form the background to the core of the research, a brief overview of the 
publications, issues and arguments relating to each of the categories follows: 
 Diplomatic and Political 
The importance diplomacy plays in countering terrorism is highlighted by  Sheehan, who 
states that it forms “the cornerstone of a comprehensive, long term, international 
counterterrorism strategy that seeks to politically discredit, operationally disrupt, and 
eventually defeat the most violent groups” (Sheehan 2004: p.98). Such diplomacy between 
states allows the denial of cross border bases, the sharing of intelligence and the processing 
of extradition requests argue Hoffman and Morrison-Taw (2000).30 However, Ganor argues 
that it is no longer good enough to merely improve international cooperation at a bi-lateral 
level, but rather that a truly multi-lateral joint counter-terrorism campaign must be 
established in all areas (Ganor 2005a: p.273-86). Wardlaw (1989) is also concerned at the 
historical lack of development in international cooperation, while Wilkinson refers to “the 
huge gulf between the rhetoric and the reality of international cooperation against 
terrorism” (Wilkinson 2006: p.168).  
Since the establishment of TREVI31 in 1975, the European Union (EU) has customarily played 
a role in countering terrorism (Chalk 2000, Den Boer 2000) and following 9/11, its response 
has expanded, through the introduction of various legal instruments32 and the 
reinforcement of such institutions as Europol and Eurojust (de Vries 2005, Den Boer 2003). 
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While Zimmerman agrees that in the ‘month of transformation’ following 9/11 there was a 
dramatic increase in EU political decision making, he argues that the “lack of the EUs 
executive powers…raises the fundamental question of whether the Union itself…is an 
appropriate body for initiating, driving, coordinating and to some extent even assuming the 
role of political leadership in counterterrorism in Europe” (Zimmerman 2006: p.124). 
Nevertheless, Gregory argues that “the various forms of EU response can be very influential 
in both shaping national responses and in producing a more harmonised approach 
throughout the EU” (Gregory 2005: p.106), while Wright believes “the response of the EU 
and its member countries to international terrorism is crucial…even if it does not have a full 
range of effective military instruments, it does have a number of other political and 
economic weapons at its disposal” (Wright 2003: p.261).33  
Within the United Nations (UN), while the increasing threat of terrorism in the late 1990’s 
was recognised by the adoption of several new conventions34, van Ginkel (2003) points out 
that India’s suggestion of a Comprehensive Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in 
1996, met with opposition from a number of countries. Nevertheless, Wilkinson argues that 
“the immediate and unusually concerted response by the UN Security Council to the 9/11 
attacks marked a sea change in the role of the UN in relation to international terrorism” 
(Wilkinson 2006: p.169). Unusually, the Security Council unanimously passed the powerful 
‘Resolution 1373’ within two weeks, establishing the Counter Terrorist Committee (CTC) to 
monitor compliance (Foot 2007). While applauding its work, Dhanapala (2005) argues for 
the additional establishment of an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on terrorism, to 
complement the work of the CTC, by examining economic factors and ensuring the 
protection of human rights. Nevertheless, Wright concludes that “the UN, imperfect as it is, 
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remains the best option for a multifaceted and global campaign against terrorism” (Wright 
2003: p.259). 
Consequently, while, “during the Cold War and its aftermath…in the West, terror was not 
seen as a universal, pressing problem” (Mango 2005 p.73), the increased threat posed by 
terrorism since 9/11 has led to far greater diplomatic and political counter-terrorist co-
operation both between countries bi-laterally and within international forums. However, 
despite such improvements, there remain the usual political and bureaucratic obstacles to 
greater cooperation. Therefore, it is argued that since the al-Qaeda network, has evolved 
into a global ideological movement (Gunaratna 2005) and that consequently the future is 
likely to see an increase in attacks that are trans-national in their planning, preparation and 
even execution, such diplomatic and political cooperation will become increasingly critical. 
(See Wilkinson 2006 Chap. 10).  
 Legal 
The role of the criminal justice system in countering terrorism is examined by Clutterbuck, 
who argues that as “terrorism inevitably involves the commission of violent crimes such as 
murder, grievous assault, and kidnapping,...the investigation, trial, and punishment of the 
perpetrators… irrespective of the motive…are unequivocally a matter for the wider criminal 
justice system” (Clutterbuck 2004b: p.142). As Crelinsten et. al. prophetically stated, 
“terrorism is being treated more and more as a special criminal problem…manifest in the 
evolution of specialized law enforcement units…the adaptation of current legislation to 
changing forms of old crimes, and even the introduction of new laws” (Crelinsten et. al. 
1978: p.29). Indeed, a number of authors argue that in most liberal democracies, the main 
focus of counter-terrorism has been, and must remain, the criminal justice system grounded 
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in the ‘rule of law’ (Wilkinson 2006, Clutterbuck 2004b, Gearty 1991). 
Legislation plays a key role within this wider criminal justice response to terrorism (Lord 
Lloyd 1996) and although for some countries “the initiation of measures that constitute a 
significant departure from customary methods of policing, judicial processing and 
sentencing, would not be publicly accepted as necessary or proportionate to the level of 
violence faced” (Chalk 1996 p.100), many others, including the seven case study countries, 
have introduced and utilised specific anti-terrorist legislation.35 Walker identifies three 
justifications for the introduction of such ‘special’ counter-terrorist legislation, firstly “for 
liberal democracies to defend their existence and their values”, secondly due to “the 
illegitimacy of terrorism as a form of political expression” and thirdly, since “terrorism is a 
specialised form of criminality which presents peculiar difficulties in terms of policing and 
criminal process…it therefore demands a specialist response” (Walker 2002: pp.12-3). 
Wilkinson highlights five broad categories of such legislation: Prophylaxis, legal reforms to 
redress grievances; Deterrence, introducing severe penalties; Protection and Apprehension, 
giving law enforcement authorities appropriate powers; Symbolic and Psychological, to 
express revulsion and Other criminal legislation which impacts on terrorism (Wilkinson 
2006: pp.79-80).  
Historically legislation has also been introduced to lighten or commute sentences for 
former-terrorists who have ‘disengaged’ (Horgan 2005) and cooperated with the 
authorities, such as the Italian Pentiti (repentance) law (Wilkinson 2001, Hoffman et. al. 
2000, Clutterbuck 1990), which “marked the turning point in the history of Italian terrorism: 
it was the beginning of a series of revelations, infiltrations, arrests and trials which resulted 
in the definitive ruin of extremist organisations” (Gal-Or 1991 p.110). At the other end of the 
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legal scale, draconian ‘emergency legislation’ has been introduced, such as the Canadian use 
of the War Measures Act 1942 to counter the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in the 
early 1970’s (Crelinsten 2001, Charters 1997, Davidson-Smith 1993). Although this 
subordinated “civil rights to the preservation of public order…Canada enjoyed a decade 
relatively free of terrorism, with civil rights and liberties fully restored” (Combs 2006 p.245). 
At the international level, law “is essentially a cooperative concept, because there is no 
international enforcement mechanism that is comparable to domestic courts, law 
enforcement agencies, or crime codes” states Martin (2003: p.376). Combs is likewise 
concerned that while international law reflects international opinion, ”lacking methods and 
mechanisms for enforcement, it cannot be said to be an effective deterrent to terrorism, 
either on the national or the international level” (Combs 2006: pp.219-20). However, 
Clutterbuck argues that the various recent UN conventions and EU Framework on 
Combating Terrorism, have provided an element of international consensus on ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘terrorist offences’, concluding that this has allowed a “constantly expanding web of 
legislation to underpin their efforts…increasingly legislation is now international in its scope 
and impact” (Clutterbuck 2004b: p.145).  
Consequently, while many counter-terrorist measures introduced by a state must, by their 
very nature, remain behind a veil of secrecy to be successful, the outer layer of any defence, 
indeed the bedrock upon which many other measures and powers are based, is the state’s 
legislation. This provides the legal authority for the introduction of measures to prevent 
terrorism, the powers of investigation when a terrorist action has occurred, and the means 
to prosecute and punish those responsible for committing terrorist acts. While such 
legislation must be powerful enough to prove effective, “an important challenge for 
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lawmakers in democracies is balancing the need for counterterrorist legislation against the 
protection of…rights…it is not uncommon for nations -including democracies- to pass 
authoritarian laws that promote social order at the expense of human rights” (Martin 2003: 
p.373). 
 Security 
“Creating an effective security system that protects against a wide range of terrorist attacks 
while it continues to afford a maximum exercise of democratic freedoms and privileges is a 
formidable task” states Combs (2006: pp.264-5). Nevertheless, and in part to reassure the 
public, most societies have introduced strong defensive security measures in three main 
areas: Physical Security, ‘hardening’ a potential target; Operational Security, denying 
terrorists the opportunity to collect information and Personnel Security, the protection of 
key individuals (Combs 2006, Seger 1990). However, as modern society has become 
increasingly dependent on diverse vulnerable infrastructures,36 “the list of potential targets 
that could require security measures37 is extensive and growing rapidly with the 
development of modern technological interdependence” (Combs 2006: p.274). In the case of 
Israel, due to the level of threat, such security measures have extended to the level of 
barriers and guards at shopping centres, restaurants and coffee shops (Perliger & Pedahzur 
2006). As Clarke and Newman (2007) point out, such potential targets can be attractive to 
terrorists for various reasons.38 However, in relation to the US, Goure argues that “for the 
most part, defensive measures such as those proposed by the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, are likely to consume vast amounts of resources for little if any 
additional security” (Goure 2004: p.280). As Henderson asks, “what does one protect, and 
how much? Counterterrorists (and the governments they work for) do not have unlimited 
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resources…spending money to guard against one thing means not having it to use against 
something else” (Henderson 2004: pp.24-5). 
Transport networks provide some of the most vulnerable potential targets and after 9/11 
increased pre-flight screening processes (Murphy 2003), the use of highly trained armed ‘sky 
marshals’ (Dolan 2004) and the reinforcement of aircraft cockpit doors (McLaughlin 2002) 
have become standard in many airlines (Combs 2006). However, Szyliowicz (2004) argues 
that while the “catastrophic events of September 11th 2001 have often been referred to as a 
wake up call…the list of terrorist attacks involving aviation is a long and bloody 
one…aviation has always represented an appealing target and terrorists have not hesitated 
to strike at planes and airports of many countries” (Szyliowicz 2004: p.47, Gero 1997). 
Consequently, a comparative analysis of airport security by Hainmuller & Lemnitzer (2003) 
identifies the benefits of public, as opposed to private, control of airport security. Rail and 
underground networks are also vulnerable as highlighted by the 3/11 Madrid (Vidino 2006, 
Nesser 2006) and the 7/7 London bomb attacks (House of Commons 2006). As Jenkins and 
Gersten confirm, “public transportation is an ideal target…precisely because it is public and 
used by millions of people daily, there is little security, with no obvious checkpoints like those 
at airports, to inspect passengers and parcels” (Jenkins and Gersten 2001: p.10). 
In the case of the threat posed by maritime terrorism to transport and trade at sea 
(Greenberg 2006), Forster (1998) highlights both its historical roots and the breadth of 
terrorist organisations operating in this environment, while Thompson argues that “the 
hijacking of a ship is one of the most underemployed methods of terrorist attack… the 
techniques used by pirates to board ships underway are well known, not especially difficult 
and certainly well within the capabilities of the intelligent operatives in al-Qaeda” 
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(Thompson 2002: p.293). Consequently, while Murphy (2007a & 2007b) and Luft & Korin 
(2004) examine the nexus between piracy and terrorism, Daly (2004) assesses the current 
level of maritime threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Such concerns have led to 
various measures to increase maritime security (Holt 2004): naval cooperation (Koknar 
2005, NATO 2005, Babaoglu 2005 & 2004); international legal measures, such as the SUA 
198839 and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) ISPS 200440, physical and 
technological measures to strengthen harbours (Moss 2005 & Austen 2004); and the 
development of maritime counter-terrorist capabilities (Katz 2000). 
Apart from physical security, Seger, in his counter-terrorist handbook for government and 
law enforcement officials, highlights operational security, commonly abbreviated to OPSEC, 
which seeks “to deny terrorists the opportunity to collect information on your activity and to 
prevent them from developing intelligence that would allow them to predict your actions” 
(Seger 1990: p.107). The final form of security is personnel security, the protection of 
individuals, who due to their position or role, are at risk of assassination (Connor 1987) or 
kidnap (Bolz et.al. 2005: Chap.6). This consists of both the education of such individuals in 
appropriate measures they can take to reduce such risks (Seger 1990, Morris & Hoe 1987, 
Clutterbuck 1975) and the utilisation of trained bodyguards to form a protective detail 
providing ‘close protection’ (Holden 2006, Thompson 2003, Geraghty 1988). These 
‘bodyguards’, often police or law enforcement officers, “must act against all of their self-
preservation instincts and learn to protect the principal first, even if that means they are 
endangering themselves. These individuals must be physically fit to endure the hectic 
schedule they usually keep, and they must be mentally prepared for the stress of being 
constantly vigilant and prepared to respond to any threat” (Seger 1990: pp.129-30).  
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While such security measures can be prohibitively expensive, regardless of the level of 
expenditure, no security system can be 100% effective and consequently the continually 
expanding multitude of potential targets in modern society make it extremely difficult to 
prioritise limited financial resources. Additionally, “the erection of heavy barriers and guards 
around public buildings, although perhaps necessary to protect them from attack, are still 
unpopular with a democratic public accustomed to easy access” (Combs 2006: p.275). Other 
public buildings and transportation systems cannot be fully ‘target hardened’, due to their 
function requiring rapid public access and turnover.  
Increasingly, while political and nationalist terrorists have generally discriminated in their 
attacks, putting considerable planning into both their targeting and escape, religiously 
motivated terrorists, particularly utilising suicide attacks, have been willing to target the 
general public indiscriminately. Consequently, while it might be possible to utilise 
architectural and environmental designs similar in concept to CPTED41 measures (Pease 
1997 pp.972-4) to disperse and thin out crowds, thus reducing numbers of potential targets 
at vulnerable locations, it would be impossible to physically protect every open public space, 
tube carriage or bus. Finally, most defences, often ‘concentric and disposed in depth’ are 
based around the deterrent threats of capture, imprisonment, injury or death. Whereas 
political or nationalist groups may be deterred, or will seek a softer target, such defences 
may not deter a religiously motivated suicide bomber, who not only has no fear of injury or 
death, but actively seeks it in martyrdom (Sookhdeo 2004, Gunaratna 2000). As White 
concludes “the problem of holy warriors – religious zealots in direct contact with the truth- is 
that rationality is no barrier to action for them” (White 2002: p.242). 
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 Policing 
“When viewed legally, terrorism will always be a crime, regardless of whether the act is a 
murder, hijacking, kidnapping or bombing. Within legal vernacular, terrorist crimes have 
‘elements of offence’, each of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt”, argues 
Norwitz (2002: p.471), thus “the main burden of containing and defeating terrorism in 
liberal democratic states is carried by the police services” (Wilkinson 2006: p.77). 
Consequently, along with their more traditional policing roles such as crime control, order 
maintenance, public service and re-assurance (Reiner 1997), modern policing has gained 
new roles based around internal domestic security and intelligence led counter-terrorism 
(Veness 2002). In addition, whereas the more traditional forms of nationalist and political 
terrorism, such as the PIRAs bombing campaigns against mainland Britain (McGladdery 
2006), often allowed the police the opportunity to develop a strong evidential case as the 
conspiracy progressed, the threat posed by religiously motivated ‘new’ terrorism has 
negated this option. As Peter Clarke states, “we can no longer wait until the terrorist is at or 
near the point of attack before intervening. It might give us the strongest evidence to do so- 
to capture the terrorist with the gun or the bomb. But the risk to the public, in the age of 
suicide bombers and no notice attacks, is simply too great” (Clarke 2007: p.3). Such 
additional demands, particularly at a time of crisis, can severely test the capabilities, staffing 
and resources of policing organisations. 
Following a major terrorist incident, “how the first responding officers establish contact, seal 
off the affected area, conduct an evacuation, and protect the crime scene will greatly 
influence how the incident is played out” (Bolz 2005: p.41).42 Immediately following a 
terrorist incident, the police fulfil a number of roles, “if the incident involves an explosive 
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device43 or a shooting, complexity is once more the order of the day as several processes are 
set in motion: saving lives and dealing with casualties, scene management to maximize the 
recovery of evidence, utilization of evidence and intelligence to assist in identification of the 
perpetrators, and any immediate actions that are required to prevent a further occurrence” 
(Clutterbuck 2004b: p.152). 
While modern policing strategies must consequently focus on national security, Murray 
argues that to assume that the ‘paramilitary response’ based model is best suited to achieve 
this is a miscalculation. Rather, he suggests that “using the principles of community policing 
is a much more sensible and effective way of dealing with terrorism….it has been accepted 
that police cannot fight crime alone and must rely on the community…the same principle 
applies to terrorism” (Murray 2005: p.359). Innes differentiates between two types of 
terrorist attack, symbolic crimes against iconic cultural or social symbols, and signal crimes 
which tend to cause mass casualties, signalling vulnerability in routine settings. He suggests 
that a means of policing such ‘uncertainty’ is to “better integrate a system of local 
neighbourhood policing into the counter-terrorism apparatus” allowing the building of 
“inter-personal trust with members of Muslim and other minority communities upon which 
the communication of intelligence is often contingent” (Innes 2006: pp.4-5). Such ‘soft 
power’ models “may be more effective and ultimately less damaging to democratic 
traditions than extending covert policing methods and… reactionary legislative reform” (p.5).  
Most police organisations also have their own intelligence capability and while the 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) was established in 1883 to counter the threat of 
the Irish ‘Fenian’ bombers (Clutterbuck 2006a), similar bodies have existed amongst other 
countries, such as the French Renseignements Generaux (RG), now part of the Direction 
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Generale de la Securite Interieure (DGSI) (Black 2005, Warusfel 2003), the Spanish Policia 
Comisaria General de Informacion (CGI) and Guardia Civil Servicio de Informacion (SI) 
(Jordan & Horsburgh 2005a), Turkish National Police Intelligence Department Istihbarat 
Daire Baskanligi (IDB) (Turkish National Police Undated) and the Irish Garda Security and 
Intelligence Branch (S & I)44 (Walsh 2003). Wilkinson argues that such bodies are important 
“because the routine police tasks of law enforcement and combating crime…give the police 
service an unrivalled ‘bank’ of background information” (Wilkinson 2006: p.73) (McGarrell 
2007, Reynolds 2005). However, “it is here that the complexities lie because it often is 
necessary to acquire evidence while protecting intelligence assets and operational 
methodology from unnecessary exposure during court proceedings” (Clutterbuck 2004b: 
p.152). Consequently, Weston concludes that “a close working partnership between law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies is crucial to the efficient and effective management 
of intelligence into usable and useful evidence…the absence of this understanding provides 
opportunities for misunderstanding, rivalry and, at worst, enmity” (Weston 2007: p.38). 
At an international policing level, Europol is examined by Den Boer (2003), who points out 
that though initially focused on organised crime, following the events of 9/11 it was 
expanded to include counter-terrorist liaison officers. She also examines the Police Chiefs 
Operational Task Force (PCOTF), charged with organizing high level meetings between the 
heads of EU counter-terrorist units, the compilation of an inventory of national alert plans 
and the strengthening of border controls (p.202). The older international forum of the Police 
Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) was originally established under the auspices of the 
TREVI Group (Benyon 1993), which emerged in 1975 among the European countries most 
affected by terrorism. While the role of TREVI has been effectively subsumed into the EU’ s 
‘Third Pillar’, the PWGT remains, being responsible for the initial establishment of the 
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international network of Counter Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officers (CTELOs). 
Although one of the oldest international policing bodies,45 Interpol (Deflem 2006) has 
previously had little effect on terrorism. Anderson states that “its 1956 statutes excluded 
the communication of information on cases of a political, religious, or ethnic character. This 
ban was dropped at the 1984 Interpol General Assembly, when policy on ‘acts of violence 
commonly called terrorism’ was debated and the doctrine of ‘preponderance’ adopted” 
(Anderson 2000: p.233). To sidestep such obstacles, the organisation has tended to focus on 
current ‘thematic’ issues in terrorism, such as Project Tent, identifying those who attended 
the training camps in Afghanistan (Interpol 2005). 
Consequently, “because acts of terrorism are considered inherently criminal behaviours 
under the laws of most nations’, law enforcement agencies often play a major role in 
counterterrorist operations.” (Martin 2003: pp.369-70).46 Despite Anderson’s contention 
that “anti-terrorist action is a dubious basis for institutionalised trans-national police 
cooperation” (Anderson 2000: p.230), due to subsequent terrorist events, there has been a 
significant increase in the level of such policing cooperation. As Bratton states, “now, based 
in part on the necessity of immediate and actionable intelligence after the attacks of 11th 
September and 7th July, local police have realized that their federal governments lack the 
ability to provide a meaningful and timely link, a cop-to-cop link between police agencies 
across the globe” (Bratton 2007: p.24) and as a result, regardless of ongoing national 
differences at the top political levels, much of this cooperation is facilitated at a bi-lateral 
‘practitioner’ level, based on personal contacts and trust (Deflem 2006).  
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 Intelligence 
Intelligence is defined by a UK military publication as ‘the product resulting from the 
collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information… 
which is immediately or potentially significant to…planning and operations’.47 Such 
intelligence is closely interlinked with other counter-terrorist measures, acting as a catalyst 
for heightened security measures, and playing an overarching role in pro-active intelligence 
led policing and military operations.48 The crucial importance of such intelligence in 
countering terrorism, in particular its coordination and timeliness, has already been 
highlighted (9/11 Commission Report): “unfortunately, there was no mechanism in place to 
enable inter-agency collaboration…information that may seem unimportant to one agency 
may be critical to another…In short, for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence Community 
failed to capitalize on both the individual and collective significance of available information 
that appears relevant to the events of September 11” (Strasser 2004 pp. xxiv–xxv). Weston 
argues that while it will not always be possible to obtain precise intelligence on a specific 
plot, such intelligence is important for three reasons, to be aware of emerging 
developments, as a basis for operational decision making and to assist in contingency 
planning (Weston 2007: p.36). However, Pillar states that “terrorism is a fundamentally 
different and more difficult subject than the great majority of other topics the intelligence 
community is asked to cover.  The bull’s eye of this intelligence target – an individual 
terrorist plot - lacks the size and signatures of most other targets, from nuclear weapons 
programs to political instability. The need to uncover the activities not only of specified 
groups or states but also of potential terrorists makes intelligence questions about terrorism, 
not just the answers, more indeterminate than with most other topics.” (Pillar 2004: pp.115-
6).  
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As a legacy of the ‘Cold War’ period, the operational ‘architecture’ of many ‘Western’ 
intelligence services was reliant on technology,49 to the detriment of traditional human 
intelligence (HUMINT) networks (Gill & Phythian 2006). “But neither the capability to 
intercept mobile and satellite telephone calls, nor the ability to produce immediate satellite 
imagery of events…in remote parts of the world…was able to give the US administration 
warning of the 11 September attacks” (Smith 2004: p.16). This over-reliance on technology 
to gather intelligence has proved a major systemic weakness in countering terrorism (Baud 
2005: pp.123-6), consequently there has been a growing development of HUMINT capability 
(Keegan 2003: pp.360-5). As a Canadian ‘practitioner’ quoted by Chalk & Rosenau states, 
“human sources are the bread and butter of counter-terrorism; you will never get a terrorist 
jumping out of a fibre optic cable” (Chalk and Rosenau 2004: pp.44-5). Betts concludes that 
although “technical collection is invaluable and has undoubtedly figured in previous counter-
terrorist successes50…the targets now understand better what they have to 
evade...competent terrorists know not to use cell phones for sensitive messages, and even 
small groups have access to impressive new encryption technologies. Human intelligence is 
key because the essence of the terrorist threat is the capacity to conspire” (Betts 2004: 
p.461).  
A continuing legacy, clearly visible in various countries’ intelligence structures, is the division 
of intelligence responsibilities between domestic and foreign intelligence organisations, 
designed around more traditional roles of internal domestic counter-intelligence and 
external foreign intelligence gathering (Thuillier 2000, Baud 1998, Adams 1995).51 While 
these remain responsibilities for such organisations, counter-terrorism has generally 
assumed operational primacy. Given the current trans-national nature of the latest type of 
Islamist terrorism, and its transcendence of both internal and external security fields, such 
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historical operational divisions have not only become blurred, but have also been the source 
of major rivalry, obstruction and ‘turf wars’ between national agencies, often impacting on 
operational capability and contributing to a number of known intelligence failures (Gill & 
Phythian 2006 Chap.6). Consequently countries with single organisations fulfilling both 
internal and external intelligence roles may be better structured to operationally counter 
terrorism (Baud 2005 pp.137-40).52  
A number of countries have also established coordination and ‘fusion’ units, bringing 
together intelligence, policing and other specialists to better counter the threat posed by 
terrorism, either by collating and ‘joining up’ intelligence from all available sources, or by 
coordinating the various organisations responding to it.53 At the international level, for 
reasons of operational security and sensitivity, most intelligence organisations cooperate at 
a bilateral level regarding terrorism, particularly at the lower tactical and operational levels. 
However Ganor (2005a) argues that to be truly effective the international community must 
establish a joint intelligence bank, where appropriately sanitised intelligence could be 
shared (Chapter 3), nevertheless, there are a number of more general forums.54 
Recent attacks by the al-Qaeda network its affiliates and successor organisations, such as 
the so called Islamic State, have tended to rely on non-hierarchical, semi-independent cells 
(Wardlaw 1989: pp.134-6). Since such cells must conspire to plan, prepare and launch an 
attack, human intelligence methods are crucial in identifying a cell, penetrating it, 
establishing their plans, completing surveillance, identifying members and disrupting or 
arresting them before an attack. While the role of intelligence in countering terrorism is 
therefore critical and must be developed, because it is “not a science it is bound to have 
mistakes from time to time… caused by factors like insufficient knowledge, general 
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incompetence, deception, self-deception, or bias…a major mistake leads to surprise and thus 
an intelligence failure” (Laqueur 1985: p.255). Consequently any development must not just 
be in quantity but more particularly in quality, as “it is not enough to reinforce the 
battlements as the West has been doing. You have to get inside the mind of the terrorist and 
look back at your own castle walls.”55 
 Military / Paramilitary 
Although many argue that since 9/11 the United States has adopted the pre-emptive ‘War 
model’ of counter-terrorism, leading to a ‘more permissive environment for military 
retaliation’ (Hoyt 2004), and that due to the level of threat it faces “Israel has responded 
with some of the most draconian measures ever used by a democratic state” (Wilkinson 
2006: p.81), most ‘Western’ societies have adopted the ‘Criminal justice model’ to counter-
terrorism. While this gives primacy to their law enforcement and judicial bodies, many 
countries also accept that there will be times when, due to the threat, scale, or operational 
requirements of a terrorist incident, conventional or specialist military assistance will be 
required, often as the ‘Final Option’ (Pedahzur & Ranstorp 2001). Such military involvement 
in a domestic scenario is often strictly controlled to supporting the civilian powers and the 
police in a ‘Military Aid to the Civil Power’ (MACP) role (Taillon 2001), as many ‘Western’ 
societies would not accept military use as proportionate or appropriate to a longer term 
internal security role (Wardlaw 1989). While such societies see both “the police and military 
as the joint custodians of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force…implicit in the distinction 
is that the military fights wars, whereas the police enforce the law and pursue criminals” 
(Waddington 2007: pp.2-3). Thus whilst the military have traditionally had an external role, 
internal security is generally seen as the preserve of the police, indeed in the United States, 
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the Posse Comitatus Act specifically controls domestic military usage (Banks 2002). 
Consequently Taillon argues that “although military personnel, skills, equipment, and 
expertise may assist in the ‘war’ on terrorism, the military should not take the overall lead in 
the governmental campaign” (Taillon 2001: p.xiii).  
Nevertheless, terrorism blurs the distinctions between ‘crime’ and ‘war’ and consequently, 
there are a number of examples where concerted domestic terrorist campaigns, sometimes 
at the level of an insurgency, have led to military and paramilitary56 forces being used for 
long term internal security deployments.57 While the use of large scale military forces in 
countering such domestic terrorist campaigns is both highly publicised and in many cases 
extremely controversial, regular military forces have also been utilised in less well known 
counter-terrorist and internal security roles.58 Conventional military forces have also been 
used externally, particularly in punitive and suppressive roles, both historically, as in 
‘Operation El Dorado Canyon’, the US air bombing of Libya in 1986 (Martin 2003) and the 
1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon in ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’ (Herzog & Gazit 2005). 
More recently, they have been used in Israel’s 2006 War against Hezbollah in Lebanon 
(Norton 2007), against HAMAS in Gaza during 2014, and during the so called ‘War on Terror‘ 
in Iraq (Hoffman 2006a, Shultz & Dew 2006, Micheletti 2006, Ryan 2004) and Afghanistan, 
(Ryan 2007, Stilwell 2007, Micheletti 2004). Consequently, Steven & Gunaratna highlight 
two main military uses in counter-terrorism, either in a limited capacity as MACP in support 
of the ‘Criminal Justice Model’, or in a major punitive or suppressive role as part of a ‘War 
Model’ based on the legal justification of either Jus ad bellum (justice of the cause) or Jus in 
bello (justice of the conduct) (Steven and Gunaratna 2004: p.107-10) (Roberts 2004). 
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As well as regular military forces, many countries also have paramilitary ‘third forces’, such 
as the French Gendarmerie Nationale (Gendarmerie 2005, Bertin 1998), Spanish Guardia 
Civile (Guardia Civil 1994), Israeli National Police Mishmar Hagvul (MAGAV) Border Guards 
(Meyr 1999, Cooper 1995, Katz 1990), and Turkish Jandarma (Jandarma 2006).59 While 
trained and equipped at a military level, Wardlaw argues that their capabilities fall between 
the roles of the Army and Police, as they are “trained to deal with such difficult situations as 
riots, terrorist incidents, or insurrections” and do “not suffer from the problem of conflicting 
missions, which is the case with both the army, whose primary mission is external defence, 
and the police, whose primary mission is law enforcement/crime prevention” (Wardlaw 
1989: p.98). While many of these units have accordingly been actively involved in domestic 
counter-terrorist and internal security roles, such ‘third forces’ would not be seen as 
acceptable in the UK or countries with similar policing models, such as Ireland or the United 
States (Benyon 1993). 
Many countries have also created specialist units to fulfil tactical intervention or hostage 
rescue missions60 (Thompson 2009 & 2001, Davies 2003). As terrorism developed during the 
1970’s it became apparent that “conventional military and police units were…too unwieldy 
and, in effect, not capable of dealing with this ‘new mode of warfare’” (Taillon 2001 p.xii). 
Therefore, utilising terrorism, in particular hostage taking (Wilkinson 2006, Griffiths 2003, 
Wardlaw 1989), as a form of 'Asymmetric warfare', terrorists could confront the strongest 
nations by putting them in a position where they were impotent, their power based on 
conventional military strength being undermined. As Livingstone states, “not only are 
contemporary weapons and tactics far too destructive to be employed in heavily populated 
urban regions, but also the deployment of large numbers of soldiers against terrorists simply 
increases the number of targets at which they can strike” (Livingstone 1982: p.176). 
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Consequently in response to the upsurge of political and nationalist terrorist violence and 
hostage taking during the 1970’s, in particular the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 
Munich Olympics during the failed German police intervention (Reeve 2005, Moore 2002b, 
Taylor 1993), countries developed small highly trained tactical intervention units from their 
Military, Paramilitary or Police (Denece 2007, Ryan 2005 & 2003, Metzner & Friedrich 2002, 
Katz 1995, Morris & Hoe 1987, Thompson 1986, Pimlott 1986). Since their formation, such 
units have been utilised in numerous tactical interventions and hostage rescues, and while 
many of these have been considered successful, due to the complex and dangerous nature 
of the endeavour, even those seen as textbook operations have usually resulted in at least 
one or two hostages being killed in the ensuing crossfire (Davies 2003, Griffiths 2003, 
McManners 2003, Harclerode 2000, Weale 1997, Dobson & Payne 1982).61  
In addition, military and ‘Paramilitary’ Intelligence units have been used to pro-actively 
target terrorist individuals or groups, either pre-emptively, or by way of retribution.62 While 
such actions clearly raise significant moral and ethical questions as well as more ‘amoral’ 
tactical considerations, with far less publicity, specialist ‘pseudo’ operators, surveillance 
teams and source handlers have played crucial roles in providing the authorities with timely 
tactical field intelligence in support of counter-terrorist operations.63 Most recently, such 
specialist tactical intelligence units have been actively involved in Afghanistan and Iraq.64  
The operational use of these various military and paramilitary forces highlights the varying 
roles that such units have played in countering terrorism and as Taillon states, there is no 
doubt that “elite forces, organised, armed, trained and structured for the counter-terrorist 
role, can be an effective arm of governments in dealing with terrorism” (Taillon 2001: p.xi.). 
Nevertheless Wilkinson reminds us that when dealing with terrorism “overdependence on 
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military operations and the heavy handed use of firepower in civilian areas are likely to 
cause heavy casualties among innocent civilians, and…are a huge strategic blunder” 
(Wilkinson 2006: p.93). Consequently, Hoyt points out that while “military force represents a 
powerful tool in the war on terrorism…it is, however a tool that must be used very skilfully 
and in careful coordination with other tools of policy” (Hoyt 2004: p.163)  
 Technology 
While the use of technology underpins many of the counter-terrorist measures previously 
discussed, it is very much a double edged sword and just as technology has been developed 
and utilised to counter the threat posed by terrorism, so modern technological and scientific 
developments have also been rapidly seized upon by terrorist organisations to further their 
cause. Seger (1990) highlights a number of such areas: Modern television and media 
coverage mean that any terrorist incident is beamed worldwide in hours, highlighting the 
‘propaganda of the deed’ (Combs 2006: Chap. 8); improved communications make it easier 
for terrorist leaders to organise and co-ordinate acts of terror, often from secondary 
locations; domestic and international transportation mean that it is easier for terrorists to 
gain access to their intended target, while providing ideal targets, with a large concentration 
of innocent bystanders, often from a multitude of countries65; the reliance of modern 
society on computers and technology means that it is easier for terrorists to target the 
state’s infrastructure through ‘cyber-terrorism’; modern electronic banking eases the 
movement of the finances and donations necessary to fund particular operations; while 
modern developments in weaponry, have been utilised to their advantage by the various 
terrorist groups. As Marchington states, “today’s terrorists (and criminals and drug barons) 
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are likely to use the internet, mobile phones, digital cameras and all the other paraphernalia 
of modern life” (Marchington 2003: p.18).  
Perhaps the greatest concern though, is the possibility that religiously motivated terrorist 
groups may gain greater access to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, 
which some might not hesitate to use in an act of technological terrorism (Allison 2006, 
Stern 1999). Arguably therefore, the marriage of ‘Manufactured Uncertainty’ through the 
development of modern technology and weaponry, with the rise of religiously motivated 
terrorists willing to use such weaponry, means that the threat posed by terrorism in the 
early 21st Century is potentially greater than ever. Former Prime Minister Blair argues that 
“these groups are fanatics, capable of killing without discrimination. The limits on the 
numbers they kill and their methods of killing are not governed by morality. The limits are 
only practical or technical. We know, that they would, if they could, go further, and use 
chemical or biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction” (Bamford 2004).  
In terms of counter-terrorist technology, many countries have continually developed their 
technical capabilities in the areas of surveillance, advanced communications, security and 
perimeter protection, bomb detection and disposal, and assault and intervention 
equipment. Marchington examines these developments, and argues that “perhaps the most 
striking of recent huge advances have been in computing and electronics…smaller, faster 
computers and storage media, more powerful software, sophisticated networking solutions, 
the internet and the general spread of computers in offices and homes have changed the 
face of anti-terrorism work” (Marchington 2003: p.18). Consequently, Dewar states that 
“the terrorist faces an increasingly effective and sophisticated armoury of equipment” 
(Dewar 1995: p.15). Such technological developments have led to a cycle of counter-
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terrorist technology, where terrorist organisations will seek to exploit weaknesses in 
technology and security as a means of perpetrating an attack (Jackson 2007). Following an 
attempt or successful attack, the authorities will carry out a post attack evaluation of the 
terrorist use of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), which may lead to the introduction 
of new technologies, along with other measures, as a means of closing potential loopholes 
and preventing further attacks of this nature. The al-Qaeda network have successfully 
inverted this cycle, seeking to exploit ‘Western’ societies over-reliance on technology, by 
returning to low technology methods such as human messengers relying on word of mouth 
and coded handwritten notes, the hawala banking system based on promissory notes and 
verbal agreements, the hijacking of aircraft using box-cutters and the construction of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from commercially available products. 
This last critical area has been highlighted by British technological counter-terrorism 
experiences in Northern Ireland (Smith, S. 2006, Ryder 2005), and general American 
experience (Tomajczyk 1999), in the detection and disposal of explosive devices. While 
terrorists seek to utilise new methods and precursors to construct devices or procure 
commercial or military grade explosives (Barnaby 2007, Bolz 2005, Nance 2003), Police 
explosive experts (Expo) and Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialists have 
continually developed new technology and skills to counter them. A good example being the 
‘Wheelbarrow’ developed to examine and render safe IEDs in Northern Ireland, which  
“provided a highly effective and reliable means of giving the bomb disposal officer a close up 
view of a bomb without having to approach the device, and of delivering a means of 
neutralising the bomb” (Wilkinson 2006: p.95). Ultimately though, despite all the 
technological developments, bomb detection and disposal still relies on the courage and 
expertise of the individual EOD specialist to defuse and render harmless such IEDs.  
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Clearly, the development and use of technology underpins many of the measures utilised to 
counter-terrorism which have been discussed. Nevertheless, despite continuing 
improvements and developments and no matter how advanced the technology, without the 
human skills required to properly utilise and maximise its benefit, such technology can often 
prove to be nothing more than mere ‘window dressing’. Ultimately, particularly in a field 
such as counter-terrorism, technology is often only as good as the ‘practitioner’ using it.       
 Economic 
The current scale of the problem posed by the ‘hidden’ global criminal economy is examined 
by Napoleoni, who states that it has developed into “a fast-growing international economic 
system, with a turnover of about $1.5 trillion, twice the GDP of the United Kingdom, and is 
challenging Western hegemony” (Napoleoni 2004: p.xix). This criminal economy is based on 
illegal funds obtained for two different, but often closely interlinked reasons, crime and 
terrorism. While the former, based around money laundering (Serio 2004) has as its 
objective, the introduction of ‘laundered’ funds, obtained through criminality, back into 
legitimate financial systems, the latter seeks to hide the links between funds obtained 
through various legal and illegal means and the terrorist ‘end user’, ensuring that the funds 
reach the terrorist organisation for its operational objectives. Leader states that “terrorists 
need substantial infusions of cash to finance increasingly complex and costly activities and 
operations…expenses include everything from salaries and mundane day-to-day living 
expenses to the costs of carrying out terrorist operations: safe houses, weapons, surveillance 
equipment, explosives, bomb components, training, computers, car rentals and international 
travel” (Leader 1998: p.42). A major source of these funds, comes from the global drugs 
trade, indeed Leader and Wiencek (2000) highlight numerous international examples of a 
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drug crime and terrorism nexus, where terrorist groups either protect traffickers and their 
shipment for a cut of their profits or produce drugs themselves, to finance their terrorist 
activities.  
Due in part to the ‘hidden’ nature of this global criminal economy the authorities have a 
number of problems in the identification of terrorist economic activity. Unlike some of the 
more traditional hierarchically structured terrorist and organised crime organisations 
(Adams 1988), modern terrorism does not present such a clearly defined financial trail to 
follow. As the Madrid rail bombings of 11th March 2004 and the London tube and bus 
bombings of 7th July 2005 have respectively demonstrated, when such terrorist cells are self-
financing through petty crime, obtaining their explosives from a drug deal with a criminal 
gang (Vidino 2006), or creating their own explosives from commercially available peroxide 
and acetone, both the economic and intelligence ‘signatures’ are negligible. Ehrenfeld 
(2003) points out that the devastating 9/11 attacks of 2001 in New York and Washington are 
estimated to have cost as little as $500, 000. 
Even when financial transactions or accounts appear suspicious, it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish between those being utilised for crime and those being used for terrorism. 
Although the ultimate goals of those involved and the end use of the funds may be 
different, as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) states, “the only time that financial 
institutions might clearly identify terrorist financing as distinct from other criminal misuse of 
the financial system is when a known terrorist or terrorist organisation has opened an 
account” (FATF 2002). A further problem is the use of legitimate business fronts to cover 
criminal or terrorist fund raising or ‘laundering’ in areas such as the gem business (Farah 
2004), the sale of counterfeited consumer products such as DVDs, the car sale trade and 
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cigarette sales (Raphaeli 2003). Charitable organisations, ostensibly supporting religious or 
humanitarian causes, have also been used to raise and transfer funds to terrorist 
organisations (Ehrenfeld 2003) and this is further obscured when such charitable 
organisations are involved in genuine relief work, but also divert a portion of their funds to 
support a terrorist group. Finally, in relation to the economic threat posed by Islamist 
terrorism, the Hawala banking system based on remittance and promissory notes and 
without the use of a formal banking system, can be easily utilised for the purposes of 
transferring terrorist finances. While this system, often used in less developed countries 
where banking institutions are unavailable, predates institutionalised ‘western’ banking, its 
lack of checks and electronic or paper trails means it can easily be exploited for nefarious 
purposes (IMF 2005). 
Various international and national measures have been introduced to counter the threat 
posed by such terrorist financing, particularly following the watershed events of the 9/11 
attacks in 2001 (Jacobsen 2006). These financial measures have generally fallen into two 
main categories, firstly an improvement in record keeping and identification within the 
financial industry and secondly the monitoring and reporting of suspicious transactions, in 
the form of ‘Suspicious Transaction Reports’ (STRs), to national or international law 
enforcement agencies and financial investigation units (FIUs). Raphael and McCluskey point 
out that “the latter is noteworthy as a function which in earlier years would have been 
carried out by the state as part of its investigation into and prevention of crime; this 
obligation now tends to fall on individuals and businesses” (Raphael and McCluskey 2003: 
p.1) Consequently, much of the onus for the initiation of measures to counter criminal and 
terrorist financing falls on the money laundering and terrorist financing reporting entities of 
the financial industry. Nevertheless, there are also a number of overarching international 
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policy responses, such as the UN International Convention on the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism 1999, UN Resolution 1373 (Wright. J. 2003), UN Resolution 1390, 
which establishes a list of named organisations and individuals involved in terrorism and the 
EU Action Plan.66 There is also the International Monetary Funds (IMFs) introduction of an 
additional category of ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ 
(AML/CFT), to its country assessments under the ‘Report of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 
regime, and an additional ‘Eight Recommendations’67 to counter terrorist financing, in 
addition to the ‘Forty Recommendations’ previously issued by the FATF in 1990 to counter 
money laundering.  
Ultimately, despite such overarching international measures to counter terrorist financing, 
much relies on the motivation, awareness and observation of individuals within local 
financial institutions to identify suspicious transactions and accounts. As Raphael and 
McCluskey conclude “a terrorist act itself does not necessarily require significant financial 
support; often all that is needed is enough money to fund the living expenses of the 
perpetrators” consequently “control mechanisms can often fail to detect such terrorist 
finance, particularly those measures based on ‘unusual activity’ parameters” (Raphael and 
McCluskey 2003: p.1). 
 Civil Liberties 
A major concern for any democratic society68 in relation to the introduction and use of the 
counter-terrorist measures previously examined is the risk that civil liberties69 can be 
weakened or side-lined. In an attempt to counter a major threat from terrorism, such as 
that currently posed by the global al Qaeda network, its affiliates and successor 
organisations, such as the so called Islamic State, the authorities can easily undermine the 
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very freedoms they are seeking to defend, by introducing excessively draconian measures, 
which depart from accepted legal and moral norms.  As Wardlaw points out “intrusive 
surveillance, increased powers for the police, a greater involvement of the armed forces in 
internal security, restrictions on the news media…the grave danger in these measures, 
particularly when combined, is that they may destroy the very society we are attempting to 
defend” (Wardlaw 1989: p.198-9).  
While in the short term such measures can undermine normally accepted legal principles, 
such as habeas corpus, they may also prove counterproductive to any longer term campaign 
against terrorism, exacerbating tensions, undermining the moral legitimacy of the state, and 
motivating a future generation of potential terrorists (Silke 2005). Consequently, the 
authorities must walk a fine line between ensuring an effective response to terrorism while 
ensuring they avoid overreaction which can easily prove counter-productive by merely 
aggravating the situation. A historical example of such a measure was the UK’s use of 
internment in Northern Ireland in the early 1970’s which, during the four years of its use, 
led to the administrative detention without trial of 1,874 Republican and 107 Loyalist 
suspects (Barnaby 2007: p.214). Gearty argues that this “was the single most important 
breakthrough in terms of broadening their appeal that the IRA has ever had” (Gearty 1991: 
p.141). A further historical example is the French use of torture to counter the Front de 
Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria during the 1950’s and early 1960’s (Kauffer 2006, 
Aussaresses 2005). More recently, Israel’s Shin Bet use of physical interrogation techniques 
(Dershowitz 2002), its construction of the ‘security fence’, the use of house demolitions 
(Israeli Supreme Court 2005) and ‘targeted killings’ and the US use of administrative 
detention against ‘foreign combatants’ (New York University 2005, Roberts 2004, Dworkin 
2004) along with ‘extraordinary rendition’ (Grey 2006), have raised similar concerns and 
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debates. As Booth and Dunne state, “terrorism is a serious threat to human rights precisely 
because there is a powerful temptation to sacrifice principled commitment to the due 
process of law in the name of defending national security and public safety” (Booth and 
Dunne 2002: p.168). 
The temptation for any ‘democratic’ society suffering from terrorism, particularly when 
specific attacks cause mass public revulsion and outrage,70 is to simply reply in kind by 
responding with draconian measures. However, as has been seen in a number of historical 
and current examples, merely responding to the terrorist attacks with repressive measures 
or excessive force can lead to a cycle of increasing violence, the main victims being innocent 
members of the public caught in the middle of the ‘crossfire’.  At the same time, “prolonged 
and intensive terrorism can be very damaging to the democratic governments and societies 
that experience it. For example, in Northern Ireland and Spain terrorism has not only 
attacked innocent life and fundamental rights but it has also been used to undermine the 
democratic values, institutions, processes and rule of law” (Wilkinson 2006: p.195). Modern 
‘Western’ societies, are thus faced with a dilemma of how best to respond to terrorism; too 
weak a response endangers the lives of their citizens and threatens to weaken the 
democratic structure of the state, while too strong a response can undermine the very 
democratic freedoms the state is attempting to protect.  
Clearly dependant on the level of threat faced, an appropriate balance must be drawn 
between ensuring individual freedoms while maintaining group security, however finding 
that appropriate level of response to the threat of terrorism, particularly given the nature of 
the current threat posed by the al-Qaeda network, its affiliates and successor groups, such 
as the so-called Islamic State (IS), is a continual problem for ‘democratic societies’. While 
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acknowledging that there may be specific circumstances when it will prove necessary to 
utilise limited military force, Wilkinson argues that “if this balance is to be maintained, the 
liberal state should seek at all times to combat terrorism using its criminal justice and law 
enforcement mechanisms” (Wilkinson 2006: p. 189). However, as Netanyahu points out, 
whatever type of response is utilised “every one of the active steps that a democratic state 
can take against domestic terrorists constitutes a certain curtailment of someone’s freedom 
to speak, assemble, or practice his religion without interference” (Netanyahu 1996: p.29). 
Consequently most democratic societies have introduced safeguards to ensure that checks 
and balances are maintained between securing the safety of its citizens whilst maintaining 
their rights, such as political, administrative and judicial oversights and legislatively 
enshrined rights and freedoms. However,  whilst “counter-terrorism must never become the 
Trojan horse by which totalitarian habits are smuggled into a democratic system” (Gearty 
1991 p.136), it must constantly be borne in mind that one of the most important freedoms 
being defended is the right to life of the potential victim of terrorism.  
 Conclusion of Section 
Traditionally, responses and interventions utilised to counter-terrorism have fallen into two 
main groupings. The first are the more reactive and defensive ‘Anti-Terrorist measures’ such 
as physical, operational and personnel security, often referred to as ‘target hardening’ 
(Combs 2006), and legislation (Ramraj 2005), providing the authority for the introduction of 
preventative measures, the powers of investigation when a terrorist incident has occurred, 
and the means to prosecute and punish those responsible for such acts. Secondly, there are 
the more proactive and offensive ‘Counter-Terrorist measures’, such as the gathering, 
processing and dissemination of intelligence (Gill & Phythian 2006) and its critical use in 
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leading pre-emptive policing (Clutterbuck 2004, Chalk & Rosenau 2004) and military 
operational responses (Taillon 2001, Harclerode 2000). These various interventions have 
traditionally been seen as operating along two main theoretical models of response, which 
reflect the crime - warfare dichotomy of terrorism. Firstly the ‘Criminal Justice Model’ which 
views terrorism as a politically motivated form of crime, responds to the threat through law 
enforcement, legislation and the criminal justice system, provides police primacy and 
prioritises the protection of democratic principles and the maintenance of the rule of law. 
Secondly, the ‘War Model’, which views terrorism as a form of low intensity asymmetric 
warfare, places the onus of primacy on the military, responds more robustly through the use 
of intelligence and military methods, and prioritises the control of terrorism and the rules of 
war over the maintenance of democratic rights (Wilkinson 2006). The tensions between 
these two traditional models of response to terrorism were highlighted in the responses of 
various policing and military interviewees.  
In reality, while most liberal democracies have predicated their responses to terrorism on 
the ‘Criminal Justice’ approach, they have utilised military measures as and when they have 
become necessary, as an ‘aid to the civilian powers’. It has therefore been advocated by 
various authors that as terrorism contains elements of both ‘crime’ and ‘warfare’ (Ganor 
2005a, Cronin & Ludes 2004), and as the nature of the threat is continually changing, so all 
responses should be considered, as long as they are grounded in the rule of law (Clutterbuck 
2004). Consequently, other ‘Extended Criminal Justice’ models have emerged, which more 
closely resemble this situation of utilising both criminal justice and military responses 
(Pedahzur & Ranstorp 2001). 
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While the use of the traditional legal, policing, intelligence and military responses 
mentioned have reduced the effectiveness of the core group of al-Qaeda since September 
11th 2001, its evolution into a global ideological movement, with affiliate and successor 
groups, in particular the so called Islamic State (IS), means that in the longer term global 
Islamist networks will continue to regenerate through ‘radicalisation’, and consequently the 
threat will remain (Denece 2004). Although the nature of the al-Qaeda network has 
evolved, Western nations have failed to adequately change their responses by effectively 
incorporating counter-ideology into their wider counter-terrorism responses. This failure to 
counter the rapidly diffusing ideology of al-Qaeda and its successors is a major weakness 
with long term implications for the successful mitigation of the current threat. 
Consequently, Gunaratna argues that “If no effort is made to counter or dilute the ideology 
of extremism, then support for the al-Qaeda model of Islam among radicalised Muslims will 
only increase, which means that the military campaign against al-Qaeda, even if pursued 
unrelentingly, may last for decades” (Gunaratna 2003 p. xxxiv). As the Islamist movement 
seeks to foment a growing global conflict between Western societies and Islam, it will 
become increasingly important to ideologically counter al-Qaeda and its successors, such as 
the so called Islamic State (IS). In conclusion, it is argued that while in the short term such 
groups can be contained by the use of intelligence, legislation, police and military 
operations, in the longer term, the international community must counter this movement’s 
global ideology.71 As Burke states “there is indeed a battle between the West and men like 
bin Laden. But it is not a battle for global supremacy. It is a battle for hearts and minds” 
(Burke 2003: p.249). Ultimately therefore, to be successful in the longer term response to 
such a threat, ‘Western liberal democracies’ will have to begin to ‘Re-Imagine Counter-
terrorism’ (Warnes 2009a).72  
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e. Critical Review and Gaps in the Literature 
Having examined the literature pertaining to specific aspects underpinning the wider 
research, a critical review can be completed and gaps in the subject literature identified. As 
mentioned in the introduction, there appear to be four main sources of literature in the 
linked subject fields of terrorism and counter-terrorism: personal memoirs from both 
counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’ and former terrorists, journalistic books and articles, some 
of which are extremely well researched, official government publications and specific 
academic research, in the form of books and in peer reviewed journals. A number of issues 
regarding literature in this field can be identified. Whilst an increasing amount of general 
and academic material has been written in the subject field, particularly following the 
watershed events of 9/11, much of this is focussed on the terrorist threat, rather than 
counter-terrorist responses. As the previous introduction has already outlined in more 
detail, of the material on counter-terrorism, most tends to examine a single issue or theme, 
such as the responses of a particular country, a specific type of thematic response, a 
specialist policing or military unit, or a single incident, rather than providing a general 
overview or broad comparative analysis.  
Additionally, much of the subject literature is exploratory or descriptive, rather than 
explanatory, and over reliant on secondary source material, rather than generating original 
research through primary source interviews. The latter is due in part to two factors: firstly, 
researchers have had difficulty approaching counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’ in the subject 
field, having limited contacts and means of access; secondly, many ‘practitioners’ are loath 
to talk on the subject, being unwilling to be interviewed due to issues of anonymity and 
methodological and operational security. Thus while there are contacts between 
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researchers and ‘practitioners’, these tend to be based on one off, or limited bi-lateral 
rather than general links, leading to a divide between academics and ‘practitioners’. 
Subsequently, there are significant gaps in the subject literature, which in part this research 
hopes to address. 
f. Conclusion 
In conclusion, though many of the publications associated with former terrorists and 
counter-terrorist practitioners, and sometimes work by journalists, lacks the empirical depth 
and rigour of research by academics, for the reasons discussed, academics tend to lack the 
operational experience and insights of ‘practitioners’ and the primary source access of 
journalists. Having identified these gaps in the literature and previous research on the 
subject field of counter-terrorism, the research contained in this thesis has been designed 
so as to cover a number of these omissions in the research literature, with the intention of 
developing original research. This research seeks to combine all these aspects through 
access to the primary source interview material previously highlighted, with the 
concomitant practical insights of ‘practitioners’ within the field of counter-terrorism. This is 
grounded in empirical depth and rigour, achieved through the use of a variant of ‘Grounded 
Theory’ under the overarching comparative framework, highlighted in greater detail in the 
following methodology chapter. Consequently, this will be a multi-case research model, 
which it is hoped will lead to the development of original, holistic, explanatory knowledge of 
‘human factors’ in counter-terrorism, that will advance the subject field and help identify 
‘best practice’ in the minimisation, prevention and controlling of terrorist threats.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
a. Introduction  
This chapter seeks to outline the methodology which was used to conduct the research 
behind this thesis, a comparative analysis of the ‘human factors’ behind various countries’ 
counter-terrorist measures, based on seven case studies at the level of nation state: the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Spain, Israel, Turkey and the United States.73 Each of these 
countries has historically suffered from significant levels of various types of terrorism and 
has consequently introduced widely differing forms of counter-terrorist responses. In 
addition, the seven case study countries were selected to represent a variety of different 
historical, political, legal, policing and cultural/religious backgrounds.  
While this chapter will expand in more detail on the methodology used to examine these 
countries’ responses, in summary, the research design utilised was based on various 
research methods, which were constructed around a synthesis of a semi-structured 
interview plan, the interviewing of policing, intelligence and military specialists,74 the textual 
analysis of the resulting interview transcripts through a variant of ‘Grounded Theory’(Glaser 
and Strauss 1967), the processing of the emerging data to populate data tables and finally 
frequency analysis of that data to allow the tiering of counter-terrorist measures based on 
perceived effectiveness, or lack of it and the identification of ‘human factors’ behind these 
measures. 
Consequently this is a multi-case research model relying on various research methods. 
Ultimately it is hoped that any explanatory knowledge generated can be utilized to examine 
the links between various types of terrorist ‘threat’ and resultant ‘response’, while seeking 
to identify ‘best practice’; those measures introduced by the case study countries which 
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have effectively minimized, prevented and controlled terrorist threats, the ‘human factors’ 
behind them, and any lessons to be drawn from them.  
b. Considerations, Obstacles and Background 
Clearly any comparative analysis between such ‘human factors’ in the seven different 
countries must make careful allowance for cultural and historical differences, different 
forms of judicial, policing, intelligence and military structures and the nature of the society 
being researched. In addition, consideration also has to be given to the changes that have 
occurred in the various countries following the events of September 11th 2001, the impact 
of more recent terrorist attacks specific to those particular countries being examined and 
the effect these events have had on their counter-terrorist responses.  
The secretive nature of the subject field itself raised a number of research considerations 
and obstacles. Due to the operational sensitivity of their work, and as currently serving 
counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’, the vast majority of interviewees only agreed to assist with 
the research on the understanding that they would remain anonymous and that operational 
details and methodological techniques they considered sensitive would not be discussed. 
Consequently to firewall the interviews, each was given a unique reference number 
comprising two letters and a number, based on the country and chronology of the 
interview. Thus UK5 is the fifth UK interview, while TU10 would be the tenth Turkish 
interview and so forth, providing Unique Reference Numbers (URNs) for each interview. All 
these interviews, with brief/sanitized biographical details are listed in the appendices. In the 
analytic chapters following, these interview URNs have been used to reference quotes and 
issues raised in specific interviews, or from a number of interviews. 
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Equally, any other information which arose during the interviews which was not suitable for 
the public domain due to its sensitive nature, or which the interviewees did not wish 
included, was not incorporated in the thesis. Ultimately, nothing has been placed in the 
public domain which might compromise operational, methodological or personal security. 
Consequently, the emotive nature of the subject field, the possibility of moral and ethical 
considerations emerging during the research, the vital need to maintain sensitive 
operational details and methodologies and the possibility of restrictions of access, were all 
acknowledged as potential obstacles to the research. 
However, the researcher’s personal background in both policing and military service proved 
critical in allowing access to both contacts and relevant information, which in turn helped 
mitigate many of these problems. Indeed a number of interviewees stated that they would 
not have spoken to the researcher if he did not have an operational background, with some 
admitting they had conducted ‘due diligence’ and checked his background before agreeing 
to meet. Such credibility and access greatly assisted in facilitating numerous visits to 
appropriate policing, security, military and research organisations in the relevant case study 
countries. These research visits not only provided invaluable interview material, but also 
useful contacts, vital insights and additional primary and secondary material, hopefully 
resulting in a better quality of research.  
c. Interview Plan  
To gather data during the field research, a generic semi-structured interview plan was 
constructed, which was utilised for all interviews in the seven countries chosen as case 
studies. In a small number of cases, where for operational or travel reasons it became 
impossible to conduct face to face interviews, the same interview plan was used as a 
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questionnaire to obtain written responses, many of which proved to be extremely detailed. 
Given that there are considered to be three levels of research, exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory, and that explanatory research is considered the richest, providing a greater 
understanding, this research has been designed to develop primary source explanatory 
knowledge in the subject field of counter-terrorism (Silke 2004).  
Consequently where possible the predominant level of questioning utilised in the semi-
structured interview plan was based around ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, which are more 
likely to generate explanatory data as opposed to exploratory or descriptive knowledge. 
Such focused “how and why questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of 
case studies, histories and experiments as the preferred research strategies. This is because 
such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere 
frequencies or incidence” (Yin 2003: p.6)  
However, with this research the normal sequence of such questions was inverted at an 
overarching level, becoming ‘why’ and ‘how’. Thus ‘why’ has a particular case study country 
had to respond to a specific terrorist threat and ‘how’ has it responded? Due to the generic 
framework of the interview plan, the same questions could be asked in each of the case 
study countries (X), by merely changing the name of the relevant terrorist organisation (Y), 
thus enhancing comparability ( See figures 1 and 2 following). 
In part mirroring the Literature Review, the interview plan itself was based around two main 
sections. The first was designed to capture data on specific current and historic national 
terrorist threats based on a typology of the five key forms of terrorism examined in the 
previous literature review:  
80 
 
 Islamist (and other religious extremism) – the al- Qaeda network, affiliate groups 
and individuals inspired by it such as al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) and 
Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM), successor groups such as the so 
called Islamic State (IS), Hezbollah, HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Turkish 
Hizbullah, İslami Büyükdoğu Akıncılar Cephesi (IBDA-C), the Christian identity 
Movement, Jewish extremists, Aum Shinrikyo and New Religious Movements 
 Nationalist – Separatist – Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), ‘Dissident’ Irish 
Republican groups such as the Real IRA (RIRA), Continuity IRA (CIRA) and Qglaigh na 
h’ Eireann (ONH), Loyalist groups such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), the Front de 
Liberation Nationale Corse (FLNC) and its numerous Corsican nationalist splinter 
groups, Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne (ARB), Iparretarrak (IK), Euzkadi ta 
Askatasuna (ETA), Terra Lliure (TL), the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) 
 Extreme Right Wing – the Charles Martel Group, Battalon Vasco Espanol (BVE) and 
other right wing extremist individuals and groups in the various case study 
countries, including the Militia Movement in the United States 
 Extreme Left Wing – Action Directe (AD), Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primero 
de Octubre (GRAPO), Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C), Marksist 
Leninist Komünist Parti (MLKP) and Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist 
(TKP/ML - ‘TIKKO’) 
 Single Issue – Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Earth Liberation Front (ELF), Anti-
Abortion extremists in the United States and various other extremist animal rights, 
ecological and other single issue groups (as opposed to more main stream protest).  
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Figure 1: Interview Plan Threat Section 
 
 
GENERAL THREAT  
 
Q1 & Q2: In respect of country X, how has the threat posed by terrorism changed in the last number of years and if 
so, why has this threat changed? 
 
SPECIFIC THREAT 
 
Islamist Extremist  
 
Q3: What threat is currently posed to country X by al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups and independent cells motivated 
by its ideology? 
 
Q4: Why do such extremist organisations currently pose such a threat to country X? 
 
Q5: What level of support is there for such extremist organisations amongst the Muslim community in country X 
and why? 
 
Q6: To what extent are the citizens of country X at risk from such organisations when abroad?  
 
Nationalist Separatist 
 
Q7: What threat is currently posed to country X by the activities of the nationalist terrorist organisation Y? 
 
Extreme Right 
 
Q8: How active are extreme right wing groups Y in country X and consequently, what threat do they currently pose 
to national stability and public safety?  
 
Q8a: (US) How active are extreme right groups such as the various militia and Christian identity movements in the 
United States and consequently, what threat do they currently pose to national stability and public safety? 
 
Q8b: (Israel) How active are extremist Jewish groups in Israel and the settlements, and consequently, what threat 
do they currently pose to national stability and public safety? 
 
Extreme Left & Others 
 
Q9: What threat is currently posed to country X by the activities of extreme left wing groups Y? 
 
Q10: What threat is currently posed to country X by single issue groups such as animal liberation, ecological and 
anti-abortion extremists? 
 
 
While the research focus is on policing, intelligence and military responses, the second 
section of the interview plan was based on ‘how’ the case study countries have introduced 
various types of counter-terrorist responses to counter these terrorist threats. Like the 
typology of terrorist threats in the first section, relevant literature pertaining to these types 
of responses in the second section has also been detailed in the previous literature review: 
 Diplomatic/Political 
 Legal 
 Security 
 Policing 
 Intelligence 
 Military/Paramilitary 
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 Technology 
 Economic 
 Civil Liberties 
Figure 2: Interview Plan Response Section 
 
SPECIFIC RESPONSE 
 
Diplomatic / Political 
 
Q11: How effectively does country X co-operate with other countries to counter the threat of international 
terrorism?  
 
Q12: Does country X have a strategic co-ordinating body, which can be established either during a heightened 
terrorist threat or following a major terrorist incident, and what organisations would it co-ordinate? 
 
Legal 
 
Q13: How has legislation in country X been utilised to counter the threat of terrorism and what specific anti-
terrorist legislation has been introduced?  
 
Security 
 
Q14: How has country X utilised security measures such as ‘target hardening’ to counter the increased threat of 
terrorism? 
 
Q15: How has country X strengthened aviation security, both at airports and on flights? 
 
Q16: How has country X strengthened maritime security both on seagoing vessels and at ports and harbours? 
 
Policing 
 
Q17: How have the various police and law enforcement agencies in country X responded to the threat of terrorism 
and what specific measures have they introduced? 
 
Intelligence 
 
Q18: How has country X utilised intelligence to counter the threat of terrorism? 
 
Military / Paramilitary  
 
Q19: How has country X used specialist military, paramilitary, and police units to tactically counter terrorism and 
what specific roles have they fulfilled? 
 
Technology 
 
Q20: How has country X utilised technology to counter the threat of terrorism? 
 
Q21: Within country X how important is the role of national bomb disposal units and how active have they been in 
fulfilling this responsibility? 
 
Economic 
 
Q22: How has country X utilised economic measures, such as freezing or forfeiture orders, to counter the threat of 
terrorism?  
 
Civil liberties  
 
Q23: How has the introduction of the various counter-terrorist measures, previously discussed, impacted on civil 
liberties within country X? 
 
 
Depending on the field of work and area of expertise of the particular interviewee, certain 
questions within the plan were not utilised, and at other times the interviewee had little or 
no knowledge of a particular area. This was considered when comparing responses, the 
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‘human factors’ behind them and calculating the frequency detailed later in this chapter. In 
occasional instances, the interviewee preferred not to discuss particular areas in detail, 
most of which were understandably in relation to issues of security. Likewise, certain 
questions were only relevant to particular countries, hence questions 8a and 8b (see Figure 
1), which were utilised in relation to interviews within the United States and Israel, to 
capture data on the threats respectively posed in those countries by Christian and Jewish 
extremists. For convenience, these country specific questions were utilised in the ‘Extreme 
Right’ section, as both countries clearly also face significant threats from terrorism 
motivated by Islamist extremism. 
The questions were also designed and grouped in such a way as to make the resulting 
generic semi-structured interview plan, and the transcripts it generated, more amenable to 
the use of comparative code-based thematic analysis as part of the ‘Grounded Theory’ 
research method. While this inductive research method stresses the importance of avoiding 
the forcing of the research material to ‘fit’ a particular hypothesis, and of allowing such a 
hypothesis to ‘emerge’ from the data, it was felt essential to provide some basic framework 
in the interviews to ensure that the particular terrorist threats, the various counter-terrorist 
responses of the different countries, and the ‘human factors’ behind them were effectively 
covered, hence the ‘threat’ and ‘response’ sections of the semi-structured interview plan 
previously highlighted. Although the interviewees in the different countries were asked the 
same general questions, they were free to respond and expand as they wished.75 Indeed, as 
a semi-structured interview plan, where an interviewee began to develop an interesting line 
of information or comment, this was further developed and encouraged by the researcher’s 
use of additional questions and if necessary, clarification was sought.  
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d. The Interviews 
In total 172 interviews were conducted in the seven countries over eight years between 
2004 and 2012, but no one country’s interviews were completed in one visit, rather they 
were conducted intermittently over time. Instead, these interviews were collected during a 
number of field research visits to each of the countries, most of which were visited on at 
least several occasions. This also allowed an examination of the changing nature of the 
threat, and various responses to it over the period of research. Adding to the generalisability 
and validity of the research, as well as the number of interviews across multiple countries, 
these interviews predominantly drew on the ‘experienced’, rather than ‘acquired’, 
knowledge of counter-terrorist practitioners in various fields, from those actually involved in 
operationally delivering counter-terrorist or counter-insurgency responses. Consequently 
the interviews can be divided into four broad categories:   
 Senior and Specialist Policing and Law Enforcement Officers – This included senior 
officers responsible for strategic planning and senior command of counter-terrorist 
units, as well as officers in various national counter-terrorist units, policing 
intelligence and specialist economic crime units 
 Intelligence and Security Officials – This included intelligence officials in both 
domestic intelligence and foreign intelligence collection organisations along with 
various types of security officials 
 Military Specialists and Police Tactical – This included operators from various 
military special forces units with either domestic and/or overseas counter-terrorist 
roles and police firearms officers from specialist police or gendarmerie tactical 
intervention units 
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 Academic Experts and Consultants – A limited number of academics and consultants 
with previous service or close ties to such units, to act as a check and control, 
providing a wider overview of national counter-terrorist measures, which could be 
used as a check on the interview data from individual ‘practitioners’ in specific fields.  
Of the four categories, a deliberate policy was taken to prioritise the interviews of 
‘practitioners’ with operational experience in the policing, intelligence, security and military 
fields, thus on average only a couple of academics were interviewed per country and of 
these, most had close links to or previous service in policing, security or military 
organisations.  
This decision was taken because much of the academic work in this field has been based on 
previous academic publications and secondary sources, rather than the development of 
original research material through the interviewing of ‘practitioners’ in the field of counter-
terrorism to capture their practical insights, experience and expertise. As previously noted, 
this has tended to lead to the same academic material being continually adapted, 
referenced and repeated over time. Much of this previous over reliance on secondary, and 
sometimes tertiary, source material has been due to both the researchers’ lack of access to 
operational practitioners and the practitioners’ traditional reluctance to discuss even the 
non-sensitive aspects of their work and experiences with those who do not share that 
operational experience and understanding (Clutterbuck and Warnes 2013). Consequently 
this researcher’s background operational service in both policing and military roles proved 
critical in developing a level of trust and access. 
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However, the research focus on interviewing practitioners is not to denigrate the role of the 
academics who were interviewed for this research. On the contrary, these experts often 
provided a much broader overview of their country’s counter-terrorist responses and the 
‘human factors’ behind them, which proved complimentary to the more specific knowledge 
of the practitioners in their own particular field of experience based expertise. In addition, 
the input of these academic experts also acted as a useful ‘control’ with which to assess the 
more area specific interviews of the practitioners, and in some cases as an oversight which 
helped inform further interviews within that country. 
Given their various specialisations, all the practitioner interviewees can be regarded as ‘key 
informant’ interviews, due to their specific insights and views arising from privileged 
operational positions (Fielding 2009).76 However, one concern of focusing most of the 
research on interviews with officials and representatives of the state is that the researcher 
will only be fed the ‘official line’, minimizing or glossing over failures, exaggerating 
successes, vilifying those opposed to the regime and generally portraying the authorities in 
a positive light. While the researcher was conscious of these concerns, this had to be 
balanced against the experienced personal knowledge and insights that such individuals 
could bring to an interview. A further linked concern is that the operational nature of the 
interviewees could be seen in terms of very-focused self-referencing groups, leading to a 
skewing of the analysis and results. However, to a large extent these potential problems of 
bias were negated through the multitude of different organisations and roles covered by 
over 170 interviews. The policing interviewees ranged in rank from Commissioner/Chief 
Constable to Detective Constable and as well as senior command, covered various 
experience and expertise, such as intelligence analysis, source handling, anti-terrorist 
investigation, bomb disposal and tactical firearms. Likewise, intelligence officials covered 
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from strategic to field intelligence, both domestic and foreign intelligence, surveillance, joint 
fusion and particular areas of expertise, such as Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Technical 
Intelligence (TECHINT). Security officials ranged from aviation ‘Sky Marshals’, to specialists 
on rail and building security, to close protection ‘bodyguards’. The military ranged in rank 
from Rear Admiral, full Colonel and Wing Commander to Sergeant, covering such areas as 
military intelligence, surveillance, source handling, bomb disposal, maritime security, air 
policing, both maritime and land special forces and hostage rescue. Naturally, interviewees 
were likely to express particular, often organisationally situated, perspectives on effective 
counter-terrorism and how it should be delivered. However, given that this broad variety of 
‘practitioners’ additionally came from seven different countries and that academics in each 
country acted as a control, this helped mitigate and negate any concerns of bias or skewing 
of the resultant data.    
At the same time the researcher did his utmost to develop a thorough knowledge of both 
the historical background and the ongoing operational situation in the country concerned. 
This was achieved through the development of an extensive collection of specialist 
publications from the various countries, many of which are referenced in the endnotes, and 
detailed reading and background research prior to any interviews. These were 
complemented by the researchers own operational experience and insights in the subject 
field and where relevant the researcher challenged interviewees replies and asked awkward 
or sensitive questions. 
Consequently, the researcher was positively encouraged by how candid and open many of 
the interviewees were regarding previous failures and ongoing concerns and problems their 
organisations and countries faced in countering particular terrorist threats, though clearly 
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much of this was contingent on the interviewees anonymity. Such candid responses can only 
add to the richness of the research and given the multiple case study countries, variety of 
organisations and number of interviewees, it is hoped that this will assist with both the 
validity and generalisability of the overall research.   
e. The Case Study Countries 
The level of questioning previously highlighted tends to lend itself to the development and 
use of case studies as a research strategy. As Yin points out “in general, case studies are the 
preferred strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator 
has little control over the events and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within some real-life context” (Yin 2003: p.1). He further notes that a case study approach is 
particularly useful “when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (Yin 2003: p.13). In a Chapter on ‘Case-oriented comparative methods’, Ragin 
argues that such methods have a number of benefits: “First they are designed to uncover 
patterns of invariance and constant association…the second distinguishing feature follows 
from the first: the method is relatively insensitive to the frequency distribution of types of 
cases…third, case-orientated methods force investigators to consider their cases as whole 
entities…fourth, case-oriented methods stimulate a rich dialogue between ideas and 
evidence” (Ragin 1989: pp.51-2).   
Consequently, as part of the research design, there is a need to define the nature of the 
‘case’, which effectively forms the ‘unit of analysis’ being utilised in the research. For the 
purposes of this research design, the initial ‘case’ unit of analysis was at a nation state level 
by ‘country’, thus examining each country’s counter-terrorist responses, and the various 
‘human factors’ behind them, as an individual case. As the research design was based on a 
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comparative analysis, and since, “multiple cases offer the researcher an even deeper 
understanding of processes and outcomes of cases, the chance to test (not just develop) 
hypothesis, and a good picture of locally grounded causality” (Miles & Huberman 1994: 
p.26), the research utilised a multiple ‘case’ study, with a comparative analysis between the 
seven individual countries.  
While it can be argued that all the ‘case study’ nations chosen could be considered 
‘Western’ in terms of their orientation and arguably ‘democratic’ in terms of their political 
system, Wilkinson states that “there is no universally applicable counter-terrorism policy for 
democracies… every conflict involving terrorism has its own unique characteristics…the 
tightrope between under-reaction, or toleration of terrorism, on the one hand, and 
draconian overreaction, leading to serious infringement of civil liberties, on the other, is 
pitched at a different height and angle in each case” (Wilkinson 2001: pp.229-30). 
Consequently, while the case study countries have both historically, and more currently, 
suffered from significant levels of numerous types of terrorism, this has resulted in various 
levels of political, criminal justice and military responses and the introduction of widely 
differing forms of counter-terrorist measures. As previously stated, the case studies were 
also deliberately chosen to reflect a wide breadth of political systems, international foreign 
policy agendas, historical legacies and different political, legal, policing, and 
cultural/religious backgrounds. Some of these issues and the literature pertaining to their 
choice are now briefly considered. 
 The United Kingdom 
A Constitutional Monarchy, with an adversarial legal system and its geographically based 
police constabularies, has faced the nationalist separatism of the Provisional Irish 
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Republican Army (PIRA) during its thirty year campaign of violence from 1969 (English 2003, 
Moloney 2002), and the ensuing Loyalist response by groups such as the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA) (Wood 2003, Taylor 1999). While PIRA 
appear to be abiding with the 1998 ‘Good Friday’ ceasefire, a limited threat is still posed by 
the small number of active ‘dissident’ Republican groups such as the Continuity (CIRA), Real 
IRA (RIRA) and Oglaigh na h’Eireann (ONH) (Frampton 2011). However, along with many 
other countries, the UK authorities are now faced with a different type of terrorism from 
semi-autonomous and independent, non-hierarchical cells of domestically based Islamists, 
and sometimes ‘lone actor’ individuals, motivated by the ‘Jihadi-Salafist’ ideology of al-
Qaeda (‘The Base’) or Islamic State (IS), who are willing to launch mass casualty suicide 
attacks, highlighted by the underground and bus bombings of 7th July 2005, similar attempts 
on 21st July, various bombing conspiracies, and the attack on Glasgow airport in June 2007 
(Clutterbuck and Warnes 2011). The United Kingdom has considerable historical experience 
in countering terrorism and insurgency, including the lessons learned during the Post-War 
‘Brush Fire’ wars (Dewar 1990), and its military and policing counter-terrorist responses to 
the PIRA’s thirty year campaign of violence (Taylor 2002). In response to the September 11th 
attacks, and the continuing Islamist threat highlighted by the 7/7 London bombings (Cornish 
2005), it has introduced the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001, the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act 2006 (Walker 2011), established the 
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and framed the Government’s Counter Terrorist 
Strategy (CONTEST). More recently, five of the larger police constabularies have established 
Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs),77 while a number of Regional Intelligence Cells (RICs – now 
Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units CTIUs) have been established to better coordinate 
operational counter-terrorist activity regionally between intelligence and police 
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organisations (Clarke 2007). The continuing threat has been highlighted by further recent 
arrests ‘on suspicion of the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism’ 
and the murder of off duty soldier Lee Rigby in 2013.  
 Ireland  
A young Republic, itself forged in ‘guerrilla’ warfare and terrorism with the 1916 Easter 
Rising (Caulfield 1995, Townshend 2006) and the Anglo-Irish War between 1919-1921 
(Hopkinson 2004a). It subsequently faced a historic Civil War against ‘anti-treaty dissidents’ 
between 1922-3 (Hopkinson 2004b) and periodic threats to the stability of the nation from 
Republican ‘subversives’, rejecting its legitimacy based on twenty six of the thirty two Irish 
Counties (Coogan 1988). Ireland also faced the brief threat posed to public order during the 
interwar period by the quasi-fascist ‘Blueshirt’ movement (Manning 2006). Mainstream 
Republican terrorists, and more recently the ‘dissident’ groups, have used the Republic for 
training, fund-raising, high profile kidnappings and as a safe haven for launching attacks 
against the North (Howard 2004, Davidson 2003). Subsequently a number of police officers 
from An Garda Siochana (‘Guardians of the Peace’) and members of the Defence Forces 
have been killed and wounded. In addition, the Irish Republic has also been targeted by 
Loyalist terrorists and organised criminals with links to paramilitaries (Mullan 2000, Williams 
2004). More recently, given fundraising and support activities by Islamists within the 
country and the use of Shannon Airport by the US military as a refuelling stop on route to 
Afghanistan, the Irish Republic has been faced with the possibility of becoming the target of 
Islamist terrorism. The long Irish experience of countering ‘subversive’ Republicanism is 
highlighted by the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and the use of the Dublin Special 
Criminal Court (SCC) (Hogan and Walker 1989), the establishment of the Criminal Assets 
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Bureau (CAB) (Williams 2006), the various Garda policing and military measures utilised to 
counter PIRA’s activities (O’Halpin 2000) and their use of covert operations against the 
‘dissident’ RIRA particularly following the Omagh bombing of 1998 (Mooney and O’Toole 
2003). Consequently, while the Irish authorities have significant experience of countering 
Republican ‘subversion’, there has been a growing response to the potential Islamist threat 
to the Irish Republic (Walsh 2003).  
 France 
The historical Republic, with its inquisitorial legal system (Fairchild and Dammer 2001) and 
dual Police Nationale and Gendarmerie policing structure (Bertin 1998) has for over forty 
years suffered from numerous forms of modern terrorism. During the 1970’s and 80’s, the 
country experienced domestic attacks associated with Palestinian, Armenian, Lebanese and 
other Middle Eastern groups (Cettina 2001), while abroad in Lebanon, its peacekeepers 
were targeted in 1983 by Hezbollah affiliated proxies of Iran (Norton 2007). The authorities 
also faced the threat of domestic terrorism from both political extremists, such as the 
extreme left Action Directe (Dartnell 1995, Hamon and Marchand 1986) and various 
extreme right groups (Davies 2002), as well as nationalist separatists such as the various 
factions and splinter groups of the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) 
(Follorou and Nouzille 2004, Farrugia and Serf 2004), Breton Revolutionary Army (ARB) and 
Basque Iparretarrak (Baud 2003). Historically linked to, and politically supportive of, the 
Algerian authorities, France became the target of campaigns by the Algerian Groupe 
Islamique Arme (GIA) in the mid-1990s (Shapiro and Suzan 2003), and from its offshoot the 
Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC), re-named ‘al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’ 
since 2007 (AQIM) (Parmentier 2006). There have also been attacks against French interests 
93 
 
and nationals abroad such as the killing of eleven French Naval engineers in Karachi in May 
2002 and the attack on the tanker MV. Limburg in October 2002 (Premier Ministre 2006). 
Historically, France has a long historical legacy of countering terrorism and insurgency in its 
former colonies of Indo-China (Windrow 2004, Fall 2005) and Algeria (Horne 1996) and the 
backlash of the Organisation de l’Armee Secrete (OAS) at the time of Algerian independence 
(Dard 2007). It also has longer experience of dealing with Islamist threats than many other 
countries. More recently France has introduced various policing, intelligence, military and 
security responses to counter terrorism (Cettina 2003), in particular its utilisation of 
significant legislation, including its ‘association des malfaiteurs’ powers (Gozzi 2003), the 
development of an extensive local intelligence network through the Renseignements 
Generaux (RG), now part of the Direction Generale du Securite Interieur (DGSI) (Black 2005), 
the creation of the ‘Vigipirate’ and associated contingency plans (DGPN 2005) and the 
establishment of the Unite de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-terroriste (UCLAT), to better 
coordinate national counter-terrorist responses (UCLAT 2003). Despite such measures, 
there continue to be concerns of domestic terrorist threats from radicalised groups or 
individuals within the sizeable Muslim minority, particularly disadvantaged youth in the 
poorer banlieues suburbs, highlighted by the firearms attacks of Mohamed Merah in the 
Toulouse area during 2012 and the attacks by the Kouachi brothers on the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ 
offices and Abedy Coulibaly against a police officer and kosher Jewish supermarket in the 
Paris area in January 2015.   
 Spain 
A recent Democracy following the death of Franco in 1975 (Preston 1993) and the transition 
period to Constitutional democracy under King Juan Carlos (Preston 2004), Spain has faced 
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several forms of domestic terrorism. Although initially threatened by Falangist extremists 
(Wilkinson 1981a) and radical left-wing extremists from the 1st October Anti-Fascist 
Resistance Group (GRAPO) (Alexander and Pluchinsky 1992: pp. 114-33), the major concern 
for the developing democracy was extremist Basque nationalism (Mees 2003) and the 
terrorist threat of the Basque separatist group Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) (Clarke 1984), 
which maintained a campaign of violence for over forty years (Alexander et. al. 2001b). 
Though no longer a viable threat, Spain has also occasionally had to counter the violence of 
extremist Catalan nationalists, specifically the historical terrorist attacks of Terra Lliure (Free 
Land) (Balcells 1996). The new threat posed by Islamist extremism against Spain manifested 
itself in the Casablanca suicide attacks of May 2003 (Aristegui 2005), which included 
‘Spanish’ targets and more directly in the multiple bomb attacks on the Madrid rail network 
on 11th March 2004 by a cell linked to the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM) itself 
associated with the al-Qaeda network (Reinares and Elorza 2004). Given their long 
experience of dealing with ETA, the Spanish authorities introduced various policing, 
intelligence and legislative responses (Reinares and Jaime-Jimenez 2000), such as the 
establishment of the Ertzaina autonomous Basque police force (Trevino 1982), the ‘Ley 
Antiterrorista’, various ‘Organic’ laws, and the Political Party Law (Guardia Civil 2003c), while 
at the same time covertly supporting the historical activities of the Grupos Antiterroristas de 
Liberacion (GAL) hit teams in the ‘Dirty War’ against ETA (Woodworth 2002). Following the 
2004 Madrid rail bombs and evidence of the threat posed by Islamist cells, Spain has 
introduced various intelligence and coordination measures, such as the establishment of the 
Centro Nacional de Coordinacion Antiterrorista (CNCA) (Jordan and Horsburgh 2005a). This 
was amalgamated with organised crime databases in 2014 to form the Centro de 
Inteligencia de Terrorismo y Crimen Organizado (CITCO). 
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 Israel 
A Middle Eastern country, with many European roots, was founded as a ‘Jewish homeland’ 
in 1948 following the ‘Holocaust’ of the Second World War, and a period of ‘Guerrilla’ 
warfare and terrorism against the ‘British Mandate’ (Zadka 1995, Begin 2007). Israel has 
itself suffered continually from terrorism and insurgency along with a number of 
conventional wars since its inception (Herzog and Gazit 2005). Initially during the late 
1960’s, 70’s and 80’s this threat came predominantly from politically and nationalistically 
motivated Palestinian groups, such as al Fatah (Hirst 2003), the Palestinian Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine – General Command, (PFLP-GC) and the Abu Nidal Group (Seale 
1992). During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the latest manifestations of this nationalist strand of 
terrorism have been the attacks of the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades (Bregman 2010). 
Historically Jewish extremist groups and associated individuals emerged in response to 
Palestinian terrorism, and these continue to remain a threat, as demonstrated by the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 (Shahak and Mezvinsky 2004, Sprinzak 2000). 
However, since the 1990s and the First Intifada, the main Palestinian terrorist threat shifted 
to the religiously motivated Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (HAMAS – ‘Enthusiasm’) 
(Levitt 2006) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (Alexander 2002a) who have regularly relied 
on the tactic of suicide bombings to target public areas, restaurants and buses (Pedahzur 
2005). Israeli targets have also been attacked by the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah ‘Party of 
God’, along with Jewish interests internationally, such as the Buenos Aires bombings of the 
Israeli Embassy in 1992 and Jewish community centre in 1994 and a suicide bomb attack on 
an Israeli tourist bus at Burgas Airport, Bulgaria in 2012 (Levitt 2013). Additionally Israel has 
faced the threat of al Qaeda cells, both in the Sinai region and internationally (Schweitzer 
and Shay 2003). Due to the severe and continuous level of such attacks against Israel, the 
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authorities have responded over the years with numerous counter-terrorist measures 
(Byman 2011), including the use of draconian emergency legislation inherited from the 
British mandate period (Israel Supreme Court 2005), the construction of the ‘security fence’, 
specialised intelligence (Pedahzur 2010), policing/border guard (Katz 1990) and military 
(Katz 1992a) responses. These interventions have included the selective use of ‘targeted 
killings’ against terrorist leadership and active cadres (Ganor 2005a). 
 Turkey 
A ‘Western orientated’ Muslim Republic, straddling Europe and Asia, which was established 
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by Mustafa Kemal ‘Ataturk’ in 1923 (Mango 
1999, Kinross 2001). Turkey has suffered significant levels of terrorist activity for the last 
forty years (Mango 2005, Caglar 2005). Initially this came from domestic left wing extremist 
groups, which continue to this day in the form of the Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi 
(DHKP/C) (DEVSOL), Turkiye Komunist Partisi/Marksist Leninist (TKP/ML) (TIKKO) and 
Marksist Leninist Komunist Partisi/Kurulus (MLKP/K) (Bal and Laciner 2001), exacerbated by 
the violent reactions of the extreme right wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Bozkurt 'Grey 
Wolves' and Ulkuculer 'Idealists’ (Harris 1994). Turkish officials and diplomats were also 
targeted by radical Armenian nationalist terrorist groups such as the Justice Commandos of 
the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA) (Gunter 1990). In August 1984, the Partiya Karkari Kurdistan (PKK) or 
‘Kurdish Workers Party’, launched its separatist campaign of violence against the Turkish 
authorities and despite the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, periods of 
ceasefire and changes of name, Kurdish separatist terrorism continues to claim lives 
(Rugman and Hutchings 1996). More recently, the Turkish authorities have faced the threat 
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of ‘Religious’ terrorism from Turkish Hizbullah (Cakir 2007), the Islamic Great Orient Raiders 
Front (IBDA-C) and the Hilafet Devleti ‘Caliphate State’ (Aras and Toktas 2007), while in 
November 2003 individuals linked to the al-Qaeda network carried out suicide attacks 
against two Istanbul Synagogues and days later similar attacks on the British Consulate and 
HSBC Building in the same city (Williams B. 2004). Consequently, Turkey has introduced 
numerous policing, intelligence and military counter-terrorist responses (Aktan and Koknar 
2002), including the Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 Terorle Mucadele Kanunu 1991, the use of 
military interventions into South-East Anatolia and Northern Iraq (Agar 2004, Akinan 2007), 
and the establishment of police Ozel Harekat Tim special operations teams (Metzner and 
Friedrich 2002). 
 The United States 
Described by some as the Worlds’ ‘super-power’ and with an extensive federal structure of 
fifty states, and numerous police and security organisations at the federal, state and local 
level, the country has nevertheless historically suffered from various forms of domestic 
political and nationalist terrorism. These include the extreme left Symbionese Liberation 
Army (SLA) and Weather Underground, the Black Panthers (Sargeant et.al. 2003), various 
extreme right groups (Kaplan 1995) and nationalists, such as Puerto Rican separatists 
(Hewitt 2003), however, many of the domestic incidents caused by these groups were 
limited in scale. Most significant attacks against the United States during the 1970s and 80s, 
many of which were state-sponsored (Byman 2005), occurred against US diplomatic 
personnel, military forces and tourists abroad, such as the hostage taking at the US Embassy 
Iran in 1979 (Bowden 2006), the Hezbollah associated bombings of the US Embassy and 
Marine barracks in Beirut (Wolf 1989) and kidnappings of American nationals in the 1980’s 
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(Harik 2005), the hijacking of the Achille Lauro (Forster 1998) and TWA Flight 847 in 1985 
(Bruce 2000a & 2000b) and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 (Pillar 2003). The 
impact of domestic terrorism was brought home to the American public with the al Qaeda 
associated attack on the World Trade Center, New York in 1993 (Caram 2001) and the 1995 
bombing of the Murrah Federal building, Oklahoma, by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, 
extreme right Christian Identity extremists linked to the Militia movement (Hamm 1997). 
During the 1990s the al Qaeda organisation attacked US assets abroad, including the 
military complex at Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the two US Embassies in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam in 1998, and the USS Cole in Aden Harbour in 2000, before striking the 
American mainland, in the World’s worst terrorist incident, the 9/11 attacks (9/11 
Commission 2005). As a result of its experiences, the United States has introduced a wide 
range of measures to counter terrorism (Jenkins 2006). These have included the 
introduction of the PATRIOT Act (Henderson 2004), the expansion of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), the establishment of the Department 
of Justice Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council program (ATAC) (Department of justice 2006), 
new roles for police and law enforcement organisations (White 2004), the establishment of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Galeotti 2002), the restructuring and 
expansion of various intelligence structures (Pillar 2004), and the use of specialised military 
and paramilitary units in external operations (Friedman 2004, Mazzeti 2013) . 
As previously stated, and as the brief overviews highlight, each of these countries has 
historically suffered from significant levels of various types of terrorism and has 
consequently introduced widely differing forms of counter-terrorist response. In addition 
the case studies were selected to represent a variety of different historical, political, legal, 
policing, and cultural/religious backgrounds.  
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f. ‘Grounded Theory’ Variant 
Having completed the interviews of counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’ in the seven case study 
countries, and built up a large collection of supportive primary and secondary source 
documentation around the subject field, the material in the interview transcripts was 
subjected to a variant of ‘Grounded Theory’. This research methodology, which was 
originally outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and further developed by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998), has been described as a form of ‘constant comparative textual analysis’ (Bottoms 
2000). According to Glaser and Strauss, “the purpose of the constant comparative method of 
joint coding and analysis is to generate theory more systematically…by using explicit coding 
and analytic procedures” (Glaser and Strauss 1967: p.102). Such ‘thematic analysis’ and 
coding allows the systematic ‘comparative analysis’ of the qualitative data obtained in the 
semi-structured interviews, leading to the ‘emergence’ of a more formal theoretical 
hypothesis.  
Three main processes embody ‘Grounded Theory’. Firstly, the interview transcripts were 
subjected to ‘textual analysis’ through ‘Open Coding’ which fragmented the material and 
identified concepts within the data. “The analyst starts by coding each incident in his data 
into as many categories of analysis as possible, as categories emerge or as data emerge that 
fit an existing category” (Glaser & Strauss 1967: p.105). This process has been defined as, 
“breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data” (Strauss & 
Corbin 1990: p.61). As the coding of the interview transcripts progressed, sub-categories, 
links and other analytically developed thoughts were identified from the ‘richness’ of such 
qualitative material. These were recorded in the form of memos, which were later examined 
to aid in the development of a hypothesis. Although computer software, such as the various 
100 
 
versions of N-Vivo, can be utilised to speed up this process and assist with both coding and 
retrieval, and though time consuming, the researcher preferred to ‘manually’ code all the 
transcript material, as  this developed a greater ‘hands on’ understanding and feel for the 
data and the issues it contained.  
The second process to which the interview transcript data was subjected was ‘Axial Coding’, 
which seeks to, “begin the process of reassembling data that were fractured during open 
coding. In axial coding, categories are related to their subcategories to form more precise 
and complete explanations about phenomena” (Strauss & Corbin 1998: p.124). While 
Strauss and Corbin later developed a specific ‘Coding Paradigm’ for this part of the coding 
process, based around the four categories of Conditions, Interaction among the Actors, 
Strategies and Tactics, and Consequences, this was explicitly rejected by Glaser, who argued 
it went against the original concepts of ‘Grounded Theory‘, namely ‘emergence’ and 
‘discovery’, by attempting to ‘fit’ the data into pre-constructed paradigms (Dey 1999: pp. 
106-7). Rather, Glaser developed a much wider range of coding families to allow far greater 
flexibility, while at the same time acknowledging that they were preconceived and insisting 
they only be used if they emerged from the data. Consequently, given the complex and 
varied nature of the data which was obtained for this research in multiple national ‘case 
studies’, it appeared more appropriate to follow Glaser’s model.   
Finally, having linked and integrated categories and subcategories in the data, in effect re-
assembling the raw data, the interview material was subjected to ‘Selective Coding’ where 
integration occurred around a central category which ‘emerged’ from the data, in this case 
the ‘human factors’ associated with counter-terrorism. “A central category has analytic 
power. What gives it that power is its ability to pull the other categories together to form an 
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explanatory whole. Also a central category should be able to account for considerable 
variation within categories” (Strauss & Corbin 1998: p.146). Both Glaser and Strauss provide 
separate guides to the criteria necessary for such a central category (Ibid: p.147). However, 
to achieve this point in the research, Glaser and Strauss in their earlier publication suggest 
that parsimony in variables will occur, the number of categories will be reduced and 
theoretical saturation will be achieved (Glaser and Strauss 1967: p.111). In summary, 
“selective coding is the process of integrating and refining the theory. In integration, 
categories are organized around a central explanatory concept….once a commitment is 
made to a central idea, major categories are related to it through explanatory statements of 
relationships” (Strauss and Corbin 1998: p.161).   
Such a research method allowed a great deal of flexibility in the initial stages of the 
gathering and processing of the research material and given the complex nature of the 
subject field this initial flexibility was essential, allowing the necessary range for objective 
analysis. As the interview transcripts were processed through the various stages of 
‘Grounded Theory’ described, the resultant ‘Independent Variables’ were further collected 
under the emerging areas of ‘human factors’:  
 Personal Relationships 
 Individual Capabilities 
 Effective Leadership 
 Technical Interface 
 Organisational Culture 
 Community Engagement 
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This structure, based on the emergent ‘Higher Codes’ from the use of ‘Grounded Theory’, 
was utilised as a framework in the writing of the thesis, providing the chapter headings and 
aspects of ‘human factors’ to be examined. It also lends itself to comparative analysis, and 
indeed benchmarking, between both countries and also the different thematic areas due to 
its logical and consistent structuring.  
g. Data Tables 
The next stage of the methodological process was to develop data tables utilising the 
‘independent variables’ that emerged after subjecting the interview transcripts to the 
various stages of the ‘Grounded Theory’ variant described. These data tables were based 
around the ‘truth tables’ used at the initial stages of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), 
which is a comparative research method based on Boolean algebra, the algebra of sets and 
logic (See Ragin 1989).  
With the ‘Independent Variables’ forming the horizontal X axis and the interviews by 
country forming the ‘Fixed Variables’ on the vertical Y axis, this allowed the use of a simple 
binary code to identify the presence or absence in a particular interview of a wider subject 
variable, effectively a particular counter-terrorist measure. Though only an example is 
shown following, these simple tables were utilised to calculate the frequency and inform 
and calculate the tiered data tables discussed shortly, which informed the chapters. 
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Table 1: Example of Data Table facilitating Comparative Analysis 
 
INTERVIEWS Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 3 Variable 4 Variable 5 
Interview 1 
UK 
0 1 0 1 1 
Interview 2 
Ireland 
1 1 1 0 0 
Interview 3 
France 
1 0 0 1 0 
Interview 4 
Spain 
0 1 0 1 1 
Interview 5 
Israel  
1 1 0 0 1 
Interview 6 
Turkey 
0 0 1 1 0 
Interview 7 
US 
0 1 1 0 1 
 
Once the emergent data from all 172 interviews had been input and the data tables 
completed, examination along appropriate ‘rows’ or ‘columns’ facilitated comparative 
analysis, not only between countries, but also between separate interviews and between 
specific variables. Similar data tables utilising qualitative data obtained from interviews of 
policing and security force officials have previously been developed, tried and ‘field tested’ 
by the researcher in a number of Government and EU client publications on various security 
related subjects (See for example Clutterbuck and Warnes 2011). 
h. Frequency Analysis 
For the research behind this thesis, these populated data tables allowed a ranking of 
substantive significance (not statistical), as perceived by the interviewees, through a level of 
frequency analysis. At this point the procedure used for this research diverged from Ragin’s 
QCA. This frequency analysis provided a ‘Quantitative’ element from the ‘Qualitative’ 
interview data, adding to the validity of the research data by providing a perceived 
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weighting of the various counter-terrorist measures by the practitioners, supported by the 
‘Qualitative’ descriptions of such measures by the interviewees. 
Using such a ranking of perceived significance allowed a data frequency analysis, where for 
example if out of twenty French interviews, fifteen interviewees mentioned the Vigipirate 
Security Plan as a critical part of the French counter-terrorist response, a 75% score would 
lead to this being considered a ‘Tier 1’ response. Having used such a data frequency analysis 
to identify ‘scorings’ for each of the counter-terrorist measures raised in the interviews, 
these were then grouped both by subject area, under the emerging ‘Independent Variables’ 
previously detailed, and by scored ‘Tiers’. These ‘Tiers’ were organised into three levels 
based on the perceived ranking of the relevant national interviewees: 
 ‘Tier 1’ =  > 66% 
 ‘Tier 2’ = 33% to 66% 
 ‘Tier 3’ = < 33% 
In some cases, because of their specialisations in one area and lack of knowledge in another, 
certain interviewees did not answer or cover particular sections of the interview plan. In 
these cases, as they had not discussed an area in relation to a particular ‘independent 
variable’ (counter-terrorist measure) for the purposes of that particular frequency analysis, 
they were not included in the calculation. Thus if twenty one French officials were 
interviewed, one could not comment and fifteen mentioned the Vigipirate  Security Plan, 
this would still lead to a 75% score as it would be based on 15 out of 20 positively 
commenting on the Plan.  
This frequency analysis was used to group the emerging ‘independent variables’ (counter-
terrorist measures) both by subject and ‘tier’ (perceived effectiveness or lack of it) under 
105 
 
the six higher codes of ‘human factors’ previously detailed. Subsequently 47 tiered thematic 
data tables were constructed containing, brief ‘buckets of data’ describing the relevant 
‘independent variable’, approximately 15 each for the three linked subject fields of Policing, 
Intelligence and the Military. Though not all of these will be utilised in the thesis, the most 
significant will be used to populate the various chapters they informed.  
The resultant grouping of counter-terrorist measures both by subject and ‘tier’ in these 
tables has been used to inform the framework and writing of the thesis. However, it is 
important to point out that even though a particular measure is perceived by the 
interviewees at ‘Tier 3’, it has still been raised by ‘practitioners’ and has a level of 
significance. Finally, a number of important outliers emerged, which shed an interesting and 
original perspective on certain measures and the ‘human factors’ behind them, which 
contrasted with the majority perception and these are highlighted in the thesis.   
An example of one of the tiered data tables follows, in this case relating to the data that 
emerged regarding Policing experience and expertise:  
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Table 2: Example of Policing Experience and Expertise in Counter Terrorism 
 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
1 
 Long Garda 
experience 
countering 
‘Subversive’ 
Republicans 
since 
formation of 
the State in 
1922 
Countering 
Islamist 
terrorism 
‘before 
9/11’ 
 
Previously 
dealt with 
significant 
international 
terrorism on 
French 
territory 
Long 
experience 
of countering 
Basque ETA 
since late 
1960s  
Long 
experience 
countering 
Palestinian 
terrorism 
since the 
State’s 
formation 
in 1948 
Experience  
countering the 
Kurdish PKK 
since it 
launched its 
campaign 
began in 1984 
 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Historic 
experience 
of dealing 
with ‘Irish 
Terrorism’ 
of PIRA  
 
Change 
from ‘Irish 
Terrorism’  
to Islamist  
Lack of 
knowledge 
& 
experience 
of Islamist 
extremism 
    Failure to 
identify 
9/11 
conspiracy 
and 
HUMINT 
weakness  
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Effective 
break up of 
Met SO12 
& national 
SB system  
 
Disbanding 
of RUC & 
loss of  
knowledge-
especially 
RUC SB 
 
Expertise in 
railway of 
BTP & at 
Heathrow 
& City of 
London 
with SO18 
  Blinkered 
focus on 
threat of ETA 
prior to 
Atocha 11-M 
Bombings in 
2004? 
 
Difficulty of 
dealing with 
indoctrinated 
Marxist – 
Leninism of 
GRAPO  
Focus on 
Palestinian 
terrorism 
&Hezbollah 
negated 
response to 
Jewish 
extremism? 
 
However 
security 
forces 
understand 
& infiltrate 
Jewish 
terrorists 
now more 
of a priority 
after Rabin 
killed 1995 
Focus on PKK 
to extent the 
threat from 
Islamists 
marginalised? 
 
Islamist 
terrorism seen 
as threat to 
‘Western 
interests’ in 
Turkey, not 
the Turkish 
state itself 
 
Difficulty of 
understanding 
or dealing 
with extreme 
left DHKP/C 
FBI success 
in 
infiltrating 
extreme 
right wing 
Militia 
 
Due to 
strategic 
turf 
battles, a 
failure to 
effectively 
leverage 
local 
knowledge- 
expertise 
of police in 
CT? 
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i. Quality of Research Design 
Having outlined the case study research design and logical research methods which were 
utilised to ‘process’ the field research data, it is worth focusing attention on the quality of 
the design. Yin highlights four key tests which can be applied to an empirical case based 
design to assess its quality (pp.33-39). These are construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability:   
 Construct Validity  
A major concern of any research is that its methodology fails to be effective or operationally 
valid, leading to a significant element of subjectivity entering into the field research and the 
assessment of the resultant data. In effect, this is concerned with the extent to which a test 
measures what it claims to be measuring. While the use in this research of multiple sources, 
through interviews and case studies, along with a logical processing of the resultant data, 
assists in strengthening such validity, the research is still very much dependent on 
interpretive data, in particular the perceptions of counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’. However, 
as this research highlights, although there is a reliance on such perceptions, these are from 
experts in their fields with operational experience, providing ‘key informant’ interviews. At 
the same time, the breadth of this expertise from various countries policing, intelligence and 
military specialists at different levels, regarding different specialities, and the sheer number 
of interviewees from seven countries, helps strengthen such validity. Nevertheless, 
consideration must be taken that the measurement in this thesis is based on a frequency 
based evaluation of expert opinion and the implications of this for effective counter-
terrorist measures.   
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 Internal Validity 
Yin states that a concern relating to any explanatory/causal research, is that the researcher 
may make incorrect ‘inferences’ if all aspects of the research subject are not considered and 
rival explanations are not addressed. This is usually concerned with how effectively the 
findings of a piece of research are caused by the data that was collected. The processing of 
the data from N = 172 interviews through a variant of ‘Grounded Theory’, which has been 
previously outlined in detail within this methodology chapter, linked the significance, indeed 
centrality, of ‘human factors’ to effective counter-terrorism. As this causal link is based on 
the claims of ‘practitioners’ and their perceptions of effectiveness, utilising a frequency 
based evaluation, care must be taken in how their subjective responses can be translated 
into objective claims and findings.  
As well as the measures taken to ensure construct validity detailed, both prior to and 
continually during the research, rival explanations were considered, contained in opposing 
propositions and their associated literature. In particular consideration was given to the 
various arguments raised by more ‘Critical’ literature on counter-terrorism, highlighted by 
the research of Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning and Smyth (Jackson et. al. 2009, and 2011). These 
‘alternative’ arguments include that the risk from terrorism has not significantly increased, 
rather the propaganda usage of the word ‘terrorism’ has multiplied (Goodin 2006), that the 
United States foreign policy excesses (Blum 2002) and international imposition of its 
economic (Barber 2003) and cultural norms (Sarder and Davies 2002) motivated the 9/11 
attacks, that the United States and certain ‘Western’ nations have deliberately heightened 
public ‘risk perceptions’ for their own politico-military agendas (Vidal 2002, Chomsky 2003), 
that current international ‘counter-terrorist’ actions will not only fail to negate terrorism, 
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but will actually exacerbate the problem and lead to further terrorist attacks (Burbach and 
Clarke eds. 2002) and that the greatest victim of the current ‘War on Terror’ will be the 
traditional diplomatic, political and legal values and norms of world order (Falk 2003). 
However, the majority of these alternative arguments are framed at the strategic level, 
rather than at the operational and even tactical level, which this research is focused on.  
 External Validity (Generalisability) 
A third concern is external validity, whether the results of the research can be applied 
beyond the immediate case research itself. This is particularly problematic if the research is 
based on a single case study, and consequently, the suitability for the replication of this 
research has been increased and strengthened by its utilisation of comparative analysis 
amongst a holistic multiple case design, based on seven different case study countries. 
Although the seven countries can all be considered ‘Western’ in their nature, as the earlier 
summaries of each country in this methodology chapter demonstrate, they all have very 
different historical, cultural, linguistic and religious differences. In addition, the countries 
have all faced different types of terrorist threat, while the way each country’s police and 
security forces are organised varies, all leading to a broad variety of responses and adding to 
the broader validity of the research. Nevertheless, to further strengthen external validity, a 
wider set of case study countries could have been examined, including countries with very 
different political structures, culture and/or in different continents, but this was beyond the 
time and financial resources of the researcher.  
 Reliability 
The final concern is whether the research is reliable; could the same logical steps be 
followed and replicated at a later stage? While the same semi-structured interview plan was 
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used for each interview, this qualitative research is very much based around the textual 
analysis of interview data from individual police, intelligence or military ‘practitioners’. 
Consequently it would not be possible to perfectly replicate each interviewees’ responses, 
with a multitude of potential variables, such as location, context, mood and attitude of the 
respondents. Nevertheless, given the problems of reliability associated with the qualitative 
nature of the research, the use of the semi-structured generic interview plan detailed earlier 
in the chapter at least provided a higher level of validity, if not reliability itself. To assist with 
providing such a higher level of validity, each step has been recorded and all data has been 
retained in a logical manner to maintain a form of database, comprising copies of questions, 
interview tapes, copies of transcripts, computer data and backup CD-ROMs and sticks. 
j. Summary and Publications  
In summary, the research methodology behind the thesis is based on four main phases: 
Interview plan and collection, a ‘Grounded Theory’ variant, Data tables and Frequency 
analysis. These can be summarised with the key publications providing the warrant for a 
given procedure on that particular aspect of the process:    
Interview Plan & Collection (Yin 2003) 
 The design of the semi-structured interview plan around ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
– inverted to ‘why’ and ‘how’.  
 The breadth of catchment, nature and number of interviewees (N = 172)  
 The three critical areas of policing, intelligence and the military in counter-
terrorism 
 The use of a limited number of academic interviews  
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 The reasons for the seven case study countries of the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
France, Spain, Israel, Turkey and the United States 
‘Grounded Theory’ Variant (Glaser & Strauss 1967) 
 The use of a ‘Grounded Theory’ variant for the textual analysis of the interview 
transcripts 
 The ‘Open’ and ‘Axial’ Coding and ‘independent variables’ emerging from the 
processing of the interviews, identifying the ‘Higher Codes’ of: 
o Personal Relationships 
o Individual Capabilities 
o Effective Leadership 
o Technical Interface 
o Organisational Culture 
o Community Engagement 
Data Tables (Ragin 1989) 
 The use of data table frameworks for policing, intelligence and the military themes, 
with the emerging independent variables of each subject forming the horizontal X 
axis and the interviews by country forming the vertical Y axis 
 The use of a simple binary code to identify presence or absence in a particular 
interview of a wider subject variable (counter-terrorist measure) which emerged 
from the ‘Grounded theory’ populating these data tables  
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Frequency Analysis 
 The ranking of the significance of that measure according to the practitioners, for 
example if out of twenty French interviews, fifteen mentioned the Vigipirate 
security plan as a critical response, a 75% score would lead to this being considered 
a ‘Tier 1’ response 
 The structuring and percentages of the ‘Tier’ system for classifying ranking 
 The importance of considering emerging outliers from the process 
k. Ethical Statement 
Given the sensitive nature of this research into counter-terrorism and in particular the need 
to protect the identities of the ‘practitioner’ interviewees, along with sensitive 
methodological or operational material, very strict protocols were introduced. Aspects of 
these interview protocols are detailed in ‘Interviewing Government and Official Sources: An 
introductory guide’ (Clutterbuck and Warnes 2013). These measures also conformed to the 
ethical practices outlined by the British Sociological Association (BSA 2002) which are 
detailed and referenced following, along with the measures introduced in the research to 
ensure  compliance with them:-  
 Anonymity & Confidentiality 
“34. The anonymity and privacy of those who participate in the research process should be 
respected. Personal information concerning research participants should be kept 
confidential” (p.5).  
“35. Where possible, threats to the confidentiality and anonymity of research data should be 
anticipated by researchers. The identities and research records of those participating in 
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research should be kept confidential whether or not an explicit pledge of confidentiality has 
been given” (p.5) 
“36. Where appropriate and practicable, methods for preserving anonymity should be used, 
including the removal of identifiers, the use of pseudonyms and other technical means for 
breaking the link between data and identifiable individuals…Members should also take care 
to prevent data being published or released in a form that would permit the actual or 
potential identification of research participants” (p.5) 
To ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of the counter-terrorist ‘practitioners’, each 
interviewee was allocated a unique reference number (URN), that reflected which country 
they were from and the sequence of interview, thus UK2 was the second UK interviewee, 
while TU5 is the fifth Turkish interviewee. These URNs have been used to reference quotes 
used from the interviews. At the same time, to add some level of provenance to the 
statements or quotes used in the thesis, general information is provided in relation to an 
interviewee’s rank and parent organisation, thus for example, ‘a senior officer from the 
Metropolitan Police stated’, ‘an Irish Army Ranger Wing officer believed’ etc. In the cases of 
some of the intelligence officials, not even the name of their parent body was detailed. Thus 
no particular ranks were used, which might assist in identification, and no names were 
recorded. While there was not the same concern in relation to the small number of 
academics, it was deemed easier to extend blanket anonymity to all those interviewed for 
this research. Consequently, only the researcher/author knows their exact identities and has 
given his word to maintain that anonymity regardless of Freedom of Information (FoI) or 
indeed any other pressure or incentive. 
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 Protection of Participants 
“13. Ensure that the physical, social and psychological well-being of research participants is 
not adversely affected by the research. They should strive to protect the rights of those they 
study, their interests, sensitivities and privacy, while recognising the difficulty of potentially 
conflicting interests” (p.2) 
“26. It is therefore incumbent upon members to be aware of the possible consequences of 
their work. Wherever possible, they should attempt to anticipate, and to guard against, 
consequences for research participants that can be predicted to be harmful” (p.4) 
To ensure protection of the participants, as well as the strict anonymity and confidentiality 
protocols previously detailed, the process of the interview, nature of the research and use 
of the data were all clearly outlined to the participants prior to their interviews. 
Interviewees were also reminded that they did not have to answer the questions if this put 
them in a difficult situation. On several occasions, because of operational sensitivities and 
their closeness to recent experience, participants politely declined to answer specific 
questions, or certain sections of the interview. Clearly this was fully respected and 
understood.   
 Consent 
“16. As far as possible, participation in sociological research should be based on the freely 
given informed consent of those studied. This implies a responsibility on the sociologist to 
explain in appropriate detail, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the research is 
about, who is undertaking and financing it, why it is being undertaken, and how it is to be 
disseminated and used” (p.3). 
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As well as all the other protocols and explanations already detailed, prior to each interview, 
having fully explained the nature, purpose and use of the research, interviewees were asked 
to confirm their consent and willingness to participate in the interview. It was made clear to 
them that at any stage the interviewees could stop the interview, that they did not have to 
continue, and that they did not have to answer particular questions.  
 Warning & Self-Censorship  
“18. Research participants should understand how far they will be afforded anonymity and 
confidentiality and should be able to reject the use of data-gathering devices such as tape 
recorders and video cameras” (p.3). 
“20. When making notes, filming or recording for research purposes, sociologists should 
make clear to research participants the purpose of the notes, filming or recording and, as 
precisely as possible, to whom it will be communicated” (p.3) 
“34…. In some cases it may be necessary to decide whether it is proper or appropriate even 
to record certain kinds of sensitive information” (p.5) 
In addition to the various protocols already discussed, at the start of some of the interviews, 
respondents were asked whether they were willing to be recorded on a mini tape-recorder, 
but in the majority of cases they preferred for hand written contemporaneous notes to be 
taken during the interview. However, in other cases, particularly with those countries where 
the use of a tape recorder would be culturally inappropriate and might cause offence, only 
the recording of written notes was offered and confirmed. Regardless of which method was 
used to record data, all material was anonymised. Interviewees were also warned to avoid 
discussing any issues or material which might be considered methodologically or 
operationally sensitive, or which might in any way compromise them or their organisation. 
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Additionally, all recorded material from the interviews was reviewed by the researcher, 
utilising the knowledge from his own previous service in both the military and the police. In 
only two cases was material given in interview, which was considered by the researcher to 
be sensitive, inappropriate to place in the public domain and which did not add substantially 
to the strength of the thesis. Consequently this self-censorship led to this material not being 
utilised in the thesis.   
l. Conclusion 
It is hoped that the research design outlined above provides a useful multi-case approach 
with which to examine the various case study countries’ counter-terrorist measures, in 
response to the threat of terrorism, in particular their effectiveness, proportionality and the 
‘human factors’ behind them. Ultimately it is hoped that any explanatory knowledge 
developed through the research will identify ‘best practice’; those measures introduced by 
the seven ‘case study’ countries which have effectively minimised, prevented and controlled 
terrorist threats, their associated ‘human factors’ and any lessons to be drawn from them.  
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4. Introduction to Analytic Section 
Having placed the research in context within the wider field of counter-terrorism through 
the introduction and literature review, and having also explained the methodology utilised 
in the preceding chapter, the following analytic chapters will seek to address and answer the 
research question. Namely, ‘How significant are personal relationships, individual 
capabilities, effective leadership, the human-technical interface, organisational cultures 
and community engagement to effective counter-terrorism?’ While comparisons will be 
made in relation to specific factors in this question between the different country 
responses, and some level of evaluation will be made about the relative importance of each 
individual ‘human factor’, the objective is not to provide a systematic assessment of their 
relative importance in relation to each other. To answer this research question regarding 
the significance of ‘human factors’ in counter-terrorism, the data collection deliberately 
focused on developing empirical data from interviewing ‘human’ counter-terrorists, rather 
than relying on theoretical writings or the repetition of previously published secondary 
source material, which risks leading to ‘circular-reporting’78 (Silke 2004).  
Consequently many of the quotes utilised in this section come from those interviewed, who 
were actually involved in the practical delivery of counter-terrorism. Additionally, while 
much previous research has been conducted around policing and the criminal justice 
system, this research sought to answer the research question in relation to the wider field of 
counter-terrorism, including the use of intelligence and police tactical/military responses. 
Consequently, while the focus of the research is predominantly on domestic counter-
terrorism, when discussed by interviewees, data or input on overseas experiences and 
operations will be incorporated. 
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This analytic section will thus draw on the primary source data obtained from counter-
terrorist specialists in the fields of policing, intelligence and the military to examine six key 
areas which emerged from the interview data, each highlighting the significance of 
different, but interlinked, human factors in the pursuit of effective counter-terrorism. These 
human factors, individually covered in their associated chapters, will not only be examined 
in relation to answering the main research question, but also in how their underlying issues 
relate to and interact with current analytic concepts and constructs from the wider field of 
Sociology in such areas as Criminology, Organisational Sociology, Political Sociology and the 
Sociology of Work and Occupations. Additionally, while the main focus of the research is on 
counter-terrorism, each of the human factors discussed will also be considered in relation to 
its own ‘mirror image’… the way that terrorist individuals and organisations utilise and 
exploit the same factors in the development and pursuit of their objectives. 
However, although the emerging six areas of human factors, their associated themes and 
issues remain fundamentally the same, given that the interviewees came from seven 
different case study countries, there are inevitably questions regarding the transferability of 
concepts, their practical applications and interoperability. Clearly, the emphasis and focus 
on these human factors in relation to counter-terrorism will vary a great deal in each 
country depending on the nature of the particular terrorist threats the country faces, as well 
as the national culture, history, political and legal systems and the structure of the police 
and security forces in the country concerned. The significance of these human factors will 
also vary between the three counter-terrorist fields previously detailed, hence while 
positive public relations and community engagement may not be as relevant in the field of 
intelligence; they would clearly have more of an impact in the field of policing, where 
engagement and interface with the public and local communities is more critical. Such 
119 
 
variable factors across both countries and fields will be considered throughout the analytic 
chapters, when assessing the transferability, generalisability and interoperability of these six 
human factors and their associated themes and issues. Nevertheless, since such human 
factors are based around the ‘Mark 1 Human Being’, theoretically they are inherently 
transferable across both countries and cultures. However, as expected the data highlighted 
the varying degrees of effectiveness and importance of specific ‘human factors’ in the 
different case study countries.  
While considering these background factors, the initial analytic chapter will examine 
arguably the most important of these human factors, the personal relationships, interaction 
and engagement of the various types of counter-terrorists with local communities and the 
resultant understanding and trust of that community, or indeed lack of it, which stems from 
those relationships and contacts. This includes the involvement of local community 
members and businesses in actively supporting the authorities, acting as ‘unlikely counter-
terrorists’. In overseas operations such relationships are critical to developing an 
understanding of the ‘Human Terrain’ and the development of local intelligence to counter 
terrorism when it is utilised as one part of a wider insurgency (AFM 2010).79  
In a domestic context, as numerous examples from various countries and communities have 
arguably demonstrated, this level of trust from the local community, and the resulting 
legitimacy, is important, not only to the effective countering of terrorism, but in the 
maintenance of public order and dealing with conventional crime (Bradford 2012). As a 
result, although the focus of this research is on the impact of these human factors on 
effective counter-terrorism, they have direct overlaps and links with concepts of procedural 
justice, institutional legitimacy, social inclusion and public cooperation within the wider 
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criminal justice system. Consequently these sociological concepts, associated with the 
Procedural Justice Model, will be considered when examining the data in relation to the 
wider research question, in particular the significance of personal relationships, 
communications, interactions and their associated perceptions between police, security 
forces and the public (Hough et. al. 2010).  
At both a more internal and micro level, the significance of the skills, capabilities, training 
and development of individual counter-terrorist practitioners is examined in the second 
analytic chapter, not just in terms of counter-terrorist policing, but equally in relation to 
intelligence services and military special forces. How are individuals recruited, assessed and 
selected and what basic characteristics and abilities do they need to possess? Once selected, 
how are such individuals trained and what skills and expertise do they develop? Finally, 
given the sensitivity of the field and the potential impact at even the most junior levels, how 
do organisations involved in counter-terrorism ensure that the ‘right people’ are selected in 
the first place, or do they? How do they identify if an individual is the ‘wrong’ type of 
person? Such human factors and their associated skills are reflected and will be examined 
against concepts of competency frameworks and various forms of situational awareness and 
intuitive practice.  
The third human factor to be examined, which impacts broadly and often significantly across 
various areas and levels of counter-terrorism, is leadership, command and control (C2). 
Much of the effectiveness of such leadership depends on personal relationships, this time 
internally within organisations, the individual skills and capabilities of those in leadership 
and command positions, and the wider group dynamics, communication and organisational 
culture of the various policing, intelligence and military structures the individual agents 
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serve and lead. These particular human factors not only touch on aspects of Sociology, in 
particular the Sociology of Work and Occupations, but also aspects of Business 
Management, thus concepts from both will be considered when examining the interview 
data in relation to the research question initially detailed.  
The importance of Socio Technical Systems (STS) and the integration of human factors with 
technology in a socio-technical interface are examined in the fourth analytic chapter. This 
highlights the interrelationships and interaction between individual counter-terrorists and 
technology and the links to organisational processes and human skills in such counter-
terrorist structures. As well as questioning whether technology can become a false promise 
and ‘mere window dressing’ without the appropriate human skills to effectively operate it, 
the chapter will also examine the nature of technology as a ‘double edged sword’ and the 
technological ‘Learning Competition’ between terrorists and counter-terrorists. While the 
broader chapter has similarities to the sociological concept of Sociotechnical Theory, the 
‘Learning Competition’ is reflected in certain aspects of ‘Crime Scripts’, with which they will 
be considered.  
Clearly counter-terrorists are individual agents within larger structural institutions. Thus the 
fifth analytic chapter will seek to answer the part of the research question relating to 
organisations, through examining such institutions in terms of their group dynamics, 
internal and external communications and occupational and organisational cultures. These 
human factors will be examined in relation to the sociological concepts of Organisational 
and Occupational Cultures and Occupational Deviance.  
The final analytic chapter will take the research back full circle, returning to the human 
factors of personal relationships and communities, specifically examining the role of 
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communities against terrorism. Consequently, the chapter will consider engagement with 
communities to counter terrorism and its role in counter-radicalisation while providing 
community counter narratives. Given the nature of current terrorist threats and their 
exploitation of individuals and communities for their own purposes, the chapter will 
question whether a way forward in effective counter-terrorism is the development and 
enhancement of communities against terrorism?  
The conclusion will draw together the results of the overall research, including an 
overarching assessment of the six human factors and their significance to effective counter-
terrorism. More specifically, it will seek to bring together the various analytic strands 
relating to the human factors discussed, in order to answer the research question as to how 
significant human factors are to effective counter-terrorism. From addressing this question, 
relevant implications and wider conclusions about effective counter-terrorism will be 
drawn. Ultimately the conclusion will seek to identify examples of ‘good practice’ and any 
lessons or recommendations that can be drawn from them.  
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5. Personal Relationships 
a. Introduction 
It can be argued that the relationships, perception, trust and associated support of the 
general public towards those policing and security organisations responsible for delivering 
national, or indeed international, counter-terrorist (CT) measures can prove critical to their 
effectiveness. This is particularly the case with policing, where the majority of roles require 
significant engagement and interaction with the public and local communities, in an effort 
to develop and build trust, local knowledge and the support of that community (Warnes 
2011). To a greater or lesser degree, these relationships, interaction with the community 
and their associated generation of trust and local knowledge, permeate the various 
functions of the police, whether countering crime or terrorism. In theory this should reflect 
the words of Sir Robert Peel, the founder of the Metropolitan Police, who stated that, “The 
police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the 
historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police” (Peel 
1829). 
Consequently, Tyler, Bradford, Jackson, Hough, Myhill, Quinton, Stanko and others argue in 
relation to the Procedural Justice Model, that police legitimacy and associated compliance 
with the law is not only linked to their effectiveness in countering crime, but also how police 
interact with the public. Thus “when police provide individuals with appropriate status 
information (through fair procedures and respectful personal treatment), they seem more 
likely to perceive the police to be legitimate. They are also more likely to comply with the 
law, with the effect flowing largely through moral alignment” (Jackson et. al. 2012:p.1060). 
While historically Weber saw such ‘Legitimacy’ as a critical pillar of political authority, Tyler 
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& Mentovich state that “Legitimacy is a quality that is possessed by an authority, a law, or 
an institution that leads others to feel obligated to accept its directives” (Tyler & Mentovich 
2011).  
This factor appears particularly relevant amongst culturally and linguistically diverse 
minority communities, where research has shown that when minority communities perceive 
the behaviour of police during their interactions as fair and without prejudice, their 
confidence and trust increases (Bradford, Jackson & Stanko 2009). Such confidence in, and 
perceived legitimacy of, the police amongst both minority communities and the wider public 
is critical to the level of interaction and engagement, the development of local community 
knowledge, trust, contacts and the concomitant willingness of the public to pass on 
information or report offences and suspicions. As Bradford points out “this is important 
because the police rely on some form of public cooperation in almost everything they do and 
current research suggests that judgements about the legitimacy of the police are a key 
determinant of such a cooperation” (Bradford 2012: p.2) 
However, within the wider field of counter-terrorism it is not only the police who interact 
with the public and local communities, consequently it will be argued that many of the 
factors behind the Procedural Justice Model, such as positive personal relationships, fair 
treatment, developed trust, perceived legitimacy and institutional authority are equally 
transferable to other areas of counter-terrorism. While intelligence agencies clearly lack the 
immediacy and level of overt public interface, operating behind a layer of operational and 
methodological secrecy, at a more specific covert level, relationships are equally critical in 
the development of local community intelligence. The military on the other hand regularly 
engage with communities, both domestically when acting in a Military Aid to the Civil Power 
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(MACP) role and while abroad operating ‘amongst’ local indigenous communities. This in 
turn has led to a greater focus on the development, training and deployment of Army Civil 
Affairs (CA) Units (US35/37), Stabilisation Units and an increased emphasis on Civil-Military 
Co-Operation (CIMIC) operations and doctrine (FM 3-05.40 2006). As a US Civil Affairs 
specialist explained, “We need to develop an effective counter-insurgency force, from the 
‘tip of the spear’ with Delta, down to civil affairs, peacekeeping and nation building. We 
need to be able to transition from a pure military to civil-military control. If we’re going to 
win the ‘war on terror’, we can’t just use ‘kickers and shooters’, who are the tip of the 
arrowhead. You also need support elements and specifically civilian affairs to provide the tail 
feathers of the arrow, which guides the direction of the arrow” (US35). 
Thus whether fulfilling domestic security roles, international peace keeping missions or 
overseas counter-insurgency roles, positive military interaction and engagement with local 
communities is clearly significant to operational effectiveness. The criticality of developing 
such positive interaction and engagement with local communities, and the negative impact 
on legitimacy when the rule of law is ignored or excessive military actions occur has been 
repeatedly demonstrated during Coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (US37) 
(Kilcullen 2009). Consequently, a fundamental principle of any effective counter-insurgency 
strategy is to ‘Gain and Maintain Popular Support’, helping to generate authority and 
legitimise the campaign’s operations (FM-3-24 2007). In such potentially hostile 
environments this very much comes down to building individual personal relationships with 
the local population and their representatives, while working to develop a level of trust 
based on these. Critical to the development of this trust is an understanding, awareness and 
respect of the local community and culture (US33).80 
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b. Generating Interaction, Engagement, Legitimacy & Trust  
Within the domestic policing field, the importance of these personal relationships, and 
effective interaction and engagement with the local community were reflected in this 
research by police interviewees in all seven of the case study countries, particularly in 
relation to community policing and the public perceptions of police officers and their 
legitimacy, though with a different emphasis dependent upon national context. Both the 
tradition and respect of the unarmed British ‘Bobby on the Beat’ policing by consent (Reiner 
2010), and the public fondness for the uniformed Garda in Ireland were raised. In the latter 
case, and despite a perceived historic Irish dislike of authority (IR10), the Garda were seen 
as generating a sense of community trust, leading to a greater likelihood of the public 
reporting their concerns (IR3/10) (See Table 3 Following) 
In a more specific counter-terrorist context, the significance of this public trust, associated 
legitimacy and the resultant willingness to talk to the police were highlighted by a senior 
French Gendarmerie interviewee, who mentioned two separate incidents where local 
landlords in rural France had reported their concerns to the Gendarmerie (FR9). Subsequent 
enquiries based on these reports led to significant counter terrorist successes against both 
the Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne (ARB – Breton Revolutionary Army) and the Basque 
nationalist group Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA – Basque Fatherland and Freedom), resulting 
in both the recovery of stolen explosives and the arrest of the then heads of the ‘military’ 
wing of ETA.81  
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Table 3. POLICING INTERACTION & ENGAGEMENT 
 
Similar examples demonstrating public trust, interaction and engagement were raised by 
United Kingdom (UK) police interviewees, such as a self-storage worker, who phoned police 
in 2004, when a group of young British men of Pakistani origin stored half a ton of 
Ammonium Nitrate fertiliser in a West London storage facility.82 This led to the complex 
counter-terrorist Operation Crevice, which resulted in five life sentences for ‘conspiring to 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
      Community 
policing of 
state, 
municipal & 
local police 
units 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Respect & 
image of 
UK 
Policing 
‘By 
consent’ 
 
Tradition 
of 
unarmed 
‘Bobby’ & 
public 
support 
 
Image of 
New 
Scotland 
Yard, but 
how 
accurate? 
Traditional 
public 
regard & 
fondness 
for Garda 
despite 
humour 
 
Garda 
providing a 
sense of 
community 
trust leads 
to 
reporting  
 
Historic 
Irish dislike 
of 
authority 
 
Lack of 
minority 
access & 
members 
& difficult 
insight 
Lack of public 
trust in 
policing as a 
legacy of 
WWII 
collaboration 
Public 
perspective of 
Policia Nacional 
professionalism 
compared to 
Policia 
Municipal  
 
However 
Spanish Policing 
model seen as 
‘upholding law’, 
not serving 
public 
 
Historic legacy 
of previous 
brutality & fear 
from Francoist 
period, 
especially 
Guardia Civil 
 
Priority of 
Police is 
security & 
counter-
terrorism not 
‘Hearts & 
Minds’ 
 
INP so busy 
with security 
that it 
impacts on 
routine 
policing roles 
 
Suggestion 
that as a 
result 
security 
should 
become the 
exclusive 
responsibility 
of MAGAV 
allowing INP 
to focus on 
traditional 
policing 
 
Very 
different 
community 
perspectives 
General 
public 
support of 
Polis and 
Jandarma 
 
However in 
Kurdish 
areas legacy 
of fear, 
particularly 
Jandarma 
 
Culture of 
speed of 
response to 
threats, but 
TNP will 
now 
develop 
intel. & info 
before 
acting  
 
Polis not 
seen as a 
such a 
political 
organisation 
as the 
Turkish 
Army 
However, 
public 
remoteness 
of some 
Federal 
policing 
structures 
 
Prosecution 
versus intel. 
as Police 
are often 
unwilling to 
commit 
time & 
resources to 
intel. 
gathering if 
don’t think 
it will lead 
to 
prosecution 
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cause explosions’. Finally, as a direct result of concerns raised by members of the Muslim 
community in Bristol during 2008, police investigated and later arrested the radicalised 
Islamist convert Andrew ‘Isa’ Ibrahim, who was found to be in an advanced stage of 
fabricating his own suicide vest, comprising HMTD explosives, with enhanced fragmentation 
from ball bearings, for a solitary, so called, ‘lone wolf’ type attack on a nearby shopping 
centre.83 
Such interview responses and the associated examples raised by police interviewees from 
different countries, provide at least tacit support for the concepts behind the Procedural 
Justice Model previously mentioned, which contrasts normative compliance, based on 
perceived legitimacy and institutional authority, with the previous managerialist and 
deterrence based policing models and their more formalised instrumental compliance 
(Loader 1994, Kennedy 2008, Braga & Weiburg 2012). This contrast has been highlighted in 
the field of counter-terrorist policing by Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq’s (2010) study of the 
Muslim American Community and in wider British policing by Myhill and Quinton (2011). 
Five key factors behind such normative compliance have been identified by Hough et. Al. 
(2010: p.3): 
 The treatment people receive at the hands of the police and justice officials 
 The resultant trust that people have in institutions of justice 
 The legitimacy people confer as a consequence of this trust on institutions of justice 
 The authority these institutions can then command when they are regarded as 
legitimate 
 People’s consequent preparedness to obey the police, comply with the law and 
cooperate with justice 
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However, while the various academic concepts associated with the Procedural Justice 
Model have traditionally been framed around the fields of policing and indeed the wider 
criminal justice system (Baird 2001), it was found, after processing and interpreting the data 
from the military counter-terrorists interviewed for this research, that there were 
considerable overlaps and elements of transferability with military counter-terrorism. This 
was particularly the case in MACP operations where the military were operating in domestic 
‘policing’ and security type roles. Nevertheless, as well as such Procedural Justice concepts 
as ‘fair treatment’, the ‘development of trust’, the ‘conferring of legitimacy’ and subsequent 
‘institutional authority’ one other critical factor which emerged from the military interviews 
was ‘public familiarity’ and the resultant level of interaction, engagement and trust 
associated with it (See Table 4 Following).  
Consequently, although most military interviewees from the various countries generally 
commented on the historical support and pride of the public in their armed forces, there 
emerged a clear distinction of perceptions between those countries where the uniformed 
military were regularly deployed and seen ‘on the street’ interacting with the public in 
MACP roles and those where they were not. Clearly this raises further questions about both 
the use of the military in domestic security roles and the militarisation of the police; 
however, while these issues are touched upon in other sections, their detailed examination 
is beyond the scope of this research (Wardlaw 1989: Chapter 10). 
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Table 4: MILITARY INTERACTION & ENGAGEMENT 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
 Due to its 
ATCP (MACP) 
roles the Army 
is seen as ‘part 
& parcel’ of 
Irish life  
 
 
Military 
regularly 
deployed 
for 
additional 
security 
measures 
as part of 
Vigipirate 
plan 
 Critical 
historical 
role of IDF in 
formation & 
defence of 
the nation 
and due to 
conscription 
part of 
national life  
  
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
UK public 
pride & 
support of 
the military 
 
UK public 
concern at 
military use 
in a 
domestic 
role – eg. 
‘Tanks’ 
outside 
Heathrow in 
2003 
 
Greater 
involvement 
of UK 
military in 
public life & 
wearing of 
uniforms 
following 
end of 
conflict in N. 
Ireland 
Irish military 
seen by public 
as 
peacekeepers, 
not aggressors, 
due to culture 
and previous 
UN roles  
 
This may place 
certain 
limitations & 
restrictions on 
their CT roles 
& usage 
 
Historic 
tradition of 
Irish service in 
US & UK 
military forces 
Public 
accept 
military in 
public life 
& used to 
seeing 
uniforms, 
due to 
conscripts 
until 1996 
– ‘The 
French 
public 
don’t bat 
an eyelid’ 
 
Positive 
public 
perception 
of French 
military 
 
Willingness 
to utilise 
tactical 
option & 
effective 
capability 
 
 
Element of 
public 
assurance 
in MACP 
roles- rail 
& CNI 
security 
 
Despite 
assurance 
some 
public still 
unhappy 
given the 
Francoist 
legacy – 
‘They like 
us to be 
there, but 
prefer not 
to see us’ 
 
Attitude to 
Ops. risk & 
example- 
Leganes 
 
Operation 
success 
against 
ETA & 
willing to 
intervene 
Historical 
emphasis on 
direct action, 
leading from 
the front & 
healthy 
rivalry 
 
Recent 
controversy 
over the IDF 
use in 
Lebanon & 
Gaza 
 
Very 
different 
perspectives 
on the 
military & its 
role amongst 
elements of 
the 
Palestinian 
community 
 
General public 
understanding 
& support of 
the Turkish 
Army given its 
historical role 
and male 
conscription 
 
Previous 
historical pride 
& status of 
Turkish 
military 
amongst public  
 
Very different 
perspectives of 
the military & 
its roles 
amongst 
elements of 
the Kurdish 
minority 
community 
US public 
very 
supportive 
of military 
in society 
with 
veterans 
groups, 
benefits 
etc.   
 
However, 
due to 
Posse 
Comitatus 
regulars 
not used 
so much in 
MACP role 
but rather 
National 
Guard 
 
Concern 
that 9/11 
saw the 
‘militar- 
isation ‘ of 
CT efforts 
away from 
policing 
 
At a Tier 2 level, Irish interviewees believed that due to its various security related Aid to the 
Civil Power (ATCP – Equivalent to MACP) roles, particularly during the historic period of the 
‘Troubles’, such as border patrols, deployment on checkpoints supporting the Garda, bank 
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security van, high risk prisoner and explosives escorts, the Irish Army were seen as very 
much ‘part and parcel of daily routine’ (IR1/2/8/11). This was observed during field research 
in Ireland during 2006, when the researcher witnessed a four man Army team in full 
camouflage, equipment and armed with assault rifles, pull up in an SUV and deploy around 
the outside of a bank in a market town, just prior to the arrival of a security van. As the 
interviewees described, the local public paid little attention and carried on with their 
business as normal. Thus while police primacy is clear, a strong tradition of cooperation with 
the Garda has been established, underpinned by legislation and powers (IR8/12).  
However, because of such domestic ‘day to day’ roles in support of the civilian powers and 
their historic service overseas as ‘Peacekeepers’ on various United Nations (UN) and 
European Union (EU) operations, one interviewee was concerned that the Irish public 
perceived their military as “a peace keeping force and to see them as anything else would be 
a hard thing culturally” (IR11) (Duggan 1992: Chapter 10).84 This raised concerns of possible 
operational limitations on the domestic use of the Irish military; particularly should the 
specialist Army Ranger Wing (ARW) be required to resolve a ‘terrorist worst case scenario’ 
(IR8/12/13). Such scenarios might include a serious hostage taking, such as at an embassy, 
on a train, an aircraft hijacking or a maritime intervention (IR8).  
Likewise, again perceived at a Tier 2 level, in France the military are regularly deployed to 
patrol airports, rail stations and tourist locations and were perceived to provide additional 
security measures along with public re-assurance, as part of the wider Vigipirate security 
plan (Ministere de la Defense 2006). Interviewees felt that, ‘the public are not so concerned 
about the military patrolling in the streets with full weaponry’ and while ‘for tourists in Paris 
it’s something of a shock’, for the French public it’s ‘par for the course and nobody bats an 
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eyelid’ (FR11/12/13). Again this was observed by the researcher in 2004 during the 60th 
anniversary of D-Day, when fully armed, uniformed and equipped teams, comprising a Non 
Commissioned Officer (NCO) and two soldiers from such elite units as the Paratroopers, 
Foreign Legion and Chasseurs Alpins mountain troops, provided security around the major 
tourist locations of Paris. While most people paid little attention to them, those members of 
the public who interacted with the patrols seemed to be mainly seeking directions. A former 
Foreign Legion Paratrooper believed this French public acceptance of the military was due 
to the fact that until relatively recently (1996) the Country had a conscript Army and 
“uniforms were visible throughout France” (FR13). 
As well as air policing and maritime security, the Spanish military fulfil various MACP 
support roles, particularly providing additional security at sites of Critical National 
Infrastructure (CNI), such as dams, oil installations and the rail network, consequently, the 
Spanish public are used to seeing them deployed.85 One Spanish interviewee went further, 
stating that after the 3/11 (11-M) 2004 Atocha bomb attacks on the Capital’s trains by the al 
Qaeda linked ‘Madrid Cell’, the sight of armed soldiers patrolling the Spanish rail network 
positively re-assured a fearful Spanish public; “You’ll get Spanish Army soldiers, in full battle 
dress with assault weapons wandering through the trains… When the two soldiers come in, 
there’s much less looking at other people because they’re relaxed, the Army’s here, they’re in 
charge, they’ll look after us” (SP5). However, the same interviewee raised a downside to the 
military being used for such physical security roles, mentioning a ‘joyrider’ in a stolen 
vehicle who failed to stop at a checkpoint manned by soldiers of the BRIPAC Parachute 
Brigade, who subsequently opened fire, critically wounding the young driver (SP5). A further 
caveat was raised by a senior military specialist, who believed that due to the Francoist 
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legacy “Spanish society is still a little uncomfortable with the military, they like us there but 
prefer not to see us” (SP15). 
It is argued therefore, that although framed for a different field, these examples show that 
aspects of the Procedural Justice Model, such as fair treatment, the development of trust, 
the conferring of legitimacy and subsequent institutional authority, are transferable 
concepts to military counter-terrorism, particularly when units are being utilised in domestic 
MACP operations, fulfilling ‘policing’ and security roles. As previously mentioned, and 
highlighted in the next section, the research has also identified the significance of an 
additional factor in such domestic military operations of ‘public familiarity’. Further, since 
these concepts are based around the ‘Mark 1 Human Being’, interacting and engaging with 
people, developing a rapport and building trust, it is submitted that they are equally cross-
cultural, eminently transferable, and relevant to wider military counter-insurgency 
operations abroad. 
This is demonstrated in an example raised by Kilcullen, a former special advisor to General 
Petraeus, concerning US military units in Iraq during 2006. He states that “rather than 
working with the population so as to protect them from the insurgents, some units, because 
of their lack of situational awareness and personal relationships with the people, tended to 
treat all Iraqis as a potential threat and thus adopted a high-handed approach that 
alienated the population. This exacerbated the backlash against their presence, discouraged 
people from coming forward with information about the insurgents and thus further reduced 
these unit’s situational awareness, leaving them trapped in a vicious cycle of intervention 
and rejection” (Kilcullen 2009: p.124). Clearly in such a violent ‘kinetic’ environment, a 
balance must be made between the level of engagement with the local community and 
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‘force protection’, attempting to ensure that troops on the ground are not exposed to 
unnecessary risks.  Nevertheless, the significance of such local knowledge and situational 
awareness will be examined later in this chapter.86 
Consequently, though posited in a domestic criminal justice context, elements of the 
Procedural Justice Model have at least passing conceptual links to aspects of military 
counter-insurgency and the British strategy of ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ as it was 
originally expounded and developed during the Malayan Emergency, between 1948 and 
1960. This change from a previous search and destroy approach included an increased 
emphasis on the positive treatment of the minority Chinese community while attempting to 
address their grievances whenever possible (Stubbs 2008). More recently, continuing links 
are highlighted in a recent British Military publication which states that “it is always 
counterproductive for security forces to operate outside the law and it always undermines, 
perhaps catastrophically, their credibility and that of the government involved. Operating in 
accordance with the law not only fosters the rule of law, which is an important end in itself, 
but it is a crucial part of maintaining legitimacy of the host government and of the security 
forces. It is therefore, a crucial factor in gaining consent” (AFM 2010: 3-11). 
Again, although the concepts behind the Procedural Justice Model have been framed 
around policing and the wider criminal justice system, there are still conceptual aspects of 
these, such as fair treatment, legitimacy, institutional authority and even the development 
of trust, which overlap and can impact in the field of intelligence. While the various national 
intelligence agencies clearly lack the immediacy and level of overt public interface of the 
police, or indeed even the military, and are arguably protected behind a layer of operational 
and methodological secrecy, their access and effectiveness can also be significantly 
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impacted by wider public perceptions, the associated levels of trust (or lack of it) and 
subsequent institutional legitimacy. As raised later in this chapter, this is particularly the 
case when seeking to develop human intelligence (HUMINT) from the recruitment and 
development of sources amongst local communities, where personal relationships and 
contact are critical. Consequently it is useful to examine the data which emerged from 
intelligence and policing interviewees concerning the wider aspects of intelligence.  
Despite these issues, intelligence is perhaps one of the most important factors in 
successfully countering terrorism, particularly when it is being conducted by small cell like 
networks within the wider community. A British military document defines ‘Intelligence’ as 
‘the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and 
interpretation of all available information… which is immediately or potentially significant 
to… planning and operations’. As a result, along with its political and military applications, 
intelligence is closely interlinked with other counter-terrorist (CT) measures, in particular 
acting as a catalyst for heightened security measures and playing an overarching role in pro-
active intelligence led policing and military operations (Wardlaw 1989: Chapter 12). 
However, unlike the more traditional development of intelligence in a military context, 
where signatures are more distinct and structures are more fixed, the closed, often inward 
looking, nature of such terrorist cells, their exploitation of legitimate religious and other 
institutions, and the fact that they are outwardly indistinguishable from the rest of the local 
community, means they are often much harder to identify. As Pillar states, “terrorism is a 
fundamentally different and more difficult subject than the great majority of other topics the 
intelligence community is asked to cover… An individual terrorist plot lacks the size and 
signatures of most other targets, from nuclear weapons programs to political instability. The 
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need to uncover the activities not only of specified groups or states but also of potential 
terrorists makes intelligence questions about terrorism, not just the answers, more 
indeterminate than with most other topics.” (Pillar 2004: pp.115-6).  
Table 5: INTELLIGENCE INTERACTION & ENGAGEMENT 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Critical 
importance 
of intel. in 
counter- 
terrorism as 
shown in 
Northern 
Ireland 
Domestic 
intelligence 
remit of the 
Garda, while 
Army G2 has 
a more 
external, 
longer term 
view 
  Intel. seen 
as very 
successful 
& vital to 
survival of 
the State 
of Israel  
 Question if 
domestic 
intel. role 
should 
remain 
within the 
FBI or need 
for a stand- 
alone intel. 
agency 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Historical 
respect for 
UK intel. 
agencies 
 
Long 
historical 
legacy of 
the use of 
intel. in the 
UK  
Historical 
roots of Irish 
intel. in 
networks of 
Michael 
Collins 
during Anglo 
–Irish War 
 
Importance 
of pre-
emptive 
intelligence 
 
Development 
& speedy 
initiation of 
operations 
 
Ensuring 
flexibility of 
intel. enqs. 
Without legal 
bureaucracy 
 
Culture of 
‘Plods 
knowledge’ 
vs. intel led 
policing  
Historical 
culture of 
‘Direct Action’ 
in DGSE, 
allegedly 
inherited from 
WWII BCRE & 
Algeria 
 
National 
marginalization 
of individual 
freedoms for 
group security 
 
Previous 
‘intrusiveness’ 
of RG, seen as 
‘Secret Police’ 
gathering mass 
of local intel. 
Spanish 
culture of 
speed & 
exploitation 
of intel. 
 
However, 
sometimes 
less 
methodical 
& more 
cursory  
 
Concern 
Spanish 
intel. tends 
to be more 
reactive & 
responsive 
than pro-
active 
 
Need to 
dramatically 
increase 
inclusion of 
strategic 
intel. & 
increase 
quality 
Focus on 
‘fast-time’ 
tactical & 
operat. 
intel. due 
to 
historical 
necessity 
 
Concern 
that the 
flipside is 
that 
higher 
level 
strategic 
intel. is 
less of a 
focus 
Importance 
of intel. in 
maintain. 
State & 
security of 
Turkey  
 
Concern 
over the 
reliability  & 
focus of 
statistics on 
PKK threat  
 
 
Negative 
impact of 
Church- 
Cooper 
Hearings & 
FISA Act 
1978 on 
HUMINT & 
foreign & 
domestic 
‘jointness’ – 
‘Baby going 
out with 
bathwater’ 
 
Since 9/11 
intel. not so 
much 
strategic as 
driving the 
operational 
& even 
tactical 
levels  
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Unsurprisingly then, most of the interviewees commented positively on the importance of 
intelligence. At a Tier 2 level, a number of UK policing and intelligence interviewees 
perceived the ‘critical importance of intelligence in countering terrorism, as demonstrated in 
Northern Ireland’ and in ‘countering several Islamist conspiracies’87 (Hewitt 2008). A 
Metropolitan Police CT specialist explained that “as a result, we intercepted several serious 
conspiracies between 2001 and 2005 which relied on important communications between 
the intelligence services and the police. The best examples of ‘preventing’ and ‘pursuing’ are 
Operations Crevice, Rhyme and Overt, which are classic examples of operational complexity 
and cooperation” (UK33) (Clutterbuck & Warnes 2011). However, although one UK 
interviewee stated that since 7/7 a number of potential attacks have been blocked through 
the successful use of intelligence (UK25), others believed that as the 7/7 tube and bus 
bombings and the attempted attacks of 21/7 demonstrate, ‘intelligence isn’t perfect and 
some attacks will always get through’ (UK8/9/16) (See Table 5 Previous)  
Likewise a number of Irish interviewees commented on the significant role of intelligence in 
countering dissident republicans, who were seen as posing a ‘subversive’ threat to the Irish 
State88 (Mooney & O’Toole 2003), whilst also acknowledging the historical roots and 
importance of intelligence to Irish independence through the networks established by 
Michael Collins during the Anglo-Irish War (IR8) (Foy 2006 & Dwyer T.R. 2005). However, 
they also drew a distinction at a Tier 2 level, between the internally focused remit of the 
Garda’s Security & Intelligence Section (S & I) and the more outward looking perspective of 
the Army intelligence G2 (IR8). This was based on the domestic security role of the Garda 
and the Army’s focus on any external threats with its greater foreign cultural knowledge as a 
result of various military service overseas (IR12) (Walsh 2010). 
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Both Israeli and Turkish interviewees went further, not only stressing how successful 
intelligence had been in countering terrorism, but also its perceived importance in 
maintaining the security and very survival of their respective nations (Gilboa & Lapid 2011). 
One police liaison officer in Israel stated, “That’s number one. Without that you have 
nothing, without intel you are lost. Because you don’t want to learn how to respond to post 
terrorist events, you want to learn how to prevent them” (IS2). In the same way a Turkish 
Polis CT specialist explained that intelligence, “is important not only in Turkey, but in every 
state, because as well as making it easier to fight terrorism through knowing the enemy, it is 
better than physical force and less damaging in the longer term” (TU5). Similar comments 
were made by a Garda National Surveillance Unit (NSU) officer, who stated that “without 
the intelligence you’d be running around… at least you can be more focused with the 
intelligence there. It all depends on the quality of intelligence and the people who are 
analysing it, to give you the picture… I mean try to get the thing before it’s done, before it 
happens, as opposed to waiting till it happens and then reacting to it” (IR4).89  
Nevertheless, despite such positive feedback and arguments from both intelligence and 
policing interviewees on the wider importance and significance of intelligence, and as other 
more critical examples which will be discussed in the next section demonstrate, negative 
public perceptions can seriously impact on wider intelligence effectiveness in counter-
terrorism. This is particularly the case when classified information concerning sensitive 
intelligence operations gets into the public domain. Most recently this significance has been 
demonstrated by the public reactions and responses to the Bradley Manning and Edward 
Snowden File disclosures, which have seriously undermined public trust, perceived 
legitimacy and the institutional authority of certain intelligence agencies and their actions 
(Harding 2014).  
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c. Factors Negating Legitimacy and the Building of Trust 
Many of the Procedural Justice Model concepts previously discussed in relation to counter 
terrorist policing, intelligence and military responses, such as perceived legitimacy, 
institutional authority and normative compliance (which is based on belief as opposed to 
instrumental compliance based on deterrence and fear of sanction), are closely associated 
with the building of individual trust and internalisation (Scott 1971). Tyler argues that the 
authorities can effectively regulate citizens’ behaviour by maintaining a culture of 
supportive social values which are internalised by the public (Tyler 2011 quoted in Jackson 
et. al. 2012: p.1064). While the psychological and neurological factors behind internalisation 
are beyond the scope of this research, “psychologists have traditionally recognised that 
internalisation, namely the process by which people take on values as their own, provides an 
important basis for compliance with rules. Obligation to obey the police and moral 
alignment with the police, both involve internalization – and internalization can involve 
obligations or moral principles or both” (Jackson et. al. 2012:p.1062) 
Nevertheless, as well as the more positive examples detailed in the previous section, 
empirical data which emerged from the research interviews highlighted a number of factors 
and issues in the various fields, which undermined and negated personal relationships, the 
development of legitimacy, the building of trust and subsequently the levels of  public 
internalisation. In the case of policing, these included the remoteness from the public of 
national and federal level policing structures, both a historical and current ‘legacy of fear’ of 
certain policing and security organisations amongst specific individuals and communities 
and a lack of minority community membership within police organisations impacting on 
their level of ‘cultural interface’ with those communities. One further factor, sometimes 
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seen and experienced in relation to ‘normal’ crime and response policing, was that police 
were so busy dealing with counter-terrorist related security tasks that it negated the time 
available for public interface and the subsequent building of trust (See Table 3 Previous). 
Thus while the positive public perception of the Irish Garda was raised, along with its 
cultural awareness and understanding of Republican ‘subversives’, there were also concerns 
from  a number of individual Garda specialists at the small number of officers from minority 
communities within the organisation. This was believed to contribute to a lack of policing 
interface, access and insight into such minority communities within Ireland, raising concerns 
amongst those being interviewed (IR9/10/11/14). However, it was pointed out that the 
authorities were aware of the issue and attempts were being made to address this concern 
through various Garda policies, such as the removal of the Gaelic language entry 
requirement, the active encouragement and recruitment of minority officers and the pro-
active community policing of the Garda Racial, Intercultural and Diversity Office (GRIDO), 
Ethnic Liaison Officers (ELOs) and local uniformed Garda, building trust and understanding 
within such minority communities (IR10/11/14) (Condren 2011).   
Notwithstanding the previous French examples, one French Police officer was concerned 
that despite the passage of time, there was still a legacy of public mistrust and unwillingness 
to speak to the police because of historic collaboration during World War II (FR12). Despite 
the courageous involvement of many individual Police and Gendarmerie officers within the 
Resistance movement (Cobb 2009), at an organisational level, both the Police and 
Gendarmerie played significant roles in supporting the authorities during the period of the 
Vichy Regime and German occupation. They were particularly linked to the arrest of 
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Resistance members and the rounding up of the French Jewish community for onward 
transportation to concentration camps (Davies 2002). 
Likewise, although the Spanish interviewees highlighted the publics’ positive perception of 
the professionalism of the Policia Nacional, particularly when compared to the Policia 
Municipal, responsible for traffic tickets, countering anti-social behaviour and local bye-
laws, one police specialist also raised the historical legacy of ‘inherited distrust’ from the 
Franco period (SP5) (Preston 2012). During this time, both the urban Policia, who were 
nicknamed the ‘grises’ because of their grey uniforms, and the Guardia Civil who were 
responsible for policing the rural areas of Spain, were seen as being instrumental in 
upholding and maintaining the Francoist regime through brutality and public fear (Hooper 
2006). Possibly as a result of this authoritarian legacy, and despite Spain’s transition to 
democracy in the latter part of the 1970s, the current Spanish policing model was perceived 
as being based more on ‘upholding the law, rather than serving the public’ (SP5).    
In the cases of both Israel and Turkey, while many of the interviewees perceived strong 
public support and trust amongst the majority population, it was acknowledged by some, 
that elements within the Palestinian and Kurdish communities respectively would have 
completely different perspectives. Consequently in Turkey one interviewee, interestingly a 
non-Turkish foreign liaison officer, felt there was a legacy of fear in some Kurdish areas of 
South East Anatolia, particularly in the case of the more rurally based Jandarma 
‘Gendarmerie’ (TU8). Nevertheless, according to one senior officer, the Turkish National 
Polis (TNP) were generally seen as being a far less ‘political’ organisation than the Turkish 
Army and will now take time to develop intelligence and information before acting, which 
he admitted they had sometimes failed to do historically (TU14).  
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Additionally, in Israel one interviewee commented on the fact the Mishteret Yisrael Israeli 
National Police (INP - ‘Blue Police’) were so busy dealing with security matters that it 
negatively impacted upon their routine policing roles, suggesting that such security should 
become the exclusive responsibility of the Mishmar Ha’Gvul Border Guards (MAGAV – 
‘Green Police’), thus allowing the INP to focus on its traditional public policing 
responsibilities and roles (IS10). This factor was confirmed by a former police tactical 
specialist who pointed out that due to the level of the Palestinian terrorist threat, the 
priority of the INP and MAGAV was security and counter-terrorism, “not building up 
relationships and winning hearts & minds” (IS16).  
Finally, American police interviewees highlighted the distinction between the federal level 
policing and security structures, which were seen as being remote to the general public, and 
local law enforcement departments, which were more strongly perceived at a Tier 2 level, as 
having developed effective community policing and good local relations. Nevertheless, 
despite these community relations, and in an issue reflected amongst police interviewees in 
various countries, it was pointed out that US police were often unwilling to commit and 
invest time and resources to ‘bottom up’ local information, intelligence and concerns, if 
they felt it was unlikely to lead to successful prosecutions (US28).  
With intelligence, particularly when it is utilised in any pro-active counter-terrorist role, such 
as the recruitment of sources and the development of HUMINT, internalisation can provide 
a strong measure of influence for the police and security forces. If internalisation of a belief 
is the driver, rather than doing something because they have been told to do it, sources will 
complete a task because they believe in what they are doing, which means their external 
responses are not only ‘skin deep’ and they will not just ‘go through the motions’. 
143 
 
Consequently, they are far less likely to have second thoughts and far more likely to 
complete the tasking they have been given. Again, as highlighted in the factors behind the 
Procedural Justice Model, most individual internalisation is based on the development of 
legitimacy and the building of trust through positive communication, behaviour and actions 
on the part of the intelligence official or source handler. However, despite the positive 
perceptions of the interviewees on the importance of intelligence to effective counter-
terrorism detailed in the previous section, a number of significant issues emerged which 
strongly negated positive public perceptions, the perceived legitimacy and institutional 
authority of intelligence agencies (See Table 5 Previous). 
While the size, technological support and resources of the US Intelligence Community (IC) of 
17 agencies and organisations were perceived as providing great capability and capacity to 
counter terrorism,90 there were concerns raised that this very capability also promoted 
more of a ‘big brother’ type intrusiveness (US2/6). Historically, this intrusiveness was one of 
the factors which led to the Church Committee of the 1970’s and the resultant Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 1978, on domestic intelligence and law enforcement. 
This Senate Committee examined previous external and domestic excesses by both the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), such as the FBI’s 
COINTELPRO (Counter-Intelligence Program) during the Civil Rights Period, and the CIA’s so 
called ‘Family Jewels’, where the organisations conducted illegal covert operations and 
intelligence activities outside their charters. The ensuing introduction of FISA created a 
strong legal firewall between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement, keeping 
them separated. In practice, this meant that ‘in the past, while it was easy to get 
information and intelligence in a criminal case; it was difficult to do the same in relation to 
terrorism’ (US5/6/10/14).   
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In the perception of the interviewees, as well as ‘firewalling’ intelligence and law 
enforcement, a further impact of the Church Committee hearings and other associated 
political measures and cutbacks was to ‘stovepipe’ domestic and foreign intelligence, 
weaken operational cooperation and  degrade the HUMINT capabilities of the CIA and other 
intelligence organisations (US4/5/10/28). Although the PATRIOT Act of 2001 was seen as 
lowering this wall and allowing a greater sharing of intelligence information (US10), one 
intelligence specialist described these earlier events as “throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater” (US28). However, amongst certain communities and groups, such historic 
abuses and more recently the powers contained in the PATRIOT Act have left a legacy of 
mistrust (US2/6), which according to one interviewee has been exacerbated through 
“breaking down the boundaries between the CIA and the FBI, allowing a vast extension of 
domestic intelligence gathering” (US9). 
Likewise, while French intelligence structures were seen as being very effective in 
historically countering terrorist threats, particularly from International and Islamist 
terrorism,91 there was also perceived to be a cultural pre-disposition of ‘Direct Action’ 
within the overseas Direction Generale de Securite Exterieure (DGSE), emanating from a 
heritage of WWII Resistance, the Free French BCRA intelligence organisation and 
operational experiences in Algeria with the 11th Choc parachutists (Denece 2007).92 This 
emerging theme is supported by examples of targeting operations by 29th Service d’Action 
(29SA) in Lebanon, against those terrorists responsible for the assassination of the French 
Ambassador in September 1981 (Arostegui 1995: pp.219-21). Equally at a domestic level, 
the Renseignements Generaux (RG), now part of the domestic intelligence Direction 
Generale de la Securite Interieure (DGSI), was perceived by some as an ‘intrusive’ form of 
‘secret police’ because of their role in gathering a mass of local intelligence data for the 
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Government (Warnes 2009b). In relation to both these examples, some French interviewees 
raised the ‘national marginalisation of individual freedoms for greater group security’ as a 
cultural legacy from the Country’s Republican traditions (FR13/14). 
Although as previously stated both Israeli and Turkish intelligence organisations were 
perceived as having been vital to the safety and very survival of their nations, concerns were 
expressed at the longer term impact of their actions and connections. While the officially 
acknowledged Israeli policy of ‘Targeted Killing’ was seen as ensuring that ‘the terrorists are 
so busy looking over their shoulders that they find it hard to coordinate attacks’ (IS10), 
concerns were raised by interviewees not only at the more strategic international 
repercussions and ethical and moral implications of such a tactic, but also regarding the 
more operational ‘law of unintended consequences’. Examples raised included ‘collateral’ 
victims or the wrong person being killed (such as at Lillehammer Norway in 197393), a new 
terrorist official replacing the targeted individual being far more effective and efficient, or a 
failed operation enhancing the victims profile and creating a political ‘martyr’, such as 
HAMAS leader Khaled Mashal (IS2/4/7) (Byman 2011: Chapter 21). In the case of Turkey 
concerns were raised at the perceived links between Turkish intelligence and security forces 
with the shadowy Derin Devlet, the so called ‘Deep State’ conspiracy, purportedly linked to 
disappearances and major human rights violations (TU8).   
It became clear from the research interviews that such negative factors and associated 
public perceptions equally applied to military roles in counter-terrorism, in particular, 
similar examples of a ‘legacy of fear’. These examples from different countries clearly 
negate and undermine certain communities’ perceptions of legitimacy, their willingness to 
trust, their belief in the institutional authority of the organisations and their subsequent 
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internalisation of any message that emerges from those organisations. Additionally, the lack 
of ‘public familiarity’ previously detailed in relation to the use of the military in domestic 
MACP ‘policing’ and security roles became more clearly pronounced. Consequently, while in 
certain case study countries the military were regularly ‘seen on the street’ by the public 
fulfilling such MACP roles, in others these security roles would not be acceptable to the 
public, being seen very differently, due to the historical and cultural sensitivities involved 
(UK11/US17) (See Table 4 Previous).   
In the case of the UK, while the British Military were extensively deployed in Northern 
Ireland over decades as part of Operation Banner, in support of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) to counter the terrorist campaign of the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA), they were rarely deployed on the mainland (UK11/24/37) (Edwards 2011). 
Thus, while UK interviewees highlighted the current level of public support and pride in the 
military, and the regular wearing of uniforms in public following the reduction of threat 
from Irish Republican terrorism, such ‘high visibility’ MACP military roles would more likely 
cause public panic and negative press headlines.94 A case in point raised by interviewees 
being the deployment of ‘Tanks’, outside Heathrow airport during a heightened MANPADS 
threat in February 2003 (UK13/18/33/SP5).95  
Similarly, in the US, while the majority of the public were perceived to have a very positive 
view of the military (US35), Posse Comitatus legislation introduced in 1878 following the 
American Civil War of 1861-5 restricts the use of the ‘regular’ Federal military in the 
Continental United States (CONUS), unless authorised by Congress or, in extremis, the 
President as Commander in Chief (CinC) or due to his ‘Take Care’ authorities (Banks 2002).96 
However, particularly since the 9/11 attacks of September 2001, the regular military can 
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provide assistance to the civil authorities and law enforcement when its specialised training, 
skills, equipment or capabilities are required. At the same time, the National Guard, as a 
State resource, can be utilised by a State Governor and are regularly deployed following 
natural disasters or during periods of heightened security (US26/UK35).97 Nevertheless, 
regular military involvement in MACP roles within the US homeland is limited, with 
domestic security and counter-terrorist incidents normally being dealt with by law-
enforcement and the FBI acting as lead agency (US11/17/28). While Posse Comitatus was 
cited, it was implied by interviewees that additional underlying factors limiting the 
deployment of the military domestically were political fear of the Department of Defence 
(DoD), due to its size and influence, as well as a historical American public concern over 
excessive power in the hands of the ‘executive’ and the subsequent separation of civilian 
and military powers.  
Both the Posse Comitatus Act and FBI primacy in dealing with domestic terrorist incidents 
were cited as being factors behind the formation of the national level FBI Hostage Rescue 
Team (HRT) providing a non-military ‘Tier 1’ counter-terrorist tactical intervention capability 
within the domestic US (Whitcomb 2001).98 However, while comprising serving FBI agents, 
many of its members are former Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs or, because of its location 
at FBI Headquarters in Quantico Virginia, where the US Marine Corps (USMC) also has its 
headquarters, former Marines. This clearly provides an effective and convenient way around 
the restrictions on domestic military usage imposed by Posse Comitatus. Consequently, 
despite providing a ‘civilian’ capability, the HRT effectiveness can be judged by the 
comments of a former UK Special Air Service (SAS) interviewee who trained with them and 
stated that “the guys in the HRT are very, very bright and as members of the FBI de facto 
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have a degree. They are at the top end of the game and very fit, well-resourced and 
equipped” (UK43) (Tomajczyk 1997).  
Finally, in both Israel with its conscript Army and reservist Miluim system (Creveld 2002) and 
Turkey with a conscript Army which is the second largest in NATO (Hale 1994), the military 
were perceived by interviewees as critical to the historic establishment of independence, 
the formation of the state, and in the very survival of their nations (IS3/9/TU1).99 With such 
‘citizen soldiers’, military service was seen by many of those interviewed as a ‘rite of 
passage’ (IS2/3/TU1/12), while this historical legacy and public involvement in military 
service were believed to lead to a greater understanding and respect for the military in both 
countries, as ‘everybody has to serve’ (IS2/11/TU1).100 However, both the Israeli and Turkish 
militaries have been involved in long running domestic counter-terrorist and counter-
insurgency campaigns over decades, respectively countering various Palestinian nationalist 
and religious groups, such as HAMAS (Alexander 2002), the Lebanese based and Iranian 
supported Hezbollah (Levitt 2013) and the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) or ‘Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party’ (Mango 2005). As a result of these domestic counter-terrorist roles, and 
despite the positive public perceptions amongst the majority populations, there are clearly 
very different perspectives found amongst elements of the Palestinian and Kurdish 
communities (TU8).  
Consequently, the research identified a number of issues which negatively impact upon the 
effectiveness of the concepts behind the Procedural Justice Model, such as fair treatment, 
perceived legitimacy, the development of personal trust and institutional authority. As 
discussed, these negative issues were not only observed when aspects of the Model were 
transferred and applied to military or intelligence based counter-terrorism, but also in a 
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domestic policing context for which it was originally framed. Several issues in particular 
stood out as potentially inhibiting and impacting on the effectiveness of the concepts 
behind the Model: these were various examples of a ‘legacy of fear’, the domestic 
deployment and use of the military in a community where there was limited ‘public 
familiarity’ and finally a lack of minority community membership within organisations 
impacting on their level of ‘cultural interface’ with those communities.  
Historical legacies, such as French collaboration during World War II or upholding the 
Francoist Regime in Spain, continue to taint policing or security organisations, sometimes 
even decades later, leaving a ‘Legacy of fear’ amongst certain members of the public, 
particularly those of an older generation or from particular communities. The enduring 
legacy of such historical events was demonstrated by a senior Turkish police official who 
admitted during a discussion on the roots of modern Armenian terrorism that during the 
First World War, “this was due to a historical reason… something happened historically” 
(TU2) (Gunter 1990). Such negative ‘Legacies of Fear’ can also occur where current 
operational roles, such as those of the Israeli Police or military security forces amongst 
Palestinian areas, Turkish Polis and Jandarma forces in the Kurdish region of South East 
Anatolia or Spanish Policia and Guardia Civil in the Basque region, are viewed very 
differently by the local communities they operate amongst, compared to the majority 
national population. Similar negative perceptions were historically experienced by the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), when dealing with the Catholic Nationalist community in 
Northern Ireland and though perhaps not to the same extent, these concerns remain 
amongst certain elements within that community regarding the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI).  
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In such circumstances, even though an individual police officer, intelligence official or 
military operator might treat people with great fairness and respect, they are automatically 
at a disadvantage in the eyes of the individual or community they are dealing with, because 
of the way the organisation they represent is perceived and associated with a ‘Legacy of 
fear’. Thus while the officer might conform to aspects and concepts of the Procedural 
Justice Model, they are unlikely to develop any sense of legitimacy, gain a level of trust or 
build any institutional authority. Indeed, they may find it almost impossible to establish a 
dialogue with certain individuals or communities in order to even begin building the trust 
and legitimacy necessary to develop such a process.  
Though a very different causal factor, similar obstacles to the establishment of an initial 
dialogue and rapport may also occur when the military are deployed in domestic MACP type 
‘policing’ and security roles amongst communities where there has been a  previous lack of 
‘public familiarity’. In these circumstances, while strong community support for the military 
might exist, the inhibitor is more likely to be down to initial public shock and surprise at 
seeing the military operating in such roles. Likewise, the researcher has witnessed similar 
public reactions in the UK when armed police firearms officers have been deployed in either 
security or response roles. However, like the MACP, these are not necessarily transferable 
examples, and in those countries and communities where the public are used to seeing their 
police armed, ‘public familiarity’ means the reaction is likely to be far more positive. As 
French police interviewees pointed out, ‘the big difference is that everybody carries a gun in 
France, all Police and Gendarmerie officers are armed’ (FR10/14) 
Barriers to the communication and rapport necessary to build trust, develop legitimacy and 
establish institutional authority can also occur, when policing, intelligence or military 
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organisations lack the minority membership, cultural understanding or linguistic skills, 
necessary to establish a dialogue and engagement with individuals of a particular 
community. In a domestic policing context this can lead to a lack of ‘cultural interface’, 
highlighted in the example raised earlier from the Irish Garda and resulting in a lack of 
understanding and knowledge of developments within a particular community. It can also 
lead to a lack of ‘Social Inclusion’, where members of a minority community feel that the 
police are unrepresentative of their community and consequently that the organisation is 
not inclusive and/or that they are not valued. This in turn means they are less likely to 
respect, support or comply with its representatives. The flipside is that “people will be more 
willing to cooperate with the police when they identify with and feel included in the social 
group it represents” (Bradford 2012: p.4). 
The lack of what Kilcullen (2009) refers to as ‘situational awareness’ and understanding of 
‘Human Terrain’ is even more pronounced when the military are involved in overseas 
counter-insurgency operations ‘amongst’ local communities. In these environments, as well 
as a solid understanding and respect for the local culture, language skills can help bridge the 
cultural divide and reduce the risk for misunderstandings and confusion (Davis 2010). 
However as one military HUMINT specialist explained in relation to Afghanistan, despite 
intensive language training, many British military linguists “speak the ‘Queen’s Pashtu’, so 
they don’t understand local dialects, accents and words” (UK47) Similar difficulties have 
occurred in relation to the use of ‘classical’ Egyptian Arabic in Iraq. Consequently, 
Accredited Cultural Advisors (ACAs) who not only speak the language fluently, but have 
originally grown up in the country concerned and fully understand its culture, can prove 
critical to the establishment of the communication, dialogue and rapport necessary for the 
development of the type of trust, legitimacy and internalisation previously discussed. These 
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are more than just interpreters and can advise on culture, history, what to say and when to 
say it, potentially proving invaluable in such complex environments (FM-3-24 2007: 
Appendix C).101              
d. Community and Culture  
As the previous examples highlight, community knowledge, cultural understanding and 
associated linguistic skills can prove to be important factors in initially building the type of 
trust, legitimacy and institutional authority previously discussed in relation to the 
Procedural Justice Model. The relationships between various organisations, in particular the 
police and local communities are critical to developing such interaction and engagement, 
while effective counter-terrorism, particularly its associated ‘bottom up’ local intelligence, is 
often contingent on building this trust with the community. In conventional crime 
orientated policing, this has led to ‘Community Policing’, which “quickly became a policy 
buzzword for numerous strategies aimed at mending the relationship between the police 
and the public, while at the same time improving crime control. Fighting crime and 
police/community relations were now viewed as intimately related” (Sunshine & Tyler 2003: 
p.521).  
Thus Community Policing, sometimes referred to as Neighbourhood or Reassurance 
Policing, seeks to engage with and reassure local communities, particularly cultural and 
linguistic minorities.102 This is in contrast to the more traditional ‘uniformed response 
policing’, where mobile units respond to reports of incidents from the control room and 
‘run’ to deal with those. Often such a response unit will deal with a dozen calls or more in a 
shift, and there is consequently not the time to build much dialogue or interface with the 
public, rather recording details of the offence and witnesses, typing up crime reports or 
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conducting arrests in more of a managerialist type approach.103 Clearly community policing 
focuses differently, allowing more time to build ties to the community and working more 
closely with them to counter local crime, social disorder and indeed, their fear of crime. In 
the specific case of counter-terrorist policing, Murray argues that while it might be tempting 
for police to apply a more paramilitary approach, “using the principles of community policing 
is a much more sensible and effective way of dealing with terrorism. It has been accepted 
that police cannot fight crime alone and must rely on the community. The same principle 
applies to terrorism. A community police relationship that is built on trust and mutual 
respect is much more likely to give early warnings about terrorist acts” (Murray 2005: 
p.359).  
Consequently, while community policing models can prove effective in reducing local anti-
social behaviour and crime through these community contacts and trust, they can also help 
develop the level of local police knowledge to counter extremism within communities (H.M. 
Government 2006).104 Likewise, a strong trust based relationship with the local community 
also means that members of the community are far more likely to report anything of 
concern or out of the ordinary. According to Innes et. al., “this is because community 
policing affords connectivity with local people and their problems in a manner that can 
develop a rich picture of their perceptions, experiences and attitudes”, consequently being 
“well placed to build security, confidence and trust.” (Innes et. al. 2007: p.10)  
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Table 6: POLICING COMMUNITY & CULTURE 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Critical 
importance 
of 
community 
policing 
and local 
contacts  
 
 
Strength of 
local 
community 
contacts 
especially 
amongst rural 
Garda 
 
Cultural & 
religious 
understanding 
of ‘subversive’ 
Republicans 
Previous 
expertise/ 
individual 
contacts of 
RG & DST 
(local/ 
business), 
now both 
part of the 
DGSI 
  Local 
knowledge 
& rural 
contacts of 
Jandarma  
 
Due to their 
Muslim 
faith the 
TNP better 
understand 
Islamist 
threat 
Local 
community 
policing 
knowledge & 
outreach of 
NYPD, LAPD 
& BPD  
 
 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Role of 
Met. Police 
Muslim 
Contact 
Unit (MCU) 
‘Soft power’ 
role of GRIDO 
& Ethnic 
Liaison 
Officers (ELO)   
 
Problem of 
lack of 
minority 
membership 
& access to 
minority 
community in 
Garda 
 
Drive to 
recruit Garda 
from minority 
communities 
Domestic 
local rural 
knowledge 
& contacts 
of GN  
 
Cultural 
knowledge 
of officers 
of N. 
African, 
Corsican or 
Basque 
officers 
Local rural 
knowledge of 
Guardia Civil  
 
Basque 
cultural 
knowledge of 
Ertzaina  
 
Use of Policia 
Municipal to 
assist with CT 
investigation 
given their 
local 
knowledge  
 
Policing 
failure to 
address local 
cultural 
issues 
Ethnic 
diversity & 
local 
knowledge 
of Civil 
Guard & 
MAGAV, 
respective. 
containing 
Israeli Arabs 
& Druze, 
Circassians 
& Bedouin 
 
Good local 
knowledge 
& active 
INP/ MAGAV 
recruitment  
of various 
minority 
community 
 
Close INP 
coop. with 
Israeli public 
esp. Sy. 
Guards  
 Demographic 
& linguistic 
skills 
contained in 
the NYPD & 
its Operation 
Century to 
leverage 
these skills 
 
Critical 
importance 
of local ‘cop 
on the beat’ 
acting as the 
‘Eyes & Ears’ 
in the local 
community 
particularly 
amongst 
minorities 
 
NYPD 
Operation 
Nexus to 
make local  
businesses 
aware of dual 
technology 
 
The data from the interviews conducted for this research strongly supports the previous 
academic arguments, highlighting the perceived importance of community policing, 
contacts and local knowledge in counter terrorist policing (See Table 6 Previous). The UK 
interviewees in particular stressed the criticality of police developing cooperation and 
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support amongst the community as ‘local people know the patterns of activity in the local 
community and very quickly pick up on changes or irregularities, so are critical to the 
police’.105 Likewise in Ireland, “we’re trying to engender this community involvement and 
awareness, and sort of penetration of the various communities… bringing the people on 
board, sort of engaging their hearts and minds” (IR1). The success of these efforts was 
highlighted by another Garda specialist who stated that “while people won’t inform about 
someone stealing sheep as that’s against the Irish psyche, if there’s an outsider or if there’s 
somebody who doesn’t belong in the locality, especially in rural areas, they will tell the police 
about that” (IR10) 
The strength and importance of community engagement in a rural context was also stressed 
amongst the various ‘Third Force’ gendarmerie interviewees, such as the rural contacts of 
the Turkish Jandarma (TU8) and the local knowledge of the Spanish Guardia Civil, originally 
founded in 1844 by the Duke of Ahumada to ‘maintain public order, protect individuals and 
provide the support required to enforce the law’ in rural areas (SP2/3/11) (Viquera Undated). 
Consequently, one police specialist believed that with “the Guardia Civil, its great, great 
strength in terms of intelligence has been its fight against ETA. It’s been very, very successful 
at that, it’s resolute, its officers are highly courageous” (SP5).106 Likewise, within France “the 
Gendarmerie are on the ground and sometimes they can pick up intelligence in rural areas. 
They can see the situation because of their awareness and local knowledge” (FR14). The 
development of this local Gendarmerie community intelligence benefits from having around 
3,600 stations widely dispersed across France in numerous small communities (FR9), 
nevertheless ‘the way that the Gendarmerie is structured in the rural areas means that they 
are able to deploy and to overcome certain contingencies very quickly’ (FR13).  
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The significance of Community Policing was also strongly perceived by US interviewees at a 
Tier 2 level,107 with one specialist from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stating, 
“there is a huge focus on community policing within the US and I think that’s a huge area, 
there’s a big awareness… there’s a lot of initiatives taken at the state or local level” (US16). 
At the municipal level, the New York Police Department (NYPD) priority was seen as 
“identifying radical elements and influences on communities and while uniformed police deal 
with normal crime, using the community policing to relay security issues” (US1).  
This highlights the inherent dichotomy and underlying tensions seen in previous examples, 
and raised by several UK police interviewees, between whether police officers on the beat 
acting as community officers should build a good overt rapport and dialogue with the local 
community, or act as field intelligence officers, covertly gathering intelligence and 
developing sources (CHIS) amongst that community (UK3/16/28) (Harfield & Harfield 
2005).108 To some extent this mirrors the wider distinctions between the two models of 
Community Policing and Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) and raises questions as to how much 
the two can be integrated (McGarrell et. al. 2007).109 While it was suggested by interviewees 
that officers could fulfil both roles, the two can prove mutually exclusive and to avoid any 
possible backlash with the local community, it may prove more effective to clearly separate 
and ‘firewall’ these differing policing roles (US1/ UK16).  
When the data which emerged from the research interviews concerning community policing 
and police interaction with communities was examined through the ‘lens’ of the Procedural 
Justice Model, it again highlighted the importance of interacting with the public, gaining the 
trust of individuals within communities and ‘engaging their hearts and minds’. This was 
perceived by the interviewees as leading to compliance and assistance from individuals 
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within those communities, supporting Myhill and Quinton’s assertion that “if the police are 
viewed as legitimate in the sense that they share a common purpose with the public, people 
are more likely to say they will report crimes and suspicious activities and provide 
information about suspected offenders to the authorities” (Myhill and Quinton 2011: p.10). 
In particular the interview responses emphasised that the supply of this type of information 
and development of ‘bottom up’ community intelligence was often contingent upon 
building such trust and contacts within the relevant communities, which will be examined in 
greater detail later in the chapter.  
As previously stated, the initial communication and interaction with local communities, and 
the subsequent level of this ‘cultural interface’, can be significantly enhanced by having an 
appropriate cultural, religious and linguistic understanding, particularly when policing, and 
security organisations have serving officers from relevant minority communities. Such 
understanding was raised at a Tier 2 level In Ireland, where because of a shared cultural and 
religious background, it was believed ‘the Garda has a very clear sense of the kinds of 
conditions that subversive recruitment comes from and a strong sense of the historical 
Republican romanticism and traditional legitimacy’ (IR3/7/9/12). Two of the interviewees 
pointed out that because of the small close knit communities in Ireland, sometimes Garda 
have even ‘grown up alongside a traditional IRA terrorist and attended the same school’ 
(IR3/11) (Tanner 2001). Consequently one Irish interviewee stated that “even with the 
quickest of interrogations, it’s easy to establish a person’s background on the Republican 
side. I could ask someone half a dozen questions and know where they stand” (IR12).  
A similar cultural and religious understanding was raised by Turkish police interviewees at a 
Tier 2 level (TU3/7/10/11/12), where it was stated that “talking to Religious extremists is 
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easier (as opposed to the PKK or DHKP/C)… as they are fellow Muslims, they share the same 
faith” (TU7). However, several Turkish interviewees were keen to point out that such 
extremism ‘was not real Islam, which promotes tolerance and protection of the innocent’ 
(TU5/10/14). As a result of such cultural and religious understanding the Turkish Polis 
Istihbarat Daire Baskanligi (IDB – ‘Intelligence Department Presidency’) introduced ‘Sight 
Orientated Policing’, where “after the Istanbul bombings (2003), we interviewed 
approximately 100 people in an attempt to understand the ideology and motivation of the 
attackers, in particular… the families of the attackers and after talking with us, many people 
quit their association with such groups. The most important thing is to get them away from 
such organisations” (TU3). Likewise, similar shared cultural, religious and linguistic 
backgrounds made it easier for Israeli police and security forces dealing with Jewish 
extremism, to counter such groups (IS7/16) and for the FBI to infiltrate the Militia 
movement, where they ‘did a great job breaking down the militias in the 1990s through 
infiltration and undercover work’ (US1/39). As one FBI official pointed out, ‘we also recruit 
powerfully built guys who play football from rural farming communities’.110 
As well as countering extremists from ‘within’ their mainstream communities, such cultural, 
linguistic and demographic capabilities were also raised in relation to minority communities. 
The French interviewees commented on the benefits of having officers of North African, 
Corsican and Basque origin, with one joking about the ‘Corsican Mafia’ within France’s 
policing and security organisations, due to the number of senior Corsican officers (FR12). 
With Spain, as well as raising the Basque cultural knowledge of the Ertzaintza, the local 
police in the Basque Region, one Spanish Guardia Civil mentioned the use of Policia 
Municipal to assist with terrorist investigations because of their local knowledge and often 
cultural affinity with minority communities (SP3). The Israeli interviewees pointed out that 
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the regular INP was supported by thousands of ‘Civil Guard’, comprising civilian volunteers 
with full police training and powers and that ‘if you see a police car patrolling with two 
officers, one is often a volunteer’ (IS6/13/18). Not only does this directly involve members of 
the local community in actively supporting the police to conduct their duties, but many of 
these volunteers are from the Israeli Arab community (IS13). Likewise, the MAGAV Border 
Guards have traditionally recruited members of the Druze, Circassian and Bedouin 
minorities, however, while this also assists with linguistic and cultural understanding of the 
Palestinian Arab community, historical hatreds, tensions and allegations of brutality may 
negate this understanding and the potential for ‘cultural interface’, by introducing the type 
of ‘legacy of fear’ previously discussed.   
In a similar context, Irish Garda interviewees felt that lack of minority membership and 
access to minority communities meant that whereas they had great cultural understanding 
of ‘subversive’ Republicanism, they lacked the same understanding and subsequent 
awareness of Islamist extremism. This lack of minority membership also limited their ability 
to fully interact and engage with the minority communities such extremists shield behind 
(IR3/11/12). Nevertheless, recognising this potential new security threat, and as previously 
discussed, the Garda have introduced a number of measures to address this issue. The 
flipside to such a situation, which can inhibit ‘cultural interface’ with local communities, was 
raised by US interviewees, who commented on the ethnic diversity of both the NYPD and 
LAPD, allowing them greater capabilities in community policing as well as the potential for 
undercover operations.111 This capability has been leveraged by the NYPD and LAPD both 
operationally and in community outreach programs (US7/18). 
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However, as well as the significance of such community knowledge and cultural 
understanding to the more overt police based ‘cultural interface’ and engagement 
previously discussed, it became clear from the interview data that these cultural, linguistic 
and demographic backgrounds, or lack of them, were also transferable and relevant to 
military and intelligence capabilities when operating amongst communities (See Tables 7 
and 8 Following). These were in the more covert fields of surveillance and human source 
recruitment, which are understandably less well researched and examined because of their 
nature. Nevertheless, such intelligence methodologies still rely on the types of ‘human 
factors’ previously detailed, such as personal relationships, individual skills, local community 
knowledge and cultural understanding. Consequently, having source handlers or 
surveillance operators with appropriate cultural, linguistic and demographic backgrounds 
and capabilities can prove critical to operational effectiveness and impact. 
Nevertheless, such cultural and linguistic skills are not necessarily transferable. Thus, the 
successors of the UK’s 14 Intelligence Company in the current Special Reconnaissance 
Regiment (SRR) have inherited many of their specialist surveillance skills and capabilities 
developed from operations in Northern Ireland against PIRA. However, as one military 
specialist explained, while “our experience in Northern Ireland has been invaluable… we 
have had to adapt our methods of operation in Afghanistan because of the conditions and 
terrain… With Iraq and Afghanistan such (surveillance) skills are very difficult to use. You can 
have LRRPs and OPs to provide eyes on, but it’s very difficult to blend in. Some guys in 
Northern Ireland could blend in and then develop the accent, but you do not have the same 
capability in Iraq and Afghanistan” (UK47).112  
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Table 7: MILITARY COMMUNITY & CULTURE 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
 Interface 
between 
Irish Army 
& public 
due to its 
numerous 
ATCP roles 
     
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Specialist 
HUMINT & 
surveillance 
skills of SRR 
based on 
expertise of 
FRU 
(HUMINT) & 
14 Int (Surv.) 
in N. Ireland 
 
British 
military 
much more 
involved in 
public 
events & in 
the public 
eye since 
the 1998 
Good Friday 
Agreement 
 Foreign 
Legion not 
just as an 
elite unit, 
but as a 
cultural pool 
for special 
operations 
or 
intelligence 
Large 
number of 
Muslim 
troops in 
both 
Regulares 
& Spanish 
Foreign 
Legion, 
generally 
recruited 
from 
Ceuta & 
Melilla 
Use of 
Sephardic 
Jews & Arabic 
speakers as 
Mista’Aravim 
 
Tracking skills 
& cultural 
knowledge of 
IDF Bedouin 
Gashashim 
‘Trackers’ 
 
Cultural, local 
& 
geographical 
knowledge of 
Druze 
Muslims 
serving in IDF 
& Sayeret Ha’ 
Druzim 
Use of 
‘turned’ PKK 
for JITEM 
HUMINT & 
Pseudo- 
Operations 
 
Turkish Army 
use of 
PSYOPS & 
Civil Affairs in 
rural SE. 
Anatolia 
 
Local 
geographical 
& cultural 
knowledge of 
‘Village 
Guards’ in 
rural SE. 
Anatolia 
US SOCOM 
Civil Affairs 
capability & 
importance 
of Civil 
Affairs 
operations 
 
‘Can’t just 
use ‘kickers 
& shooters’ 
who are the 
tip of the 
arrowhead, 
but also 
need 
support 
elements, 
specifically 
CA to 
provide tail 
feathers 
giving the 
arrow 
direction’ 
 
Historically, in such counter-insurgencies, there has been a long tradition of military and 
police ‘pseudo’ operations, where teams comprising operators disguised as terrorists, and 
sometimes ‘turned’ terrorists, with the right linguistic and cultural knowledge, have blended 
into the ‘target community’ to conduct covert surveillance and in some cases interdiction 
operations. Examples include the Kenyan Police Reserve ‘Pseudo Gangs’ countering the Mau 
Mau during the 1950s, the French in Algeria with their Commandos de Chasse comprising 
selected local indigenous forces and ‘turned’ terrorists, Rhodesia with its Selous Scouts and 
South Africa with elements of 32 Battalion and the Reconnaissance Commandos, all of 
162 
 
which relied on a mixture of black and white operators combining both tactical and 
technical  skills with an indigenous knowledge of the local languages and communities they 
operated amongst (Cline 2005). Although many of these skills have been utilised in overseas 
counter-insurgency operations, in a more domestic context the Turkish Jandarma 
‘Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism’ (JITEM) has allegedly used such mixed teams of 
disguised intelligence specialists and ‘turned’ terrorist ‘Shrivers’ to counter the PKK in the 
South East of the country utilising a combination of HUMINT and surveillance (TU1/10) 
(Aktan & Koknar 2002).  
Likewise in a more domestic context, while the operational skills and capabilities of the 
Israeli Mista’aravim (‘disguised as an Arab’ or ‘Arabist’)  will be briefly detailed later in this 
chapter, the cultural and linguistic aspects of their recruitment and training, which are 
intrinsic to this intelligence capability, were raised by several Israeli interviewees 
(IS8/10/13). Many come from Sephardic Jewish communities, often 2nd, 3rd or 4th 
generation immigrants from historic communities in Yemen, Morocco, Iraq and Egypt. 
Consequently as well as having Arabic features, they often speak Arabic fluently at home, 
and many of their customs, diet and traditions, while Jewish, are closer to the Arab cultures 
than to European Ashkenazy Jews. Consequently, upon conscription, normally at the age of 
18, Israel has a pool of potential Mista’aravim who can be trained to disguise themselves 
and culturally and linguistically pass themselves off as Arabs (Cohen 2008).113 The downside 
of such deception and ‘cultural asymmetry’ (IS8) is that “due to conflicts within the Muslim 
community, they will single out individuals because of their dialect, for example the Naserite 
dialect versus villages around Jerusalem, which makes it hard for Mista’aravim” (IS13).  
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As well as the cultural and linguistic skills of the Mista’aravim, the Israelis have also 
recruited military trackers or Gashashim from the Bedouin minority community to patrol 
the various desert and border areas. These Bedouin trackers demonstrate a very different 
type of ‘human factor’ skill, but again this has been developed through their communal and 
cultural upbringing. Having grown up in nomadic rural communities, often tracking sheep or 
other livestock in their youth, many have developed exceptional abilities to track and follow 
human spoor from terrorists or criminals infiltrating across the border, which has proved 
invaluable. Such human spoor consists of tracks, scuffs, bent grass, snapped twigs, rubbish, 
snagged cloth etc. indicating human presence and direction of travel. Likewise, the Israeli 
authorities have relied on the cultural and geographic knowledge of Druze Muslims serving 
in the specialist Sayeret Ha’Druzim, particularly their local knowledge of the sensitive border 
area of the Golan Heights, where many of the Druze communities are located, often 
straddling the border (IS3) (Katz 1993).  
Similar examples of such unique capabilities are provided by the Australian Army Regional 
Force Surveillance Units (RFSU), responsible for conducting surveillance and reconnaissance 
patrols in the remote Western and Northern areas of Australia, who utilise the ‘bush’ skills 
and local knowledge of their indigenous Aboriginal members.114 In the same way, advanced 
skills in tracking ‘signs’ of smugglers and drug traffickers have been used with great success 
by the ‘Shadow Wolves’, a unit of Native American trackers working as part of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on the US  - Mexican border in Arizona (Wheeler 
2003).  
A former Legionnaire stated that a similar ‘military-cultural pool’ exists for France within the 
French Foreign Legion, where as well as being highly trained elite light infantry and para-
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commandos, you have “genuine representatives of most nations in the World, with the right 
languages, cultural knowledge and passports’” (FR13). Consequently after one or more five 
year contracts to the Legion, when their loyalty was confirmed, individuals with the right 
cultural and linguistic backgrounds “got attached to the French Secret Service to do special 
missions… and that was considered absolutely normal” (FR13). This is assisted by a 
comprehensive database listing all the skills and capabilities of military personnel in certain 
specialist regiments (FR13). It was also raised by a Spanish military interviewee that Spain 
has a significant number of Muslims serving in the Spanish Army in both the elite Spanish 
Legion and Regulares, many recruited from the Spanish North African enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla (SP13). However, the downside of using elite military or police firearms officers for 
specialist intelligence or surveillance roles was raised by a French interviewee who had been 
on joint training and pointed out that although the Police RAID is sometimes used in such 
roles, they don’t blend in as ordinary members of the public as “they are all big guys, maybe 
they stand out during surveillance!” (FR11). 
Consequently, the evidence from the interviewees in various countries, concerning both 
community knowledge and cultural understanding, support the importance of community 
policing approaches, particularly when these are utilised as a platform for increased 
community engagement and interaction. More specifically they highlight the importance of 
such relationships in the building of trust, community internalisation and the concomitant 
flow of information and ‘bottom up’ community based intelligence. Such positive 
interactions, the building of trust and the associated support of the community conform to 
key aspects of the Procedural Justice Model previously discussed. Clearly however, as the 
examples show, the effectiveness of community policing approaches and the associated 
level of information and intelligence this generates, will significantly depend upon the 
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quality of police delivery, their level of ‘cultural interface’ and the nature of the community 
concerned.  
Table 8: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY & CULTURE 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Historic 
HUMINT 
experience 
& capability 
from N. 
Ireland  
Intelligence 
benefits from 
strong cultural 
knowledge of 
Republicans  
 
Strong 
relations 
between S & I 
& local Garda 
with 
community 
knowledge 
Previous 
expertise/ 
individual 
contacts of 
RG & DST 
(local/ 
business), 
now both 
part of the 
DGSI 
 Extensive 
source 
networks 
amongst  
communities  
 
Capability of 
Mista’Aravim 
to operate 
amongst 
minority 
communities, 
but difficult 
operationally 
 NYPD 
diversity 
helps its 
Intel. 
Division run 
UC 
operations 
& develop 
local 
community 
HUMINT 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Lack of 
‘Bottom 
Up’ intel. 
flow to 
match ‘Top 
Down’ in 
the UK 
 
Local 
community 
intel. role 
of Police 
CTIOs 
Lack of intel. & 
access to 
minority 
communities, 
particularly 
Muslim  
 
G2 cultural & 
linguistic 
understanding 
from overseas 
operations 
such as UNIFIL 
 
Increased 
minority 
recruitment & 
language 
training to 
better interface 
with minority 
communities 
 
 
Significant 
HUMINT 
amongst 
minorities 
 
Cultural 
benefit of 
Corsican & 
N. African 
origin intel 
officers 
 
Difficulty of 
intel. in 
Basque & 
Corsican 
rural areas 
 
Benefits of 
For Legion 
as cultural 
pool for 
intel. ops 
Successes of 
Franco-
Spanish 
surveillance 
teams 
against ETA  
 
Successful 
use of 
HUMINT / 
TECHINT to 
counter 
rural ETA 
 
Despite 
historical El 
Andalus lack 
of Spanish 
cultural 
knowledge 
of Muslim 
Community 
& Arabic 
language 
Cultural 
benefit of 
intelligence 
personnel of 
Sephardic & 
minority 
communities – 
Druze, Israeli 
Arab, 
Circassian, 
Bedouin etc. 
 
Cultural 
knowledge, 
infiltration & 
monitoring of 
Jewish 
extremists 
 
Intelligence 
benefits of 
Jews from 
many 
nationalities in  
Israel 
Cultural 
knowledge 
of Islamists 
& use by IDB 
of Sight 
Orientated 
Policing 
 
Polis IDBs 
use of 
HUMINT 
sources to 
‘Listen to the 
Heart of the 
PKK’ 
 
Local 
knowledge & 
rural 
contacts of 
JITEM in SE. 
Anatolia – 
developed to 
cover gap in 
MIT 
coverage of 
PKK in 1980s 
Post 9/11 
focus to 
improve & 
develop 
HUMINT  
 
After 9/11 
problems 
because US 
intel. 
community 
(IC) didn’t 
have 
language  & 
cultural  
knowledge 
 
FBI success  
infiltrating 
XRW after 
Oklahoma 
Bombing 
1995 
 
Weakness 
of FBI intel 
systems -no 
‘eyes & 
ears’ on 
ground 
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The examples also highlight the benefits to such ‘cultural interface’ of having police officers 
with the appropriate cultural, religious, linguistic and demographic backgrounds necessary 
to establish and develop initial relationships and understanding with the community, 
particularly when this is a minority community. However, as the examples from military and 
intelligence interviewees demonstrate, such cultural, religious, linguistic and demographic 
knowledge and understanding are transferable skills and can prove critical not only in 
establishing an overt dialogue and rapport with local communities, but also in the 
development of human or surveillance based intelligence. Nevertheless, as interviewees 
discussed, the boundaries between overt dialogue and covert intelligence collection must 
be very carefully managed and where necessary ‘firewalled’.  
e. The Unlikely Counter-Terrorists  
The public’s internalisation of shared values with the police and their subsequent 
willingness to actively support the police in their responsibilities are believed to be key 
benefits which flow from the building of trust, development of legitimacy and establishment 
of institutional authority previously outlined in the Procedural Justice Model. This can prove 
particularly relevant in a local community environment and as Myhill and Quinton state, 
“problem solving is often most effective when the public are involved. People in local 
communities are best placed to know what the issues and problems are in their 
neighbourhood, can help specify the nature of these problems, and which cause greatest 
harm. They may propose alternative solutions to problems – which could be more effective 
than standard police responses – and also help to deliver them” (Myhill & Quinton 2011: 
p.9). Similar concepts regarding such public support can be found in relation to the field of 
counter-terrorism, with Innes et. al. stating that “over time, by winning over hearts and 
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minds… the aim will be to translate this into a degree of reciprocity manifested as a greater 
willingness for people from these communities to act as the police’s ‘eyes and ears’” (Innes 
et. al, 2007: p.30). The former Metropolitan Police ACSO, Sir David Veness, refers to these 
non-state actors from communities, commerce and business as ‘unlikely counter-terrorists’, 
arguing that “their endeavours to prevent and reduce harm are critical to the new counter-
terrorism…. the public sector alone will not be able to offer a comprehensive solution” 
(Veness 2002 pp.52 & 55). 115 
Again, aspects of the concepts behind ‘Unlikely Counter-Terrorists’ acting as additional ‘eyes 
and ears’ were reflected and supported in the research data, with a number of cases raised 
where the public have approached the police and reported their suspicions. Of particular 
note is the case of the Islamist convert Andrew ‘Isa’ Ibrahim, where in 2008 members of the 
Muslim community in Bristol raised their concerns, resulting in a police investigation which 
led to his arrest and stopped him launching a so called ‘lone wolf’ suicide bomb attack on a 
local shopping centre. Though technically public servants, Innes et. al. mention the case of 
Muslim Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) working amongst Asian communities in 
the UK, where “a view was expressed that such individuals were especially well attuned to 
community concerns and had a greater awareness of cultural conventions in dealing with 
problems when they arose” (Innes et. al. 2007 p.30). While the authors highlight that the 
evidence supporting this was mixed, in a similar scenario, a Spanish Guardia Civil 
interviewee mentioned that he often contacted local Municipal Police (fulfilling a similar 
role to PCSOs) during counter-terrorist investigations (although this was not their role), 
because of their local knowledge and cultural understanding (SP3). 
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A further aspect of ‘Unlikely Counter-Terrorists’ was raised by  interviewees in Spain, Israel 
and the US, commenting on the use of security guards to provide additional ‘eyes and ears’ 
to the police through the provision of local security and intelligence (See Table 6 Previous). 
One LAPD interviewee mentioned their Security Officer Terrorism Awareness Course 
(SOTAC) acting as a ‘force multiplier’ by getting security officers to “look maybe at the 
terrorist slide rule, acting as our eyes out there” (US20), while in Spain following the Madrid 
bombings of 2004, the Policia were given the power to mobilise local security staff to assist 
them in response to an incident.  
In Israel close relations have been developed between the INP ‘Blue Police’ and local 
security guards, which forms a key part of the Israeli national security concept of ‘Three 
Circles of Security’. While the ‘First Circle’ concerns ‘the security of the borders of Israel and 
beyond, through external intelligence and military intervention abroad’ (IS4/14), the ‘Second 
Circle’ concerns ‘security measures inside the 1967 borders, such as INP and MAGAV 
roadblocks, stops and Shin Bet checks’ (IS4/14/18). The ‘Third Circle’ concerns ‘local target 
hardening which is achieved through security guards in shopping centres, bus depots and 
train stations, Civil Guards assisting the police, the use of explosives detection technology 
and sniffer dogs, and the generation of civilian awareness and resilience’ (IS4/6/14/18). In 
this ‘Third Circle’ of Security the police rely on the numerous local security guards in Israeli 
cities to provide additional ‘eyes and ears’ against terrorism (IS2/3/7/10/11). One 
interviewee pointed out that in Israel, “security guards all have previous military experience, 
they see it as an honour to protect the public, they have been effective in reducing the level 
of casualties from suicide attacks, they treat their job with pride and once terrorists are 
through intelligence and police, they are the final line” (IS2).  
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A different type of community support was raised with the NYPD’s Operation Nexus, where 
its Counter-Terrorism Division “makes private industry aware of dual-purpose technology” 
(US7). This is a network of businesses and enterprises cooperating to prevent terrorist 
attacks, by reporting suspicious business encounters, particularly when they are linked to 
the purchase of certain materials and equipment, or more formalised training to acquire 
specific skills or licences.116 Likewise, Project Griffin was originally introduced by the City of 
London and Metropolitan Police to protect London’s financial sector, but has now expanded 
to cover other businesses in the private sector and local authorities, educating them to 
become additional ‘eyes and ears’.117  
In a far more hostile environment and more of a counter-insurgency context, following the 
increasing level of attacks by the PKK in the rural South East of Turkey, in 1985 the 
authorities passed Law 3175. This allowed the formation, training and arming of Gecici Koy 
Koruculugu (GKK) or ‘temporary village guards’ from local residents in those areas. This GKK 
system was based on the UK doctrine during the Malayan Emergency, of establishing a 
‘Home Guard’ to defend rural communities. As the interviewees explained “there’s a 
recruiting process in the villages around the border with Iraq, so people within the villages 
are taken into militia guards” (TU8) and “they work under the Gendarmerie (Jandarma) and 
help in the defence of their villages against possible terror attacks” (TU12).  In a more 
proactive role, the ‘village guards’ have also coordinated roadblocks and supported the 
security forces to mount operations against the PKK, where their local knowledge and 
contacts have proved critical (TU12). The downside of such a system, and often reflected in 
other examples of militia groups, has been a level of corruption, violence between GKK 
groups and allegations of serious human rights violations (Bese 2006). 
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Thus data from interviewees in various countries evidenced support for the concepts behind 
both the assistance of ‘Unlikely Counter-Terrorists’ and their utilisation to provide additional 
‘eyes and ears’ to the police and security forces amongst local communities. Though framed 
for a crime prevention environment as part of his wider Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity 
(CCO) Framework, Ekblom’s mnemonic CLAIMED, regarding the use of the local public in 
crime prevention, reflects aspects from a number of these examples in the field of counter-
terrorism (Ekblom 2011):  
 Clarify crime prevention roles  
 Locate appropriate preventive agents 
 Alert them  
 Inform them 
 Motivate them 
 Empower them - increase capacity  
 Direct them – objectives and standards  
Perhaps it is a lack of this latter direction and associated standards, which has proved a 
factor in the last example from Turkey, which though an exemplar reinforces the fact that in 
certain circumstances care must be taken in both how these community actors are 
empowered and how they are managed. Nevertheless, despite this caveat, two senior UK 
counter-terrorist police interviewees believed there was an important role to be played by 
such communities, security guards, businesses and local authorities when acting as ‘Unlikely 
Counter-Terrorists’ (UK16/35). 
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f. Understanding ‘Human Terrain’ and Local Intelligence 
As has already been outlined in the preceding sections, the various concepts behind the 
Procedural Justice Model, such as building individual and community trust, developing 
perceived legitimacy and establishing institutional authority, can arguably prove critical to 
developing positive relationships, a thorough understanding of the community and in 
generating local ‘bottom up’ intelligence. Much of this intelligence is contingent upon these 
relationships, a level of local knowledge and the support of additional ‘eyes and ears’ from 
within the local community. However, as the research examples in the previous sections 
have demonstrated, although these concepts were originally framed for a domestic policing 
context, many of them, including an understating of the ‘Human Terrain’ of a community 
and the development of local intelligence, are arguably transferable to an overseas 
environment and relevant to the use of intelligence organisations and the military in a wider 
counter-insurgency (Fate & Jackson 2005).118  
In such a counter-insurgency environment, just as in a domestic context, the same critical 
factor behind both an effective understanding of ‘Human Terrain’ and the generation of 
population centric local intelligence is the level of policing and military engagement with the 
local community (Paul et. al. 2010). Since the insurgents operate ‘amongst’ the population, 
often hiding behind local institutions, to avoid creating ‘Accidental Guerrillas’ through 
excessive, inappropriate or over reactive military actions, a level of interaction with the 
community is essential (Kilcullen 2009).119 Consequently there is a need to assess and 
address local community issues, to build confidence, encourage engagement and develop a 
level of trust. This engagement with the community means the policing and military security 
force operators are in a better position to understand the ‘Human Terrain’ and to develop 
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‘bottom up’ local intelligence. Such engagement also facilitates an understanding of the ‘day 
to day’ environment of the community and a feeling for when something is ‘not right’, ‘out 
of place’ or when a person ‘does not fit in’. This local ‘Situational Awareness’ and associated 
community intelligence complement the type of ‘top down’ intelligence from the more 
strategic level national intelligence organisations. 
Thus, mirroring the advantages of insurgents in their local knowledge of the community and 
terrain, two principles of counter-insurgency are particularly critical in achieving 
effectiveness: A thorough understanding of the ‘Human Terrain’, which has been defined as 
linking aspects of sociology, political science, geography, linguistics and regional studies 
along with properly integrated and developed local intelligence (AFM 2010). As stated, 
these are contingent on building community engagement, while developing local knowledge 
and ‘situational awareness’. One former military source handler likened the focus on such 
factors as a return to the skills of the ‘Great Game’, played out between Imperial Britain and 
the Russian Empire in Central Asia during the 19th Century (UK31) (Hopkirk 1991). As in a 
domestic context, both principles are greatly enhanced by utilising individuals with 
appropriate demographic, cultural and linguistic skills and knowledge, which fosters the 
successful development of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) from local sources and enhances 
effective surveillance and interdiction, which will be discussed in the next section. Such 
individuals may come from within national security forces or, particularly in the case of 
overseas operations, indigenous personnel operating in such roles. However, while there 
are differences in the operational capabilities between policing and military field 
intelligence teams, impacting on their utilisation dependent on the permissiveness of the 
operational environment, foreign operators will never develop the same understanding of 
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‘Human Terrain’ and local knowledge as indigenous members of the local community 
(Joseph 2014).  
As a result, not only have countries utilised their own specialist operators, with cultural and 
linguistic knowledge and expertise, to operate both overtly and covertly amongst such 
communities, but many have also recruited local irregulars and former ‘turned‘ insurgents 
and terrorists to operate alongside them in the type of  ‘pseudo’ operations, previously 
mentioned. Additionally, capacity building has been utilised to ‘raise the bar’ and enhance 
local indigenous policing, intelligence and military units’ counter-insurgency capabilities, 
through both additional specialist training and mentoring in their core competencies. 
Therefore, despite the inherent difficulties and dangers of counter-insurgency operations, a 
further option is to conduct such operations by ‘proxy’, utilising specially trained indigenous 
forces.  
Although obviously a different environment and situation, there are clearly certain parallels 
which can be drawn with the domestic examples of ‘Unlikely Counter-Terrorists’ from 
‘inside’ the community, providing additional ‘eyes and ears’. Thus the recruitment of 
indigenous personnel from ‘within’ the relevant communities, with their understanding of 
‘Human Terrain’ - local knowledge of language, community structures, demographics and 
physical terrain, has often proved invaluable in such counter-insurgency campaigns. Given 
this understanding, when working closely alongside specialist military or police operators 
with the appropriate level of knowledge and cultural awareness, and when effectively 
trained, equipped and led by such individuals, such local indigenous operators can perform 
very effectively. As historical examples demonstrate, this can be out of all proportion to 
their numbers.  
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g. HUMINT, Surveillance and establishing ‘Ground Truth’ 
The evidence from the research interviews previously detailed has arguably supported the 
various concepts behind the Procedural Justice Model, which are detailed at the start of this 
chapter.120These assert that by treating individual members of a community fairly and with 
respect, perceived legitimacy can be developed by the police, leading to institutional 
authority and ultimately the support of the general public. Taking this further, Innes and 
others argue that by gaining ‘hearts and minds’ within a community, a level of reciprocity 
can be developed, which can lead to members of that community acting as additional ‘eyes 
and ears’ in support of the police and their actions (Innes et. al. 2007). As has already been 
alluded to, and going one stage further, as well as leading to more overt relationships, local 
knowledge and information, such community support can also benefit the more covert 
intelligence methodologies of source led HUMINT and visual intelligence from surveillance 
(See Table 9 Following). While great care must be taken to ‘firewall’ these methodologies, 
particularly in relation to source protection, such human centric intelligence can prove 
critical to developing an effective understanding of the ‘Human Terrain’ within a community 
and collecting local ‘bottom up’ field intelligence, both domestically and overseas. 
Subsequently, the product generated from these intelligence methodologies can prove an 
important factor in establishing the local ‘Ground Truth’, a military description for what is 
actually occurring real time on the ground as opposed to a remote estimation or 
assessment.  
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Table 9: INTELLIGENCE HUMINT & SURVEILLANCE 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
1 
  Historical 
intelligence 
experience 
countering 
Islamist 
extremists 
from N. 
Africa & in 
Algeria 
Historical 
experience 
countering 
ETA 
amongst 
national, 
Policia & 
Guardia 
Civil intel. 
   
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Historical 
HUMINT 
experience/ 
intelligence 
capability in  
N. Ireland 
Long 
experience of 
operations 
against 
‘subversive’ 
Republicans  
 
Intelligence 
benefits of 
cultural & 
religious 
understand. -
Republicans 
Franco-
Spanish 
intelligence 
cooperation 
to counter 
ETA 
 
 Shin Bet & 
Mossad 
historical 
expertise in  
operational & 
tactical 
intelligence on 
Palestinian & 
Hezbollah 
terrorism 
Long 
intelligence 
history of 
countering 
the PKK, 
including 
HUMINT  
 
 
 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Long history, 
tradition & 
experience of 
intelligence  
 
Improved 
intel.  
systems, 
structures & 
manpower 
post 9/11 & 
7/7 
 
Adjustment 
from ‘Cold 
War’ & ‘Irish’ 
to ‘Islamist’ 
focus of CT 
intelligence 
Surveillance & 
hides 
expertise of 
National 
Surveillance 
Unit (NSU) 
Extensive 
HUMINT 
networks 
amongst  
N. African 
minorities 
rather than 
UC officers 
 
Successes of 
joint Franco-
Spanish 
surveillance 
teams 
against ETA 
 
 
Successful 
use of 
HUMINT & 
TECHINT to 
counter ETA 
- most 
activists 
identified 
 
Police intel 
expertise in 
Basque 
region-ETA 
 
Previous 
focus on 
ETA vs. 
concern of 
lack of focus 
on 
Islamists? 
Critical 
development 
of extensive 
HUMINT 
source 
networks  
 
Infiltration & 
monitoring of 
Jewish 
extremists 
 
Dogmatic 
focus on 
Palestinian & 
Hezbollah at 
the expense 
of Jewish 
extremists & 
internationala
l Qaeda 
network? 
 
Expertise of 
JITEM in 
developing 
HUMINT in 
rural SE. 
Anatolia  
 
Focus on 
threat of 
PKK to 
detriment 
of Islamist 
threat focus 
Post 9/11 
expansion 
& coop. FBI, 
CIA & NSA 
plus  
exchanges 
 
‘Cold War’ 
& Church 
Hearings 
weakenedH
UMINT for 
TECHINT 
but not 
‘ground 
truth’ 
 
Increase in 
focus on  
HUMINT 
capability 
post 9/11  
 
Despite the recent media focus on Technical intelligence (TECHINT) from signals or 
electronic means, a strong overarching theme that emerged from the research interviewees 
of various countries and fields, was the significance in counter-terrorism of both HUMINT 
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developed through skilled ‘handlers’ running sources within the community and associated 
surveillance or Visual intelligence (VISINT).121 As a former UK military source handler 
explained, “in terms of countering terrorism, HUMINT is totally crucial… because bugs, 
probes, jarks, surveillance etc. tell you about what’s happening now, but only HUMINT can 
tell you what your enemy is planning in the future” (UK31).122 While this is not strictly true, 
and much technology is designed with the intention of helping predict the future, it is 
perhaps the level of insight and understanding of the mind-set and intentions of the 
terrorist that HUMINT provides, which the interviewee was referring to.  
The development of such HUMINT relies on the recruitment of suitable sources within the 
wider community with the local knowledge, contacts, situational awareness and 
understanding previously highlighted. These can lead to the successful identification of 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED – Bomb) locations, the support and technical construction 
network around a bomber, insurgent networks and cells, weapons caches and bomb making 
‘factories’.  
As  well as the recruitment, running and development  of sources by ‘handlers’, a further 
means of obtaining HUMINT is through the infiltration of a terrorist cell or network by an 
undercover police or intelligence officer. In many cases this is dependent on having officers 
with the right cultural and linguistic backgrounds previously discussed, as well as the 
necessary psychological aptitudes and skills. As recent events in the UK have demonstrated, 
such undercover policing must be carefully controlled and directed by handlers, while 
individual officers involved in such difficult and dangerous work must be properly 
supported, physically, psychologically and socially (Evans & Lewis 2013). 
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Thus applying an ‘asymmetric response to an asymmetric threat’, as a means of obtaining 
and developing pre-emptive intelligence to counter a terrorist or insurgent threat, many 
policing, intelligence and military organisations have developed HUMINT through the use of 
the ‘Mark 1 Human Source’. The identification, recruitment, cultivation and longer term 
development of human sources, or Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS), by source 
handlers, is a major factor in the infiltration, undermining and development of intelligence 
to counter terrorist groups. This was amply demonstrated by the success of this type of 
intelligence development during the thirty years of operations by the RUC and British Army 
against the Provisional IRA (Geraghty 2000). Both the RUC Special Branch and the Army 
Force Research Unit (FRU) ran sources within the PIRA, some of whom, such as Denis 
Donaldson and Freddie Scappaticci, were developed to a high level within the organisation 
(Urban 1992). As one former FRU handler explained, “as well as telling you what your enemy 
is planning in the future, HUMINT provides you with the ability to develop a long term asset 
in an organisation, for example ‘Stake Knife’” (UK31).123 Effectively, HUMINT ‘broke the back 
of PIRA and its infiltration led to paranoia in the organisation with no one trusting the other’ 
(UK28/30). This significantly weakened its external capabilities, undermining the 
organisation’s internal cohesion and trust to a point where it strongly impacted on its ability 
to conduct operations. 
Other countries have also utilised HUMINT networks as a means of countering terrorism. 
The French domestic intelligence services have allegedly collected ‘extensive intelligence on 
the streets’ to identify Islamist extremism amongst elements in the Algerian and wider 
North African minority community (FR2/5/6), ‘having developed an extensive network of 
sources in various communities, and seeking to recruit sources from within Islamist 
networks’ (FR1/14). Likewise, in response to ETA “the Spanish intelligence services rely a lot 
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on HUMINT sources, and I think that they’ve had some success with that. That’s the best 
type… because it provides the best warning of attacks and such… (However) because the 
Basque Country is very small and everyone knows each other, they live in small villages… 
technology has also been used in the fight against Basque terrorism” (SP1).  
With Israel a former Shin Bet official stated that “HUMINT is very important above all the 
other sources in knowing who, how, and why, because then you will have the chance to 
decide to prevent it or track it and tracking is sometimes more important than to prevent it… 
the two questions you will ask as a commander are when and how, it’s a matter of timing 
and intention” (IS5) (Ganor 2005).124 This was supported by other Israeli interviewees who 
believed that ‘although technical intelligence is a very important issue, there is nothing like 
two legged intelligence from human sources, which can intercept and penetrate PIJ and 
HAMAS cells’ (IS6/9/16) (Alexander 2002).125 Despite the loss of much of the network of 
human sources following the Oslo Declaration of Principles in 1994, the network was 
renewed when suicide attacks re-emerged and in particular following the start of the 
second al Aqsa Intifada in 2000 (IS4/8). One senior police officer concluded that “if we are 
good in offence, like in soccer you will have less work on the defence. So when we are good 
in intelligence and we penetrate their cells there in the territories or in Gaza, we have less to 
take care of from the defence point of view” (IS6). 
Likewise, one Turkish Polis liaison officer explained that the PKK “work as a cell system, each 
cell doesn’t know the others; it’s not easy to focus on the terrorism, so intelligence is very 
important” (TU10). Consequently, a senior Turkish police officer with previous service in the 
IDB explained that, “there are agents in the PKK and we are listening to their heart, so we 
understand exactly what is going on” (TU14). However, interviewees highlighted that it was 
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not only the Polis, or indeed the ‘National Intelligence Organisation’ Milli Istihbarat Teskilati 
(MIT), with experience of generating HUMINT on the PKK. Following the upsurge of the 
PKK’s terrorist campaign in South East Anatolia in 1984, it was found that the MIT initially 
lacked the local sources to counter what was becoming a rural insurgency (Aktan & Koknar 
2002). Consequently the Turkish authorities turned to the Jandarma with their local 
knowledge and rural contacts. It is believed that they formed the shadowy Jandarma 
Istihbarat ve Terorle Mucadele (JITEM – Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism), 
which has allegedly developed expertise in both HUMINT and covert operations against the 
PKK (TU1/10) (Bese 2006). 
Even with the recruitment, ‘handling’ and development of human sources from within, or 
closely associated with a terrorist or insurgent group, due to the regular use by such 
organisations of cell networks to firewall information and their adherence to Operational 
Security (OPSEC) measures, any intelligence is likely to be ‘single strand’, such as a who, a 
what, a where, a when, a why, or a how in isolation, rather than a detailed combination of 
these intelligence ‘strands’. As two senior UK Special Branch (SB) officers explained, it is 
extremely rare to obtain the ‘Crown Jewels’ of intelligence, ‘contact intelligence that on day, 
date, time and place this is going to happen’ (UK9/12). However, a former RUC SB source 
handler stated that with HUMINT, “all other forms of intelligence, whether technical or 
surveillance orientated can run off it. You need to be thinking of the longer term strategic 
goal, rather than the short term operational” (UK28).  
The other operational intelligence capability which was strongly highlighted by the interview 
data was intelligence developed through the various countries specialist surveillance units. 
While the ‘handling’ of human sources helps ‘find’ terrorists, the use of surveillance allows 
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the police and security forces to ‘fix’ terrorists, identifying their lifestyles, movements and 
contacts, before going executive through arrest or tactical intervention to ‘finish’ (UK32) 
(Peritz & Rosenbach 2012).126 This surveillance can be in the form of either mobile 
surveillance by teams on foot or in vehicles, or through the use of static ‘Observation Posts’ 
(OPs) to monitor a venue, such as the subject’s home address or a meeting place. With rural 
locations this often requires additional specialist skills in the construction of ‘Covert Rural 
Observation Posts’ (CROPs) or camouflaged hides.  
As with source handling, both the RUC Special Branch with its E4A unit and the British 
Army’s 14th Intelligence Company (14 Int or the Det), were very actively involved in 
‘watching’ the PIRA during the terrorist organisation’s campaign of violence in Northern 
Ireland, playing a critical role in countering their plans and operations (Taylor 2002). As a 
former 14 Int operator explained “as a group the Det was very good at going out on 
surveillance, getting intelligence and feeding it to Box and Branch. We were also given 
information and intelligence and then we would act on it. Surveillance was set up and we 
would monitor lifestyles and patterns of behaviour” (UK46).127 However, such surveillance 
was conducted in a very hostile and rapidly changeable environment, as demonstrated by 
the reaction when individual operators or units were identified. Consequently “although 14 
Company was responsible for covert surveillance, because of the fluidity of the situation in 
Northern Ireland, it had to have the capability and skills to tactically intervene when it 
became necessary” (UK32) (Rennie 1997). In the mainland United Kingdom, meanwhile, the 
use of police OPs and surveillance teams has proved vital in countering a number of major 
conspiracies by violent Islamists, particularly in such complex operations as Operation Overt, 
a terrorist conspiracy in 2006 to down transatlantic aircraft with liquid explosives smuggled 
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aboard the aircraft, which required numerous surveillance teams from constabularies across 
the country. 
In possibly one of the best examples of inter-state operational cooperation, joint Franco-
Spanish surveillance teams, with a level of extra-territoriality on both sides of the border, 
have played an important role as part of their countries’ joint efforts to mitigate the threat 
posed by the Basque separatist group ETA through the identification and arrest of its 
leadership. A former surveillance team member explained that “we inaugurated a lot of 
techniques of very close cooperation, especially with intelligence and surveillance, and I think 
we have invented mixed surveillance teams” (FR6). Despite the great success of such joint 
teams, effective ETA counter-surveillance and the physical threat to the teams highlighted 
the difficulty of operating in this environment (SP1/FR6).128 This threat was manifested in 
2007 when two Guardia Civil surveillance officers operating on French soil in Capbreton 
were identified and executed by an ETA Comando.129 In countering another form of 
nationalist terrorism, because of the difficult terrain and closed rural communities in 
Corsica, where it has proved very dangerous to put people in the villages (FR8), the French 
have used specialist Police and Gendarmerie units to establish long term covert rural hides 
as a means of conducting surveillance on various Corsican nationalist extremists, such as 
Yvan Colonna, responsible for murdering the island’s Prefect, Claude Erignac in Ajaccio 
during February 1998 (FR8).  
The Irish Garda National Surveillance Unit (NSU), who were perceived to be “extremely good 
at surveillance, hides and other skills” (IR12), have also been particularly active in operations 
across the whole country. As a team leader explained “some of our work is split between 
criminal stuff or more ‘subversive’ stuff. I mean a lot of it would be actual ongoing 
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operations in relation to the seizure of drugs or armed crime… and then another part of it is 
gathering intelligence in relation to some of the characters involved… some of them would 
come from a dissident Republican background who have gone into the criminal area and 
there’s a crossover” (IR4). To operate successfully in such hostile environments, often with 
close knit rural communities, without being compromised, requires a high degree of 
operational skill, and the type of local knowledge and cultural understanding previously 
examined. Taking this to its logical conclusion, the Israeli Mista’aravim (‘disguised as an 
Arab’) units in both the police, such as the Border Guards ‘Green Police’ YAMAS unit, and 
the military, such as Sayeret Duvdevan (Unit 217), “have to act, smell, live, talk and behave 
like them (local Palestinian communities). Now when you are gathering the intelligence 
data… with those guys who are Mista’aravim you can get a surgical operation, clear cut, 
without damaging… collateral and other innocent people and this is the main reason to 
make those kinds of units for those kinds of missions” (IS10). Clearly being able to pass 
oneself off as a member of the local community is invaluable in conducting surveillance of 
terrorists, close target reconnaissance (CTR) of their venues and locations and direct 
intervention (Cohen 2008).  
Consequently, because of their nature and the type of operational and tactical intelligence 
they develop, both HUMINT and surveillance methodologies can prove critical to 
establishing the ‘Ground Truth’ in both a domestic community based counter-terrorist or 
overseas counter-insurgency environment. However, as well as helping understand the 
‘Human Terrain’ and developing local ‘bottom up’ intelligence, both intelligence 
methodologies are intrinsically linked to the type of personal relationships, local community 
knowledge and cultural understanding discussed in the previous sections.  
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Despite its relatively small size, the Garda ‘Crime and Security’, which includes S & I, the 
NSU and the Special Detective Unit (SDU), was perceived as having an advantage in this area 
of ‘bottom up’ local community intelligence, because it forms part of Ireland’s wider 
national policing organisation. As a senior Garda officer explained, “the primary function of 
Special Branch (SDU) is to develop sources within the ‘dissidents’, Human Intelligence. The 
enquiries in relation to intelligence, which is detective work, conducting we’ll say background 
in relation to their homes, their associates, their activities, their demeanour, their attitudes, 
their reactions… that is all the responsibility of Special Branch” (IR7). As part of the wider 
Garda, it has access to a network of local Garda units with their contacts and local 
knowledge. As one Garda specialist explained, “that’s the key to it, between the intelligence 
unit, the Security and Intelligence Unit, with the border units, because that’s really where the 
local Garda are” (IR5). The benefits of such local knowledge were confirmed by a senior 
officer who explained that in one counter terrorist operation they had relied on a local 
uniformed Garda who “knew everybody down there, he’d been there for 14 years and even a 
cat doesn’t cross the road without him knowing about it” (IR9).  
In order to try and ensure this ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ intelligence connectivity, the 
French have developed a ‘Maillage’ or ‘Grid’ system of intelligence, where “the country is 
scrutinised by intelligence officers in all of its 22 Departments, who report to the 
Departmental level. Each Department reports to the Regional level, each Region reports to 
the Zonal level and the Zonal to the Central level. All the resulting intelligence is entered on a 
national database and analysed” (FR14). In the case of Israel, much of this focus on local 
intelligence development through HUMINT and surveillance is based around the concept of 
‘Three Circles of Intelligence’, where “the first level is identifying the suicide bomber for 
example, coming from Ramallah to Netanya market, in order to intercept him, secondly you 
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try to find his commander or other support network and thirdly, you try to find and counter 
the ideology amongst the population” (IS7). As the former AMAN military intelligence officer 
went on to explain, “intelligence is the heart of it… crossing all the levels” (IS7) (Katz 1992b). 
h. Mirror Image: Personal Relationships & Local Knowledge 
As raised in the introduction to the analytic section, while the main focus of this research is 
on the significance of human factors in effective counter-terrorism, each of the various 
factors being considered has its own ‘Mirror Image’, where terrorist individuals and 
organisations utilise and exploit the same ‘human factors’ in the pursuit of their objectives. 
While space and focus preclude a more detailed analysis, it may prove more appropriate to 
consider this section’s ‘Mirror Image’ in reverse, since the policing, intelligence and military 
counter-terrorists are generally  using ‘human factors’ in response to the threat posed by 
terrorists or insurgents, normally already embedded in, and often emerging from, within 
those communities. Consequently terrorists and insurgents often have the advantage of 
their knowledge of the types of local terrain, weather, language, culture and communities 
discussed in the previous sections. Indeed, such communities often provide them with a 
source of recruitment, subsistence, shelter and concealment. Thus in more recent times, a 
major concern for the policing and military security forces involved in any counter-terrorist 
or counter-insurgency campaign has been to identify and mitigate or neutralise the threat, 
whilst minimising the collateral impact on the wider community, which has acted as a major 
catalyst of further recruitment for the insurgents (Richardson 2006). 
In the case of personal relationships, community opinion and local knowledge, terrorists and 
insurgents will seek to use these relationships to develop legitimacy, establish their 
institutional authority and improve their contacts, community support and local intelligence. 
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However, as mentioned, the terrorists usually have the benefit of sharing the same 
community knowledge, cultural understanding and associated language skills as the 
community they are operating amongst. These relationships and contacts have led to 
varying levels of support from members of the local community and while there are many 
examples of coercion, this has not always been the case.  
However, while the nature of the terrorist/insurgent group, their ideology, organisation and 
objectives will influence their relationship with constituent communities, the data from the 
research interviews tended to highlight two broad groupings, the more traditional 
hierarchical terrorist groups, such as PIRA and ETA, and the more loosely controlled 
networks of cells linked to or affiliated with the wider al Qaeda network. The former clearly 
have more organised and structured community support bases, often firewalled into 
different cells or groups to conduct various support or logistical roles, such as intelligence 
collection, training, fundraising, engineering (IED construction), propaganda etc. while the 
latter have more loosely connected cells often fulfilling a number of functions and roles, 
such as conducting their own fundraising, target identification, IED construction and 
operations (Nance 2003). 
Nevertheless, to a greater or lesser extent, both types of organisation rely on the support of 
what might be considered ‘Unlikely Terrorists’, mirroring the positive support from the 
community previously discussed. As Bell explains, “the central leadership must be able to 
allot certain tasks (operational direction, intelligence and acquiring, storing and deploying 
arms, for example) and maintain contact with the direct operatives. This is normally done 
through a network of individuals who are sympathetic to the cause, but who are not full-
time terrorists. Like the cell members, they have little contact with other members of the 
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formal organisation and are given occasional tasks – delivering a package here, making a 
telephone call there. They are, however; the sinews that bind the organisation together. 
Without them, the active cells could quickly become isolated” (Bell 1997: p. 226).  
Thus as well as the leadership and active cadre of the organisation, involved in the actual 
planning and conducting of operations, Seger identifies two types of community supporters, 
active supporters and passive supporters. Active supporters are those members of the 
community likely to be involved in fund raising, providing safe houses, storing weapons or 
explosives, publishing and distributing propaganda, obtaining vehicles and organising 
logistical and administrative support. Passive supporters on the other hand, while not 
directly involved in support of the terrorist or insurgent group, believe in its aims and may 
be willing to give funds, allow people to use their vehicles or property without question or 
pass on information and intelligence (Seger 1990). 
Regarding this last factor of collecting and developing local intelligence, terrorists and 
insurgents have the advantage of benefitting from a network of potential informants and 
intelligence collectors throughout the community. In a mirror image to the types of 
intelligence methodologies previously discussed, these ‘Unlikely Terrorists’ can provide both 
HUMINT and local surveillance intelligence. Depending on the level of such community 
support, this can pose a significant threat to the police and security forces operational, 
physical, personnel and communications security. While the research data raised a number 
of examples of successful terrorist intelligence networks, perhaps the exemplar was 
provided by Irish interviewees who mentioned the historic networks organised by Michael 
Collins during the Anglo-Irish War of 1919 to 21 (IR8) (Foy 2006). As one Irish military 
specialist explained, “when I think of intelligence, I think of counter-intelligence. My concerns 
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are that if you’re doing pretty good at intelligence, then the chances are that the enemy, 
whoever the enemy are, are equally as effective in intelligence. So I wouldn’t be complacent 
in that area… Certainly I would be concerned both ways that there’s intelligence working 
against us as well as for us” (IR8).  
Thus terrorists or insurgents will often utilise similar approaches to the conceptual 
framework previously detailed, building personal relationships in their constituent 
community, developing trust and legitimacy and establishing institutional authority in order 
to obtain the support of ‘unlikely terrorists’ from among the community and to develop 
local intelligence, support and capability. However, it should be noted that while many 
groups do establish support bases amongst their constituent communities through this 
approach, others rely upon coercion and the threat of violence to obtain support from the 
local community through intimidation and fear.  
i. How Significant are Personal Relationships? 
Having reviewed the data from the research interviews in relation to personal relationships, 
public perceptions and local knowledge, and having examined the effect of these factors on 
counter-terrorism, it became clear they were closely interlinked and arguably have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of operational counter-terrorism. In particular, when 
the interview data from the various practitioners across the fields and countries was 
examined through the lens of the Procedural Justice Model, the significance of personal 
relationships with individuals within the wider community became apparent, particularly in 
the field of policing. This relies on the generation of legitimacy, trust and local knowledge 
amongst the public in order to conduct its various functions and it became clear from the 
data that this was as equally valid for the various police counter-terrorist roles as it was for 
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‘normal’ criminal policing. In addition, the data demonstrated that such personal 
relationships and associated public perceptions were not only important in the field of 
counter-terrorist policing, but also with the military, particularly when they were being used 
in domestic MACP roles or in overseas counter-insurgency, and even impacted in the 
development of local ‘bottom up’ field intelligence. The benefit to these processes of having 
police officers, intelligence officials or military operators with appropriate community 
knowledge, linguistic skills and cultural understanding, preferably from the relevant 
community itself, was also evidenced. The emerging data from the interviews can therefore 
be used to enlarge the factors raised by Hough at the start of the chapter as part of an 
expanded conceptual framework, with the additional factors highlighted in bold:  
 The treatment people receive at the hand of the police and justice officials 
 The resultant trust that people have in institutions of justice 
 The legitimacy people confer as a consequence of this trust on institutions of justice 
 The authority these institutions can then command when they are regarded as 
legitimate 
 People’s consequent preparedness to obey the police, comply with the law and 
cooperate with justice 
 Winning ‘hearts and minds’ in the community and the willingness of ‘unlikely 
counter-terrorists’ from the public to provide additional ‘eyes and ears’ 
 Consequent understanding of ‘Human Terrain’ and generation of local intelligence 
 The development of HUMINT & surveillance and establishment of ‘Ground Truth’ 
These personal relationships can significantly impact on an organisation’s building of trust, 
the development of legitimacy and the establishment of institutional authority amongst the 
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local community. Arguably therefore, such factors can affect the ‘winning of hearts and 
minds’ amongst the local community and this in turn can impact on the level of practical 
support and assistance given to the police and security forces by the ‘Unlikely Counter-
Terrorists’ of the general public, in particular their willingness to act as additional ‘eyes and 
ears’. This last factor is especially relevant to effective counter-terrorism not only in relation 
to obtaining more overt local community information, but also in the development of 
source led HUMINT and in providing a permissive environment for the development of 
VISINT through surveillance. As Myhill and Quinton state, “the police cannot function 
without the support of the public. The latest research shows that the means of enhancing 
the role of the public are (partly) in the gift of the police service, through the way they deal 
with people on an everyday basis” (Myhill & Quinton 2011: p.13). 
Consequently, although the process outlined in the preceding sections, and supported by 
the interview data, leads ultimately to an understanding of the ‘Human Terrain’, the 
development of ‘Bottom Up’ community intelligence and establishing the local ‘Ground 
Truth’, the starting point is with the development of personal relationships and treating 
people fairly and with respect. The reverse is also true, that unfair, heavy handed or 
brusque treatment of individuals minimises effective engagement with the community, 
weakens public trust and legitimacy, undermines institutional authority, limits 
understanding and local intelligence and ultimately negates effective counter-terrorism. As 
a result, the evidence from the research interviews suggests that positive personal 
relationships with individuals amongst the wider community are highly significant to the 
longer term building of trust, legitimacy, institutional authority and ultimately in the 
concomitant generation of local intelligence. Thus although the start of a longer term 
process, positive personal relationships on a one to one basis can have a potentially 
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significant impact on wider community relations, just as a single negative interaction in this 
type of environment has the potential to impact exponentially. Therefore, it is argued that 
the ‘human factors’ of personal relationships are vital to the development of effective 
counter-terrorism in the types of local community environments described. 
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6. INDIVIDUAL CAPABILITIES  
a. Introduction 
As was highlighted at various stages of the previous chapter, to pursue effective counter-
terrorism in the wider community, individual police officers, intelligence officials and 
military operators require the ‘human factors’ of various individual skills and capabilities, 
some physical, some mental and some psychological. A number of these skills and 
capabilities will be inherent to the individual officer, official or operator, being identified 
during the recruitment, selection and assessment phases for the relevant organisations they 
are hoping to serve in. Other skills and capabilities will be enhanced, developed or taught 
during the ensuing training and development phases. Depending on the particular role and 
function of the individual, this training and development can be more generalist at one end 
of the spectrum to highly specialised and specific at the other, for example from a 
uniformed police officer interacting with the public, to a specialist source handler, 
intelligence analyst or military special forces operator, demonstrating a form of functional 
specificity. At the same time, the more specialist aspects of counter-terrorist training and 
development will regularly change and adapt over time in response to the mutating nature 
of the terrorist threat.   
Understandably then, a significant amount of data was generated by the interviewees 
regarding their particular skills and capabilities and while they were unable to discuss 
certain methodological or operational aspects of their training and capabilities, due to the 
various sensitivities involved, they nevertheless provided useful data. In a similar manner to 
the previous chapter, while this data was primarily examined to identify the significance of 
the ‘human factors’ associated with individual skills and capabilities and their impact on the 
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effectiveness of counter-terrorism, it was also examined through the ‘lens’ of a conceptual 
framework. Thus aspects of a criminological concept were again utilised to frame the data, 
in this case from Ekblom’s Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO) framework (Ekblom 
2011).  
While much of Ekblom’s framework is focused around designing out crime, situational crime 
prevention and preventive measures, he also raises criminal competencies and drivers. 
Ekblom states that “the conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO), my preferred framework, 
sets out 11 generic, immediate causes of the crime problem being tackled. These range from 
the offender side – such as their personality and their immediate motivation, which is 
influenced in turn by their current life circumstances, such as drug addiction or poverty…” 
(Ekblom 2005: p. 66). However for the purposes of this research these ‘human factors’ 
behind elements of criminal competence and their drivers, were adjusted and reversed to 
provide a conceptual tool to help identify counter-terrorist competencies. These new 
counter-terrorist competencies, based on Ekblom’s, include: 
 Predisposition to become involved in counter-terrorism (Longer term personality 
based influences – volunteering, commitment) 
 Appropriate individual characteristics and abilities to fulfil a counter-terrorist role 
(Social skills and physical, mental & psychological aptitudes) 
 Readiness to become involved in counter-terrorism (Shorter term influences – 
Motives & Emotion) 
 Resources for counter-terrorism (Appropriate training, knowledge, experience, 
contacts, logistics and equipment) 
 Perception, motivation and anticipation of risk, effort and reward  
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Consequently, while there are clearly overlaps between the various aspects of these 
individual skills and capabilities, the different factors of the conceptual framework were 
reflected in a number of interviews from the various countries, which will be examined in 
the following chapter. 
b. Recruitment, Selection, Training & Skills 
The initial volunteering or application of an individual to join a policing, intelligence or 
military organisation can therefore be framed in conceptual terms as both a predisposition 
and a readiness to become involved, as well as the anticipation of a potential reward of a 
stable career and employment. With the military, there may also be other initial 
motivational drivers such as the opportunity to travel, excitement, challenge, a perceived 
ability to serve your country etc. while with the police there may be a desire to serve the 
public for example. These drivers provide additional perceptions of risk, effort and reward, 
which will obviously vary widely between the individual and type of organisation they are 
hoping to join. However, regardless of the specific motivational factors leading to 
volunteering or applying, most of these organisations will have some form of preliminary 
selection and/or assessment process to identify those individuals with the appropriate 
inherent skills and physical, mental and psychological aptitudes to successfully fulfil the role 
(See Table 10 Following). While both space and the focus of the research preclude a more 
detailed examination of the psychological factors behind individual personalities, personal 
values and emotional intelligence, the initial recruitment, selection and assessment of 
individuals can generally be framed around two linked but distinct factors, the personal 
‘Capability’ of the individual and their ‘Suitability’ for a particular role or function. These two 
factors can be further sub-divided, with an individual’s ‘Capability’ being based around their 
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experience, expertise and ability and their ‘Suitability’ being assessed around their 
personality, motivation and values. 
Table 10: POLICING RECRUITMENT, SELECTION, TRAINING & SKILLS  
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Local 
contacts & 
community 
knowledge 
of 
uniformed 
police 
officers as 
CT ‘Eyes & 
Ears’ 
The local 
contacts 
and 
knowledge 
of 
individual 
Garda 
especially 
in rural 
areas  
    Interface & 
knowledge of 
community 
law 
enforcement 
officers at 
local level   
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Emphasis in 
UK of 
individual 
officers 
serving the 
public & 
policing by 
consent 
 
Uniformed 
RUC 
officers 
constant 
focus on 
terrorism 
associated 
with 
criminality 
 
Because of 
previous  
attacks on 
transport 
networks 
get BTP 
officers to 
think of 
terrorism 
 
Awareness 
of local 
anomalies 
Instilling an 
awareness 
of CT into 
the rank & 
file Garda 
to become 
additional 
‘eyes & 
ears’ 
 
Specialist 
language 
training for 
certain 
Garda in CT 
roles 
(Arabic 
etc.) 
Mobilisation 
of officers 
on the beat 
to consider 
counter-
terrorism 
Specialised 
training of 
individual 
officers to 
better 
understand 
the Islamist 
threat  
 
Previous 
policing 
culture of 
separating 
crime and 
terrorism 
possibly 
dealing with 
ETA 
Importance 
of INP 
community 
knowledge 
& 
intelligence  
 
Large 
numbers of 
INP on 
patrol are 
‘Civil Guard’ 
civilian 
volunteers 
 
 
Polis 
improvement 
in CT skills 
and training 
over time 
 
Lengthy 
training & 
education for 
Polis & 
selection/ 
specialised 
training for CT 
roles 
 
Individual 
Jandarma 
recruits lack 
of maturity 
compared to 
Polis 
 
Compulsory 
Polis postings 
to SE. 
Anatolia for 
career 
ensures 
individual 
knowledge & 
experience of 
PKK  
Difference in 
individual 
concept 
between ‘Law 
Enforcement’ 
& policing 
 
Training for 
NYPD & other 
law 
enforcement 
in CT tactics & 
techniques by 
NYPD 
Counter- 
Terrorist 
Division 
 
Example of 
BOLO book & 
JDLR concept 
of Street Cops 
 
Certainly, from the researchers previous experience in both the UK police and military, this 
initial recruitment, selection and assessment process will normally consist of a detailed 
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application and paper sift, a medical, a basic fitness test and some type of interview or 
board procedure. If successful, the recruit/trainee will then normally be expected to swear 
an oath of allegiance before going on to conduct initial training. This will usually consist of 
basic military training followed by specialist to arm/trade skills in the military, while recruit 
training followed by a two year probationary period is common in the police. Intelligence 
organisations are more likely to focus on teaching an understanding of the intelligence 
cycle: Direction, collection, processing (collation, evaluation, and interpretation) and 
dissemination of intelligence and either analytical training or role appropriate tradecraft. 
While these recruitment, selection and assessment processes and the ensuing initial training 
are generally common in most of the other countries examined for the research, it should 
be stressed that they are for the initial membership of policing, intelligence or military 
organisations and that later specialisation in a counter-terrorist role generally requires 
additional selection processes and usually the development of significant operational 
experience and expertise in the meantime.130  
Thus, when viewed through the conceptual framework previously outlined, after developing 
a predisposition to volunteering and applying to join a policing, intelligence or military 
organisation, the individual will be recruited, selected and assessed to identify whether they 
have the appropriate individual  social skills, physical, mental and psychological aptitudes to 
complete basic training and fulfil the role they are applying for. Upon this initial selection, 
the recruits complete basic training, which helps them to develop the resources they need 
to then serve, through additional trained skills and knowledge. However, while this 
framework is generally linear and progressive in nature, to move from a normal policing or 
military function in order to specialise in a counter terrorist role often requires a return to a 
far more rigorous recruitment, selection and assessment phase. In effect this is volunteering 
196 
 
to start the process again, but at a different level following some years of developing the 
appropriate resources for counter-terrorism through operational experience and expertise 
in the mainstream organisation.  
In the historic case of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (S012), which bridged policing 
and intelligence, this selection consisted of an initial paper sift based on evidence of 
operational experience and suitable criteria, followed by a written exam testing 
international knowledge, political structures, geography, world religions etc. and for those 
passing, a final interview board with both policy and operational questions. At the same 
time the Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13) would look to interview, board and recruit 
experienced detectives, often with a previous track record of investigative success in various 
crime squads, thus demonstrating the functional specificities of the different roles.131 While 
most of the other case study countries’ police specialist operations units followed similar 
selection processes for intelligence or investigative roles, Turkish interviewees highlighted a 
different approach to identifying and selecting police counter terrorist specialists.  
One senior Turkish Polis interviewee believed that although during the 1970s, when 
terrorism first became prevalent in the country, the Polis were effective in normal policing 
roles, they were not experts in countering terrorism, however, he believed they have since 
become far better trained in this role (TU14). Currently Polis trainees spend four years at the 
Academy, “where the general concepts regarding terrorism are compressed, with examples 
from different countries” (TU7). It is also here that officers with the appropriate skills and 
aptitudes are identified and selected for specialist departments, such as Intelligence, Anti-
Terrorism, Anti-Smuggling or International Relations (TU5). Once identified and selected, 
they then receive more advanced courses in specialist skills, such as an understanding of 
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religious extremism (TU7). A further resource in Turkish Polis understanding and knowledge 
of terrorism is the policy of posting all officers for a ‘tour of duty’ in the South East of the 
Country, where the PKK are most active. As part of Polis career progression, this is normally 
for around two years, but depends on the threat level in the location they are posted to, 
with longer tours in more secure locations. Thus while in Tunceli, one of the most dangerous 
cities it is two years, in Bingol or Diyarbakir it may be three years (TU5). 
With the military, while various units can be used for the general security and ‘policing’ 
MACP roles discussed in the previous chapter, the more specialised counter-terrorist 
intervention roles are usually performed by highly trained special forces units (or indeed 
specialist police intervention units). In most cases these counter-terrorist ‘Black’ operations 
are just one role alongside the many other ‘Green’ military roles special forces are called 
upon to perform and consequently they tend to have demanding, arduous and exhaustive 
selection and assessment processes to identify versatile and capable individuals, who will 
then go on to intensive continuation training  (See Table 11 Following). Taillon states that, 
“candidates for such units must have motivation and determination, physical and mental 
stamina, initiative, self-discipline, compatibility for small groups during long-term isolated 
operations, and the aptitude to assimilate a wide range of skills and think laterally” (Taillon 
2001 p: xiv). This would tend to support the developed conceptual framework mentioned 
earlier, highlighting individual ‘readiness to become involved’ (motives & emotion), inherent 
‘individual skills’ (physical, mental and psychological aptitudes) and the ability to assimilate 
new skills (‘Resources’).  
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Table 11: MILITARY RECRUITMENT, SELECTION, TRAINING & SKILLS  
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Individual 
skills, fitness 
& training of 
SAS, 
combining 
many roles -
Air,Mobility, 
Boat & 
Mountain, 
with 
specialist 
skills – 
medic, 
signaler, 
sniper, 
explosives 
 
Specialised 
maritime CT 
& land 
based 
training of 
SBS RM  
 
Experience, 
maturity & 
training  of 
CO19 SFO 
Officers 
 
Initial 
immaturity 
of HMSU 
sorted 
 
Mixed police 
firearms 
training & 
skills & 
concern of 
‘mental 
firewall’ in a 
Mumbai 
scenario 
Individual 
ARW  
trained to 
fulfill a 
variety of SF 
roles 
parachute, 
hostage 
rescue, 
diving, 
sniper  
 
Concern 
that while 
individual 
ARW have 
high level of 
skill & 
training, do 
not have 
continual 
operational 
experience 
like UK SAS 
The Rapiere 
course & 
RAPAS 
training of 
1st RPIMa 
 
Breadth of 
specialist 
training of 
GIGN 
operators – 
commando, 
parachute, 
mountain, 
diving, 
sniper, 
pistol etc  
 
RAID 
surveillance 
issue, where 
officers do 
not blend in 
with the 
public 
 
Difference 
between 
individuals 
in policing 
teams who 
will use the 
minimum 
force 
necessary & 
Army units 
who will 
simple 
neutralize 
the threat 
Professional 
training of 
military now 
no longer a 
conscript 
force & 
specialised 
training of 
MOE units 
including 
hostage 
rescue 
 
Specialised 
training of 
policing 
intervention 
units, 
sometimes 
from 
military, with 
UEI more 
like SF 
Arduous 
Gibush & 
training of 
Sayeret  
 
Breadth & 
level of 
YAMAM 
selection, 
training & 
skills – 
Tactical 
hostage 
rescue, 
sniper, 
breaching, 
explosives, 
MOE etc. 
 
Specialised 
training of 
reservist SF 
unit Lotar 
Eilat in 
Hostage 
rescue, 
sniping, 
diving & 
desert 
 
CT training 
(Lotar) of 
operators 
at Mitkan 
Adam Base 
(Unit 707) 
since 1985 
 
Regular 
military  
young 
conscripts 
lacking 
maturity & 
experience 
Harsh but 
realistic 
training, 
skills of 
Special 
Forces & 
Komandos – 
parachute 
training at 
Kayseri, 
mountain 
training at 
Bolu & 
various 
commando 
training  
 
Young 
conscripts 
versus 
professional 
career 
Special 
Forces 
soldiers 
Exceptional 
training & 
operational 
capabilities 
of 
individuals 
within JSOC 
units – 1st 
SFOD Delta 
(CAG) & 
SEAL Team 6 
(DEVGRU) 
 
Maturity & 
professional 
approach of 
FBI HRT, 
many of 
whom are 
former SF 
SEALs, USMC 
etc 
 
Counter-
terrorism is 
a perishable 
skill & need  
SF to  have 
continual 
training & 
‘real world’ 
operational 
experience- 
‘lose edge’ 
 
Problem of 
using SOF 
‘Alpha 
males’ for 
recon –
‘difficult to 
free-fall & 
then creep 
around 
quietly’ 
 
While there are many such military special forces selection processes, one example will 
suffice to outline the wider concepts behind such selection courses. Perhaps the most 
famous, and copied or emulated by many other countries, is the four week long UK Special 
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Forces Selection Course, which has been extended from the selection of the SAS to include 
the Royal Marines (RM) Special Boat Service (SBS) and certain aspects of which are used for 
the SRR, all of which have some form of counter-terrorist role. While beginning with long hill 
runs and map reading to build up fitness and navigational skills, the course continues with 
several weeks of increasingly longer navigation marches across the difficult terrain of the 
Brecon Beacons, Black Mountains and Elan Valley, Wales, while carrying heavier bergen 
rucksack loads. The final fourth ‘Test Week’ sees increasing loads and timed distances 
between checkpoints manned by training staff, culminating in the ‘Long Drag’ or ‘Endurance 
March’ covering 40 miles in under 20 hours with a 55lb bergen, additional food and water 
and carrying a rifle (Thompson 2009: Chapter 2). As one SAS officer explained, “the guys will 
actually walk a lot further because of the terrain and detours, so that if they complete it, 
there’s no celebration in the four tonner (lorry) on the way back as everyone is too 
shattered. At that stage it’s hard enough just to climb into the lorry” (UK22). 
The detail of the previous example is used to highlight the fact that while exceptional fitness 
is a pre-requisite, the selection is designed to go beyond that, pushing hopefuls to identify 
whether, despite sleep and food deprivation and the usual course associated injuries, they 
have the mental and psychological strength to continue and complete a task beyond the 
point of physical exhaustion. Bearing in mind the conceptual framework previously 
discussed, while map reading and navigation are trained skills and fitness can be developed 
and improved (in part the purpose of the first week), it is these individual mental and 
psychological aptitudes that are really being tested and assessed. Similar psychological 
aptitudes are tested in this and other selection courses by the ‘dislocation of expectation’, 
such as being awoken by a fire alarm and having to parade in the early hours during a 
limited sleep period, turning up at a cookhouse for breakfast only to be confronted by 
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training staff for an intensive physical training session, and opening a box of food for a two 
day exercise, only to find a single sandwich inside. Perhaps the ultimate example of such a 
‘dislocation’ approach is the US Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) teams ‘Hell Week’ (Waller 
1994: Chapter 2 & Denver 2013). Regardless of the specifics of such selection processes, this 
type of mind-set and psychological aptitude to keep going beyond the point of exhaustion 
and demoralisation was described by an SAS senior NCO, quoting one of the principles of 
David Stirling, the founder of the Regiment as ‘the unrelenting pursuit of excellence’.132 
This type of selection focus on individual mental and psychological strength was reinforced 
in a conversation with a Team Leader from the Swedish Police national intervention unit 
Nationella Insatsstyrkan (NI – ‘National Task Force’) in Stockholm, who explained that only 
around one in ten police applicants successfully completed their selection and went on to 
further training. He explained that while many candidates turned up highly physically 
trained, the most difficult part of the selection was psychological as opposed to physical and 
this was where many failed.133  Consequently, while it is difficult to precisely convey the 
exact psychological aspects of such selection courses, and whether defined as ‘will power’, 
‘endurance’, ‘dedication’, ‘motivation’, ‘robustness’, ‘resilience’ or ‘commitment’, the point 
being made by the interviewees was that the processes seek to identify an ‘inherent 
psychological aptitude’ which means the individual has the ‘mind set’ to go beyond physical 
exhaustion and complete a task, regardless of obstacles. One American Special Forces 
interviewee and counter-terrorism specialist defined such individuals with this aptitude as 
‘the right people’ (US42). The importance of having such aptitudes is raised by SEAL Admiral 
McRaven, who states that to sustain relative superiority in a special operation, “frequently 
requires the intervention of courage, intellect, boldness and perseverance, or what 
Clausewitz calls the moral factors” (McRaven 1996: p.5) 
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A good example of the operational importance of this type of mental and psychological 
aptitude to keep going regardless of physical and psychological obstacles, was provided by 
one interviewee, a former Israeli Sayeret Matkal commando, who had been in the lead 
assault team at the hostage rescue at Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976 during Operation 
Thunderbolt (Yonatan): “When you are a soldier, when you are a trained soldier, you train in 
more shooting and more navigation and they are very selective… When they said ‘Go’, the 
whole Unit was rushing around and there was frantic effort, but quietly. We were not 
allowed to tell anyone at home… The flight was very long and very uncomfortable and many 
troops were sick. We were not used to so many hours, the crazy flying and the weather. 
People were also reacting to tension and nerves. It was a kind of relief when we arrived, it 
was smooth and quiet and the lights were on... then we went in. Our tactics were based on 
surprise and shock and you don’t have much time to think, just to go in and get out. After 
opening fire and removing the threat of the terrorists, then there was no time for anything, 
but grab the hostages and go. Every moment we delayed increased the risk of response” 
(IS15) (Netanyahu 2002). 
However, it became clear from the interview data and conversation in Sweden, that it was 
not just military special forces who were highly selective and sought individuals with this 
inherent psychological aptitude, but also specialist police tactical intervention units. To get 
‘the right people’, the RUC Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU) developed a 
demanding selection, which “was very rigorous and resulted in low numbers passing, but 
they didn’t play the numbers game to get more recruits. They focused on recruiting the right 
person with the right qualities… The focus of selection and training was speed, firepower, 
aggression, so ‘controlled aggression’. Selection was extremely rigorous with sleep 
deprivation, 25 to 30 mile runs, 24 hour OPs etcetera. It was very rigorous and only about 5% 
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of those who started were selected. When I attended there were around 40 officers who 
started and they only took 3 of us through. The whole thing was more mental than it was 
physical and you needed the will power to keep going” (UK51). This again supports the 
emphasis on the importance of having the ‘right’ psychological aptitude, forming part of the 
appropriate individual skills detailed in the conceptual framework.  
A similar selection and ethos was applied to the Irish Garda Special Task Force (STF), which 
later became the Emergency Response Unit (ERU). As a former officer in both units recalled, 
“the precedent behind it was brilliant. We started off with 70 or 80 people and eventually 
whittled it down to a very small group of around 25 to 30 people, extremely fit, extremely 
dedicated… absolutely dedicated and I mean you just literally left at a moment’s notice and 
obviously it took huge understanding from the wives. But the idea of it was brilliant, these 
people trained together, they lived together, they fought life together and we are still close” 
(IR9). While again the interviewee’s focus was on the psychological and mental rather than 
the physical aspects of selection, his definition of such an aptitude was framed in terms of 
‘dedication’, along with the ‘reward’ of being part of such a close knit team. This also raises 
the concept of ‘motivation’ generated through what is often referred to as Esprit de Corps. 
Whilst again difficult to define, this motivational driver reflects aspects of what has been 
described as ‘team spirit’, ‘unit pride’, ‘solidarity’, ‘devotion to a cause’ and ‘fellowship’, 
again supporting the previously discussed concept of the psychological aptitude to 
overcome obstacles, but in this case as part of a group, rather than as an individual. Such 
group morale was described by Leighton, who stated that “morale is the capacity of a group 
of people to pull together persistently and consistently in pursuit of a common purpose” 
(Leighton 1949). This will be considered in more detail in the ‘Organisational Culture’ 
chapter later in the thesis.  
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One final aspect of the various selection and assessment processes which emerged from the 
interview data was that due to particular operational roles, specific skills and aptitudes can 
be highlighted and identified at an early stage in such selection courses. Thus, as well as 
providing a tactical firearms capability, the NYPD Emergency Service Unit (ESU) also 
performs emergency rescues. In a high rise city like New York, “obviously you do suicide 
rescues… Every ESU trainee has to climb to the top of a bridge, you climb up to the top of the 
George Washington or the Brooklyn Bridge and you stand up on the top structure, because… 
you have to be capable of climbing up there and rescuing that guy. It’s a part of their big 
training” (US29). While this test obviously requires the individual physical aptitudes 
required to climb the bridges, the focus is again on ‘inherent psychological aptitudes’, in this 
case the ability to cope with heights and overcome any fear, necessary for their rescue role 
(Katz 1995). Sadly, due to these emergency rescue skills, along with the Fire Department of 
New York (FDNY), many of the NYPD officers killed in 9/11 were members of the ESU. 
Similar functionally specific operational aptitudes regarding claustrophobia are tested by 
both the selection courses of the French Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
(GIGN) (FR9) and Irish Army Ranger Wing (ARW) (IR8) (Thompson 2009: Chapter 2), while 
the US Navy SEAL teams use various ‘drown-proofing’ tests to assess familiarity and 
confidence in water (US11) (Denver 2013). 
Having successfully completed the various types of advanced selection process, whether in 
the fields of policing, intelligence or the military, individuals will go on to develop the more 
specialised ‘resources’ necessary for them to effectively conduct their counter-terrorist 
roles, such as the training, knowledge, experience, contacts, logistics and equipment 
previously raised in the conceptual framework (See Table 12 Following).  
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Table 12: INTELLIGENCE, RECRUITMENT, SELECTION, TRAINING & SKILLS 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
    Individual 
skills of 
Mista’Aravim 
who are 
trained to 
speak, think 
& look like 
Palestinian 
Arabs 
  
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
 Individual 
quality of S 
& I branch 
officers 
‘pound for 
pound as 
good as 
any’ 
 
Specialised 
language 
training of 
selected 
officers 
from S & I, 
such as 
Arabic & 
active 
minority 
recruitment  
 Specialised 
intensive 
training 
courses to 
better 
understand 
Islamist 
extremism, 
where 
students 
are 
immersed 
in the 
culture 
 
Significant 
increase in 
the number 
of 
researchers 
dedicated 
to 
analyzing 
the Jihadist 
threat 
  Improvement 
of quality & 
training for 
the FBI post 
9/11  
 
A need to 
ensure 
proper 
career paths 
for intel. 
analysts to 
ensure 
supported & 
clearance is 
cost effective 
 
‘We rely too 
much on 
analysts for 
subject 
matter 
expertise, 
when they 
are basically 
systems 
analysts & 
don’t 
understand 
context 
 
Streetwise 
investigative 
detective vs. 
civilian intel. 
analyst 
 
Thus the interviewees highlighted various training and courses for specialist intelligence 
roles. In Ireland a number of Garda officers have attended language training courses at 
some of their universities, including Arabic and East European languages (IR11). In Spain, the 
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Guardia Civil Servicio de Informacion (SI – ‘Intelligence Service’), “are providing training, 
especially for Islamic [extremism], its two weeks training I think. They go to the mountains, 
isolated from everybody… all the people, because with this you gain two things. One, they 
know the problem, they know how to tackle the problem, but also, they know each other, so 
when it comes to cooperation for me it’s better to talk to you if I’ve already seen you” (SP2). 
Likewise, as well as supplying additional material and personnel to the intelligence groups 
combating Islamist terrorism, the Policia Nacional Comisaria General de Informacion (CGI) 
‘run training courses to keep these groups up to date’ (SP10).  
Along with the training and courses of specialist police and intelligence officials, various 
military interviewees mentioned aspects of the training and skills of their special forces 
operators. As detailed, most have a very demanding selection process, followed by 
extensive continuation training, sometimes taking years before an operator is considered 
fully qualified (See Table 13 Following). This exhaustive training is likely to include aspects 
of small unit tactics, surveillance and reconnaissance, parachuting, firearms, explosives, 
signals, medic, unarmed combat, Fighting in a Built up Area (FIBUA), combat swimmer, 
mountain, artic, jungle and desert warfare, foreign languages and culture, escape and 
evasion and counter-terrorism (Thompson 2009: Chapter 3). Consequently, given the 
breadth of such training, skills and capabilities, many countries have established different 
units to specialise in specific skills. However, in the case of the SAS a former Senior NCO 
(SNCO) explained that “unlike many countries’ Special Forces, the Regiment in effect do 
everything and combine all roles. Over time our guys rotate through all different roles, Air, 
Mobility, Boat and Mountain and continually train to develop new skills such as medic, 
signaler etcetera. So over time they become very skilled and very versatile” (UK43) (Asher 
2007).  
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He went on to explain that unlike the UK, the US had various special forces trained to fulfil a 
variety of different specialist roles (Adams 1998), this included Delta (1st Special Forces 
Operational Detachment Delta - 1st SFOD, also known as Combat Applications Group - CAG 
or Army Compartmented Element- ACE), which was closest to the SAS Regiment and dealt 
with hostage rescue and top end ‘Green roles’, such as certain Direct Action (DA) and Long 
Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) (Haney 2002). The Special Forces ‘Green Berets’ 
(USSF) specialise in overseas training of indigenous forces, which is one of the skills of the 
SAS (Couch 2007), while the Rangers fulfil a similar role to the Parachute Regiment and are 
often used to cordon an area for Delta, or support them in a similar way to the UK’s Special 
Forces Support Group (SFSG) (UK43) (Bahmanyar 2005). While previously “the USMC used to 
say we didn’t have Special Forces, but rather larger units that were Special Operations 
Capable (SOC - von Hassell 1991)… now the Marine Corps have decided to go into Special 
Operations (since 2006). This has led to the establishment of MARSOC (Marine Special 
Operations Command) which has pulled assets from amongst traditional Recon volunteers 
and placed them into MARSOC” (US38) (Pushies 2011).  
The current level of the skills and capabilities of these various US Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) were described by a former US Navy SEAL Team 6 (ST6 – ‘Development Group’ 
DEVGRU) (Wasdin & Templin 2011) commander, who stated that “on the joint special 
operations side, those guys are the best they’ve ever been, phenomenal… dealing with the 
international aspects… The purely tactical side, where the guys that do the hard work of 
finding, fixing and finishing them… Unbelievable, incredible the things that they do. We 
thought we were pretty high speed when we developed the capability that’s SEAL Team 6 
and Delta, and we were at the time, but these guys now have so much experience because 
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they’re in and out of theatre all the time… They are just so skilled and so confident and 
professional, that its mind boggling to watch them” (US11).  
Table 13: MILITARY SPECIAL FORCES SKILLS & ROLES 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
1 
Special Air 
Service 
(SAS)  as a 
premier SF 
unit with 
wide range 
of skills & 
capabilities 
includes CT 
Army 
Ranger 
Wing (ARW) 
combining 
both green 
special 
forces skills 
and a CT 
capability 
     
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
SAS as a 
‘surgical 
response to 
a terrorist 
‘worst case 
scenario’ 
ARW 
training & 
equipment 
versus ERU 
operational 
intervention 
experience 
  Mista’Aravim 
unit Sayeret 
Duvdevan 
(Unit 217) has 
CT ISR & DA 
roles  
Army Mavi 
Bereliler 
‘Blue 
Berets’ 
Komando in 
CT DA roles 
 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Support 
roles of 
Special 
Forces 
Support 
Group 
(SFSG) 
based 
around 1 
Para  
 
Specialist 
intelligence 
Support of 
Special 
Recce. Regt. 
(SRR) 
 
Previous SF 
‘trinity’ in 
N. Ireland – 
FRU, 14 Int 
& SAS 
Troop 
ARW 
doesn’t 
have 
continual 
operational 
experience, 
unlike the 
UK SAS 
1er RPIMa, 
the ‘French 
SAS’ has 
similar (to 
UK) skills & 
capabilities   
 
13th RDP SF 
LRRP skills 
for both 
COS & DRM  
 
Capabilities 
of various 
CRAP units 
who can 
also act as 
SF and CT  
 
Foreign 
Legion, not 
just elite 
but as a 
cultural 
pool for 
special 
operations 
MOE units 
for overseas 
NEO Ops.  or 
‘Worst case 
scenarios’ 
 
The former 
BOEL of the 
Spanish 
Legion now 
serves as 
part of MOE  
 
The Spanish 
Foreign 
Legion  
‘Tercios’ has 
a rapid 
intervention 
& HR 
capability 
 
Training of 
Policing 
tactical 
teams by 
military SF  
Sayeret 
‘recce.’ Units  
fulfill various 
SF roles-  in 
UK would all 
fall to SAS  
 
CT & HR skills 
- capabilities 
of Matkal 
(Unit 269) as 
shown at 
Entebbe 1976 
 
CT & HR Skills 
& capabilities 
of reservist  
Lotar Eilat 
(Unit 7707) 
 
Sayeret 
Tzanahim & 
Golani have 
provided DA 
CT support 
previously 
Turkish 
Army SF 
Bordo 
Bereliler 
‘Red Berets’ 
used in 
various CT 
roles 
against PKK  
 
Specialist 
ISR & 
‘Pseudo 
Operations’ 
capability of 
JITEM to 
counter the 
PKK, 
identifying 
cadres for 
TUAF or 
Army 
targeting 
CT skills & 
capabilities 
of ‘Tier 1’ 1st 
SFOD Delta 
(CAG) 
 
JSOC DA 
support role 
of 75th 
Ranger Regt  
 
Wider US  
SOF CT skills 
of SF (FID), 
Rangers(DA) 
& CA units 
 
Specialist 
JSOC ISR of 
ISA ‘The 
Activity’ – 
‘Grey Fox’ 
 
Critical 
embedded 
intelligence 
capability in 
JSOC Units 
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A former US Army Special Operations Command (SOCOM) specialist also stated that in his 
opinion “with Delta, I think their capabilities are top notch and I think they are the best in 
the World… they are as good as the SAS. They are the best trained, underpaid, and part of 
that ‘brotherhood’, the bond in the special operations community. However, if they are not 
used properly by our civilian leadership, they lose their effectiveness by what I consider 50%. 
It’s like using a flat head screwdriver to remove a Philips head screw… It may get the job 
done, but it’s more time consuming, frustrating and you damage the screw! And we’ve seen 
this in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. US forces, the UK and France all have good military 
counter-terrorist capabilities, but it’s how we use them… Counter-terrorism is a perishable 
skill and they have to constantly train, but also be employed in real world missions to keep 
their edge” (US35).  
As well as military special forces, similar concepts on training and skills were expressed by 
interviewees from police and ‘third force’ gendarmerie type intervention units (See Table 14 
Following). A Spanish Policia specialist explained that their Grupo Especial de Operaciones 
(GEO) was formed after the German Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9) intervention against a 
hijacked Lufthansa aircraft at Mogadishu in 1977 (Davies 1994). “We created the GEO with 
the same idea… you need a super specialised corps to deal with super difficult tactical 
situations. We have plenty of incidents where we use the GEO, not just with terrorist 
violence, but even in kidnapping situations, organised crime… We even use them in very 
dangerous places (various Spanish Embassies abroad in conflict areas)… This is not a very big 
group, but very experienced, very well trained” (SP9).  
Likewise, a former senior officer from the French GIGN stressed that the Unit’s strength lies 
in the quality of its personnel. The ‘Supergendarmes’ of the GIGN benefit from the fact that 
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in each operator, “you have a soldier and a policeman, a good culture of police methods, 
with a military engagement, ethic and skills” (FR9). Consequently, in addition to their 
policing skills, “they are trained in commando, parachuting and firearms… 100 metres for 
pistol shooting with auto to 50 metres and also with the military spectrum, shooting from 
1000 metres as Tireur d’Elite (sniper)… special skills which are good for intervention in the 
police spectrum” (FR9). Needless to say as well as the psychological aptitudes discussed and 
exceptional fitness, the GIGN place great emphasis on precision shooting and firearms skills. 
These skills proved critical when in December 1994 the GIGN had to intervene against four 
GIA terrorists who had hijacked an Air France jet to Marseille – Marignane airport 
(Harclerode 2000: Chapter 12); “So it’s why for Marignane, when we intervened at 
Marignane in 1994, we have twenty years of experience in hijacking… anti-hijacking 
airplanes, but we were also inspired by and had a good experience of commando skills. We 
were also enriched by GSG-9 experience in Mogadishu (McNab 2011), SAS experience in 
Princes Gate (Firmin & Pearson 2010) and there was a good exchange… In fact we try to use 
weapons as the ultimate issue. I mean if we need to kill, like in Marignane the four fighters, 
then we will kill them, but we have to avoid it, if we can avoid it. It depends on the threat, we 
develop in GIGN for instance the shoulder shooting” (FR9).  
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Table 14: POLICE FIREARMS SKILLS & ROLES 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
1 
 Garda 
Emergency 
Response 
Unit (ERU) 
skills & 
capabilities 
Police FIPN 
unit skills – 
RAID (nat.), 
BRI (Paris), & 
GIPN 
(Regional) 
 
Gendarmerie 
GIGN skills – 
FI (GIGN) FOR 
(EPIGN) FSP 
(GSPR) 
    
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Skills & 
capabilities of 
Met. Police 
CO19 SFO & 
ARV Teams 
  Capabilities 
of Policia 
Nacional 
GEO at 
Guadalajara  
 
Guardia Civil 
UEI at 
Valdemoro  
like Mil. SF 
HR & CT 
capability of 
YAMAM- 
‘Teaching 
the Army SF 
lessons’ – 
maturity, 
professional 
career, 
contained 
Polis Ozel 
Harekat 
Tim 
‘Special 
Operations 
Teams’ 
formed in 
1993 with 
various CT 
capabilities 
National 
level HR & 
CT 
capability 
provided by 
FBI Hostage 
Rescue 
Team (HRT)  
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
RUC HMSU 
capabilities 
against PIRA 
 
City of Lond. 
ARVs & Met 
interop  
 
Kent Police 
firearms 
security at 
Eurostar 
 
While police 
tactical units 
can conduct 
lower scale 
interventions, 
more complex 
CTLI & CTMI 
require SAS & 
SBS skills 
Previous 
concerns 
over speed 
of ERU 
response 
times?  
 
Regional 
firearms 
capability 
of Garda 
Regional 
Support 
Units (RSU) 
since 2008 
 
Ad hoc 
nature of 
early Garda 
STF 
firearms 
operations 
Regional 
capability of 
GN PI2G at 
Orange & 
Toulouse for 
speed of 
response 
 
EPIGN CT 
support role 
now fulfilled 
by FOR GIGN 
sniper, 
cordon etc.- 
Marignane 
Airport 1994 
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In Israel, while there are intensive and arduous selections, or Gibush, for a wide number of 
Army Sayeret (Reconnaissance) special force units, due to the short period of national 
service, they have established a variety of units with particular skills and tasks rather than 
have a single unit with a breadth of skills developed over time, such as the UK SAS (UK43). 
However, as an experienced senior operator explained, the MAGAV Border Guard YAMAM 
(Yechida Mishtartit Meyuchedet or ‘Special Police Unit’) “has several strengths compared to 
other Israeli specialist units. Firstly, unlike the majority of military units, which comprise 
conscripts, the YAMAM consists of operators who have previously completed their military 
service, consequently they benefit from maturity and experience, particularly in decision 
making. Secondly, because the operators in YAMAM are CT professionals, they focus 
specifically on specialist counter terrorist hostage rescue and intervention skills. Thirdly, as 
professionals rather than conscripts, they can enhance and develop their expertise in those 
skills over a longer ‘career’ period. Finally, the Unit is designed to be self-contained, with its 
operators trained in house as assaulters, snipers, EOD, dog’s section etcetera. This is in 
contrast to the Army, where to achieve a similar set of skills would require the coordination 
of a number of units” (IS17).134 Such specialist counter-terrorist skills amongst YAMAM and 
other Israeli special units, are enhanced at a counter terrorist training centre (Lotar – Unit 
707), which has been established at Mitkan Adam base. 
To further improve the skills and capabilities of the various tactical intervention and hostage 
rescue units, not only is there often joint training and exercises between policing and 
gendarmerie units with their contemporaries in military special forces, but often the 
secondment of personnel between units. This helps develop close familiarity, ensures good 
communications, allows the exchange of the ‘resources’ previously discussed, such as 
equipment, ideas and best practice, and establishes a level of compatibility and 
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interoperability should they be involved in a joint counter-terrorist operation. In some cases 
this joint training and exchange of personnel also extends bi-laterally between countries for 
the same reasons mentioned.135  
Thus French operators explained that “there is a vast amount of cross training between 
French military special units, not just special units, but a lot more elite units, and also all the 
French secret services, both internal and external. Its seen as par for the course, that training 
areas used, locations, training facilities and a lot of the CRAP (Long Range Reconnaissance 
Commandos) train pretty much with every French special service there is” (FR13) (Micheletti 
1999b). In addition, “some police surveillance departments have some links for training with 
special military troops, like the French SAS (1st RPIMa)136, we have some links with them for 
training courses” (FR6). This cross training and cooperation between these specialist 
military, policing and intelligence units means, “that the operational procedure… if they 
need to be used in a certain way, has already been established” (FR13).  
Consequently, the interview data highlighted a number of factors in relation to the 
recruitment, selection, assessment, training and skills of individual police officers, 
intelligence officials and military operators for counter-terrorist roles. Examining these 
factors through the ‘lens’ of the conceptual framework previously outlined, the individual’s 
initial volunteering and application to join the mainstream organisation can be seen as a 
‘Predisposition’ due to longer term personality based influences along with the 
‘anticipation’ of the rewards the membership of that organisation brings. Generally these 
organisations will then utilise a preliminary assessment and selection process to identify two 
key factors, the individual’s ‘capability’ and their potential ‘suitability’ for the specific role 
they are applying for, in particular their ‘inherent physical, mental and psychological 
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aptitudes’. If the individual applicant is identified as having the suitable skills and attributes 
for the role, following recruitment they are provided additional ‘resources’ for their role, 
through training, the development of knowledge, experience and the appropriate logistics 
and equipment. 
Despite such recruitment and selection processes, there is always the concern that the 
‘wrong’ sort of person might be recruited. Given the sensitivity of the field and the potential 
impact at even the most junior levels, it is clearly important, if not critical, to ensure that the 
‘right’ type of individuals are recruited for specific counter-terrorist roles. While much has 
been written in the field of policing research concerning police deviance, this may be more 
of a concern at the initial stages of recruitment and within the mainstream organisations 
(Jenks et. al. 2012). Most of the more specialised counter-terrorist units will only look at a 
potential recruit after several years of service and utilise the extensive selection and 
assessment processes detailed to mitigate this potential concern. When individual problems 
do occur, most respond to such breaches of standards, ethics or behaviour by simply having 
the offending individual ‘Returned to Unit’ (RTU’d) back to a mainstream role, or in more 
extreme cases, dismissed. 
However, there were two key issues in particular which emerged from the interview data. 
Firstly, while the processes outlined led to membership of the mainstream organisation, in 
the case of most policing and security force organisations being examined, this was often 
only the first preliminary stage to becoming involved in a specialist counter-terrorist role. 
Generally, after serving in the mainstream organisation for some years and developing 
operational experience and expertise, the individual can then apply to attend a further more 
specialised selection and assessment course, which in effect begins the outlined process 
214 
 
again, but at a different level, seeking to identify more specific ‘individual aptitudes’ suitable 
for a counter-terrorist role. Secondly, in the case of the military special forces and police 
intervention units, the interview data from those who had completed such selection courses 
highlighted the fact that contrary to popular opinion, it was not so much the physical, but 
rather ‘inherent psychological aptitudes’ that were the main focus of the selection process. 
Thus while exceptional fitness was expected as a pre-requisite, the courses were designed 
to identify those individuals who had the mental and psychological ability to keep going 
beyond the point of physical exhaustion and to cope with certain psychological fears, such 
as height, claustrophobia and operating in water. Having carefully identified the ‘right’ 
individuals to receive them, more specialised ‘resources’ through training, knowledge, 
experience, contacts, logistics and equipment are provided and invested to ensure that the 
individual officer, official and operator has the skills and capabilities necessary for effective 
counter-terrorism.  
c. Individual Characteristics and Abilities 
The interview data in the previous section has evidenced the significance of individual 
police, intelligence and military officers and operators having the appropriate ‘human 
factors’ (See Various Previous Tables). These come in the form of the inherent 
characteristics, skills (physical, mental and psychological) and abilities necessary to 
complete recruitment and pass selection courses, before going forward to receive the 
additional ‘resources’ that come from training, knowledge and experience. This combination 
of a bedrock of inherent personal skills and aptitudes, built upon with enhanced training and 
experience, can prove critical to their effectiveness, whether it is handling and developing 
sources, conducting covert surveillance, investigating complex terrorist conspiracies or 
215 
 
intervening as part of a military special forces or police tactical intervention unit. 
Consequently an enduring theme emerging from the interview data, relating to the wider 
subject of skills and capabilities, was the importance of having the right individual 
characteristics and abilities to be effective in policing, intelligence or military counter-
terrorism. However, as well as the type of operational or ‘street experience’ of uniformed 
officers in the community and the development of situational awareness to become 
effective ‘eyes and ears’ discussed in the previous chapter, the interview data also 
highlighted several less tangible aspects of individual characteristics and abilities. These 
were also perceived to impact on the individual’s effectiveness in counter-terrorism, 
specifically their individual intuition, personality type and the maturity of the ‘practitioner’.  
Thus policing interviewees from all countries perceived the importance of ‘engendering a 
level of consciousness amongst rank and file officers on the streets’ (IR1/13), so that they 
could act like “a wireless, a constant briefing of our men and women in the police service 
and linking that to our community links, you know eyes and ears” (UK1). The Irish Garda in 
particular stressed the need to get individual uniformed officers to consider “that a bomb in 
the North is much closer than you think. The car and the materials used in the attack may 
well have been processed and prepared in the South and driven up into the North, so it 
impacts upon us” (IR13).137 As a former RUC officer explained, ‘although you are dealing 
with ordinary policing issues, you must constantly have the mind-set to contribute 
intelligence against terrorism’ (UK28). He explained the significance of this mind-set 
amongst uniformed officers because, “they are on the ground 24/7 and most important is 
their attitude towards, and knowledge of, the local host community. They are effectively the 
eyes and ears on the ground’ (UK28). Likewise, because of previous terrorist attacks and the 
potential threat to transport infrastructure, a senior officer from the British Transport Police 
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(BTP) stated that “we pride ourselves that our officers think terrorism around everything that 
they do” (UK20).  
This was also commented on by a number of US interviewees who stressed the importance 
of the ‘street cop’ at state and local level being trained to recognise threats and know how 
to report them (US11/16/18/24). To help facilitate this, the NYPD Counter-Terrorism 
Division trains NYPD and other law enforcement officers in counter-terrorist tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs), particularly through Operation Century ‘which seeks to 
assist law enforcement bodies around New York with specialist skills, languages and 
capabilities’ (US7/9/29). The Israeli interviewees likewise felt that through their operational 
experience, the INP had developed a high degree of awareness and as one explained, “only 
a guy of the Police who is working day by day in this street can understand it, can unearth 
something new” (IS7), while a French Police interviewee also recognised the importance of 
‘mobilising police officers on the beat to fight against terrorism’ (FR1). These factors 
regarding ‘local understanding’, being ‘street wise’ and acting as local ‘eyes and ears’, 
conform to aspects of the conceptual frameworks detailed in both this and the previous 
chapter. 
A far harder attribute to quantify or empirically verify, was the role of individual ‘intuition’ in 
the situational awareness of police officers, possibly subconsciously based on their 
experience, local knowledge and community understanding. One senior UK police 
interviewee described this as “the importance of a policing gut feeling, really pulling 
together instances that don’t fit together” (UK3).  Likewise, a US interviewee described this 
as the JDLR concept, ‘Just Doesn’t Look Right’, pointing out that as it now had an acronym it 
was getting into police tradecraft as a concept (US12). He suggested that this could be 
217 
 
enhanced by having a local BOLO (‘Be On the Look Out’) Book for the ordinary police on the 
beat, advising them on what to look for and report. While there were numerous examples 
of this ‘intuitive’ situational awareness mentioned by the interviewees, perhaps the most 
significant was raised by a senior Israeli Police officer, who provided an exemplar (IS13): 
Three police detectives returning after a night duty in Afula, saw a suspicious man with a 
large rucksack. At first one said that as they were off duty, it wasn’t their problem, however, 
they decided to investigate. When challenged, the man tried to go towards a crowd at a 
nearby bank. They drew their firearms, calling for him to halt, then jumped on him and 
grabbed the bag while restraining him. The bag contained an explosive charge, nails and 
shrapnel in the design of a Person Borne IED (PBIED –‘Suicide Bomber’). As the senior officer 
explained, “they had the courage to try and stop him. They sensed that something was 
wrong and it’s a case of education, awareness and being alert... I’m very proud of them” 
(IS13). 
While space and focus precludes a more detailed analysis of this concept, there has been 
research around such ‘intuitive practice’. While it is understandably difficult to define what 
has been referred to in terms of ‘gut reaction’, ‘sixth sense’, ‘danger signals’ and 
‘instantaneous recognition’, Klein found that business experts operating under pressure 
would use their experience and expertise to intuitively make feasible decisions, which he 
referred to as Recognition Primed Decision (RPD). Thus although the process of making 
decisions was subconscious, it actually relied on their previous work related expertise and 
knowledge, the suggestion being that the more experience an individual has in a particular 
field, the more likely that their ‘intuitive’ decisions or actions in this area will be the right 
ones (Klein 2003). In relation to neuropsychology, Le Doux explained such ‘intuition’ in 
terms of the architecture of the brain, where in a harmful or life threatening situation, parts 
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of the Cerebellum, responsible for fear, pleasure, emotions, and motor skills, would over-
ride the Cerebrum responsible for thought, judgement, learning and memory. This leads to 
instinctive reactions to threats or pain, rather than delaying reaction to make a conscious 
assessment, by which time it would be too late (Le Doux 1996).  
Consequently, FBI specialists have deduced that in such  ‘fight or flight’ situations, where an 
individual is in a life threatening or harmful scenario, “people often perceive danger signals 
and can begin to initiate responses to them before becoming consciously aware of them… 
the rational brain – aware, conscious and reflective – ponders the consequences of the 
person’s actions. The emotional brain – more impulsive and reflexive – acts upon stimulation 
from the environment in powerful ways designed to protect the person from danger and 
harm” (Pinizzotto et. al, 2004). Therefore, it appears that in such extreme circumstances, 
while the rational brain may be unaware, the subconscious emotional brain is already 
making rapid ‘assessments’ from danger signals and Non-Verbal Communications (NVCs), 
leading to subconscious ‘judgements’ and ‘decisions’ based on previous experience and 
expertise, which result in ‘intuition’. The FBI specialists  go on to suggest that this knowledge 
can be applied to realistic training scenarios in order to better prepare an officer or operator 
for a future operational environment (Ibid). Clearly then, this may be a further factor to 
consider when designing a conceptual framework around the wider ‘human factors’ of 
counter-terrorist competencies.  
A further characteristic which emerged from the interview data, again proving difficult to 
quantify, was the importance of having the ‘right’ personality type or trait for certain 
counter-terrorist roles and functions. Thus, a senior FBI analyst drew comparisons between 
the more investigative role of police and law enforcement officers with intelligence analysts, 
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stating that “when you look at the demographics in law enforcement, it’s usually type A 
males… However, such individuals may not write down all the details as they are often only 
focused on immediate law enforcement issues, but we need to get deeper and think like an 
academic to get behind the reasons… what was the motivation, who trained him, was it 
internal or external to the US and is it via the cyber realm?” (US34).  
Further highlighting functionally specific personality traits, a former USMC Force 
Reconnaissance Officer (Force Recon) stated that “it’s hard to be good at both DA (Direct 
Action) and Recon as they are opposite roles. One requires aggressive intervention while the 
other requires quiet stealth. The Marines in Battalion and Force Recon are all alpha males, 
which means covert recon is against their normal behaviour. For example on exercise guys 
are marking an ‘enemy’ tank with ‘Recon’s were here’ or getting too close to a target. It’s 
difficult to freefall from 20,000 feet with oxygen and then creep around quietly with all the 
adrenalin flowing!” (US38). Likewise, a former USSF senior NCO detailed special forces 
personality traits, explaining that “the reason we are so successful is because we’re non-
conformist. Most people in the Special Forces are opinionated arseholes. They will always 
push back. Why we are so effective on the ground is because we put our heart into it, we put 
our heart into the job. Any country’s special forces, you will find their whole heart is in it… So 
special forces are effective because they want to do the job to the very best of their ability… 
the problem is getting the right people” (US42). 
Bearing in mind the conceptual framework discussed at the start of this chapter, it is clear 
from the interview data that while different counter-terrorist roles may be better suited to 
individuals with different inherent skills and capabilities, whether physical, mental or 
psychological, that individual personality traits may also have to be considered in order to 
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ascertain a person’s ‘suitability’. While as previously stated, this is not the place for a 
detailed examination of the psychological factors behind individual personalities, personal 
values and emotional intelligence, the NEO Personality Inventory –Revised (PI – R), a 
regularly used psychometric test, lists five major personality traits: Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and Openess to Experience, each of which 
has six subordinate facets. This highlights the wide ‘diversity’ between every individual’s 
personality traits and when considered in relation to the significantly different demands 
placed on counter-terrorist practitioners, such as between an investigative detective, covert 
source handler, intelligence analyst, military special forces operator or police tactical 
intervention officer, it may be yet another ‘human factor’ to consider in any counter-
terrorism competency framework.  
A final characteristic which emerged from the interview data as impacting on individual 
effectiveness in counter-terrorism was maturity. While mentioned as a factor by other 
interviewees, such as in the case of the Israeli YAMAM police intervention Unit, it was more 
explicitly detailed by an officer of Lotar Eilat, or ‘Counter Terror Eilat’ in Israel. Because of 
both the local threat due to its geographical location close to the Jordanian and Egyptian 
Sinai borders, and its vulnerability, due to its tourist hotels, airport and major port, Eilat is 
considered at high risk of terrorist attack. At the same time, its geographical location at the 
bottom of the Negev desert, means it is hours away from the populated areas of Israel to 
the North, delaying any effective response to a terrorist incident. As a result Lotar Eilat, a 
specialist Army intervention unit, was formed from reservists who had completed their 
regular military service and now lived in Eilat. Despite being comprised of reservists, the 
Unit has performed so well that its status has been raised to one of the top elite units in the 
Country. In fact, Lotar Eilat benefits from being based around reservists in three ways: 
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Firstly, most of those involved bring critical transferable work skills and knowledge, such as 
qualified divers, desert navigation specialists, and local hoteliers, all from the tourist trade 
and an understanding of the Port layout, shipping and equipment from those that work at 
Eilat Port. Secondly, as many remain with Lotar Eilat for the duration of their reserve 
service, unlike conscripts they can hone and develop their intervention skills over years. 
Finally, given the nature of their role, their maturity, particularly in relation to its impact on 
decision making, can prove invaluable (IS3).    
The importance of this maturity among individual military or police operators, particularly 
when dealing with complex tactical operations and the potential use of lethal force, was 
also highlighted by a very senior UK police officer who stated of police firearms teams that 
“we made mistakes in the early days, because we looked at this in terms of how fit, how 
brave, how courageous the people in these units must be. We actually sent them to be 
trained by the SAS at Hereford… And I think we very quickly refined all the training, so that 
we reached a point through very refined and extensive selection procedures, that actually 
the people appointed to these units, suddenly the age profile became much higher… Much 
more maturity, so that the last thing these folks were going to do was resort to the use of 
firearms” (UK1). In a similar manner a former SAS senior non-commissioned officer (SNCO)  
explained that the Metropolitan police SCO19 firearms teams, with whom he had trained, 
“have a lot of maturity through their age and experience, which helps with difficult decision 
making” (UK43). Yet again these examples highlight that while physical fitness is an 
important factor for military or police intervention roles, inherent psychological factors, in 
this case the impact of maturity on decision making, are perceived as being more critical.  
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Consequently, the research data from the interviews highlighted several other individual 
characteristics which need to be considered in addition to the initial conceptual framework 
for counter-terrorist competence detailed at the start of the chapter. As well as the various 
inherent physical, mental and psychological aptitudes necessary to complete the advanced 
selection courses, the more nebulous concept of ‘intuition’ was raised, along with having 
the appropriate personality traits to be ‘suitable’ for a particular type of counter-terrorist 
role and the importance of maturity in the difficult decision making associated with such 
potentially life or death roles. These will be re-considered when the framework is revisited 
at the end of the chapter. While this chapter’s conceptual framework for counter-terrorist 
competency was initially based upon aspects of Ekblom’s Conjunction of Criminal 
Opportunity (CCO) Framework, he also raised a number of concerns in relation to 
practitioners and the loss of their knowledge and expertise. He surmised that: 
 Much knowledge of practice is tacit  
 The dependence on able and/or charismatic practitioners is risky as they move on, or 
leave, reinforcing the tacit nature of knowledge 
 More generally practitioners operate at two extremes: 
o Given anarchic total freedom of manoeuvre, with implications for quality and 
mission drift or 
o Seen as technicians, not consultants, slavishly copying programme recipes – 
many hate it 
 A limited career structure and organisational reward means investment in education 
and developing expertise is patchy 
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Again, while Ekblom’s concerns may be more relevant to mainstream policing organisations, 
it does nevertheless highlight the concern that after the type of extensive selection 
processes, expensive and specialised training previously detailed, that such individual 
knowledge, experience and expertise can be lost to counter-terrorist organisations. 
Certainly the loss of highly trained personnel was raised in relation to special forces by an 
Irish military interviewee, who explained that with the Army Ranger Wing (ARW) “it’s also 
very difficult to keep them up to speed, because of the high attrition rate through injuries 
and because of the level of commitment” (IR12). Similar ‘selection – destruction’ cycles were 
mentioned in the other countries where the sheer tempo of operations, the loss of 
personnel through casualties and injuries and the difficulty of recruiting and training 
suitable candidates means that such units are always short of specialist manpower and 
often stretched to conduct operational taskings. In addition, the high wages paid in the 
security industry mean that many highly skilled ‘operators’ leave the Army to work for 
Private Military Companies (PMC). Aspects of Ekblom’s concerns at the loss of such 
experience and expertise were indeed reflected by interview data examined in the following 
section.  
d. Experience and Expertise 
While the conceptual framework designed for counter-terrorist competences has implicitly 
raised both experience and expertise (‘knowledge’); the interview data reinforced the 
importance of these factors in a more explicit way. Though this chapter is focused on 
individual skills and capabilities, since these individual police officers, intelligence officials 
and military operators have now in effect been selected and trained, they progress to form 
part of a wider counter-terrorist organisation. As a result, much of the interview data  
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concerning experience and expertise, though relating to individual ‘human factors’, was 
couched in terms of organisational structures or even at the national level (See Table 15 
Following). Nevertheless, the majority of those interviewed believed that both experience 
and expertise impacted on the longer term effectiveness of both individuals and 
organisations, the distinction being that while ‘experience’ is having a knowledge or skill of 
something acquired through involvement or exposure gained over time, ‘expertise’ is having 
a knowledge or skill in a particular area acquired through practice or talent. This also reflects 
aspects of Dey’s discussion of experience and prior knowledge, where he draws a distinction 
between abstract and personal knowledge, between knowledge acquired through study and 
that which has been personally experienced. He states that “there is a world of difference 
between the abstract knowledge in books and the practical knowledge required for and 
acquired in everyday experience – between reading what to do, seeing others do it, and 
doing it for yourself” (Dey 1999: p.101).   
Many of the countries selected as case studies in this research have suffered from years, 
often decades, of terrorism and their police, intelligence and military security forces have 
regularly been at the forefront in dealing with these threats, often reflected in the numbers 
of their casualties (Doherty 2004). Examples include the thirty year campaign of PIRA in 
Northern Ireland from 1969 (English 2003), the threat to France from the Algerian Islamist 
Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) during the 1990s, part of which mutated into the Groupe 
Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC) now known as Al-Qaida au Maghreb 
Islamique (AQMI – Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) (Shapiro & Suzan 2003), ETA’s Lucha 
Armada or ‘Armed Struggle’ against the Spanish State and its representatives since 1968 
(Shabad & Ramo 1995), decades of terrorism against Israel by Palestinian groups such as 
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS) and Lebanese based Hezbollah (Pedahzur 
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2010) and the continuing terrorist actions of the PKK against Turkey and its security forces 
since 1984.(Mango 2005).  
Often the initial responses by the authorities to such outbreaks of terrorism have been 
heavy handed, brutal and counter-productive, leading to greater support for the terrorist 
cause amongst constituent communities and increased terrorist recruitment amongst their 
support bases (Richardson 2006). For example several UK interviewees referred to the 
policy of internment introduced in Northern Ireland in 1971 to counter PIRA as, ‘probably 
the greatest recruiting agent for the PIRA there ever was’ (UK1/6/15). However, as terrorist 
campaigns develop over time and based on their increasing experience, policing, 
intelligence and military counter-terrorist responses generally become more sophisticated, 
nuanced and effective. Additionally these may be affected and influenced by external 
factors, public opinion, international law and legal frameworks, such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and various UN Resolutions, particularly in such a 
domestic counter-terrorist context. Eventually these responses often include conciliatory 
measures aimed at addressing root causes, benefits to the associated community and 
support base, a level of dialogue with the terrorist organisation, as well as more refined and 
carefully directed measures against terrorist activists themselves (English 2009).  
Consequently, police interviewees in the majority of the countries examined as case studies 
for this research mentioned their long experience in countering terrorism at a high Tier 1 
level. In the case of the French interviewees, it was stressed that their police and security 
forces had been dealing with the threat of Islamist terrorism, predominantly of Algerian 
origin, for many years, including a 1994 GIA hijacking with the intention of crashing the Air 
France passenger jet into Paris (FR9) (Harclerode 2000: Chapter 12). Thus they believed that 
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as well as being more prepared than many countries in dealing with this ‘new’ type of 
threat, ‘for France the impact of 9/11 was not such a shock’ (FR1/7/10/14/15) (Cettina 
2003). Additionally, it was pointed out that France had historically coped with significant 
political and nationalist international terrorism occurring on French soil, though not 
necessarily targeting France itself (FR2/4).  
Understandably, although the United States has suffered from acts of terrorism by extreme 
right wingers such as Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, and individual extremists such as 
the ‘Unabomber’ Ted Kaczynski, the American interviewees did not reflect this length of 
experience. Despite suffering the World’s worst terrorist attacks on 9/11 2001 (9/11 
Commission 2005), and a previous Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED – 
‘lorry or car bomb’) attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in 1993 (Caram 2001), the US 
has not experienced a recent sustained domestic terrorist campaign like the other countries, 
although many attacks were previously launched against its interests overseas.138 By 
comparison, the length of certain countries experience in dealing with such threats was 
demonstrated by Ireland, where violent Republican opposition and its suppression by the 
British authorities was instrumental to the Country’s independence and which has 
countered ‘Anti-Treaty’ and ‘Subversive’ Republicanism opposed to the Irish State since its 
foundation in 1922 (O’Halpin 1999).139 Likewise, the State of Israel, which was born in 
terrorist conflict between the British Mandate authorities with the Irgun, Haganah and 
Stern Gang, has faced terrorist threats and conflicts even before its inception in 1948 (Zadka 
1995).140  
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Table 15: POLICING EXPERIENCE & EXPERTISE 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
1 
 Long Garda 
experience 
countering 
‘Subversive’ 
Republicans 
since 
formation of 
the State in 
1922 
Countering 
Islamist 
terrorism 
‘before 
9/11’ 
 
Previously 
dealt with 
significant 
internat. 
terrorism 
on French 
territory 
Long 
experience 
of countering 
Basque ETA 
since late 
1960s  
Long 
experience 
countering 
Palestinian 
terrorism 
since the 
State’s 
formation 
in 1948 
Experience  
countering the 
Kurdish PKK 
since it 
launched its 
campaign 
began in 1984 
 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Historic 
experience 
of dealing 
with ‘Irish 
Terrorism’ 
of PIRA  
 
Change 
from ‘Irish 
Terrorism’  
to Islamist  
Lack of 
knowledge & 
experience 
of Islamist 
extremism 
    Failure to 
identify 
9/11 
conspiracy 
and 
HUMINT 
weakness  
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Effective 
break up of 
Met SO12 & 
national SB 
system  
 
Disbanding 
of RUC & 
loss of  
knowledge-
especially 
RUC SB 
 
Expertise in 
railway of 
BTP & at 
Heathrow & 
City of 
London 
with SO18 
  Blinkered 
focus on 
threat of ETA 
prior to 
Atocha 11-M 
Bombings in 
2004? 
 
Difficulty of 
dealing with 
indoctrinated 
Marxist – 
Leninism of 
GRAPO  
Focus on 
Palestinian 
terrorism 
&Hezbollah 
negated 
response to 
Jewish 
extremism? 
 
However 
security 
forces 
understand 
& infiltrate 
Jewish 
terrorists 
now more 
of a priority 
after Rabin 
killed 1995 
Focus on PKK 
to extent the 
threat from 
Islamists 
marginalised? 
 
Islamist 
terrorism seen 
as threat to 
‘Western 
interests’ in 
Turkey, not 
the Turkish 
state itself 
 
Difficulty of 
understanding 
or dealing with 
extreme left 
DHKP/C 
FBI success 
in 
infiltrating 
extreme 
right wing 
Militia 
 
Due to 
strategic 
turf 
battles, a 
failure to 
effectively 
leverage 
local 
knowledge- 
expertise 
of police in 
CT? 
 
Though no longer posing the same level of threat, one further aspect commented on by 
police interviewees from both Spain and Turkey was that despite the length of previous 
campaigns and their experience and expertise in countering them, how difficult it was to 
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deal with extreme left terrorists, from respectively GRAPO and the DHKP/C (Alexander & 
Pluchinsky 1992).141 These activists were described as being ‘indoctrinated’, having a 
‘monastic lifestyle’ (SP2/SP7) and being ‘fanatical’ (TU10), while similar sentiments were 
expressed by French interviewees about the historical campaign of violence by Action 
Directe (AD) between 1979 and 1987 (Dartnell 1995 and Hamon & Marchand 1986).142 
However, in a negative flipside to this extensive historical experience and expertise across 
various countries, interviewees also highlighted the difficulties and risks when police and 
security organisations have dealt almost exclusively with one type of terrorism for many 
years, only to be faced with a new and different type of terrorist threat. These concerns 
were also mirrored by Intelligence interviewees across various countries. In the UK after 
decades of dealing with the more hierarchical and structured nationalist-separatist ‘Irish 
Terrorism’ the police and intelligence services have had to adjust their systems, structures 
and procedures to dealing with loose networks of Islamist extremists inspired by al Qaeda 
(Wikinson 2007).143 While PIRA were willing to inflict casualties to achieve a political 
statement, this was not always their main priority. By contrast, the latter’s focus is generally 
to inflict the maximum number of casualties, often through multiple mass casualty attacks, 
sometimes by suicide bombers, such as the 7/7 London transport bombings of 2005 (Black 
2005).144 Clearly this requires a different approach from the police and intelligence services, 
who now lack the same ability or time to allow a surveillance operation to ‘run’ and 
generate evidence, because of the primacy of ensuring public safety (UK1/13) (Clarke 2007). 
Likewise, in Ireland, while the interviewees believed great understanding, experience and 
expertise has been developed over the years on ‘Subversive’ Republicanism, the lack of 
knowledge and experience amongst the Garda and security forces of Islamist extremism 
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was commented on by a number of Irish interviewees.145 Subsequently, there have been 
increased concerns regarding the security of Shannon Airport, where US military transport 
planes en route to Afghanistan refuel after crossing the Atlantic, and for the US and Israeli 
Embassies in Dublin (Walsh 2003).146 The US interviewees highlighted that during the 1990s, 
prior to 9/11, much of the focus and success of the FBI had been in dealing with domestic 
extreme right, new religious and militia movements. This was particularly in the aftermath 
of the Oklahoma Bombing of the Murrah Federal Building by Timothy McVeigh and Terry 
Nichols on April 19th 1995, the worst terrorist attack on US soil prior to 9/11 (Hamm 1997) 
and in the run up to the Millennium with Project Meggido (US1/35/39).(FBI 2002). However, 
at a Tier 2 level, they also commented on the failure to identify the 9/11 Conspiracy and the 
previous historical degradation and weakness of US human intelligence (HUMINT) 
capabilities.147   
In the cases of Spain, Israel and Turkey, stronger concerns were raised by some of the 
relevant national policing and intelligence interviewees that this focus on the ‘traditional’ 
terrorist threat might have negatively impacted on their operational effectiveness in dealing 
with such ‘new’ threats. Consequently, it was suggested that in Spain there was a ‘blinkered 
focus’ on ETA prior to the 11-M Atocha bombings and that “Spain never really believed in a 
clear Islamist threat until the attack on Atocha in 2004” (SP10) (Reinares & Elorza 2004). 
Instead, while many of these predominantly North African extremists in Spain ‘were 
considered to be transiting between Africa and Europe’ (SP2/9), those Islamist cells 
operating in the country were ‘mainly seen as being involved in fundraising’ (SP6). It was 
confirmed by one interviewee that, “in 2004 we were watching them and controlling them, 
but they went from a logistical support group to an attack group” (SP17).  
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While Israeli respondents acknowledged that Jewish extremists were now more of a priority 
for the security forces, particularly following Yigal Amir’s assassination of Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, some commented that the previous focus on terrorism from 
Palestinian groups and Hezbollah had negated the Israeli security responses to Jewish 
terrorism (IS7/16/17/18). This is supported by Katz who states that “The Shin Bet had, for 
the better part of fifty years, indoctrinated its agents that the principal threat to the Jewish 
state was an Arab one. It was a blinding tunnel vision that had left a clear field of fire for a 
Jewish assassin” (Katz 2002: p.227).148 Likewise, one Turkish interviewee believed that “the 
big issue is the PKK and anything else, Islamic or other, is secondary” (TU8), while another 
pointed out that “Religious (Islamist) terrorism is seen as a threat to Western interests in 
Turkey, not to the Turkish State itself” (TU1). A major concern is that this outlook might have 
marginalised the threat posed by Islamist groups, prior to the November 2003 Istanbul 
bombings of the Beth Israel and Neve Shalom Synagogues, an HSBC building and the British 
Consulate (Williams 2004). 
A final issue raised by UK interviewees, which specifically reflects aspects of Ekblom’s 
concerns, raised at the end of the last section, was that having built up organisational 
knowledge, experience and expertise over decades, such knowledge could be easily lost 
when the authorities disbanded or neglected policing and intelligence organisations. The 
RUC was perceived by one senior police interviewee as having been ‘airbrushed from 
history’ (UK21), while others were worried ‘the RUC Special Branch and its associated 
intelligence machinery for dealing with PIRA were dismantled’ (UK23/36/38). Consequently, 
concerns were raised as to the capability of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) to 
counter any possible future upsurge in Dissident Republican terrorism by groups such as the 
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) (Frampton 
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2011).149 Similar concerns over the loss of organisational knowledge and expertise were 
raised over the effective break-up of the national Special Branch system, which had 
traditionally played an important role in countering PIRA attacks on the UK mainland 
(UK26/29) (Clutterbuck 2006). 
In the specific case of intelligence organisations, these have had to develop and adapt from 
their more traditional domestic counter-intelligence and foreign intelligence gathering roles 
during the ‘Cold War’, to better counter the terrorist threats, both domestic and 
international, detailed at the start of this section. Consequently, at both the Tier 1 and Tier 2 
levels, interviewees highlighted that their intelligence agencies have more recently built up 
significant operational experience in dealing with different types of terrorist threat, both 
domestic and international. These threats have ranged from the nationalist-separatist 
terrorism of groups like ETA , PIRA, the PKK and the various fissiparous Corsican separatist 
groups, to the religious extremism of the global Islamist al Qaeda network, HAMAS, 
Hezbollah, Jewish extremists in Israel and the extreme right American Militia movement.  
However, while the same core tradecraft and competences of an intelligence operator or 
analyst might remain generally the same, the historical experiences of countering such a 
wide variety of terrorist groups with varying ideologies, supporting communities and 
operating environments, have required different approaches in the collection, generation, 
development and exploitation of intelligence (Baud 2005) While the interview data in the 
previous chapter has highlighted the perceived significance of HUMINT and VISINT, these 
are supported, and often interlinked with, Technical Intelligence (TECHINT), which one UK 
security official described as forming a ‘Virtuous Circle’. He believed that “in terms of 
streams of intelligence, it is always critical to have a balance of sources… If you have the 
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right HUMINT, it generates TECHINT, which then assists with the recruitment of new sources 
for HUMINT, so it’s what I call virtuous circles, similar, but separate to the intelligence cycle 
itself” (UK49).  
As well as highlighting the more general MACP experiences detailed at the start of the 
chapter, the various military operators and police firearms interviewees also commented on 
the historic experience and expertise developed by the specialist tactical intervention and 
Hostage Rescue Units (HRU).150 During the 1970s in response to the upsurge of political and 
nationalist terrorism and hostage taking, in particular the killing of eleven Israeli athletes 
and a Bavarian police officer at the 1972 Munich Olympics (Reeve 2000), it became 
apparent that due to the asymmetric nature of terrorism, conventional police and military 
units (and their associated responses), were either ineffective or too destructive, and 
generally counterproductive (Wardlaw 1989: Chapter 10). Consequently, various countries 
developed small highly trained tactical intervention and HRU from within their military, 
gendarmerie ‘third-force’, or police organisations. Many of those military or police tactical 
operators interviewed for this research have served, or are currently serving, in such units 
which can be divided into three broad categories depending on their origin and recruitment 
(Dobson & Payne 1982).  
Consequently, some countries formed national HRU and intervention units from among 
elements of their existing military special forces units (Katz 1995). Individual operators from 
these units were seen as already possessing the necessary mental, psychological and 
physical aptitudes for such roles, along with relevant firearms skills for the precision 
shooting required. Examples of such military units and capabilities include the UK Special Air 
Service (SAS) policy of rotating individual Squadrons through their Counter Revolutionary 
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Warfare (CRW)/ Special Projects role (UK11/19/22/37/43), the Irish formation of the Army 
Ranger Wing (ARW - Fianoglach), whose roles include dealing with such terrorist ‘worst case 
scenarios’ (IR8/12), and the Israeli Sayeret Matkal (General Staff Reconnaissance Unit) 
training for this additional role (IS9/15). As mentioned, the Israelis also established Lotar 
Eilat to deal with the unique geographical and cultural situation of the port City of Eilat (IS3), 
while the US formed their 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta from amongst its 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) (US11/31/42). A similar example from outside the case 
study countries, is provided by the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) formation of 
their Bijzondere Bijstands Eenheid (BBE – ‘Special Assistance Unit’), now known as the 
Marine Intervention Unit (UIM), which conducted several successful hostage rescue 
operations against South Moluccan terrorists during the 1970s (Herman & Van der Laan 
Bouma 1993).   
However, other countries did not want such domestic roles being fulfilled by their militaries. 
thus other specialist intervention units were formed from within ‘third force’ gendarmerie 
or domestic intelligence structures. These were seen as combining both a law enforcement 
function and legal understanding, along with the necessary military capabilities, which one 
former French Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) officer described 
as ‘combining the best of both worlds in an individual operator’ (FR9). As well as the GIGN, 
examples include the Spanish Guardia Civil Unidad Especial de Intervention (UEI) (SP2), the 
Israeli MAGAV ‘Border Guards’ YAMAM (IS6/16/17) and the US FBI national HRT and 
regional Enhanced SWAT Teams (US5). Though falling outside the case study countries, a 
useful example is provided by Germany. Whilst realising the critical need for such a hostage 
rescue and intervention unit following the operational failure at the Munich Olympics in 
1972, the German authorities deliberately avoided forming such a unit from within the 
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military, due to the historic and political sensitivities involved. Consequently they turned 
instead to the ‘third force’ of the Bundesgrenzschutz or ‘National Border Guards’, forming 
the specialised Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 9) from within its ranks. In 1977, at Mogadishu, 
Somalia, the recently established Unit demonstrated its expertise during the storming of a 
Lufthansa jet whose passengers had been taken hostage by members of the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in support of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang/ Rote Armee 
Fraktion (RAF) (Davies 1994). 
Such specialist counter-terrorist intervention units were also formed from within police and 
prison service units, again combining both a legal knowledge and understanding with 
advanced tactical firearms capability. Examples raised by interviewees included the 
Metropolitan Police SCO19 (UK27), the RUC HMSU (UK18/51), the Irish Garda ERU (IR6/9), 
French Police RAID (Reaction, Assistance, Intervention, Disuassion) and Paris Brigade de 
Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI) (FR4/12) and Spanish Policia GEO (SP4/9). Interviewees 
also mentioned the Israeli Prison Service (IPS) Masada and Nachson Units (IS13), Turkish 
Polis Ozel Harekat Tim ‘Special Operations Teams’ (TU10/12) and various US police Special 
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, such as the New York Police Department (NYPD) 
Emergency Support Unit (ESU) (US7/29), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) SWAT 
(US18) and Boston Police Department (BPD) SWAT (US23) (Metzner & Friedrich 2002). It 
was pointed out by interviewees from several of the countries that such police tactical 
intervention teams, along with their ‘third force’ gendarmerie colleagues, have a high 
operational tempo, developing a great deal of ‘hands on’ experience, since as well as their 
counter-terrorist roles they are also regularly used in operations against organised crime 
groups, drug gangs and armed criminals (UK27/FR12/IR6/9). 
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Due to both the potential terrorist threat and the complexity of operating in a maritime 
environment, interviewees highlighted that many countries had also formed units or 
developed capabilities for Maritime Counter-Terrorist (MCT) roles, predominantly from 
amongst their existing naval or marine combat diver units. Examples raised by interviewees 
included the Royal Marines Special Boat Service (SBS) (UK25), the Irish ARW MCT role (IR8), 
the Israeli Navy’s Shayetet 13 capability (IS10), Turkish Su Alti Taaruz (SAT) and Su Alti 
Savunma (SAS) Naval Komandos (TU9) and US Navy SEAL Team 6 (US11) (Katz 2000). As a 
former SBS officer explained, “I guess that pre 9/11 we were driven by North Sea Oil and the 
terrorism of the late 60s and 70s. The SBS had a focus and dedicated military forces, with a 
specific requirement beyond the capability of the police. It was really in the 70s that we first 
considered how to climb an oil rig. This was a defining role… with North Sea oil rigs in an 
MCT role. So… 50% of our time was spent on ‘Black’ ops and 50% on ‘Green’… It required an 
intense effort and very specialised techniques, even more so than land… When 9/11 occurred 
there was a realisation… if they were not beyond seizing and using a plane as a weapon, 
they were not beyond seizing a supertanker and doing the same thing” (UK25). 
Since their formation, as well as conducting countless training exercises, such specialised 
military, ‘third force’ gendarmerie and policing hostage rescue and intervention units have 
been utilised in numerous interventions and hostage rescues, where individual operators 
have developed great operational, tactical and technical experience and expertise 
(Harclerode 2000). Nevertheless, despite the significant amount of experience and expertise 
developed by such intervention and hostage rescue teams, due to the complexity of such 
situations, even those seen as textbook operations have often resulted in a number of 
injuries and deaths amongst both the hostages and their rescuers (Griffiths 2003). 
236 
 
The various examples raised by the interviewees from the different countries and fields 
highlighted the significance of individual experience and expertise in countering terrorism. 
Nevertheless, despite the clear operational benefits of such experience and an associated 
understanding of a particular type of threat, there is a concomitant risk of a blinkered 
approach to new threats, either where they are underestimated, or where tried and tested 
approaches are utilised, even though unsuitable, “because we’ve always done it that way” 
(UK29). Finally, reflecting some of Ekblom’s concern, there is the risk that hard earned 
organisational knowledge, experience and expertise, sometimes paid for in lives, is lost 
when units are disbanded or neglected for political, cultural, historical, social or financial 
reasons. Though framed by the interviewees at the organisational or even national levels, 
the examples evidenced the individual ‘experience and expertise’ of police officers, 
intelligence officials and military operators who belonged to those organisations. 
Consequently, when viewed through the conceptual framework of counter-terrorist 
competencies outlined in the introduction to this chapter, it is argued that the explicit 
raising of both experience and expertise mean that these need to be considered as 
additional categories in a revised conceptual framework, rather than sub-categories.     
e. Mirror Image: Individual Capabilities  
A mirror image to such individual counter-terrorist skills and capabilities exists where 
terrorist groups and networks rely on their own recruitment and selection, or indeed ‘self-
selection’ processes, to identify suitable individuals before providing then with additional 
training to develop and build further terrorist skills and capabilities. Thus ETA would utilise 
the Kale Borroka street rioting by its Segi youth members to identify those with the 
commitment and motivation to recruit into its terrorist Comandos (SP2/4/12), while the 
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Palestinian HAMAS and Kurdish PKK would respectively use the Intifada (IS1/8/17) and 
Serhildan (TU13) street unrest for similar purposes. The PIRA would also test the 
commitment and reliability of youths from its Fianna youth wing, with minor tasks, such as 
the storing of weapons, conducting surveillance, ‘dicking’ (acting as look outs for Army or 
RUC units), rioting etc, while an extreme left wing group like the Spanish GRAPO would 
ensure its member’s ideological commitment by making them “draft reports about Marxist-
Leninism, about Communism” (SP2).  
With the various core, affiliate, associate or inspired groups linked to the al Qaeda network, 
radicalisation and the psychological ‘predisposition’ to become involved in terrorism will be 
examined in more detail later in the thesis as a ‘mirror image’ to organisational culture. 
However, alongside such a predisposition, individuals appear to be initially recruited 
through various social networks and hotspots. These have included immediate and 
extended family, prayer groups, student associations, those linked to charismatic preachers 
(UK14/16/17/41/45) (O’Neill & McGrory 2006), prisons (Warnes & Hannah 2008) and 
increasingly social networking sites (Bailey & Grimaila 2006).  
Regardless of the organisation and recruitment process and whether this is more or less 
formal, having been identified and ‘selected’, individual terrorists will normally go on to 
conduct some type of training at the basic, intermediate or more advanced levels. While the 
level of training is clearly dependant on the individual’s experience and skills, these will 
normally include physical training, weapons handling, tactics and IED construction (Bomb 
making) (Nance 2003). Although the more advanced training has tended to be conducted by 
state governments which sponsor and support terrorist movements (Byman 2005), more 
basic training is often conducted in ‘ungoverned spaces’, where national governments and 
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security forces have little if any control. These areas have included parts of Kashmir, the 
Philippines, Bosnia, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. A good example of 
this more basic training occurred when Omar Khyam and a number of his colleagues, who 
became the subjects of the Operation Crevice investigation, travelled from the UK to 
Pakistan in the summer of 2003 in order to attend a training camp near Malakand. Here, 
they conducted physical training, practiced firing AK assault rifles and RPG-7 rocket 
launchers and constructed explosives from ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder 
(Clutterbuck & Warnes 2011).  
More recently, concerns have been raised at the potential return of ‘Foreign Fighters’ to the 
UK, and indeed many other European, North American and other nationalities, who have 
taken part in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Clearly when/if these individuals return, they will 
come back into the communities they left, where they may act as a focus for other 
likeminded individuals, predominantly young men, within that community. Not only is there 
the potential for such radicalised and brutalised individuals to have the predisposition, 
motivation and ‘intent’ to commit acts of terrorism, but their training and combat 
experiences mean they are more likely to have the ‘capability’ in such areas as IED 
fabrication, firearms and close quarter fighting. Given the Darwinian nature of the conflict in 
such countries as Syria and Iraq, there is also likely to be an element of ‘survival of the 
fittest’. Consequently, the most capable and skilled individuals are more likely to survive and 
return than some of the more impressionable individuals who have already travelled to 
these areas of conflict. As has been seen in the UK with a number of previous terrorist 
attacks, despite having the predisposition and ‘intent’, attacks have failed due to technical 
or explosive fabrication failures. Many of the groups involved in these failed attacks were 
amateurish, with little technical experience or training. However, in the case of returning 
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‘foreign fighters’, given the radicalising effect of being involved in such brutal conflicts and 
their development of those technical skills and experiences discussed, they are far less likely 
to make these types of technical or tactical mistakes (Carter, Maher & Neumann 2014). 
Again, we can see a mirror image of the conceptual framework previously outlined, this time 
based around terrorist or insurgent competencies, where individuals with a ‘predisposition’ 
through political, religious, racial or other ideological extremism (often exacerbated through 
radicalisation processes), are identified and selected or self-selected for a terrorist 
organisation. Having been recruited they are given additional ‘resources’ through training, 
knowledge, equipment, and the development of experience and expertise, in order to more 
effectively conduct their terrorist actions. Historically, the  al Qaeda network has also acted 
as a ‘force multiplier’ to cells, providing additional specialised training and where necessary 
providing technical specialists to help facilitate attacks.  
f. How Significant are Individual Capabilities?  
After examining the interview data regarding individual skills and capabilities in the field of 
counter-terrorism through a conceptual framework adapted from Ekblom’s Criminal 
Competences, it became clear that aspects of the framework were reflected by the 
interviewees, in particular, that while most organisations utilise an initial selection and 
assessment process, this is for the mainstream policing, intelligence or military functions 
and often only the first step towards a counter-terrorist role. After an individual has 
developed a level of operational experience, most organisations then run more advanced 
selection and assessment processes to identify ‘appropriate individual skills’, specifically the 
inherent physical, mental and psychological aptitudes necessary for particular counter-
terrorist roles. Once identified as having these skills and aptitudes, the individual is provided 
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additional ‘resources for counter-terrorism’ in the form of specialised training, knowledge, 
experience, contacts, logistics and equipment. However, while supporting and reinforcing 
the adapted ‘counter-terrorist competences’ framework, the interview data also highlighted 
a number of other factors which the interviewees felt were important to individual 
effectiveness, specifically, situational awareness, intuitive practice, the ‘right’ personality 
traits and maturity. They also made explicit the significance of individual experience and 
expertise, while serving as part of a wider organisation involved in the field of counter-
terrorism. Therefore, having examined the data, the conceptual framework of ‘counter-
terrorist competences’ was re-visited and these additional factors were incorporated, which 
have been highlighted in bold. The enlarged framework was also arranged around the two 
overarching factors of individual ‘capability’ and ‘suitability’ discussed previously, resulting 
in an updated framework of ‘counter-terrorist competences’: 
 Capability 
o Appropriate individual characteristics and abilities to fulfil a counter-terrorist 
role (Social skills and physical, mental & psychological aptitudes) 
o Resources for counter-terrorism (Appropriate training, knowledge, 
experience, contacts, logistics and equipment) 
o Situational awareness 
o Intuitive practice 
o Experience (Knowledge or skill of something acquired through involvement 
or exposure gained over time) 
o Expertise (Knowledge or skill in a particular area acquired through practice 
or talent) 
 Suitability 
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o Predisposition to become involved in counter-terrorism (Longer term 
personality based influences – volunteering, commitment) 
o Readiness to become involved in counter-terrorism (Shorter term influences 
–Motives & Emotion) 
o Perception, motivation and anticipation of risk, effort and reward  
o The ‘right’ personality traits for a particular role  
o Maturity 
Consequently, the evidence from the research interviews and the ‘counter-terrorist 
competences’ framework developed from them, suggests that the ‘human factors’ behind 
individual skills and capabilities are significant in the recruitment, selection and training of 
appropriate individuals to become effective policing, intelligence or military counter-
terrorists. As the revised framework shows, these various skills and capabilities which 
emerged from the data can be grouped under two main overarching factors, the individual’s 
general capabilities and their suitability for a particular role. Moreover, the research tends 
to highlight that many of these skills and capabilities are functionally specific to the 
particular role, such as investigative detective, source handler, intelligence analyst, military 
special forces or police intervention officer, requiring very different skill sets and aptitudes. 
Nevertheless, despite the functional specificity of these different counter-terrorist roles, 
each requiring distinct skills and capabilities, the emphasis of the more advanced selection 
processes for the various roles was very much focused on having suitable psychological 
aptitudes, mental strength and appropriate personality traits. Consequently, individual skills 
and capabilities, particularly the appropriate inherent aptitudes, appear to significantly 
impact upon individual effectiveness in counter-terrorism.   
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7. Effective Leadership 
a. Introduction  
The third ‘Human Factor’ to be examined, which impacts broadly and often significantly 
across various areas and levels of counter-terrorism, is leadership and its associated 
command and control (C2). This overlaps with aspects of the previous and following 
chapters, since much of the effectiveness of such leadership depends on personal 
relationships, this time internally within organisations, the individual skills and capabilities of 
those in leadership and command positions, and the wider group dynamics, communication 
and organisational culture of the various policing, intelligence and military structures the 
individual actors serve and lead. Consequently, a former US police and SOF SNCO states that 
“leadership permeates all folds of military, law enforcement and tactical training operations. 
Generally success or failure of the mission can be tracked down to either leadership genius or 
void in the selection or training of the personnel at the individual, team, or organizational 
level of the tactical element” (Howe 2011: p. XI).  
The significance of leadership is particularly pronounced in counter-terrorist or counter-
insurgency operations, because of the complex, constantly changing, ambiguous and often 
time critical nature of the environment. This requires effective and timely decision making, 
where delays or the making of inappropriate command decisions can have an impact far 
beyond the immediate focus of the action, as evidenced in the previous ‘Experience and 
Expertise’ section. As a military publication states, “the dynamic and ambiguous 
environment of modern counterinsurgency places a premium on leadership at every level, 
from Sergeant to General… exercising leadership in the midst of ambiguity requires intense, 
discriminating professional judgement” (FM-3-24 2007: p. 237). The quote also highlights 
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that in such ambiguous and sensitive environments, while effective leadership and decision 
making at the higher strategic and operational levels are important, decisions at the tactical 
level by junior leaders can prove critical (See for example HMIC undated). Thus local 
command decisions by police sergeants or army corporals acting as team leaders can have a 
significant impact on relations with the local community, leading to the concept of ‘the 
strategic corporal’. 
Though more widely framed than just counter-insurgency environments, and including 
humanitarian assistance, peace keeping and conventional conflict, the basic premise behind 
the concept of ‘the strategic corporal’ is that a junior leader’s tactical actions may have 
strategic consequences. Clearly this is particularly relevant to the complex, ambiguous and 
sensitive environments previously discussed in relation to counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency amongst local communities. The concept was originally outlined by USMC 
General Krulak in 1999 (Krulak 1999) and explained by General Flynn as preparing “small 
unit leaders to be multicapable, able to accomplish a range of tasks. This requires leaders to 
be technically and tactically proficient, savvy in both customs and languages, physically 
hard, capable of meeting ethical and emotional challenges and ready to change missions 
quickly” (Flynn 2008). This leadership concept has been adopted by other countries, leading 
one Israeli former Sayeret Matkal officer to explain that “In Israel we speak of the ‘strategic 
corporal’. This refers both to the responsibility given to Corporals and the fact that their 
leadership and actions can impact on Israel around the World. Consequently a Corporal has 
to understand strategic and intelligence issues” (IS9). 
Closely associated with successful leadership are the command and control (C2) systems 
and structures necessary to ensure that leadership decisions and commands are effectively 
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and rapidly transmitted and acted upon. In a similar manner within the field of intelligence, 
‘all source’ ‘fusion’ centres, and coordination/de-confliction structures should in theory 
provide a commander with timely and accurate intelligence, which can then be acted upon. 
All these structures are shaped by historical factors, organisational culture and their 
functional roles. Allowing for these differences, some of the structures are more 
traditionally hierarchical, ensuring a disciplined chain of command and strong control, while 
others are more horizontal in nature, allowing greater flexibility and speed of response. A 
number of these counter-terrorist C2 structures, which were detailed by the interviewees, 
will be examined in a later section, covering the command levels from the strategic, through 
the operational down to the tactical and falling across the fields of policing, intelligence and 
military counter-terrorism.  
Just as in the previous chapters, while the primary focus was on identifying and evidencing 
the significance of successful leadership as a ‘Human Factor’ in effective counter-terrorism, 
the emerging data from the research interviews was also examined in relation to a 
conceptual framework. However, the subject of leadership not only touches on aspects of 
sociology, particularly the sociology of work and occupations, but also business 
management, leading to a wide range of theories and concepts on this issue (Bass & Bass 
2008). A number of these concepts were considered from both subject fields, but given the 
variety, this led to sometimes conflicting theories. This tended to confirm Ulmer’s view that, 
“leadership principles and lists of traits and descriptions of required situational behaviours 
will continue to flood the market, even though the basics of leadership that derive from 
timeless human needs and aspirations have changed little in all of recorded history” (Ulmer 
1998: p.152).  
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Ultimately then, despite the mass of different concepts and arguments, aspects of which 
will be considered in this chapter, the key factors of ‘Leadership’ can be simplified down to 
the three critical variables of the individual leader, the team being led, and the environment 
they are working or operating in. Given these fundamentals and the operational nature of 
the counter-terrorist environment previously outlined (as opposed to a business 
environment), the most practical framework was extrapolated and adjusted from a paper by 
former General, and Ambassador Maxwell Taylor (Taylor 1977). Reflecting elements of 
different conceptual theories, this framework covers both aspects of leadership which can 
be taught and learnt, and those more nebulous and less empirical factors which appear 
inherent to the individual’s aptitudes and character:  
 Professional Competence 
o Thorough knowledge of job 
o Ability to train subordinates 
o Ability to supervise and evaluate 
o Good judgement in choosing key assistants 
o Maintaining personal discipline and fitness 
 Intellectual Capacity  
o Disciplined and orderly mind 
o Broad intellectual interests beyond personal field 
o Clarity and facility in oral & written expression 
 Strength of Character 
o Reliability 
o Courage – Personal and in taking difficult decisions 
o Dedication to mission, aim or objective 
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o Determination 
o Self-Discipline 
o Gain and retain respect and confidence 
 Inspirational Qualities  
This last factor of inspirational qualities proved difficult to scale. However, even though 
Taylor admitted the elusiveness of trying to define and frame these qualities, he highlighted 
them through historical examples of leadership and a negative example, stating that 
although there were many very capable, intelligent and reliable officers, some of these 
remained dull, unimaginative and uninspiring (Taylor 1977). Though the paper was 
predominantly drafted for a military audience, arguably this extrapolated framework 
provides a practical and applicable framework through which to view the broader leadership 
concepts in the different fields of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, namely 
policing, intelligence and the military. Consequently throughout the chapter, the interview 
data and different theories and concepts of leadership will be considered in relation to the 
various factors of this conceptual framework.  
b. Effective Leadership  
Effective leadership has been defined as “all about setting direction and creating the right 
organisational conditions for heading in that direction… It means ensuring that the right 
working conditions and physical resources are available but, more importantly, creating the 
culture, relationships and motivation to inspire people to make the most effective use of 
them” (Leadership and Management Network Group LMNG 2012: p. 22). This definition 
highlights both the more practical physical aspects of leadership, such as working conditions 
and physical resources, while also raising the more psychological and mental aspects, such 
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as culture, relationships, motivation and inspiration. To some extent it also reflects the 
dichotomy and ongoing dispute as to whether effective leadership relies on the internal and 
inherent aptitudes, the individual ‘human traits’ of the leader, or whether the external 
environment and situation shapes and conditions a leader, basically whether effective 
leaders are ‘born’, or whether they can be ‘taught and developed’ – Nature versus Nurture. 
While not discussed in detail by the interviewees, this and the following section place other 
data from the interviewees in context. Thus although the focus of the research precludes 
more detailed analysis, this dichotomy can be seen in the various theories of leadership, 
which will be briefly examined. More recent theories argue that effective leadership actually 
combines elements of both, positing that a person is born with a predisposition to becoming 
an effective leader, through inherent suitable attributes, but that these normally need to be 
identified, honed, trained and developed in order to make them an effective leader (Scouller 
2011).   
Consequently, the historic Classical and Renaissance ‘Great Man’ theories of writers such as 
Plato, Plutarch and Machiavelli led on to the Trait Theories of the 19th and early 20th 
Centuries, which argued that some people are born to lead and have the inherent traits 
necessary for effective leadership. This concept was challenged by the Behavioural School, 
and while initially Weber, Stogdill and Lewin identified replicable behaviours in certain 
environments (Thomas 2009), in the 1960’s McGregor argued that leadership could be 
practiced and developed through teaching and observation (McGregor 1960). These 
concepts were further developed by Situational Leadership Theories, which argue that 
leaders choose the best course of action based on situational variables and Contingency 
Theories, which argue that different styles and approaches of leadership are required for 
different contingencies (Bolden et. al. 2003).  
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More recently Burns and Bass developed the Transactional and Transformational Theories. 
The Transactional Leadership Model is based around set criteria, achieving targets and using 
rewards and penalties to encourage individual team members to achieve goals, in more of a 
managerialist type of approach. However, this leadership approach has not been seen as 
particularly inspirational or motivational, arguably encouraging mediocrity. Concerns at 
aspects of the Transactional Leadership approach were highlighted by police counter-
terrorist specialists in the UK who felt this approach led to an over-emphasis on metrics, 
along with promotion based on ‘self-evidencing’ and multi-choice exams, rather than 
genuine leadership skills (UK17/19/22/29). In the field of criminal policing, many countries 
have adopted a performance and target driven culture, based on the use of metrics in 
performance frameworks and a managerialist type leadership approach to policing. This 
strong focus on crime reduction figures, detection rates and performance indicators was 
perceived by the interviewees as failing to consider and address the level of community 
confidence in the police and the consequent development of local community knowledge. It 
was also perceived as failing to foster consultation and interaction with the local 
community, which as an earlier chapter highlighted, was perceived by practitioners as a key 
factor in effective counter-terrorism.  
The Transformational Model on the other hand, is based on the charismatic leader who 
inspires his/her team in a transformational manner. Bass states that “transformational 
leadership occurs when leaders broaden and elevate the interests of their employees, when 
they generate awareness and acceptance of the purposes and mission of the group and 
when they stir their employees to look beyond their own self-interest for the good of the 
group. Transformational leaders achieve these results in one or more ways: They may be 
charismatic to their followers and thus inspire them; they may meet the emotional needs of 
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each employee; and or they may intellectually stimulate employees” (Bass 1990 p. 21). Bass 
goes on to outline four key factors behind a ‘transformational leader’ (Ibid p.22):  
 Charisma - providing vision and a sense of mission 
 Inspiration – communicating high expectations 
 Intellectual Stimulation – promoting intelligence and rationality 
 Individualised Consideration – giving personal attention and treating each team 
member individually, coaching and advising 
Recently, Scouller posited his Three Levels of Leadership Model (Public, Private and 
Personal), which accepts aspects of the previous theories and models discussed, while 
arguing that none of them on their own can fully explain the various factors behind effective 
leadership. Most significantly, he argues that they fail to address the ‘leadership presence’, 
which is critical to inspiring trust and motivating individuals (Scouller 2011).   
When these various theories concerning effective leadership are viewed through the lens of 
the framework extrapolated from Taylor’s paper, there are significant areas of similarity and 
overlap. The major dichotomy which emerged across the various theories between the 
argument over ‘born leaders or trained leaders’ is reflected in the framework, which 
highlights aspects and factors from both, with ‘Professional Competence’ and ‘Intellectual 
Capacity’ falling into the latter category and ‘Strength of Character’ and ‘Inspirational 
Qualities’ the former. In that sense, despite the time difference between the two 
publications, it is Scouller’s Three Levels of Leadership Model, which most closely reflects 
the framework, suggesting that an effective leader combines aspects of both inherent 
internal aptitudes and environmentally adaptable and trained skills. Scouller also focuses on 
the significance of the nebulous concept of ‘leadership presence’, which Taylor refers to as 
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‘Inspirational Qualities’ and which is also raised by Bass in terms of the ‘charisma’ and 
‘Inspiration’ he details in his Transformational Model. Finally, given the focus in the 
Situational Leadership and Contingency Theories of different styles and approaches of 
leadership, dependent upon the situation and environment, perhaps additional factors 
which can be considered for the conceptual framework’s ‘Strength of Character’ category, 
are flexibility and adaptability. These skills particularly correspond with operating in the 
ambiguity and uncertainty of the counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency environments 
previously discussed. 
Regardless of the theoretical model behind the style of leadership, and though framed for a 
military audience, the significance of developing leadership effectiveness in these types of 
roles and environments, was highlighted by Thomas. He states that “many programs are 
beginning to focus more squarely on the context of the current operating environment – an 
environment characterized by volatility, uncertainty and chaos… building leaders for the 
‘Long War’ against radical non-state actors, who offset their lack of traditional military 
power with information technology, terror tactics and networked alliances of like–minded 
extremists” (Thomas 2009: pp.5-6). Consequently, it is argued that exercising effective 
leadership in counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency is one of the most demanding forms 
of leadership, not only due to the complexity and ambiguity of the operational environment, 
but also because even at the lowest command level, decisions can have an impact far 
beyond the immediate action or location. Based on an assessment of the various leadership 
theories and the extrapolated conceptual ‘leadership framework’ previously detailed, to 
conduct truly effective leadership in such a difficult situation requires significant ‘human 
factors’: A strong combination of an individual leader’s inherent personal traits and 
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characteristics, along with their training and competences and ultimately, though difficult to 
elucidate or define, their inspirational qualities.  
c. Leadership Styles 
The different leadership theories discussed, particularly the concepts behind the Situational 
and Contingency Models, which favour an adaptable and flexible approach to leadership 
dependent on the situation and environment, have led to a number of different leadership 
styles. Thus Goleman details six styles of leader – Pacesetting, Authoritative, Affiliative, 
Coaching, Coercive and Democratic (Goleman 2000). However, given the fields of policing, 
intelligence and military counter-terrorism being examined, these can generally be 
subsumed into three overarching leadership styles, which are more directly relevant:  
 Authoritarian/Autocratic  
 Democratic/Participative  
 Laissez-Faire/Free Rein  
As can be imagined, the Authoritarian/Autocratic style of leadership leaves the decision 
making in the hands of the leader rather than allowing input from subordinates, and while it 
can prove effective in a crisis situation requiring a rapid decision, or when inexperienced 
individuals need direction, it is not suitable for a skilled or highly motivated team. The 
opposite approach is the Democratic/Participative style of leadership which involves the 
participation and consensus of the team. While not suitable in a crisis situation where time 
constraints demand an immediate command decision, it fosters the type of internalisation 
and team ‘buy in’ discussed in an earlier chapter, while capitalising on the shared 
knowledge, expertise and insights from a skilled and experienced team in the decision 
making process. The final overarching style of leadership is the Laissez-Faire/Free Rein style 
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of leadership, where the leader allows the group members to make their own decisions, but 
clearly this approach can only really be effective with a self-motivated and highly 
experienced team who know what needs to be achieved and will do whatever is necessary.  
While all three leadership approaches can be utilised depending on the operational 
circumstances and situation, some are clearly more suitable styles depending on the make- 
up and nature of the team. Thus, considering the discussions in the previous chapter, at the 
early stages of selection, assessment and training for a mainstream policing, intelligence or 
military organisation, a more Authoritative leadership style might be more suitable for 
inexperienced recruits undergoing training. However, a more participative approach may be 
far better suited for dealing with highly trained counter-terrorist officers or operators, who 
have completed various advanced selection processes and may have years of experience 
and expertise to contribute in any command decision. Indeed, in many such situations, team 
members will often have more operational experience and specific expertise than those 
leading them. Consequently a Participative leadership approach can capitalise on that 
experience and expertise for command decisions, while a laissez-faire approach may be 
suitable for such a highly motivated and experienced team, where they only need to be told 
once what needs to be achieved and can then be left to complete the task.  
Certainly, in many of the specialist military and policing units discussed in the previous 
chapter, having successfully passed the arduous selection courses described, those in 
leadership roles as officers are often subjected to an additional period to test their 
leadership, planning and decision making.  One such example is the SAS ‘Officer’s Week’, 
where officers are given complex planning, administrative or logistical tasks under intense 
time constraints before having to brief an experienced audience of NCOs, who will scrutinise 
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and challenge their planning and decision making. Coming from more conventional military 
units with a more Authoritative style of leadership, many find this an extremely demanding 
experience (UK22). As one SAS officer explained, given the level of highly skilled and 
motivated individuals in such more specialised policing and military teams, this participative 
style of leadership will often continue into an operational environment, where the other 
members of the team will discuss and input their thoughts and suggestions regarding an 
operational plan in a so called ‘Chinese parliament’, before the leader makes a final 
command decision (UK22). Indeed, as another interviewee pointed out, it is the SNCOs who 
provide the backbone and repository of operational knowledge within such units as the SAS 
(UK43).    
Much of this discussion on leadership styles is therefore reflective of the nature of the team 
being led, mirroring aspects of McGregor’s ‘Theory X and Theory Y’ which focuses on the 
wider human nature of individuals within teams and the corresponding leadership style 
needed. Theory X “says the average human being is lazy and self-centred, lacks ambition, 
dislikes change and longs to be told what to do. The corresponding managerial approach 
emphasises total control…. Theory Y maintains that human beings are active rather than 
passive shapers of themselves and of their environment. They long to grow and assume 
responsibility. The best way to manage them then, is to manage as little as possible” 
(Stewart 2010: pp.1-2). In the case of the specialised policing, intelligence and military 
organisations which form the focus of examination in this research, having had the 
motivation to effectively re-volunteer and pass the type of specialised selection processes 
detailed in the previous chapter, such individuals are more likely to conform to the ‘Theory 
Y’ approach, though this is not always the case. In the more extreme examples, where an 
individual police officer, intelligence official or military operator in a counter-terrorist role 
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strongly conforms to a ‘Theory X’ style of personality, most units have an RTU option of the 
type previously discussed.  
Viewing this section through the ‘lens’ of the extrapolated ‘Leadership framework’ 
previously detailed, much of the data generally supports the broader leadership concepts 
already discussed concerning a combination of the ‘human factors’ of inherent leadership 
skills and the identification and training necessary to develop and strengthen those further. 
However, the data more explicitly highlights the significance of leaders having the flexibility 
and adaptability to utilise the various leadership styles appropriate for both the operational 
environment and the motivation and skills (or lack of them), of those being led. While much 
of the effectiveness of this leadership also depends on the supporting Command and 
Control (C2) systems, arguably “the best leaders face problems head on and have the 
confidence to propose sometimes innovative or difficult solutions. They also have the 
humility to accept that they do not have all the answers and will encourage others to make 
decisions by delegating authority and responsibility” (LMNG 2012: pp. 22-3).   
d. Command and Control (C2) 
Along with the need for the type of effective leadership previously detailed, and closely 
associated with it, interviewees highlighted the importance in any pro-active counter-
terrorist operation, or indeed in responding to an incident, of having good command and 
control (C2) structures. This has been defined in a UK policing document as “being the 
authority and capability of an organisation to direct the actions of its own personnel and the 
use of its equipment” (NPIA 2009) and is often expanded in military and intelligence circles 
to C3I ‘Command, Control, Communications and Information’ and even C4I ‘Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence’. In theory these command structures 
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ensure critical decision making, strategic, operational or tactical planning, effective 
command, the coordination of resources and the direction of appropriate responses to 
either stop or mitigate any threat. Such command and control structures raised by 
interviewees as examples, ranged from the top level strategic bodies, such as the UK 
Cabinet Office Briefing Room Alpha (COBRA or COBR), the French Conseil de Securite Interior 
(CSI) or ‘Homeland Security Council’ and various countries’ National Security Councils, 
through to operational level command structures, such as the UK’s Gold-Silver-Bronze 
system and the tactical level Israeli delegation of command decisions, including if necessary 
the use of lethal force,  to tactical-surveillance team commanders (See Table 16 Following).  
Perceived at a Tier 2 level by UK interviewees, the UK’s COBRA is the official crisis response 
committee which sits in the Cabinet Office, Whitehall. This coordinates the authorities’ 
responses to any major crisis which impacts on the nation, including major terrorist 
operations or incidents. It will normally comprise the Prime Minister or other senior 
Minister to Chair and other relevant Ministers, senior Police and Military Officers, and other 
specialists depending on the nature of the incident who “will provide strategic direction and 
coordination in accordance with emergency response protocols”(UK4). Generally COBRA was 
viewed by the interviewees as a well proven and well-rehearsed mechanism, linking the 
policing enforcement or military intervention with political direction and has shown itself to 
be adaptable, both in size and in terms of types of crisis (UK1/16). Much of this effectiveness 
was perceived to be due to personal relationships, with the key people knowing each other 
personally, working together over years and regularly meeting (UK8). Likewise, there was 
perceived to be a strong inter-relationship between the various policing, intelligence, 
military and support organisations in the alcove rooms, which “goes a long way towards the 
effective sharing of intelligence and information” (UK33).  
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Table 16: POLICING COMMAND & CONTROL 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE  SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
1 
  Importance 
of UCLAT 
coordinating 
& sharing CT 
intelligence 
Role of 
Spanish 
Centro 
Nacional de 
Coordinacion 
Antiterrorista 
(CNCA) 
   
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Importance of 
Cabinet Office 
Briefing Room 
Alpha (COBRA) 
 CSI 
committee 
formed from 
relevant 
ministers & 
senior 
officers of 
emergency 
services 
    
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Establishment 
of National 
Security 
Council (NSC) 
 
Gold-Silver-
Bronze 
command 
structure 
 
Coordinating 
role of Home 
Office OSCT 
 
Command role 
of ACPO- TAM 
which has 
become 
significant 
 
National 
leadership role 
of Met. ACSO  
Coordinating 
role of 
National 
Security 
Committee 
(NSC) 
 
National 
Emergency 
Group 
chaired by 
Minister of 
Defence with 
Garda 
 
Overarching 
CT role of 
Garda ACCS 
Strategic 
coordination 
of CILAT 
 
Coordinating 
role of 
Cabinet 
Office SGDSN 
 
During a 
crisis the MOI 
would 
coordinate 
through 
COGIC 
commitee 
National 
Security 
Council 
established 
with MOI, 
MOD & 
Director of 
CNI 
 
The Anti-
Terrorism 
Coordination 
Forum with a 
more 
operational 
remit 
 
With threat or 
incident 
CECOSE crisis 
cabinet under 
SES 
 
Historical CT 
coordination 
of Mando 
Unico…  
Role of 
National 
Security 
Council (NSC) 
cont. all 
policing & 
intel 
 
Role of 
Counter-
Terrorism 
Bureau in the 
PM’s Office  
 
Role of the 
Special 
Advisor on 
Terrorism 
 
Multitude of 
security 
systems 
leads to 
fragmented 
command & 
control 
Milli 
Guvenlik 
Konseyi 
(MSK) or 
National 
Security 
Council 
 
Higher 
Council 
for the 
Struggle 
Against 
Terroris
m 
 
CT 
Coord. 
Committ
ee 
 
Polis & 
Jandarm 
under 
centralis
ed 
commd. 
Coordinating 
role of 
National 
Security 
Council (NSC) 
 
Influence of 
Homeland 
Security 
Committee 
(HSC) 
 
Previous C2 
problems at 
incidents 
such as NYPD 
and FDNY at 
9/11 
 
However, one interviewee pointed out that COBRA’s effectiveness has not really been 
objectively analysed by outsiders (UK15) and additional concerns were raised by one senior 
police officer that clarification of the roles between COBRA and the Chief Constable acting 
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as ‘Gold’ Commander for an incident needed to be ‘teased out’ (UK13). As another senior 
officer stated, “experience in other areas of police life leads me to conclude that if politicians 
are involved in the command and control process, its less likely that a swift satisfactory 
result will be achieved, but it is important that politicians are involved in the support 
process” (UK5). Consequently, while COBRA was seen to be effective by the interviewees, “it 
is important that it focuses on strategic decision making and isn’t tempted to move into the 
tactical” (UK2). Clearly the same concerns over excessive political influence and 
interference, lack of delegation and micro-management are equally relevant to similar 
strategic command structures in other countries. 
Like the UK’s COBRA, France also has a crisis response committee that would be formed to 
coordinate responses at the time of a major incident, known as the Conseil de Securite 
Interior (CSI) or ‘Homeland Security Council’. Similarly, the President will form this 
committee from Government Ministers and from representatives of the emergency 
services, such as the heads of the Police and Gendarmerie (FR1).151 The CSI would then 
convene a crisis coordination meeting where there would be an information release policy 
supported by a permanent secretariat (FR4/9). The CSI is also responsible for defining the 
orientation of domestic security policy and establishing priorities (Premier Ministre 2006). 
As one interviewee concluded, “So yes, perhaps not as formal, but we have the equivalent of 
the COBRA meetings when there’s a particular threat, so this is inter-ministerial cooperation, 
justice, law, defence, Minister of Interior” (FR10). A further French strategic command 
structure raised in the interview data was the Comite Interministeriel de Lutte Antiterroriste 
(CILAT), which has the main responsibility for strategic level oversight of counter-terrorist 
responses in France and meets roughly twice per year. Although it is an inter-ministerial 
committee, it is the Prime Minister’s responsibility, but is convoked by the Home Minister 
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and falls under the control of the Ministry of the Interior (FR9). While the exact membership 
at a meeting can vary dependent on the issue, most of the policing and intelligence directors 
will attend (FR9). 
Similar strategic command structures were mentioned by interviewees from Ireland, Spain, 
Israel, Turkey and the US, which would direct police, intelligence, military and other assets, 
in a major counter-terrorist operation or following an incident. Often referred to as 
‘National Security Councils/Committees’, these regularly comprise such officials as the 
President, Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, Minister of Defence and Minister of Justice. 
Consequently, one example will suffice to demonstrate such structures’ role in counter-
terrorism. The Irish authorities established the National Security Committee (NSC), which is 
known to have met following the 9/11 attacks and more recently in the summer of 2006, in 
relation to the UK based conspiracy by Islamists to bring down aircraft with liquid explosive 
gel, known as Operation Overt (Silber 2012). While this brings together various senior 
Ministers, such as Defence and Justice and Taoiseach’s (Prime Minister’s) Office, the Garda 
play a critical role providing threat assessments, and fulfilling the policing and investigation 
role of any major emergency (IR2). As a military specialist summarised, “we do have a 
National Security Committee and I think in the sense… not as formal and as well declared [as 
the UK’s COBRA], but there is a semi-formal facility for the same sort of decision making 
process to occur” (IR8).  
As well as strategic level command structures, British interviewees also raised the Gold- 
Silver- Bronze command structure for more operational aspects of police command 
(UK9/32/45). Developed after the Broadwater Farm Riots in 1985, this established a C2 
hierarchy for major incidents with three levels of command. ‘Gold Commander’ is in overall 
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strategic control of resources at an incident. If the police are involved, this will normally be a 
senior officer or Chief Constable operating away from the actual site of the incident in ‘Gold 
Command’. ’Silver Commander’ is the tactical commander who takes strategic directions 
form the ‘Gold Commander’ and turns them into actions to be completed by the ‘Bronze 
Commander’. ‘Bronze Commander’ is responsible for the operational command of the 
organisation’s resources at the actual scene of the incident (NPIA 2009). However, these 
command roles are flexible, thus if a uniformed police sergeant is the first to arrive at a 
major incident, he or she will start the first responses and take initial command, effectively 
acting as ‘Gold’ until a more senior officer arrives on scene (UK17). Numerous other 
countries have introduced similar operational command structures to better coordinate 
major events or pro-active operations and respond to critical incidents including terrorist 
attacks. 
At the tactical level, Israel has developed ‘truly joint’ surveillance and tactical teams (IS9). 
The interviewee went on to explain that because of the level of threat, and more 
importantly the criticality of time when dealing with domestic terrorist incidents, such 
teams cannot wait for requests to go up, and authorisations to come down, from a rigidly 
hierarchical chain of command. Consequently, based on a more ‘horizontal’ structure, 
command has already been devolved down to the team commander on the ground, 
including if necessary the right to use lethal force. Such a devolved and delegated command 
structure clearly speeds up critical decision making, but it also means that such difficult 
decisions are made by the team commander with ‘eyes on’ of the actual incident and based 
on personal operational experience, rather than by a remote decision making command 
structure. Closely associated with this, the Israelis have also developed the concept of ‘Short 
Circles of Intelligence’, where the operational criticality and timeliness of a piece of 
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intelligence on a planned terrorist attack, means that it has to be exploited and responded 
to extremely rapidly (IS6). Consequently in an incident, all intelligence assets fall directly 
under the control of the designated operational commander, which one former intelligence 
operator described as “building the capability of real time intelligence, whether this is 
HUMINT, COMINT or SIGINT and then building the mechanism to tie this piece of real time 
intelligence to operational capability in order to be able to strike” (IS8). In particular he 
mentioned the response speed of the Border Guard YAMAM hostage rescue and tactical 
intervention unit, often acting as the ‘executive arm’ of the Shin Bet domestic intelligence 
agency (IS8).   
Within the military, those specialist military units most directly responsible for counter 
terrorist operations, such as overseas intervention, hostage rescue and possible domestic 
responses in ‘worst case scenarios’, are normally grouped with their various command and 
support elements within ‘special forces commands’ (See Table 17 Following). In theory 
these structures, with their integrated assets, provide the right level of command and 
control, operational flexibility, communications, service and support, and technical and 
transport means to rapidly respond to these and other ‘fast time’ operational scenarios. 
Such Special Forces command structures raised in the interview data included the United 
Kingdom Special Forces Group (UKSF) under the command of Director Special Forces 
(DSF),152 the Irish Army Ranger Wing (ARW) and its support elements answering directly to 
the Chief of Staff at the Curragh Camp (IR8/12) and the French Commandement des 
Operations Speciales (COS), along with its associated ‘Deuxieme Cercle’ Units,153 formed in 
1992 after coordination and field intelligence shortfalls during the First Gulf War 
(FR9/13).154  
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Table 17: MILITARY & POLICING FIREARMS COMMAND & CONTROL 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
UKSF under 
DSF for C2 
all UK SF 
units, SAS, 
SBS, SFSG, 
SRR & 
support 
 
CO19 falls 
under the 
control of 
the Met. 
Police 
Special 
Operations 
Command 
 
Concern at 
lack of 
political 
support, 
experience 
understand. 
& will to 
make 
difficult 
decisions 
The ARW 
based at 
the 
Curragh 
Army HQ 
reports 
directly to 
the Chief 
of Staff 
 
The ERU 
falls 
under 
control of 
the 
Special 
Detective 
Unit 
(SDU) – 
Special 
Branch & 
is based 
at 
Harcourt 
St. Dublin 
Formation of 
COS in 1992 to 
centralise 
command & 
control of 
French Special 
Forces 
including links 
to ‘Deuxieme 
Cercle’ units 
like GIGN 
 
Establishment 
of UCOFI to 
coordinate 
Police & 
Gendarmerie 
tactical 
firearms units, 
in particular 
PN RAID & GN 
GIGN because 
of previous 
rivalry 
 
If an incident 
developed, 
primacy 
between RAID 
& GIGN would 
depend on 
whether PN or 
GN region 
 
During a crisis 
French MOD 
would 
coordinate 
through COIA 
Formation 
of MOE in 
1997 to 
control 
Boina 
Verde 
units of 
the Army 
GOE & the 
NAVY 
TEAR UOE 
 
C2 issues 
and rivalry 
between  
Policia 
Nacional 
GEO & 
Guardia 
Civil  UEI 
 
Coord. 
Plans 
between 
military & 
police, 
with 
military 
only 
scheduled 
to 
intervene 
at 
maximum 
threat 
level (4) 
Despite 
Home 
Command, 
need for a 
single Special 
Forces 
command 
like the US 
SOCOM  
 
T’zahavach 
plan 
introduced in 
1990 for 
Army C2 – 
resulting in 
classification 
of Takeover, 
Engagement 
& Assisting 
Units 
 
Territorial 
Commands: 
North, 
Central, 
South & 
Home 
Command 
 
With any 
incident Op. 
commander 
will be 
territorial 
commander 
from Army 
or Police 
depending 
on location 
Formation 
of Ozel 
Kuvvetler 
Komutanligi 
(OKK)  
‘Special 
Forces 
Command’ 
to control 
Bordo 
Bereliler 
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Also raised were the Spanish Mando de Operaciones Especiales (MOE) formed in 2006 
(SP13/15).155 A senior Spanish Army officer explained that “the MOE would only be used in 
counter-terrorism for the rescue of hostages abroad in an extremely dangerous 
environment. They have also been used for the evacuation of nationals from abroad, such as 
in Lebanon during 2006, and more recently, we have evacuated the business community, 
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mainly involved in oil, from Libya… However, these special units would be the last resort for 
overseas operations” (SP13). As another senior officer expanded, “The MOE special forces 
operate overseas on operations and provide protection overseas, but if there is a terrorist 
incident domestically, it would be the Police GEO or Guardia Civil UEI that would deal with it. 
They are the best trained for that specific type of hostage rescue or intervention role” (SP15). 
The Turkish military have established the Ozel Kuvvetler Komutanligi (OKK – Special Forces 
Command) (TU8/12/13).156 As Turkish interviewees explained, “the military and 
Gendarmerie have special operations forces in their hierarchy to accomplish special missions, 
such as search and rescue operations and air assault operations” (TU12), “such special 
troops are active in the rural areas of Turkey where the terror groups are in hiding… they are 
the ones that do the initial encountering with PKK terror groups” (TU13).   
Within the United States is the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), 157 which was 
formed in 1987. SOCOM’s more specific sub-command for counter-terrorism, the Joint 
Special Operations Command (JSOC)158 was established in 1980 to better coordinate US ‘Tier 
1’ special operations forces (SOF) following the inter-unit problems and rivalries highlighted 
by Operation Eagle Claw,  the plan to rescue the US diplomatic hostages in Iran (Beckwith & 
Knox 1984). Despite the problems leading to its initial formation, a former military operator 
believed that JSOC has been a great success story as “the infrastructure of the task force was 
set up well prior to 9/11 and was thus ready to prosecute expeditionary CT in Afghanistan, 
Iraq and elsewhere. It is important though, for a CT task force to understand the way in 
which they fit into the overall theatre mission in a place like Afghanistan or Iraq” (US31) 
(Mazzetti 2013). 
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Surprisingly, despite having a Home Command and a large range of special forces units, 
Israel does not have a special forces command, and this raised concerns amongst some 
Israeli military interviewees who identified the need for such a structure ‘to counter egos 
and empires and coordinate special operations like the US SOCOM’ (IS9/10) (Lotan 2011). 
However, although Israel does not have such a command, in 1990 following previous 
problems of operational coordination and rivalries between military units, the T’zahavach 
Plan was introduced. This details specific individual unit roles and responsibilities, dividing 
them into three categories. Premier ‘Takeover Units’ such as Sayeret Matkal, Kommando 
Yami, YAMAM and Lotar Eilat, are highly trained in tactical intervention and hostage rescue 
as well as their other military capabilities. A former senior special forces officer explained 
that “you have to separate YAMAM from Sayeret Matkal. Sayeret Matkal is not dealing with 
counter-terrorism by definition…. You have to take into consideration that Matkal decided to 
fight in counter-terrorism. Not only do they have very specific kind of missions… but it’s 
basically based on intelligence somewhere or another, strategic level. It’s also if you are 
trying to get similar to the British kind of SAS. A bit like an SAS, also part of their training is 
counter-terrorism” (IS10). In support are ‘Engagement Units’, which will normally cordon 
and contain an incident, while providing an Immediate Action (IA) capability until a 
‘Takeover Unit’ arrives and which have hostage rescue as a secondary capability. Finally 
there are ‘Assisting Units’ which provide specialist technical, communications and other 
support roles, such as Oketz dog units or specialist bomb disposal EOD units such as Sayeret 
Yahalom. (Miller 2002). 
More recently, in 2015 the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) announced the formation of a new 
Commando Brigade in order to unite elements of their special forces (Zitun 2015). This is in 
effect a ‘half-way house’ to a full special forces command, bringing together four Sayeret 
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‘reconnaissance’ units, Maglan and Duvdevan, currently affiliated with the Paratroopers 
Brigade, Egoz, affiliated with the Golani Brigade and Rimon, affiliated with the Givati 
Brigade. The formation of the Commando Brigade is intended to strengthen cooperation 
and communication between the units and wider IDF, and has been likened to the US 
Ranger Brigade.159     
In a similar manner, Police interviewees highlighted that tactical firearms teams in the 
various countries examined for this research have traditionally come under the special 
operations departments of their respective police forces (See Table 17 Previous), such as 
the Metropolitan Police SCO19 SFO (Specialist Firearms Officer) ‘Teams’ and ‘Trojan’ Armed 
Response vehicles (ARVs), which fall under Scotland Yard’s Specialist Operations Command 
(SO) (UK27) (Waldren 2007). To better coordinate such UK police firearms units 
operationally, ‘Designated Firearms Officers’ (DFOs) have been established at the Silver 
Command level in the Gold, Silver, Bronze C2 structure previously detailed. These Silver 
level police commanders have the appropriate firearms experience and rank and in any 
major terrorist incident requiring MACP support, they can work in a joint Silver level 
command with their counterparts in military special forces. As a special forces officer 
explained, “so you’ve got a military tactical commander and a police tactical commander, 
sat together, which has not happened before… So I’m looking at his feed, he’s looking at my 
feed and then you’ve got a number of triggers on the wall and you know that if certain 
criteria are met, you have the authority, he has the authority to say go and that’s essential, 
absolutely essential” (UK11).  
In France, “with concerns over a Mumbai type attack and subsequent need for trained 
manpower; both the Police and Gendarmerie have amalgamated their resources. So the 
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GIPN, RAID and BRI now all form part of the Force d’Intervention de la Police Nationale 
(FIPN),160 while the Gendarmerie has established a larger Groupe d’Intervention de la 
Gendarmerie Nationale, comprising GIGN, EPIGN, and GSPR.161 This combines tactical 
intervention, surveillance and close protection capabilities” (FR14). In addition, to help 
overcome the historic rivalry between Police and Gendarmerie firearms teams, and improve 
tactical C2 the Unite Coordination des Forces d’Intervention (UCOFI) has been established, 
containing a General from the Gendarmerie and a Commissaire Divisionnaire of the Police 
Nationale, who are responsible for strategic coordination between the various policing 
intervention units (FR14). 
Again, such organisational structures and their associated command arrangements were 
perceived as providing a faster response to incidents and command decisions, while 
facilitating better coordination and support from other policing units, providing intelligence, 
surveillance, aviation, maritime, dog unit or other specialist technical support. In the case of 
police firearms units however, this role is often reversed, with the specialist firearms teams 
regularly providing support to the investigative, surveillance and intelligence units during 
operations. This includes counter-terrorism and organised crime, where the increased 
threat level or likelihood of firearms necessitates their deployment and indeed more 
routinely, when regular uniformed police become involved in a criminal firearms related 
incident.  
e. Intelligence Fusion and Coordination 
While the different C2 structures have been developed with the intention of facilitating 
leadership and command decisions at the various levels – strategic, operational and tactical, 
intelligence ‘fusion’ and coordination/de-confliction structures should in theory assist the 
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leader’s decision making with timely and accurate intelligence. Thus within the wider field of 
intelligence a number of all source intelligence ‘fusion’ and coordination organisations were 
detailed in the interview data, providing various levels of command and control (See Table 
18 Following). Historically in 1981 the Spanish Minister of the Interior established a single 
command to better coordinate counter-terrorist responses against ETA, known as the 
Mando Unico para la Lucha Contraterrorista. This led to a number of significant operational 
successes (SP2) (Reinares & Jaime-Jimenez 2000). More recently in response to a new type 
of Islamist threat highlighted by the Atocha bombings of 2004, Spain established the Centro 
Nacional de Coordinacion Antiterrorista (CNCA) (SP11), which in 2014 was amalgamated 
with organised crime databases to form the Centro de Inteligencia de Terrorismo y Crimen 
Organizado (CITCO). The CNCA was perceived at a Tier 1 level by national interviewees. One 
police specialist explained that “Its establishment was a direct result of the Madrid train 
bombings, where one of the problems that was identified was the lack of coordination 
between the various security agencies in Spain” (SP5).  
Also perceived at a Tier 1 level by its national interviewees, the French Unite de 
Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT) was created within the Ministry of the 
Interior in 1984, but predominantly staffed by police specialists, “to improve links and 
cooperation between the French agencies, because of course you have a lot of 
misunderstanding between intelligence, criminal police and so on” (FR1) (UCLAT 2003). 
Similar benefits were raised by UK interviewees concerning the Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre (JTAC) which was established in 2003 following the 9/11 attacks and was used as a 
model by the Spanish to develop their own CNCA.162  More specifically JTAC ensures the 
fusion, sharing and dissemination of counter-terrorist intelligence across various 
Government departments and relevant policing and security organisations (Walker & 
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Osborne 2010). A senior police officer believed that, “the advent of JTAC has led to a greater 
coordination and an improvement of relations between policing and various intelligence 
agencies” (UK2).  
Table 18: INTELLIGENCE FUSION & COORDINATION 
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At a more historical operational level, Tasking and Coordination Groups (TCGs) were used 
with great success in Northern Ireland to counter PIRA. These attempted to integrate 
policing and military intelligence, improve joint coordination and de-conflict RUC and Army 
operations. As a former RUC specialist explained, “in the case of specific intelligence, we 
would establish a TCG… we developed intelligence, tasked sources, looked at the collection 
plan, assessed intelligence and managed source handlers... We would then utilise analysis 
for an overall view and disseminate the threats to the uniform officers through action sheets. 
Action committees combining both police and military would then be briefed on the 
intelligence assessment and would decide where to focus resources as a means of effectively 
smothering activity in the hotspots of a particular area” (UK23). The importance of the TCG 
was detailed by Urban who explains that, “in the mid-1970s security chiefs decided to extend 
the system to cover co-operation between the police and Army by establishing a new 
integrated intelligence centre called a Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG). The setting up 
of the TCGs was probably the most important of all the steps taken during the late 1970s 
towards enhanced information gathering” (Urban 1992: p.94) 
In more of an overseas counter-insurgency environment, the UK and other countries have 
established ISTAR structures at a military headquarters level, providing intelligence 
‘jointness’, coordination and fusion to assist command decisions. ISTAR or Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance, is an all sources organisation, part of 
the wider military intelligence structure, which ‘fuses’ intelligence from HUMINT, VISINT, 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and other sources, to support the 
Intelligence/Operations Cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse – F3EA) and inform the 
commander’s situational awareness and decision making. Likewise, the Israeli military has 
established a system of Chief Knowledge Officers (CKO) and learning officers in units, to 
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ensure commanders receive the real time dissemination of operational knowledge and 
lessons learned in a form of Operational Knowledge Management (Ariely 2006). These 
systems and structures tend to support the concept of Network Centric Warfare, where 
modern information technology and communications systems allow higher levels of 
situational awareness, faster command decisions and better unit coordination. Thus 
“Network Centric Warfare derives its power from the strong networking of a well-informed, 
but geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are a high-performance 
information grid, access to all appropriate information sources, weapons reach and 
manoeuvre with precision and speed of response, value adding command and control C2 
processes” (Cebrowski & Garstka 1998: p.9). 
As part of the drive to better coordinate the disparate mass of around seventeen agencies 
and organisations forming the US Intelligence Community (IC), the Intelligence Reform Act 
2004 created the role of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a supporting Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and a national intelligence hub, the National 
Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) (US30). The NCTC is in effect a federal level ‘fusion’ and 
coordinating centre for the mass of US intelligence agencies where “executives and experts 
from these agencies work side-by side under the same roof in the Washington DC area to 
pool their information” (US30). Previously a similar role to the DNI was fulfilled by the 
Director of Central Intelligence, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but there 
was a separation or roles. However, one intelligence expert and former SEAL was concerned 
that the coordinating role of the DNI was weakened because of the lack of his budgetary 
control and poor Congressional oversight. As he explained “there’s multiple committees with 
different responsibilities that have different control of the purse strings for different aspects 
of intelligence. So there’s no cohesive way to manage the intelligence, let alone the 
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intelligence programme” (US11). As a result he was concerned that domestic intelligence 
capability in the US was ‘fragmented and fractured’. 
In the United States the FBI, in cooperation with local law enforcement, other security and 
‘first-responder’ organisations, has developed the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) system, 
providing both counter-terrorist policing and intelligence development by bringing together 
FBI and seconded local law enforcement officers. While the first JTTF was established in 
1980 in New York, these have expanded significantly since the 9/11 attacks to all 56 FBI field 
offices across the country and some smaller offices. The strengths of the JTTF system raised 
by interviewees were its coordination of different organisational strengths, the size and 
coverage of the network, the level of federal funding and intelligence from the FBI, and the 
powers and local community knowledge of the police and other officials attached to the 
JTTF, who are deputized as Deputy Marshals and given Federal powers (US3/5/8/36/41). 
However, on the negative side, other police interviewees argued that by assigning five or six 
detectives to a JTTF, many police departments felt they had fulfilled their counter-terrorist 
obligations to the Federal Government, while other small forces don’t have a local JTTF 
despite a high level of threat in their area. There has also been some friction between larger 
police departments, such as the NYPD and the local JTTF regarding decision making and 
control. Finally there have been tensions in smaller forces where local police who haven’t 
been deputized do not have the same powers, and the chief of police does not get access to 
the classified information that junior officers on the JTTF can (US1/14/22). 
The interview data also detailed the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) by Presidential Executive Order (EO) 13228 in October 2001, with its own ‘Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis’, being integrated into the wider US Intelligence Community (IC). It 
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was placed in charge of the fusion center initiative, which has established over seventy 
Regional Intelligence (‘Fusion’) Centers (RICs), such as the Joint Regional Intelligence Center 
(JRIC) in Los Angeles and the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC).163 These fusion 
centers have been established nationwide at state and municipal levels, bringing together 
intelligence practitioners from local and state policing, Federal agencies and state and local 
officials with the intention of developing ‘all source - bottom up’ intelligence. One police 
officer and team leader at a ‘Fusion’ center believed that ‘they have done well locally with 
local intelligence’ (US24),  while a DHS specialist explained that to better disseminate any 
resulting intelligence product, “within the DHS, we’ve established a cell or a program office 
that links directly with all the different fusion centers at the state and local level. So we have 
a mechanism for them to send information” (US16).  
However, even at the official level, many questions have been asked about the vast costs 
involved in establishing such ‘fusion’ centers, the additional bureaucracy they create, the 
quality of the intelligence product they are generating and in their overall effectiveness 
(Committee on Homeland Security 2012). Such concerns led one senior NYPD officer to 
state that “rather than spend a fortune on a fusion center, I would prefer the hiring of more 
police officers to work on counter-terrorism” (US7). Interviewees also questioned whether 
the fusion centers were really properly connected and whether they were there to ‘connect 
the dots for the senior management or the operational guys on the ground’ (US22/26). 
When the relatively recently created DHS took a leadership role in the fusion centers, “the 
FBI were already here and said ‘wait a minute, we have all the information and we have our 
JTTFs (Joint Terrorism Task Force) and we don’t need your system, our system works for us’… 
as a result we’re seeing these agency fusion centers currently today are for the most part 
being run by either the state agencies, without FBI participation, or… with the over 
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participation by the FBI” (US22). This was described as being part of a wider ‘turf war’ 
between the FBI and its parent organisation the Department of Justice (DOJ) with the DHS, 
after the DHS was given the mandate to provide threat information to state and local law 
enforcement, which was traditionally seen as part of the FBI’s mandate.164   
Thus as can be seen evidenced by the interview data, while these intelligence fusion and 
coordination structures have been established with the intention of producing timely fused 
intelligence to help inform effective leadership command decisions, a further role is to de-
conflict and improve coordination between various counter-terrorist organisations. 
However, a number of these structures seem to have exacerbated tensions and problems 
between agencies with a concomitant impact on the effectiveness of intelligence and the 
command decisions based upon it.   
f. Factors Negating Effective Leadership & C2 
Consequently, as well as those ‘human factors’ promoting effective leadership and the 
appropriate command and control structures to disseminate operational decisions and 
coordinate resources, the interview data also raised a number of factors and issues which 
negated such effective leadership, command and control. As the previous sections 
highlighted, utilising the wrong style of leadership for the type of team or group being led, 
choosing an inappropriate leadership approach for the type of circumstances, or making the 
wrong command decisions in such complex, sensitive and ambiguous environments can 
seriously impact on the effectiveness of leadership. With terrorism in particular, it is 
essential for effective leadership to ensure that any responses are proportionate, legal, 
accountable and necessary, otherwise, as earlier examples and discussions demonstrate, 
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these can prove entirely counter-productive, merely increasing the groundswell of support 
for the terrorist cause amongst constituent communities (Silke 2005).  
Leadership and command effectiveness can also be severely negated by excessive political 
influence and interference, a lack of proper delegation and continual micro-management. 
Several experienced UK police interviewees were concerned that senior officers were 
becoming ‘risk averse’ because of ‘political correctness’, which they described as the growth 
of ‘armchair critics’, the impact of ‘health and safety’ legislation and having difficult 
command decisions continually scrutinized by the media and remote structures. 
Consequently they believed senior officers were wary of making difficult, potentially 
controversial, command decisions in case it negatively impacted on their longer term career 
development (UK17/29/30). Even UK military specialists in an operational environment 
overseas, raised concerns at being ‘second guessed’ by non-military civilian political and 
legal ‘advisors’ (UK22). Clearly similar factors are likely to impact policing, intelligence and 
military organisations in other countries. 
With the command and control structures, the most significant underlying issue which 
emerged from the examples raised by interviewees across both the countries and different 
technical fields, was the difficulty of finding an effective command and control structure, 
providing strategic planning, direction and leadership, whilst balancing that with the need 
for operational and tactical flexibility and speed of response. This was particularly the case 
with more traditional hierarchical command structures. According to various interviewees, 
the problem comes when strategic level leadership is tempted to stray into the tactical 
realm, with excessive political influence and interference, lack of delegation and micro-
management. As a senior police officer explained, in those circumstances, “it does put 
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politicians and indeed senior civil servants, in a position where they could actually have a 
very significant influence over command and control at the first time decision making. Now 
this is manifestly not their job and you know frankly getting decisions best guessed or 
changed around, or having politicians talking to the media about something that’s 
happening in the chain of police command or the chain of emergency services would be very, 
very unhelpful” (UK5).  
A further question regarding some of the more strategic command and control (C2) 
structures, such as the UK’s COBRA is that based on the flexibility of their constituent 
membership and their adaption to cover a broad range of widely differing threats (not just 
terrorism), just how ad hoc are they? Consequently, this flexible membership and breadth 
of responsibilities raises the further question as to whether such C2 structures are ‘Jacks of 
all trades and masters of none’? However, while the core political leadership will often 
remain the same, such as the Prime Minister, Home, Foreign and Defence Ministers of the 
relevant country, they are normally advised and assisted by senior officials, experts and 
specialists with appropriate operational or technical expertise, who are rotated into the C2 
structure, depending on the specific nature of the emergency.  This helps to ‘tailor’ the C2 
structure in a bespoke manner for dealing with any particular type of threat or issue. 
Nevertheless, no matter how extensive the C2 structures, the interview data highlighted the 
command, control and coordination problems when dealing with multiple overlapping 
national agencies, which magnify such issues, particularly when  exacerbated by individual 
and group ‘egos and empires’. Such issues were particularly manifest in the examples raised 
concerning the US Intelligence Community (IC), where part of the attempted solution has 
included the formation of various intelligence ‘fusion’ centres. However, while these have 
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required extensive funding, according to interviewees the continuing rivalry between the 
DHS and the FBI demonstrates that these problems remain. Thus with the vast costs of the 
intelligence ‘fusion’ centers and various C2 structures discussed, the question must be asked 
as to how effective they are and whether their benefits outweigh their costs (Committee on 
Homeland Security 2012)?  
With the military special force commands there have always been complaints raised by 
some of the more regular parts of the military at their cost, the level of funding they receive 
and their access to the best personnel and resources. Certainly in the case of a number of 
military interviewees there was a concern that special forces are sometimes misused and 
tasked with inappropriate missions, raising concerns at leadership decisions from the 
strategic and operational levels. As a former US SEAL officer explained, “you hope and in 
some cases you know that they’re not, but you just always hope that they’re being employed 
properly, that they don’t get outside of their mission areas, which it does happen, we see it 
happen occasionally… but for the most part… they do a tremendous job” (US11). It was also 
argued that some of the missions conducted by special forces could be handled effectively 
by regular troops. Even a former senior officer of the SAS believed that instead of the SAS 
and Special Boat Service (SBS) being continuously used, “what we need to do is drive many 
of their previous missions down into the ‘Green Army’ and share those out where they can be 
easily coped with and maintain the SAS as more of a high value asset for specific targets… 
that’s the problem, it’s being worked to death” (UK19).  
However, despite these concerns, the examples demonstrate, the command structures and 
support arms, such as the intelligence, communications and transport capabilities, have 
provided the direction, operational flexibility and speed of response necessary for dealing 
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with complex and fast moving domestic and overseas operations. These have included 
counter-terrorist intervention and hostage rescue operations. Likewise, police firearms 
teams have often benefited operationally from both the command and support elements 
provided by wider police specialist operations, such as police aviation, surveillance and 
intelligence assets.  
A final concern was raised by a senior command level police officer, at the testing and 
refining of all these C2 structures, whether policing, intelligence or military. He was 
convinced that regular and realistic exercises were essential, stating that, “I think we need to 
be looking in a far more rigorous way, possibly taking advice from the military, not only on 
exercising without troops, TEWTs as the Army call it, Tactical Exercise Without Troops, but 
also looking at tactical exercises with troops and actually getting exercise call outs… Let’s see 
who we can get hold of at half past two in the morning and how do we get people in here 
and do the radios work and have we got enough batteries… I think it keeps people on their 
toes and actually it can be quite good fun, people get a lot out of it, a lot of learning out of a 
well-planned exercise”  (UK5). This is supported by Howe, who argues that “rehearsals are 
the lifeblood of a successful mission” (Howe 2011: p.150).  
g. Mirror Image: Effective Leadership 
As with other aspects of the ‘human factors’ being examined in relation to effective 
counter-terrorism, the mirror image also exists in the form of terrorist or insurgent 
leadership, and associated command and control structures. Clearly at the strategic level 
there have been many well-known, and sometimes charismatic, leaders of terrorist groups, 
such as Osama bin Laden with the al-Qaeda network, Velupillai Prabhakaran with the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Yasser Arafat with the Palestinian Liberation 
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Organisation (PLO) and Abdullah Ocalan with the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). 
However, depending on the command and control or organisational structure of terrorist 
organisations, and whether these are more centralised or decentralised, there are various 
other levels of leadership and command decision making across the organisation.  
Three organisational models are identified by Nance: A centralised ‘Functional Structure’, 
with separate cells for different roles, such as fundraising, intelligence etc. which is very 
secure due to the ‘firewalled’ cells, but is less flexible and more difficult and timely to lead 
and control; A more decentralised ‘Operational Structure’, where command decisions are 
passed from the hierarchy’s leadership to deputies who command their own combined cells 
running the various functions, which is more flexible and timely, but less secure; Finally a 
centralised ‘Independent Cell Structure’, structurally similar to the ‘Operational Structure’, 
where each cell conducts a range of functions, but under its own devolved and independent 
cell leadership, leading to a level of command flexibility and security (Nance 2003 p.68). As 
Shapiro explains, “the terrorists dilemma is simple: leaders need to control how violence is 
executed and how finances are managed, but the tools to do so create some measure of 
operational vulnerabilities and therefore increase the likelihood of operatives being caught 
and a group compromised… Groups routinely struggle with the problem of staying covert 
while also maintaining situational awareness… Finally, there is consistent concern with 
balancing the need to control operational elements with the need to evade government 
attention and limit the consequences of any compromise” (Shapiro 2013: p.4-5). 
The last type of structure has seen independent and semi-independent cell networks across 
various countries, linked to, affiliated or associated with the wider global al Qaeda network. 
This shift from the more traditional hierarchical structures of such groups as PIRA, ETA or 
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the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), has proved far harder for the police and 
security forces to counter (Arquilla & Ronfeldt et al. 2001). As Ariely explains, the terrorist 
organisational structure “has evolved from the clear ‘conservative’ structure familiar as from 
an industrial age organisation, to that of an organisation built upon a horizontal network of 
operatives, who as ‘knowledge workers’ are accustomed to activities not dependent upon 
geographical location” (Ariely 2003). Thus, with such dispersed horizontal organisations, as 
well as the more publicly known leadership at the hierarchical pinnacle of the large scale 
terrorist/insurgent organisations previously mentioned, there are often deputy leaders 
responsible for various operational aspects, such as planning, intelligence, fundraising and 
‘engineering’ (bomb making) and at the tactical level, cell or team leaders responsible for 
organising and leading attacks.  
However, it must be born in mind that there is also the type of ‘Leaderless Resistance’ 
associated with extreme right wing US Militia and single issue groups, such as the Earth 
Liberation Front (ELF), in the United States (Kushner 2003: p.214). Additionally, across the 
ideological spectrum, there have been examples of so called ‘Lone Wolves’, seemingly 
operating alone. These include the US anti-technology ‘Unabomber’ Ted Kaczynski, the Neo-
Nazi David Copeland who launched a series of homemade bomb attacks against minority 
communities in London during 1999, Roshonara Choudry, who stabbed a Member of 
Parliament in London during 2010, and the Islamist convert Andrew ‘Isa’ Ibrahim who was 
arrested in 2008 in the midst of constructing a suicide vest for an attack on a shopping 
centre in Bristol, following intelligence provided by members of the City’s Muslim 
community.  
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A more specific debate about terrorist leadership has emerged in relation to the type of al 
Qaeda associated Islamist cell type terrorism that has been seen since 9/11 as to whether 
this is ‘Leaderless’ or ‘Leader-led’. Sageman has argued the former, that such ‘bottom up’ 
groups form spontaneously from within the community inspired by al Qaeda, while 
Hoffman has argued the latter, that there is still an element of leadership, direction and 
command of these cells from the core al Qaeda (See Picarelli 2009). Much of this is linked to 
terrorists obtaining the type of knowledge and training discussed in the previous chapter, 
consequently a former US SOF officer and academic commented “I have sympathy for the 
arguments advanced by both Hoffman and Sageman. Yes, safe havens and training camps 
matter. They are important for the spread of tactics as well as for building small-group 
cohesion. But the internet is allowing some groups and individuals to learn without ever 
having to leave Cairo or London” (US31). In fact there are aspects to both arguments, for 
while members of Islamist terrorist cells are often radicalised, identified and recruited in a 
‘bottom up’ approach through elements and ‘hot spots’ in the local community, the cell 
leaders or ‘emirs’ they are drawn to and around whom they congregate, have often had 
some form of overseas training or military experience, with varying levels of contact and 
direction from al Qaeda linked or associated leadership.  
An instructive example highlighting this type of Islamist tactical cell leadership is provided by 
the case of Dhiren Barot, a Hindu convert. In 1995, shortly after converting in his mid-20s, 
he left the UK for Pakistan, where he is believed to have received terrorist training before 
becoming involved in fighting against Indian security forces in Kashmir. In 1998, he was 
selected as a lead instructor at a training camp in Afghanistan and it is believed that it was 
here that he met Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the senior al Qaeda leader who has been 
described as the principal architect behind the 9/11 attacks. Between 1998 and 1999 he was 
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in Malaysia liaising with ‘Hambali’, a leader of the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 
later responsible for the Bali Bombing of 2002, before attending further training in the 
Philippines. He returned to the UK before heading to the US with a colleague, where they 
completed detailed targeting reports and videos for al Qaeda in New York and Washington 
DC. In early 2004, Barot returned to Pakistan to brief the al Qaeda leadership on his own 
plans for attacks in the UK, which were based around causing mass casualties through 
vehicle bombs containing large ‘blast-incendiary’ IEDs fabricated with containers of 
flammable gas. He meticulously planned the attacks, recruiting a number of trusted friends 
and colleagues he knew from the community to assist him with the planning and 
preparation. In the summer of 2004, after the pro-active policing and intelligence Operation 
Rhyme, he was arrested with thirteen others (Clutterbuck and Warnes 2011). 
The significance of these various ‘human factors’ behind terrorist leadership were identified 
in a recent study of six terrorist conspiracies in the United Kingdom, which revealed the 
criticality of the leader in the formation and activities of the group: “Each of the six 
groups/cells was led by a single, motivated individual who was committed to the concept of 
violent Jihad and the subsequent use of terrorism in pursuit of its aims. They had acquired 
the knowledge and skills to undertake attacks in the UK by participating beforehand in 
violent Jihad in other countries and in addition, they had associated with others who had 
also done so. In many instances, this period had extended over several years. Consequently, 
it was these individuals who had made the relevant contacts and connections the individuals 
in the groups/cells later relied upon in their attack planning and preparations” (Clutterbuck 
and Warnes 2011: p.54). 
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When the evidence concerning terrorist leadership is examined through the lens of the 
leadership framework outlined earlier, many such terrorist leaders display similar aptitudes, 
often replicating the same ‘human factors’. Thus re-examining the more detailed case of cell 
leader Dhiren Barot provides a salient example. Barot demonstrated ‘professional 
competence’ through his knowledge and ability to train, supervise and evaluate 
subordinates when acting as a lead instructor for al Qaeda, while his ‘intellectual capacity’ 
was shown in his disciplined and orderly mind, broad interests and written abilities, 
developing and keeping extensive and meticulous attack plans, many with scientific and 
technical details. Though more difficult to quantify, his ‘strength of character’ appears to be 
demonstrated by his courage in fighting in Kashmir along with his apparent dedication and 
determination, while he must have had some level of ‘inspirational qualities’ to recruit and 
retain the many cell members that assisted him. Interestingly, and though a mirror image, 
the case also highlights more explicitly a factor which has emerged in some of the previous 
sections, namely the significance to leadership effectiveness of developing contacts and 
networks. Thus, while there appears to be no monopoly between counter-terrorists and 
terrorists on these and the other ‘human factors’ discussed in the thesis, the critical issue 
would appear to be how and why they are utilised by the individual concerned.  
h. How Significant is Effective Leadership?  
Having reviewed the various data and examined it from the perspective of the ‘leadership 
framework’ extrapolated from Taylor, outlined at the start of the chapter, a number of 
factors emerged. These demonstrated the importance for effective leadership of a 
combination of an individual leader’s inherent personal traits and characteristics, along with 
the development of appropriate training and competences and the inspirational qualities 
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which proved so difficult to quantify. At the higher levels, these leadership skills can be 
enhanced and developed by attendance at Staff College or Senior Command courses, such 
as the Spanish Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN). A senior 
Spanish Naval instructor explained “we are building from the ground to the sky, to instil a 
strategic thinking change in our officers, to instil a mindset from the tactical to the strategic. 
We are building minds, which means they are more flexible and can interpret the strategic 
context…Its critical to understand the context” (SP17). The various theories of leadership 
highlighted the significance of such flexibility and adaptability, particularly in the complex 
and rapidly changing environments associated with counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency, while the importance of developing contacts and networks was demonstrated in 
various examples. Consequently, the initially extrapolated ‘leadership framework’ was 
revised and these additional factors were incorporated, shown in bold, along with the four 
characteristics of ‘transformational leadership’ outlined by Bass (1990): 
 Professional Competence 
o Thorough knowledge of job 
o Ability to train subordinates 
o Ability to supervise and evaluate 
o Good judgement in choosing key assistants 
o Maintaining personal discipline and fitness 
o Individualised consideration – giving personal attention and treating each 
team member individually, coaching and advising 
o Developing contacts and networks 
 Intellectual Capacity  
o Disciplined and orderly mind 
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o Broad intellectual interests beyond personal field 
o Clarity and facility in oral and written expression 
o Intellectual stimulation – promoting intelligence and rationality 
 Strength of Character 
o Reliability 
o Courage – Personal and in taking difficult decisions 
o Dedication to mission, aim or objective 
o Determination 
o Self-Discipline 
o Gain and retain respect and confidence 
o Flexibility and adaptability 
 Inspirational Qualities  
o Charisma - providing vision and a sense of mission 
o Inspiration – communicating high expectations 
The impact of effective leadership was thus seen to be particularly significant, due to the 
way its effect permeates across the various types of counter-terrorist organisation, whether 
policing, intelligence or military, and at all levels from the strategic, through the operational 
to the tactical. At the same time, the data highlights the importance of effective leadership 
due to the sensitivity, complexity and ambiguity of the environments associated with 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, where inappropriate command decisions can 
have an impact far beyond the local environment they were made in. Consequently, the 
significance of the ‘human factors’ associated with such leadership in effective counter-
terrorism was evidenced by the various data, while at its simplest level, one former Israeli 
intelligence operator described effective leadership as “the scene commander at a terrorist 
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incident grabbing a reflective jacket with – The Boss- written on it and then telling everyone 
to be quiet and listen up” (IS19).  
As the various examples across the strategic, operational and tactical command levels 
highlight, in responding to terrorist threats and incidents, leadership is closely linked to 
effective command and control (C2) structures. The examples demonstrate the need for 
clear lines of command and control, a speedy decision making process, operational 
flexibility, effective coordination, delegation of authority, relevant fusion, sharing and 
dissemination of intelligence and the need for appropriate support elements. They also 
highlight the importance of testing and refining these C2 structures through regular training 
and exercises, not only with ‘table top’, but also ‘command post’ (with control room staff 
present) and ‘real time’ exercises, with full personnel and equipment. However, as the 
examples raised by the interviewees demonstrate, in particular with the US intelligence 
fusion centres, such command, control and intelligence fusion and coordination structures 
can prove highly expensive to maintain, both in terms of financing and in personnel 
resources. These must clearly be balanced with the level of operational benefits they 
generate. At the same time, excessively bureaucratic or rigidly hierarchical command 
structures can also build in excessive time delays which can prove catastrophic in a fast 
moving operational situation where an agile response from the various counter-terrorist 
organisations can be critical.  
In conclusion, the ‘human factor’ of leadership, and its associated command and control 
structures, permeate across the strategic, operational and tactical levels within 
organisations. However, unlike some of the other ‘human factors’ examined, and no matter 
the standard of individual leadership, the interview data suggests that its effectiveness and 
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influence is also very much dependent upon having suitable command and control systems 
for the dissemination of command decisions, along with reliable intelligence fusion and 
coordination systems to better inform the situational awareness those command decisions 
are based upon.  
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8. Technical Interface 
a. Introduction 
The importance of socio-technical systems and the integration of ‘human factors’ with 
technology in a socio-technical interface, are examined in this fourth analytic chapter. More 
specifically it evidences the interrelationships and interaction between individual counter-
terrorists and technology along with the links to organisational processes and human skills 
in such counter-terrorist structures. Thus technology and its closely associated innovation, 
underpin and support many of the ‘human factors’ previously examined, particularly 
enhancing individual skills and capabilities, along with the command and control and 
intelligence structures associated with leadership and command decisions. While innovation 
can be defined as a new idea or method that provides a solution to a problem or advantage 
in dealing with it, Bain historically defined technology as including “all tools, machines, 
utensils, weapons, instruments, housing, clothing, communicating and transporting devices 
and the skills by which we produce and use them” (Bain 1937: p.860). Although this broad 
definition clearly covers a spectrum of technologies and the research is more specifically 
focused on their use in counter-terrorism, it does highlight certain relevant areas and 
perhaps more importantly, the ‘human factor’ of the interface between individual skills, 
particularly construction and usage, which along with the technology itself, leads to a socio 
(of people and society) and technical (of machines and technology) system.  
This socio-technical interface between humans and technology, has led to the concepts of 
Socio-Technical Systems (STS) and Sociotechnical Theory (sometimes referred to as 
Sociotechnical Systems Theory) which were first expounded by Trist and Bamforth in their 
seminal research for the Tavistock Institute on English mining (Trist & Bamforth 1951). 
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Critically in their post war study of the new technique of Longmining, which had introduced 
both new technology and work practices, they identified that productivity had actually 
declined and that simply introducing new technology did not necessarily improve 
performance. This clearly demonstrated that “improvements in the technical system do not 
always result in higher productivity or effectiveness if the technical system is not supportive 
and able to cope with any stresses it places on its members” (Appelbaum 1997: p.458).  
Consequently, and as discussed in an earlier chapter, having human operators with the 
correct skills and capabilities to maximise its performance, and technology that is neither 
excessively demanding nor overly complex to operate, can prove critical to the socio-
technical concept of ‘joint optimisation’, maximising effectiveness, particularly in the type of 
pressured and time critical environments previously detailed in relation to counter-
terrorism or counter-insurgency. Indeed, the Theory has a human centric aspect to it, since 
“Sociotechnical theory is as concerned for the experience of humans within systems as it is 
with the system’s ultimate performance. Socio-Technical Systems Theory sees the two as 
isomorphic under the terms of reference of joint optimisation” (Walker et. al. 2007:p. 14).  
Although advocates of Socio Technical Systems (STS) have tended to focus on Information 
Technology (IT), they have also discussed ‘configuring the user’, that is considering how the 
design of a particular technological device obliges the user to follow particular patterns of 
use or to adopt specific command and control structures. This factor should be considered 
in relation to the level of individual skills and capabilities with some of the specialist police 
and military operators discussed in the second analytic chapter and the operational 
command and control structures examined in the previous chapter, such as the Gold – Silver 
– Bronze command system. 
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Going further, academics in the field of Science and Technology Studies, such as Latour 
(1986, 2005), Winner (1977, 1980, 1986, 1993) and Woolgar (2002 – Latour & Woolgar 
1986), have argued that technology is not only shaped by the environment it is developed 
in, but that the technology itself shapes and exerts agency upon the operational 
environments in which it is deployed. Thus in his critical assessment of Winner’s ‘Do 
Artefacts have Politics?’ (1980), Joerges summarises Winner’s argument that, “tangible 
artefacts, including the built environment, and other material-spatial arrangements embody 
‘social’ (that is ‘power’) relations” (Joerges 1999: p. 412). Effectively, designs of artefacts or 
technology impact on their environments.  
Consequently Winner states that “technology in its various manifestations is a significant 
part of the human world. Its structures, processes and alterations enter into and become 
part of the structures, processes and alterations of human consciousness, society and 
politics” (Winner 1978: p.6).  He prophetically goes on to argue that “developments in the 
technical sphere continually outpace the capacity of individuals and social systems to adapt. 
As the rate of technological innovation quickens, it becomes increasingly important and 
increasingly difficult to predict the range of effects that a given innovation will have” (1978: 
p.3). 
More recently, Woolgar (2002), has examined such technological developments in the form 
of the internet and other modern electronic technological innovations, identifying five 
‘rules’ which highlight the continuing relationship and impact between technology and the 
environment (pp.14 – 21):  
 The uptake and use of the new technologies depend crucially on the local social 
context 
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 The fears and risks associated with new technologies are unevenly socially 
distributed 
 Virtual technologies supplement rather than substitute for real activities 
 The more virtual, the more real 
 The more global, the more local 
In terms of the field of counter-terrorism, the impact and agency of new technology upon 
the operational environment can be seen in the way that policing, intelligence and military 
units adjust and adapt their operational procedures in response to such technology. Indeed, 
the introduction of advanced technology may lead to their development and deployment of 
completely new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The flipside is that technology 
also exerts agency in the field of terrorism, with terrorists rapidly seizing upon new 
technology and developments for their own purposes, with examples detailed in the 
following ‘Mirror Image’ section.   
While the specific focus of this chapter is on identifying the significance of the ‘human 
factors’ for human-technical interface in counter-terrorism, from their research on the 
introduction of Longmining and its impact on productivity, Trist and Bamforth (Trist & 
Bamforth 1951) identified a number of principles relating to socio-technical interaction, 
which were developed to became key factors in Sociotechnical Theory. These provide a 
useful conceptual tool with which to consider and examine the emerging data from the 
wider research interviews and their associated issues: 
 Responsible Autonomy – A supervised cohesive team or group, not just an individual 
 Adaptability – An organisational capability of coping with uncertainty and complexity 
 Whole Tasks – A whole task is placed on the shoulders of a small team or group  
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 Meaningfulness of Tasks – Ensuring job significance, satisfaction, and value 
In a later publication Trist also identified three Sociotechnical levels (Trist 1981: pp. 11-12): 
 Primary Work Systems 
 Whole Organisation Systems 
 Macrosocial Systems 
While the Macrosocial Systems include systems in communities and industrial sectors at the 
overall level, the Whole Organisation Systems are work plants or self-standing workplaces. 
However, given this research focus on the ‘human factors’ of counter-terrorism, the most 
relevant level is the Primary Work Systems; “These are the systems which carry out the set 
of activities involved in an identifiable and bounded subsystem of a whole organisation” 
(Trist 1981: p. 11). Consequently, at its simplest level, Sociotechnical Theory can be 
considered as the interaction and effectiveness between three interlinked factors, the skills 
and capabilities of the human team members, the performance and utility of the technology 
they are using and the nature and complexity of the environment they are operating in. 
Aspects of these interlinked factors can be seen reflected in the various examples raised in 
the following interview data.  
b. Technology in Counter-Terrorism 
Within the wider field of counter-terrorism, most countries have sought to innovate and 
continually develop their technological capabilities in the areas of surveillance, advanced 
communications, security and perimeter protection, bomb detection and disposal, and the 
development of assault and intervention equipment (Marchington 2003). However, along 
with the ‘human factors’ behind their concept, design and construction, to optimise their 
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effectiveness, these technologies also clearly require the training, skill and capabilities of the 
human operators utilising them. This was demonstrated in the interview data, where as well 
as ‘bomb disposal’, which will be examined in greater detail in a later section, the 
interviewees raised a number of examples of this socio-technical interface, including in 
some cases, their concerns at the lack of appropriate training and over-reliance on 
technology, which mirrors aspects of the Sociotechnical concept of ‘Joint Optimisation’ (or 
lack of it) previously discussed.  
Both French and Spanish interviewees raised the importance of surveillance technology, 
particularly in countering terrorism within the Corsican and Basque regions. This was due to 
the close knit local communities in these regions, and resultant ‘non-permissive’ 
environments, where it has proved difficult for ‘outsiders’ to integrate and blend in 
(FR2/8/SP1/10). One police specialist explained that as a result “in Corsica, surveillance 
procedures have evolved a great deal thanks to the development of technology to intercept 
mobile phones… as well as using a system of tracker devices in vehicles… All the techniques 
you could use in a large town, such as covert pursuit, moving into OPs etcetera are very 
difficult to do on Corsica… and so we rely heavily on technical surveillance methods to keep 
us informed” (FR8). Likewise in the Basque region with ETA “it’s difficult because the Basque 
Country is very small, everyone knows each other, they live in small villages and you can’t 
infiltrate police into small village communities”… so… “There are a lot of technical means 
employed… technology has always been used in the fight against Basque terrorism, because 
it’s been so hard” (SP1).  
However, a senior Spanish CGI police intelligence official also raised another type of 
obstacle, being concerned that “the technological limitations that cause difficulty to police 
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operations in preventing and investigating terrorism are, for the most part, not due to a lack 
of material or technological resources, but rather are due to the absence of legislation that 
would oblige telephone operators and internet service providers, amongst others, to subject 
their services to the investigations that due to terrorism are now necessary” (SP8). While this 
section will not discuss in detail the moral or ethical implications of such technological 
surveillance, there is no doubt that various terrorist organisations have increasingly utilised 
mobile phone networks and the internet to communicate, coordinate, plan and radicalise. 
An Israeli intelligence specialist explained that “when the technology improves, the threat is 
greater… For example, I have a cell phone, it’s not a capability of the terrorist organisation… 
it’s not something that they have developed… it’s a simple and available way to 
communicate all over the world… If the terrorists are going to use it, the usage will bring 
them a capability that they didn’t have… So it will be the usage and timing which is 
important” (IS5). The significance of the public availability of such ‘simple technology’ was 
endorsed by a senior Irish Garda officer who stated that “the other simple systems you see 
that are often forgotten about in terms of fighting terrorism are the e-mails, the mobile 
telephones, various chips” (IR2).  
As well as terrorist identification and investigation, technology also plays an important role 
in various security measures. Thus in response to the threat posed by terrorism, and in part 
to re-assure the public, many countries have introduced strong defensive security systems 
and structures in three main areas: Physical Security, ‘hardening’ a potential target; 
Operational Security, denying terrorists the opportunity to collect information and 
Personnel Security, the protection of key individuals. This technology includes physical 
barriers, blast protection, biometric and electronic screening, facial recognition, Automatic 
Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), Rapiscan X-ray machines, spectrometers, Backscatter X – 
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Ray systems and various computer security systems and encryption. However, detailing the 
flipside of such security technology, Combs argues that because of modern societies’ 
increasing dependence on diverse technology and infrastructure, the list of potential targets 
that could require security measures is extensive and growing rapidly with the development 
of modern technological interdependence (Combs 2006).  Clarke and Newman point out 
that such potential targets can be attractive to terrorists for a number of reasons, which 
they highlight as a mnemonic EVIL DONE: Exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, 
occupied, near, and easy (Clarke & Newman 2007). Given the resulting mass of potential 
targets and increasingly limited resources, the critical question becomes ‘what to protect 
and at what level’? Hence the significance of intelligence in identifying potential targets and 
the nature and level of threat, which is reflected in various countries protection, security 
systems, structures and plans with their associated ‘threat levels’. This led one French 
academic specialist, when discussing the Vigipirate Security Plan to state that, “it’s one of 
the main measures that have become apparent based on the work of the intelligence 
services in the fight against terrorism. The general public are also warned to be vigilant and 
are told what to do if they see suspect packages and such” (FR4) (UCLAT 2005).165  
Highlighting the development of a Socio-Technical System, which integrates both 
technological and ‘human factors’ in a railway transport security environment, one senior 
BTP officer discussed the linking of facial recognition technologies, Closed Circuit Television 
(CCTV) and human Behavioural Pattern Analysis. He believed that while the technological 
aspects of the system were important, more significant to its effectiveness was his officers 
“understanding of what normally happens at these stations and noticing when something is 
different, the flow of people, their behaviour… understanding that environment and perhaps 
noticing when something is slightly different in that environment at that time” (UK20). This 
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reflects the earlier discussion of intuition and situational awareness, while also reinforcing 
aspects of the Sociotechnical Theory previously raised, specifically the importance of having 
the ‘human factors’ and skills necessary to optimise the benefits of the technology being 
utilised, in this case for effective transport security (Swain 2010). The opposite of such 
situational awareness in a transport security environment was raised by a senior City of 
London police officer concerned at airport security, who stated that “if the job of the 
security checker isn’t done properly, the person that’s comparing the faces on the passport 
to the boarding card is not doing that in a rigorous way, it ain’t worth doing. And if there’s a 
queue ten miles long across the departures foyer because the person is doing the job 
properly, that’s fine… if it’s not being done properly and there’s a queue, that winds 
everybody up” (UK5) (Molotch 2012).   
With intelligence, as well as its initial collection through technological surveillance, 
intercepts, internet monitoring and the type of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) detailed in an 
earlier chapter, technology was also perceived to have significantly improved its processing 
and the resulting dissemination of the intelligence product. Hence a senior US intelligence 
analyst explained that the staff they were now recruiting are “sharper technologically, they 
can access that information… we’re our own research aids, all right here. So this technology 
is brilliant and it’s above all a leveller within the agencies. Whereas before, if you were at a 
very core prestigious larger agency and you got to a certain GS or General Schedule (rank 
level), you could have your own research aid, we don’t need them… word processing, putting 
documents together… dissemination. All this sophistication, we never had that before, 
including graphics… So it makes it a lot easier and that’s reflected in the quality of it” (US13). 
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The counter-terrorist roles of the military special forces and police tactical intervention units 
obviously require both specialised equipment and a very high degree of training of the type 
raised in previous chapters. Clearly this is necessary to achieve the level of ‘joint 
optimisation’ and effectiveness in such demanding, complex and time critical environments. 
The technology they utilise may include specialist breaching and Method of Entry (MOE) 
equipment, pyrotechnic or distraction devices, advanced assault and sniping weaponry, 
Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), surveillance equipment and body armour (Thompson 2009: 
Chapter 5). A Metropolitan Police SCO19 instructor and technical specialist stated that “the 
things that have proved most useful to us are digital photos, satellite imagery and the 
standards and reliability of weapons… also I guess the technical development of protective 
equipment” (UK27). Nevertheless, he again raised the significance of ‘human factors’ in such 
a sociotechnical interface, pointing out that “at the end of the day, with all the technology in 
the world, you can’t beat the raw skill of the individual. Sometimes people get carried away 
by technology, but unless something is simple and can be operated by an individual under 
stress, it’s not much assistance to a firearms team” (UK27).  
The interview data also highlighted different drivers and perceptions of capability behind 
the use of technology in counter-terrorism. Thus while the UK was perceived to have 
“pushed the boundaries of technology and with the limited resources they’ve really done 
well to develop technologies” (UK17), the US was seen to have the resources to develop 
technology “which sounds like it’s out of a science fiction book… but it’s probably reality” 
(US33). The flipside was that while technologically the UK was perceived by its interviewees 
as ‘making things work’ despite limited resources and a distinct lack of coordination and 
jointness (UK33), the US was seen as possibly being over-reliant on their advanced 
technology. As a US specialist and former diplomat explained, “that’s probably our best 
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thing. I think that is probably one of our real core strengths. That isn’t to say that we’re 
perfect at it and it isn’t to say that it doesn’t have some downsides to it. I’m afraid we’ve 
relied too much on technology historically, as opposed to human intelligence” (US6).  
Nevertheless, he went on to detail US capability, stating that “we have some extraordinary 
capabilities (satellite & Imagery Intelligence IMINT)… and talking about picking a needle out 
of a haystack, on a given day we can, because the conditions are right, atmospherically and 
in other ways. We have other technologies; I mean we see a lot about these Predator drones 
and such… they are very effective” (US6). In the case of the latter technology, a retired 
senior UK intelligence official stated that “one of the issues which has raised concerns is the 
US use of drone strikes, but when the Taliban and al Qaeda elements are operating in a 
sanctuary, it is not feasible to deal with them in any other way. It’s not as if you can go in 
and arrest them under the rule of law” (UK36). While highlighting the use of technology, this 
again raises the underlying tensions between the Policing and Military Models of counter-
terrorism, and their associated responses, which will be discussed in more detail later in the 
thesis (Benjamin 2013, Byman & Cronin 2013 and Yenne 2010).166 
When the emerging interview data in this section was examined through the ‘lens’ of the 
Sociotechnical Theory detailed at the start of this chapter, a number of examples were 
found to reflect aspects of the concept. Perhaps most significantly, and whether at the more 
technically sophisticated or at the Primary Work System level, such as military or police 
tactical intervention, without the appropriate human training and skills to maximise the 
benefits of the technology, ‘joint optimisation’ will not occur. More significantly, the Socio-
Technical ‘System’ these ‘human factors’ are contributing to may fail, which in the counter-
terrorist environment can equate to the loss of lives. This highlights the potential dangers in 
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such an operational environment of relying on technology as a substitute for training, rather 
than utilising it as a means of enhancing capability by combining highly skilled and trained 
‘human’ operators with advanced technology to maximise the overall effectiveness. Such 
concerns were raised by a former Irish Army specialist who was worried that with the Garda 
ERU “all you have to do is say that the (Army) ARW are using a piece of kit and they’ll buy it. 
The problem is that despite the kit, they haven’t paid the necessary training price for the 
dividend” (IR12).  
Additionally, the BTP example again raises the critical importance in any Socio-Technical 
System of the human experience and expertise, situational awareness and intuitive practice 
discussed in a previous chapter. In the example of station security detailed, these provide a 
level of knowledge and understanding of the ‘human terrain’, similar to the type of local 
community knowledge discussed in the first analytic chapter. This maximises the benefits of 
the technology being utilised, leading to ‘joint optimisation’. However, the example of US 
satellite capability also evidences that no matter how advanced the technology, there is 
always a risk of over-reliance and as Smith states “neither the capability to intercept mobile 
and satellite telephone calls nor the ability to produce immediate satellite imagery of events 
taking place on the ground in remote parts of the world such as Afghanistan was able to give 
the US administration warning of the 11 September attacks. The inevitable conclusion was 
that there had been a dramatic failure of intelligence and, in particular, of human 
intelligence” (Smith 2004: p.16). 
Although not specifically detailed in this Sociotechnical chapter, interviewees did discuss 
counter-terrorist organisational structures which reflected aspects of the Sociotechnical 
Theory previously discussed. More specifically some of these mirrored the conceptual 
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factors of Responsible Autonomy, Adaptability, Whole Tasks and Meaningfulness of Tasks, 
detailed at the start of this chapter. This was particularly the case with small intelligence, 
surveillance, military special forces or police tactical firearms teams, which combine highly 
trained, often cross-trained, individual operators in cohesive and adaptable teams. Most of 
these individuals are strongly motivated, having already completed and passed the types of 
selection processes and training already detailed.  
By way of example, the basic structure of US Special Forces (SF) is the A Team or 
Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), comprising twelve men with specialist training in 
intelligence, engineering, medical and weapons skills and “as is normal with SF personnel, 
the team members are cross-trained in other skills, in the event of casualties, split-team 
operations, or a shortage of personnel prior to a mission deployment” (Clancy 2001: p.147). 
Harking back to the importance of cultural understanding discussed in the first analytic 
chapter, “all have regionally relevant language skills and training to deal with local cultural 
sensitivities, traditions and mores” (Ibid). Likewise, a former SAS SNCO explained that the 
basic operating element of the Regiment was a four man team, where operators would have 
rotated through Air (parachute and freefall), Boat (small boats and combat swimmer), 
Mobility (vehicles and mechanics) and Mountain (climbing and skiing) Troops, while 
developing such specialised skills as medic, signals, sniper and explosives (UK43).  
Thus although operating in a very different work environment, which one military 
interviewee described as a ‘parallel world’ (UK22), such systems and structures closely 
mirror aspects of the concepts behind Sociotechnical Theory outlined earlier, specifically 
demonstrating a supervised cohesive team, an ability to cope with uncertainty and 
complexity, the whole task being placed on the shoulders of a small team and job 
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significance. This also reflects another debate in Sociotechnical Theory between complex 
organisations with simple tasks, versus simple organisations with more complex and skilled 
tasks (Walker et. al. 2007). In the ‘parallel world’ of counter-terrorism, this equates to the 
difficulties traditionally large, bureaucratic and hierarchical policing, intelligence and military 
organisations have in countering the more agile, networked and knowledge based modern 
terrorist or insurgent organisations (Ariely 2003), and the flipside benefits of having small, 
highly skilled, networked teams of counter-terrorists with specialist assets acting as ‘force 
multipliers’ (UK37/40/US6/11/27/31/35/37). 
c.  ‘Organisational Learning’ & the ‘Learning Competition’ 
The inherent exploitation of the types of technology being discussed, often leads to a cycle 
of technological development and innovation in a ‘learning’ competition’ between terrorist 
and counter-terrorist (UK38/IS3/8). In fact Ariely argues that “the fast organisational 
learning abilities inherent in networked structures gives terrorist organisations a distinct 
advantage; knowledge is the main resource in our era and knowledge flow is much more 
dynamic and successful than the knowledge flow, or lack of it, in hierarchical organisations” 
(Ariely 2003). As the authorities attempt to negate terrorists ‘Organisational Learning’ and 
their latest methodologies and weaponry, so the terrorists will seek technological, or socio-
technical means, through a combination of new tactics and technology, to get around the 
latest security measures (Jackson et. al. 2005). Consequently an Israeli military specialist 
believed “there is no doubt that the capabilities of the terrorist organisations to develop new 
strategies, new models, has increased significantly, and no doubt each and every step in the 
ladder, was manifested through rational thinking of the organisation, not so much the 
perpetrators themselves, but the organisation controlling them” (IS8).   
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The use of such new technologies and tactics in terrorism was explained by a senior Garda 
officer who stated that, “on one side of the coin they offer the terrorists a whole new level of 
operations, but equally it presents the law enforcement opportunities, and it’s whether we 
grasp those two things, what we learn from previous terrorism and the capabilities of 
technology to use them. That’s where everyone needs to be focussed and looking” (IR2). 
Thus following an attempted or successful terrorist attack, particularly when new 
technologies or tactics are utilised, the authorities will carry out a post attack evaluation of 
the terrorist’s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). This may lead to innovation and 
the introduction of new technologies, along with other counter measures, as a means of 
closing potential loop-holes and preventing further attacks of this nature. The terrorists will 
then identify and explore new means of overcoming these latest counter-measures, and the 
cycle described above begins again. One Shin Bet specialist described part of this wider 
response, a sociotechnical fusion of technological development and operational response, 
as the ‘techno-operational’ concept. “Techno-operational is the understanding of the 
technology and use of the right technology for the right operation… tailor made. Every 
solution should be tailor made, it’s not the usual way to use technology… but we can look on 
the enemy, on the terrorists… we can look on them and try to understand their ‘techno-
operational’ regimen even if they are not aware of it” (IS5). 
Perhaps one of the best examples of such a ‘learning competition’ concerns the Israeli 
development of the ‘Security Fence’ which was initially introduced to hamper and reduce 
the level of suicide attacks against the Israeli public during the 1990s and early 2000s. This 
incorporates a range of physical and technical security measures, which are detailed more 
fully in the endnotes.167 The example also reflects concepts of Fortified and Military 
Urbanism outlined by such academics as Graham (2004, 2007 & 2011), Coaffee (2004, 2009) 
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and others (Wood & Coaffee 2005, Coaffee & Wood 2006 and Coaffee & Bosher 2008), as 
part of a wider ‘securitisation agenda’. As Wood and Coaffee explain, “Urban resilience 
increasingly involves a militarisation or securitisation of urban space, characterised by 
regulatory management, fortification and surveillance to categorise, divide and control. This 
is not a new phenomenon, but recent concern over terrorism after September 11th 2001 has 
signalled a ‘surge’ in this direction” (Wood & Coaffee 2005 p.1).  
Consequently, Graham is concerned that “attempts will be made by Governments to re-
engineer cities, so that the porous, open and intrinsically unpredictable spaces and systems 
become little more than an endless series of securitized passage points, either visible or 
invisible” (Graham 2007). Likewise Coaffee and Wood argue that the security threat “leads 
to what might be called ‘protectionist reflexes’, characterised by regulatory management, 
fortification and surveillance to categorise, divide and control” (Coafee and Wood 2006 p.7).  
However, for this research it is argued that the Israeli ‘Security Fence’ also provides an 
excellent example of the ‘Learning Competition’ in relation to technology, while all the 
evidence suggests that at a practical level, it has resulted in a significant decline in the level 
of such suicide attacks.168 One former Shin Bet official believed that, “this ‘fence’ has proved 
to be the most effective countermeasure Israel has utilised within the framework of its 
confrontation with Palestinian terrorism in the last decade” (IS18). However, Byman argues 
that “the barrier is a double-edged sword: on one hand, it serves as a highly effective 
counterterrorism device: on the other hand, it complicates peace efforts and creates 
enormous hardships for Palestinians.” (Byman 2011: p.324). These differing perspectives 
were reflected in the responses of the Israeli interviewees.   
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As a number of interviewees pointed out, ‘the Security Fence has decreased the level of 
suicide attacks by reducing terrorist infiltration from the West Bank, delaying those 
attempting to launch such attacks and giving the Israeli security forces more time to 
intercept them’.169 However, reflecting the ‘Learning Competition’, Palestinian groups such 
as HAMAS and PIJ turned from suicide attacks to tunneling under the wall and indirect fire 
by rockets, such as the home-made Qassam and military ‘Grad’ (Katyusha) rockets, which 
can overcome the ‘security fence’ through utilising the ‘third dimension’. Though clearly still 
causing casualties, public fear and disruption, these are less effective than suicide attacks in 
crowded places, public transport hubs or restaurants. In response to this current threat of 
indirect rocket fire, and further highlighting this technological ‘Learning Competition’, Israel 
has developed the new anti-missile system ‘Iron Dome’. As one expert explained, “this 
system is able to destroy any kind of standoff fire launched against Israel in mid-air. It also 
has the ability to calculate the falling location of the incoming mortar, rocket or missile and 
if this is in open terrain, will not intercept it, hence saving money” (IS18).  
However, while the ‘Security Fence’ has lowered the threat of suicide bomb attacks it has 
also seriously impacted on local Palestinian communities living in the area of its route 
inhibiting their travel, trade and local farming, while leading to allegations that it has been 
used as a means to annex additional Palestinian territory. Consequently, one former AMAN 
officer was concerned that “the line of the ‘Fence’ was a disaster… this was stupidity… so 
much a typically military approach, which neglected all other aspects” (IS8). As a result the 
Supreme Court ordered a change to the route so as to cause less impact on the local 
Palestinian communities. The interviewee also expressed concern at its previous and 
continuing cost, preferring to “take all the money and invest it in intelligence, in counter-
terrorism measures, in technology, in paying sources, in pro-active, not defensive” (IS8). 
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Consequently, he was concerned that “it has generated a defensive ‘Maginot Line’ 
mentality, rather than a more pro-active policy” (IS8). Finally, he was worried that because 
of its impact, the ‘Security Fence’ would “generate a whole new generation of suicide 
bombers” (IS8).  
This type of ‘techno-operational’ intervention in the terrorists attack cycle, not only reflects 
aspects of the socio-technical interface previously discussed, but additionally aspects of the 
wider ‘learning competition’ may also lend themselves to examination through the 
criminological concept of Crime Script Analysis, linked to Situational Crime Prevention and 
first expounded by Cornish in 1994 (Cornish 1994). This concept was originally borrowed 
from cognitive psychology and as Cornish explains, “scripts are members of a family of 
hypothesised knowledge structures, or schemata, considered to organise our knowledge of 
people and events. Such schemata are held to guide our understanding of others behaviour 
and our own actions. The script is a special type of schema, known as an ‘event’ schema, 
since it organises our knowledge about how to understand and enact commonplace 
behavioural processes or routines” (Cornish 1994: p.158). These were adapted for 
Criminology “in order to provide a framework to systematically investigate all of the stages 
of the crime commission process… and assist researchers in identifying additional 
intervention points” (Leclerc 2014: p. 15). Thus such scripts provide a detailed analysis of the 
processes required to conduct a particular crime and the rational choices made by criminals 
in their completion. This helps identify stages in the process where interventions can be 
utilised to prevent, deter or mitigate the crime.  
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Such a Crime Script approach could be applied to certain terrorist or insurgent activities, 
such as constructing an IED, which requires specific technical processes. Thus, for example 
following a Crime Script approach: 
 Steal or Obtain military grade or commercial explosives – Semtex, C4, Dynamite, 
Goma 2 Eco etc.   
 If unavailable due to lack of availability or security protocols, identify/establish a 
‘bomb making factory’ location 
 Obtain raw ‘dual purpose’ precursors to fabricate Home Made Explosives (HME) 
 Obtain appropriate fabrication and safety equipment 
 Fabricate Home Made Explosives – TATP, HMTD, ANFO, Black Powder etc.170 
 Obtain or construct a suitable detonator to initiate the main charge 
 Obtain or construct a triggering mechanism – Electrical, Mechanical, Chemical, 
Remote etc. 
 Incorporate time delay mechanism?  
 Assemble in a container, bag or suicide vest 
 Add fragmentation to enhance lethality? 
 Transit to attack location/venue 
 Deliver and leave on delay mechanism or immediately detonate at location in a 
suicide attack 
However, while certain terrorist and insurgent organisational or technical procedures, such 
as the example of IED construction, may lend themselves to a Crime Script Analysis 
approach, applying such a conceptual tool to examine broader aspects of terrorism may 
prove difficult, particularly in relation to attack plans and operations, which are inherently 
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complex and obviously conducted covertly. Consequently, although the Crime Script 
Analysis approach has previously been used for the analysis of various forms of organised 
crime, because these involve complex networks which are often international in nature, this 
has proved challenging (Leclerc 2014). Similar difficulties, though perhaps more 
accentuated, are likely to be encountered in applying the approach to terrorism or 
insurgency, which as discussed are inherently complex, covert in nature, and certainly in the 
case of modern terrorism and insurgency, often comprise loose international networks.  
Perhaps more significantly, much Crime Script Analysis inherently relies on a ‘rational 
criminal’ (Clarke 1997) or ‘reasoning burglar’ (Cromwell & Olsen 2006) to make rational 
choices and logical processes. As a result, while this approach might prove more applicable 
to the more traditional hierarchical political or nationalist terrorist groups, such as ETA, the 
PLO or PIRA, who would follow more disciplined, rational and directed tactics, techniques 
and procedures (TTPs), it is probably far less applicable to modern terrorist groups or 
networks, many of which are motivated by religious or racist extremism or apocalyptic 
fervour. Consequently, and as will be discussed in the next chapter, the ‘worldview’ of such 
groups and networks means that aspects of their actions and procedures are unlikely to 
follow what might be considered rational or logical processes by the police or security 
forces. 
Nevertheless, in broader terms Seger outlines his ‘Phases of a Terrorist Incident’, and this 
might prove more amenable for use and development in a Crime Script Analysis approach 
(Seger 1990: p.12): Combining the operational background behind Seger’s type of 
framework (effectively a Crime Script of terrorist attack profiles), along with the behavioural 
and procedural indicators detailed by former US intelligence practitioner Nance (2003), 
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could prove a useful tool for identifying terrorist planning and preparation. Clearly, much 
more technologically and operationally detailed ‘scripts’ of terrorist attack planning and 
cycles are likely to exist, but not in the public domain.   
 Pre-Incident Phase 
o Planning 
o Reconnaissance 
o Rehearsal 
 Initiation Phase 
o Movement to Scene 
o Initiation of Attack 
o Diversions 
 Negotiation Phase (Only if a Hostage Taking or Kidnapping incident) 
o Demands 
o Trade Offs 
o Open Ended 
 Climax Phase 
o Capture or Escape  
o Claim Responsibility 
o End of Incident 
 Post Incident Phase 
o Regroup 
o Critique 
o Lessons Learned 
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However, despite the Sociotechnical interface between terrorists/insurgents and 
technology, and the concepts of ‘Organisational Learning’ and the ‘Learning Competition’ 
previously detailed, in a number of cases the al-Qaeda network, its affiliates and supporters, 
have successfully inverted this cycle. Instead they have sought to exploit ‘Western’ societies 
over-reliance on technology, by returning to low technology methods such as human 
messengers utilising word of mouth or coded handwritten notes171, the Hawala banking 
system based on promissory notes and verbal agreements, the hijacking of aircraft using 
box-cutters to be used as massive guided blast-incendiary devices and the construction of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from commercially available products and precursors, 
such as acetone, peroxide and ammonium nitrate fertiliser. Consequently Betts (2004) 
concludes that although “technical collection is invaluable and has undoubtedly figured in 
previous counter-terrorist successes… the targets now understand better what they have to 
evade...competent terrorists know not to use cell phones for sensitive messages, and even 
small groups have access to impressive new encryption technologies. Human intelligence is 
key because the essence of the terrorist threat is the capacity to conspire” (Betts 2004: 
p.461).  
d. The Ultimate Socio-Technical Interface? ‘Bomb Disposal’ 
Arguably, the ultimate example of such sociotechnical interface in counter-terrorism, 
combining specialist human skills with technological utility, can be seen in the case of ‘bomb 
disposal’, which was raised by interviewees from all the case study countries (See Tables 19 
and 20 Following). While terrorists seek to utilise new methods and precursors to construct 
devices or procure commercial or military grade explosives (Barnaby 2007), police 
explosives experts (EXPO) and Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal ‘EOD’ specialists have 
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continually developed new technology and skills to counter them; a good example being the 
‘Wheelbarrow’ robot developed to examine and render safe IEDs in Northern Ireland 
(UK21/34).172 Ultimately though, despite all the technological developments, bomb 
detection and disposal still relies on the individual specialist to defuse and render them safe, 
again demonstrating the significance of the ‘human factor’. 
Table 19: MILITARY BOMB DISPOSAL  
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
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I 
E 
R 
 
2 
 Irish Army 
Ordnance 
Corps EOD 
skills & pro-
active 
expertise in 
bomb 
disposal 
from Irish & 
Lebanese 
experience 
     
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Royal 
Logistics 
Corps (ex – 
RAOC) EOD 
skills & 
capabilities, 
much based 
on 30 years 
experience 
in N. Ireland 
 
Neutralising 
bomb rather 
than 
destroying in 
situ, to 
exploit for 
intel. & 
evidence 
 
UK Alpha 
Troop 
provide EOD 
support to 
SAS 
Training to 
forensically 
exploit IEDs 
for evidence 
preservation 
 
EOD 
capability to 
ARW 
provided by 
Ordnance 
Corps team 
of Officer & 
two NCOs 
French 
military 
bomb 
disposal 
skills & 
capability 
Spanish 
military EOD, 
transference 
of experience 
Afghanistan 
to TEDAX 
 
NATO EOD 
COE with 
instructors & 
students 
from across 
NATO along 
with PN & GC 
TEDAX to 
ensure cross 
training & 
knowledge 
transfer 
 
Increasing 
importance 
on IEDs of 
forensics, 
which 
military are 
learning from 
police when 
abroad 
EOD skills 
of Combat 
Engineer 
Sayeret 
Yahalom 
‘Diamond’ 
 US Army & 
Military 
EOD skills 
& 
capability 
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This combination of technology with the courage and skills of the individual EOD operator 
was historically highlighted in Northern Ireland with the detection and disposal of PIRA IEDs 
and the countering of their technological innovations, which Oppenheimer refers to as 
‘deadly ingenuity’ (Oppenheimer 2009: Chapter 9). One former Army Ammunition Technical 
Officer (ATO) stated that “in terms of EOD, we have operational experience over 30 years in 
Northern Ireland and we have learned lessons from that, both good and bad. In the UK we 
also had a minimal amount of resources, so we had to specialise. We couldn’t waste money 
on specialist equipment, so we had to be extremely focused and professional. Our main 
philosophy in EOD was to maintain and minimise the loss of life. What we tried to do was 
fuse technology with the ordinary Mark 1 human being, based on common sense 
experience” (UK38) (Ryder 2005).  
More recently, this experience and expertise was utilised in overseas counter-insurgency, 
however, “the problem is that while it took thirty years to reach the level of technical 
sophistication in Northern Ireland, they reached the same level of sophistication in Iraq 
within twelve months and within eighteen months in Afghanistan” (UK38) (Hunter 2008 & 
Rayment 2011). Another former ATO confirmed that with the EOD teams in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, “there’s an issue there with the availability of ordnance that can be adapted, 
155mm Arty shells, RPG rockets and all sorts of stuff, but again if you look at the lessons 
from there… These are things that IRA played with, but never really got to work as effectively 
as they would have wanted… So I think there are definitely new challenges coming” (UK21). 
His fellow former ATO explained that this is due to the rapid evolution of technology, 
explaining that, “you don’t just predict the future; you look two moves ahead in an extreme 
game of chess” (UK38).    
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The interviewee went on to point out that while many countries would destroy an IED in 
situ, by neutralising it, an IED can be exploited for evidence and intelligence, using forensics 
and biometrics to try and identify the bomb-making ‘engineer’ who constructed it (UK38). In 
addition, he suggested that by technically exploiting an IED “to assess the chemical 
composition, the effectiveness of the device, the electronics etcetera, this allows you to very 
quickly bring in technological counter-measures, something that we are very good at” 
(UK38) (Hunter 2010). This approach is clearly similar to aspects of the ‘techno-operational’ 
concept previously discussed. However, looking to the future, another former ‘bomb 
disposal officer’ explained that when he was trained, the whole emphasis was to get the 
‘Wheelbarrow’ in as “tackling the things by hand was considered a very risky business… 
Whereas if you are looking at explosives like TATP, if you are looking at weapons that may 
contain a biological hazard, where you do the job for them, same with chemical weapons, 
it’s not going to be easy… So I think there are definitely new challenges coming and on the 
whole I think the military EOD teams are well equipped to deal with those” (UK21).  
In the mainland UK, while military EOD teams have responsibility for ‘bomb disposal’ 
outside of the M25 motorway, the Metropolitan Police have their own ‘Met EXPO’ teams 
covering Greater London.173 One senior Metropolitan Police officer believed that this was 
beneficial because, “we’re able to instil forensic awareness into our EOD capability, probably 
to a slightly higher level than the military, but by and large, because they are all ex-military 
anyway and they work very closely with their colleagues and former colleagues in 11 EOD… I 
think the UK is well served” (UK13). However, the former Army ATO was concerned as to 
whether collectively retired ATOs working for the Met would keep up to speed with the 
latest technological developments (UK21). He also wondered “if the day when the Met 
needs its own EOD is being surpassed by the requirements for the military to provide proper 
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EOD support to London” (UK21). This highlights a continuing divergence found throughout 
the research interviews between policing and military respondents, leading to various levels 
of tension. Nevertheless, all agreed that the operational experience of over thirty years 
previous EOD work in Northern Ireland had given the UK a great advantage by providing 
organisational knowledge and individual expertise (UK21/34/38).  
While a number of other case study countries rely on civilian specialists or police bomb 
disposal units, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in Ireland is solely the responsibility of the 
Army (IR1). These responding EOD Teams are based exclusively within the Army Ordnance 
Corps, and are equipped with robots, protective suits, and the usual specialist bomb 
disposal equipment (IR1) (MacCarron 2004). Much of their work and experience has 
understandably been based around the border areas countering Republican ‘subversives’ 
(IR3/12). Consequently as a former senior Irish ATO explained, “the Irish Army Ordnance 
Corps had to develop this capability in parallel to the UK during the ‘Troubles’, but had to 
evolve it in a different environment. Because of this isolation, we have different equipment 
and techniques, but have very good relations with the UK despite these differences. One of 
the key differences is that the Irish Army is operating in its own country, in a less hostile 
environment… so there is not the same level of threat and our philosophy is different” (IR12). 
Nevertheless, he went on to point out that “the threat assessment has got to be right to 
start with; otherwise everything else that follows will be wrong. It starts with ‘Why am I here 
8 miles from the border with a mortar?’ You have to get it right and it’s the cornerstone… If 
you get it wrong, you’ll get killed” (IR12).  
One academic expert pointed out that as well as the expertise developed during ‘The 
Troubles’, the Irish Army Ordnance Corps EOD have also built up great historical ‘bomb 
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disposal’ experience and expertise from their service in Lebanon with UNIFIL, necessarily 
developing extensive knowledge of Middle Eastern IED fabrication and tactics (IR3). In 
addition, they are regularly called out to deal with suspicious packages in Dublin, particularly 
in relation to certain foreign embassies, while providing specialist technical support to the 
Garda Emergency Response Unit (ERU) (IR6/11). Recently, they have assisted the Garda in 
dealing with more criminal explosive devices, which are becoming increasingly prevalent as 
drug gangs and criminals regularly use crude pipe bombs against each other (IR3/9). 
Consequently, the former Irish ATO explained that “the other thing we’ve done very well is 
the exploitation of the bomb, its forensic exploitation. All our EOD operators were trained by 
the Garda on evidence, the safe preservation of evidence. We have taken time and trouble to 
make safe bombs rather than destroy them in situ, to preserve evidence and allow their 
forensication, although we have paid a price for this policy” (IR12).  
Although there are both military and police bomb disposal teams, in the majority of 
incidents within France, it is the ‘scientific police’ under the Direction Securite Civile ‘Civil 
Security’ who deal with IEDs (FR6).“They’re not police officers though, they’re engineers and 
technicians who have this knowledge and they want to serve the cause of public safety, they 
come under the Interior Ministry and they are not Army” (FR7) In Paris, these ‘scientific 
police’ are part of the Central Police Laboratory operating under the Paris Police Prefecture, 
with other regional laboratories and similar teams in Marseilles, Lyon, Nantes, and Lille 
amongst other major cities (FR7).The risks of their work were demonstrated, “when in 1984, 
there was a failed attack by FARL… The bomb had been placed under the vehicle belonging 
to an American diplomat. The bomb disposal team were trying to make it safe… but the 
bomb did go off and killed the two bomb disposal experts… they belonged to the Central 
Police Laboratory for the Paris Police Prefecture” (FR7).174  
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Table 20: POLICING BOMB DISPOSAL 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
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 Bomb 
disposal an 
Army 
Ordnance 
Corps role 
in an ATCP 
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See 
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EOD 
capability 
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Police’ in 
Securite 
Civil based 
in major 
cities 
across 
France 
    
T 
I 
E 
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3 
EOD skills & 
capabilities of 
Metropolitan 
Police 
Explosives 
Officers 
(EXPO) 
  EOD skills 
of Policia 
Nacional & 
Guardia 
Civil 
TEDAX 
Teams & 
support of 
‘Civil 
Defence’ 
Skills & 
capabilities of 
INP Hablanim 
EOD 
‘Sappers’, 
with 
significant 
operational 
experience 
 
However, 
concern that 
given the 
number of 
incidents 
Hablanim 
deal with, 
they are 
prone to 
psychological 
impact  
EOD skills of 
TNP Bomba 
Imha Polisi 
‘Bomb 
Disposal 
Police’, 
supported 
by the 
Criminal 
Forensic 
Department 
(KPL) 
EOD skills 
of FBI and 
various 
police 
bomb 
squads, 
such as 
NYPD 
Bomb 
Squad 
 
Both Spain and Turkey have bomb disposal units in their police and respectively their 
Guardia Civil and Jandarma, as well as military units. In Spain these are known as TEDAX-
NRBQ (Munoz 1994: pp.401-3);175 and following any terrorist bomb incident, once Civil 
Defence Units have put in cordons, “their priority would be to detect any secondary devices 
and then conduct a forensic investigation to recover technical evidence” (SP8). Like the UK, it 
was argued that dealing with historical terrorism, in this case from ETA, meant they were 
“very well trained and experienced in dealing with bombs and casualties, which was put to 
the test with the attacks on Atocha” (SP10).176 In Turkey, just as in Spain, if an IED is found in 
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a metropolitan area, the Bomba Imha Polisi ‘Police bomb disposal’ will deal, whereas in rural 
areas it would be the Jandarma (TU1). For example, the Turkish Polis Bomb Disposal have 
their headquarters and training base just outside of Ankara, with seven major offices in the 
larger cities of Istanbul, Adana, Ankara (Centre), Antalya, Izmir, Diyarbakir and Van, along 
with smaller units in other locations.177 Thus while units and even individual bomb disposal 
experts are deployed across the country, like France they are supported by the Criminal 
Forensic Department (KPL) and Police Laboratories (TU4).  
In Israel, much like France, while there are specialist military bomb disposal units, such as 
Sayeret Yahalom (‘Diamond’) in the Combat Engineers, most domestic IEDs are dealt with by 
the ‘Police Sappers’, the Hablanim (IS2/6/13/18) (Katz 1990). These teams, based with the 
Israeli National Police across the country, contain EOD and forensic specialists “who can 
react rapidly to any scene and practice constantly” (IS6). While such teams were perceived 
to have built up great skill and capability from dealing with numerous incidents and “know 
what to do without orders”, one senior police officer was concerned that the corollary was 
“you also need to check bomb specialists for emotional and psychological upset” (IS13). Due 
to the exceptional demands of the task and associated psychological pressure, there has 
been a high incidence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) amongst many bomb 
disposal technicians.178 Finally, a limited number of US interviewees mentioned policing EOD 
capability, specifically the FBI, NYPD & LAPD Bomb Squads, who have to complete a 
standard course at the FBI Hazardous Devices School in Huntsville, Alabama, to ensure the 
same levels of skill and elements of interoperability (Tomajczyk 1999).179  
The examples raised in the interview data by the ‘bomb disposal’ experts of the different 
countries, reflect various aspects of the Sociotechnical Theory discussed at the start of the 
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chapter. Arguably, these provide an exemplar of the type of interface between human skills 
and technological efficacy to provide a highly specialised Socio-Technical System. In 
particular they demonstrate the significance of ‘human factors’ to effective ‘bomb disposal’ 
in the form of the skills and expertise of the police and military EOD operators, which in 
combination with continually developing bomb disposal technology, creates this Socio-
Technical System. At the same time, the continuing development of disposal technology to 
counter emerging designs in IED construction can be seen as another example of the 
technical ‘Learning Competition’, while the making safe of IEDs in situ for technical 
examination and forensication is closely associated with the ‘Techno-Operational’ concept 
raised previously by an Israeli specialist. Finally, the section evidences the significance of 
individual experience and expertise, developed historically through operations, which was 
discussed in an earlier chapter. 
e. Mere ‘Window Dressing’? 
The preceding sections of this chapter have evidenced the significance and impact of 
technology, which underpins many of the measures that have been introduced and utilised 
to counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, a number of interviewees commented that, despite 
continuing improvements and developments, and no matter how advanced the technology, 
without the ‘human factor’ of the training, skills and capabilities required to properly 
optimise its benefit, such technology can often prove to be nothing more than mere 
‘window dressing’. As Davies, a former SAS SNCO states, “dressing up in the assault 
equipment and looking good is the easy part. What most people do not see is the amount of 
training that goes into creating a highly trained assault team member… the average assault 
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team member must identify, confirm and act all in a split second; this can only be achieved 
by constant and rigorous training in realistic conditions” (Davies 2003: p.138). 
As well as the military/tactical field, similar concerns at the level of the human skills in the 
wider socio-technical interface were raised by one of the former UK ‘bomb disposal’ ATOs, 
who stated that “the technical capability in terms of the equipment is good, what is often 
poor is the way it’s applied… The training often leaves a lot to be desired, but it’s the way the 
equipment is used” (UK21). He went on to explain that in many cases the problems begin for 
counter-terrorist organisations with their placing the technology before the training, arguing 
that it should be “defining the requirement and then identifying the technology, not the 
other way round” (UK21). Consequently, he was concerned that “training for a whole variety 
of historical reasons always takes second place, whereas actually it should be right up at the 
top” (UK21), concluding that “there’s no point in having the kit if you’ve not been trained to 
use it properly” (UK21).  
The other form of technological ‘window dressing’ raised in the interview data also involves 
the ‘human factors’ of training, skills and capabilities, but in this case, rather than a lack of 
training negating ‘joint optimisation’ of the Socio-Technical System, overreliance and a lack 
of redundancy or resilience, can lead to its actual failure. One example from a related field 
will suffice to demonstrate this. During a NATO field training exercise, two cells of Army 
Intelligence from different countries were working together. One cell had an advanced 
computer system, where they fed intelligence on ‘exercise enemy’ into the system, while 
the other relied on maps, clear plastic talcs, coloured pins and map marking pens. When the 
‘toughened’ computer system failed during the exercise, its operators were unable to 
deliver updates or briefings as they were over-reliant on the technology, with no training for 
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alternatives, while the more traditional method, in effect relying on the ‘Mark 1human 
brain’ to process and interpret the data, continued unaffected.180   
These concerns at a lack of appropriate training and/or over-reliance on technology are 
strongly supported by the Sociotechnical Theory, which perceives that “the user interface of 
the technology and its relationship to people’s workflows and activities is critical. We all see 
the problems when technology is bought and implemented that people simply cannot use, or 
it slows down performance so much that it destroys the expected performance 
improvements… introducing new technology is not as simple as putting it in place, training 
people and then expecting them to perform in the way you want them to” (Errey & Xi 2006 
pp.3-4). Ultimately therefore, and particularly in such complex fields as counter-terrorism or 
counter-insurgency, it is argued that technology is often only as good as the ‘human’ skills 
and ability of the ‘practitioner’ using it.  
f. Mirror Image: Technology, a ‘double-edged’ sword? 
While technology plays an important role in underpinning many of the ‘human factors’ of 
counter-terrorism discussed in the previous chapters, for example supporting intelligence 
and surveillance, enhancing individual skills and capabilities, and assisting leadership and 
command decisions, it has also clearly been exploited in various ways by terrorist and 
insurgent organisations. Thus in addition to raising and discussing the relationships between 
human practitioners and technology in counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency 
environments, the interviewees also perceived technology and innovation as a ‘double-
edged sword’ due to its use and exploitation by terrorists and insurgents. Although this 
section must necessarily be limited in both size and content, due to the focus of the 
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research on counter-terrorism, it is useful to provide a mirror image of the various ways that 
technology has been utilised by such terrorist organisations and individuals.  
Historically, the progenitors of modern terrorism can be found in both the Russian 
revolutionary group Narodnya Volya (‘People’s Will’) and others, and the ‘physical force’ 
Irish Republican groups of the late nineteenth century. However, in the sociotechnical field, 
and contrary to much of the previous academic focus on Narodnya Volya, Clutterbuck 
argues that it was the Fenian Skirmishers, Clan na Gael and the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, who left more of a legacy to modern terrorist technology. Utilising the 
interface between the human terrorist and technology, the bomber and the bomb, they 
were the first group to develop explosive devices with a time delay fuse. This “enabled a 
cumulative effect strategy to be made a reality, as it allowed the perpetrator to plant the 
device, escape and strike again. Although still relatively crude, the improvised explosive 
devices would rapidly increase in power and sophistication” (Clutterbuck 2004a: p.166). 
More recently, in one of the longest running terrorist campaigns, the PIRA developed a 
range of explosive devices and other weaponry during their ‘Long War’, much of which 
demonstrated great technical ingenuity and lateral thinking. One example highlighting such 
ingenuity was the use of packets of digestive biscuits, wrapped in J-Cloths (thin cleaning 
cloths), acting to absorb the recoil of a home-made grenade launcher (Projected Recoilless 
Improvised Grenade PRIG), which would otherwise have critically injured the firer, leaving a 
pile of ‘Hansel and Gretel’ like crumbs to identify the firing point.181 However, it was in the 
construction of IEDs that they excelled, consequently Oppenheimer argues that “the IRA’s 
‘engineers’ achieved the highest level of ingenuity and inventiveness with their IEDs. Many 
pioneering bomb technologies were produced, tested and used to deadly effect. To this day, 
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the IRA remains the world’s most advanced builders of IEDs and its talent in making bombs 
has sadly influenced other terrorist groups” (Oppenheimer 2009: p. 8). 
Unsurprisingly then, the interview data from across both fields (policing, intelligence and 
military) and case study countries highlighted that technology was very much perceived as a 
‘double edged sword’. Just as technology has been developed and utilised to counter the 
threat posed by terrorism and insurgency, so modern technological and scientific 
developments have also been rapidly seized upon by terrorist or insurgent organisations to 
enhance their own tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Thus Thackrah states that 
“there have been significant changes both in the philosophy and tactics of terror and in the 
social and political environment in which it operates. Many of the differences are directly or 
indirectly a consequence of technological change. The most relevant developments have 
been in the fields of transport, communications (particularly as applied to news gathering 
and distribution) and weaponry” (Thackrah 2004: p. 259).  
Modern domestic and international transportation, particularly cheaper and more reliable 
air travel, has helped facilitate international/transnational terrorism, making it far easier for 
terrorists to meet and plan with fellow colleagues, gain access to potential targets in other 
countries, and to travel abroad to ‘ungoverned spaces’ for the type of training or insurgent 
conflict discussed previously. At the same time, transport systems and networks, such as 
railways, the underground, aircraft, passenger ships and their associated hubs, such as 
stations, airports and ports, have provided terrorists with an ideal target, namely a large 
concentration of public bystanders in a crowded place, often from a multitude of countries. 
This has been reflected in the number of terrorist attacks and incidents involving such 
transport networks and hubs over decades.  
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Communication systems and computers make it easier for terrorist commanders to organise 
and co-ordinate acts of terror, often from secondary locations, and for the planning and 
sharing of information and intelligence through encryption technologies, while modern 
electronic banking eases the movement of the finances and donations necessary to provide 
the ‘lifeblood’ of terrorism, funding particular operations (Jacobsen 2006). More recently, 
the internet and social networking through such systems as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and 
Instagram, have been used by terrorist and insurgent groups not only to communicate 
directly with colleagues, but also to spread propaganda and as a tool to increase support 
and radicalise individuals (See the predictive work of Arquilla & Ronfeldt et.al. 2001). The 
flipside of the terrorist use of communications and computers being that the reliance of 
modern society on computers and technology means it is easier for terrorists or insurgents 
to conduct effective sabotage and/or to target the state’s infrastructure through ‘cyber-
terrorism’. 
Current twenty four hour media and ‘live’ news coverage means that any terrorist incident 
is beamed worldwide in minutes or hours, highlighting the ‘propaganda of the deed’. This 
often provides the type of ‘oxygen’ of publicity that terrorist and insurgent groups are 
seeking, leading Seger to state that “terrorism is not measured in body counts, by the 
number of wounded, or by the dollar value of the damages. Terrorism is measured in terms 
of the column inches in newspapers and magazines and the number of minutes an event 
generates on television and radio” (Seger 1990: p.15). Consequently, recent complex swarm 
attacks and hostage taking against theatres (Dubrovka 2002), schools (Beslan 2004), hotels 
(Mumbai 2008) and diplomatic buildings (British Council, Kabul 2011), while effectively 
suicide missions, should not be seen in terms of ‘success or failure’, but rather the length of 
time the locations and hostages were held and the amount of media publicity they 
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generated. In that sense, these operations are similar to Viet Cong ‘sapper’ attacks against 
the US Embassy, Saigon, during the Tet Offensive of 1968, tactical suicide but strategic 
victory, through reliance on the media coverage to provide ‘Influence Operations’, 
negatively impacting the morale and willpower of the wider public and putting them in fear. 
Recent video releases by the so called ‘Islamic State’ have been designed to achieve similar 
results.  
This reflects aspects of the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), originally outlined 
by Lind et. al. in 1989, which states that the actions of small, decentralised groups, against 
society as a whole, including culture, will replace traditional concepts of modern warfare, 
that such dispersion will require greater operational flexibility and less dependence on 
centralised logistics, that traditional military power will be bypassed by an enemy seeking to 
use technology and ideology in psychological warfare to undermine society, that no 
distinction will be made between military and civilian ‘enemies’, that the mass media will be 
manipulated to influence the enemy and that unlike previous generations of warfare which 
developed from Western cultural traditions, Fourth Generation Warfare may well emerge 
from Eastern or Asiatic cultures (Lind et.al. 1989). This has led Hammes, another exponent 
of the concept, to state that 4GW “does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s 
military forces. Instead, via diverse networks, Fourth Generation Warfare directly attacks the 
minds of enemy decision makers, to destroy the enemy’s political will” (Hammes 2004).   
Likewise, modern developments in explosives and weaponry have been utilised to their 
advantage by the various terrorist and insurgent groups (Marret 2002). This has included 
the use of concealable automatic weaponry, grenades and modern explosives (Lutz & Lutz: 
Chapter 3). In the latter case, terrorism and insurgency have been particularly linked to the 
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use of explosives in various types of improvised explosive devices, since the attacks of the 
Russian Revolutionaries, Irish ‘physical force’ Republicans and various Anarchist groups 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century. While terrorists will use military grade (eg. 
Semtex) or commercial explosives (eg. Goma 2 Eco) when they are available, because of 
controls, restrictions and lack of availability, many such ‘bomb’ attacks have been carried 
out utilising Home Made Explosives (HME), such as Triacetone-Triperoxide (TATP) and 
Hexamethylene-Triperoxide Diamine (HMTD), both fabricated from acetone and peroxide, 
and Ammonium Nitrate and Fuel Oil (ANFO), often utilising fertiliser (Nance 2003: Chapter 
11). 
Perhaps the best example of a terrorist or insurgent Socio-Technical System (STS) is the 
combination of a human bomber, with a suicide explosive device, to form a Person Borne 
Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED). Thus, just as in the case of the wider field of terrorism, 
modern suicide terrorism not only seeks to destroy the physical target of its attack, often 
members of the general public in a crowded space or transport hub, but also to spread fear 
to an audience beyond its initial victims, typically the wider civilian population. In the last 
few decades, this type of PBIED attack has proven to be highly effective as it provides a 
Socio-Technical System, combining a human bomber and their brain, with a technological 
improvised explosive device often enhanced with fragmentation for increased lethality. This 
combination produces what is in effect a highly motivated, thinking, self-guided weapons 
system, capable of bypassing or adapting to security measures, and if necessary selecting 
secondary or alternative targets in order to conduct an attack and inflict casualties. As Ariely 
states, “the smartest bomb ever invented and that probably ever will be invented, is the 
human one; it’s the only bomb that adapts flexibly to a changing situation in addition to 
being ‘pre-programmed’” (Ariely 2003). 
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The effectiveness of this type of sociotechnical PBIED interface has been demonstrated by 
the rapidly expanding use of this ‘weapon system’. While historically it has been used by the 
LTTE, PKK, HAMAS and others, currently it is predominantly utilised by the al Qaeda 
network, its affiliates and individuals inspired by its ideology in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, 
Pakistan, Chechnya, Yemen and many other countries (Moghadam 2008).Consequently, 
Atran estimates that while between 1981 and 1990 there was an average of 4.7 suicide 
attacks per year, between 1991 and 2000 these figures more than tripled to an average of 
16 attacks per year. However, between 2001 and 2005 these rose exponentially to an 
average of 180 suicide attacks a year (Atran 2006). By 2013 Rosner et. al. estimated this had 
risen to around 291 suicide attacks during the year in eighteen countries causing 
approximately 3,100 deaths, with a total of around 3,500 suicide attacks having occurring 
historically worldwide (Rosner et. al. 2014).  
Finally, perhaps the greatest technological concern, is that a terrorist or insurgent group will 
gain access to, obtain or construct viable non-conventional weaponry in the form of 
chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons. This concern was realised in the Sarin 
Nerve Agent attack on the Tokyo Subway in March 1995 by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo 
(‘Supreme Truth’), but the lack of refinement and basic dispersal mechanism meant there 
were less fatalities and casualties than there might have been (Murakami 2003). One 
academic expert explained that with “Aum Shinrikyo, the first time there’s been an 
apocalyptic cult avowedly conspiring to obtain weapons of mass destruction, ultimate 
weapons, in order to create Armageddon and accomplish their goal. It is really a watershed 
and that transition from the old form of terrorism, there’s a lot of overlap, but basically the 
definite change is the nineties” (US9). While clearly the impact of such an attack occurring is 
potentially catastrophic, the likelihood is far less than conventional terrorism, due to the 
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technological complexities involved, various state security measures and the fact that for 
many terrorist or insurgent groups, such an attack would be totally counterproductive and 
‘illogical’. Nevertheless, concerns have grown with the rise in the number of religiously or 
racially motivated extremist groups and cults, where such rationality is no longer a barrier to 
their actions (Stern 1999). 
When viewed through the conceptual lens of Sociotechnical Theory, the mirror image 
examples again demonstrate the significant impact of the interface between the ‘human 
factors’ of terrorist skills, capabilities and training, with the various forms of modern 
technological development to form ‘terrorist’ Socio-Technical Systems. These can be dated 
from the original ‘bomb’ time delay mechanism introduced during the latter part of the 
nineteenth Century. However, it is not only weaponry and explosives technology that 
terrorists and insurgents have historically exploited to their advantage (Dobson & Payne 
1979), but also more recent modern forms of communication, information technology and 
transport systems, both to assist their planning, but also as potential targets. In addition, 
the current terrorist and insurgent use of small cohesive semi-independent cells, combining 
all the tasks necessary to conduct an attack and highly motivated by religious or ideological 
extremism, provides a mirror image to the Responsible Autonomy, Adaptability, Whole 
Tasks and Meaningfulness of Tasks outlined in the Sociotechnical Theory at the start of this 
chapter. These technological, tactical and organisational developments and their utilisation 
by terrorists and insurgents for their own purposes have arguably changed the face of 
modern terrorism.  
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g. How Significant is the Technical Interface? 
Having examined the evidence from the interviews and reviewed the mirror image 
examples of terrorist/insurgent use of technology, it becomes apparent that the data 
reflects many of the principles associated with Socio-Technical Theory, outlined at the start 
of the chapter. Firstly, and perhaps most significantly, it highlights the significance of ‘Joint 
Optimisation’, demonstrating that as part of a Socio-Technical System (STS) between human 
and machine, while the technology has to have utility and reliability, it requires a trained 
and skilled human operating it, to ensure the ‘system’ achieves maximum optimisation. The 
research data also demonstrates that in relation to Primary Work Systems, and though from 
a ‘parallel world’, many of the more specialised and basic organisational structures of 
counter-terrorism (and indeed their mirror image in terrorist networks), reflect aspects of 
the Theory; Specifically the concepts of ‘Responsible Autonomy’, with small cohesive teams, 
‘Adaptability’, with the flexibility and capability to adapt to complexity and uncertainty, 
‘Whole Tasks’, with a range of functions being performed by a small team or group and 
‘Meaningfulness of Tasks’, with perceived job significance and motivation. 
At a practical level, this combination of a highly trained human operator with the relevant 
skills and capabilities, along with reliable and practical technology, can have a significant 
impact on the effectiveness of counter-terrorism. However, the adverse is true, that 
effective technology can also promote laziness and a lack of training on the part of its 
human operators, which not only fails to optimise the wider technology, but can build in a 
dangerous over-reliance on a Socio-Technical System (STS) to the point of failure, where 
there is no resilience or back up option. This supports the US SEAL mantra that ‘two is one 
and one is none’.182 For these reasons, it is argued that it is in fact the ‘human factor’ which 
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is the most important in these sociotechnical interfaces, leading one of the interviewed 
ATOs to state that “while the wider counter-terrorism uses and integrates technology, the 
most important factor is still the skill of the Mark 1 human being” (UK38).     
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9. Organisational Culture 
a. Introduction 
While the previous chapters have focused on the more individual aspects of ‘human factors’ 
in counter-terrorism, such as personal relationships with local communities, individual skills 
and capabilities, effective leadership and the interface with technology, the counter-
terrorists exhibiting these factors, whether police officers, intelligence officials or military 
operators, are individual actors within both smaller teams and larger structural 
organisations. Consequently, this chapter will examine the various ‘human factors’ 
associated with both teams and organisations at both meso and macro levels, and how 
these relate to the wider systems and structures of those institutions, in particular the 
impact of organisational culture.  
Such organisational culture can be defined as individual human behaviour within a 
particular organisation, the meaning of that behaviour and how it is affected by the 
organisation’s ideology, mission, vision, values, symbols, systems and structures. Clearly the 
organisational cultures in policing, intelligence and military organisations mirrors concepts 
of such ‘human factors’ in the wider field of management. Thus Johnson has designed what 
he describes as a ‘Cultural Web’, providing a useful framework of factors in organisational 
culture, which are transferable when considering the more specific cases of counter-
terrorist organisations (Johnson 1988): 
 The Paradigm – Organisational Mission and Values 
 Control Systems  
 Organisational Structures 
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 Power Structures 
 Symbols 
 Rituals and Routines 
 Stories and Myths  
Such cultural relationships between the individual and the team or organisation are a two 
way process, and while the nature, personality, education, experiences and views of these 
individual counter-terrorists may shape both the teams and organisations they serve in, the 
organisational culture of the wider institution, reflecting aspects of its history, organisation 
and structure, is equally likely to have an impact on their views, behaviour and outlook. 
Consequently Rowe states that, “almost all organisations have a form of culture associated 
with the values, beliefs and norms that are unique to the occupation and even the individual 
organization” (Rowe 2008: pp.99-100).  
Along with such occupational and organisational cultures, the chapter will also consider 
other factors in the relationship between individual officers, officials and operators with the 
wider organisation, such as the impact of systems and structures along with communication 
and cooperation at the internal, national and international levels. As in the previous 
chapters, as well as examining the research data to identify the significance of these 
institutional dynamics and organisational cultures to effective counter-terrorism, the data 
will also be considered in relation to the concepts of organisational and occupational 
cultures in order to better frame it. Though not necessarily explicitly raised by the 
interviewees themselves, these conceptual frameworks nevertheless provide a useful lens 
and understanding with which to view the emerging data from the research interviews. 
329 
 
Clearly however, space and the focus on primary interview data limit the detail to which 
these concepts can be examined. 
b. Occupational and Organisational Culture 
In relation to occupational culture, Fielding argues that “if occupational culture is to serve as 
an empirically satisfactory concept, as well as a theoretically necessary one, the sense of its 
internal variations and textures must be brought out in the same fashion as have 
conceptions of culture in relation to delinquency” (Fielding 1988: p. 185). Historically, much 
of the previous research on occupational culture in this area has pertained to policing 
organisations, although concepts of military culture will also be considered in this chapter. 
While for obvious reasons of access (previously discussed in the methodology chapter), 
much of this previously published research relates to the general organisations, rather than 
the more specialised counter-terrorist elements within them, it still provides useful insights 
with which to view the interview data.  
The seminal work of Westley, published in 1970, but based upon research on US law 
enforcement from the 1950s, painted a monolithic police culture of solidarity, suspicion and 
secrecy, based on the perception of a hostile public (Westley 1970). Skolnik also reflected 
aspects of this solidarity, with officers covering for each other in the face of perceived 
danger and isolation (Skolnik 1966), while Bittner argued that police culture was framed by 
officers using discretionary powers in an effort to keep the peace and maintain stability 
(Bittner 1967). Clearly, such police occupational cultures, with aspects which are isolationist 
and hostile to the public, undermine the type of Procedural Justice Model discussed in the 
first analytic chapter and the building of trust with the local community. As previously 
discussed, the generation of this trust, and the resulting legitimacy and institutional 
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authority, can prove critical to situational awareness and longer term effectiveness in local 
community based counter terrorism. In their most extreme forms, such negative aspects of 
police culture can also lead to occupational deviance, where officers become involved in 
improper behaviour, abuse of authority, corruption and criminal activities (Baker & Carter 
1986).      
However, more recent research has painted a broader variety and number of occupational 
subcultures within the wider policing occupation. While Reiner still sees an ‘us and them’ 
mentality from the police towards the public, in what he refers to as ‘Cop Culture’, he also 
highlights six common subcultural elements: Suspicion, isolation/solidarity, conservatism, 
machismo, racial prejudice and pragmatism (Reiner 1992). However, Paoline states that, “all 
typology studies identify a group of officers that carry many of the outlooks of the traditional 
conceptualization of police culture… However, these studies also identify contrasting groups 
that do not equally share many of the attitudes, values and norms commonly associated 
with the police culture” (Paoline 2004: p.207). Consequently, he argues that police officers 
cope with the difficulties, strains and risks of their work in different ways, leading to a 
broader typology of five main groups based on their occupational culture (Ibid: p.211-2): 
 Tough Cops – Epitome of traditional monolithic, hostile and cynical ‘cop’ 
 Clean Beat Crime-Fighters – Cynical, but strongly focused on crime fighting 
 Avoiders – Filling in time, doing as little as possible and doesn’t care 
 Problem-Solvers – Cares about job, selective in enforcement & serves community 
 Professionals – Holds positive views of public & supervisors, willing to change 
Though not necessarily culturally transferable from a US law enforcement environment to 
UK policing, certainly from the researcher’s observations during nearly a decade of police 
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service across a variety of roles, this more accurately reflects the breadth of occupational 
subcultures found in policing. Consequently, such a framework provides a broad typology, 
which can not only be applied to wider policing organisations, but arguably also the more 
specialised units within them.  
Along with the more negative factors associated with certain police subcultures which have 
already been discussed, such as hostility to the public, a sense of isolation and secrecy, the 
positive aspects of solidarity and ‘team spirit’ were also raised by some of the criminologists 
mentioned. Certainly, this researcher can testify from his own previous experience, to the 
importance of a team sense of humour as a means of easing tensions and coping with 
stressful situations, while the knowledge that regardless of the situation, hitting the panic 
button on your police radio would lead to every other team member running to assist, was 
very re-assuring. Thus, as well as the more negative aspects associated with organisational 
cultures, “all organisations have cultures and subcultures that to some extent influence the 
behaviour of employees. Many of these cultures and subcultures are consistent with 
legitimate goals and serve as a positive influence on the operations of these organisations” 
(Rowe 2008: p.123). 
With the military, Mastroianni draws a distinction between occupational and organisational 
cultures, stating that “one important dimension, on which organizational cultures may be 
differentiated, is the extent to which they are characterized by an institutional as opposed to 
an occupational orientation. The institutional orientation is conceptualized as rooted in a 
calling to serve higher ideals represented by a shared vision of an organization rather than in 
individual self-interest” (Mastroianni 2005: p.76). Reflecting aspects of the types of 
operational specialisation previously discussed and the smaller more specialised counter-
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terrorist units within wider organisations, he also points out that “there are not only 
differences among individuals within a group, but differences among groups in many 
organisations. Many professions composed of distinct sub-specialities are characterized by a 
sort of pecking order: Surgeons are the elite in the medical profession, as are troop leading 
combat arms soldiers in the Army” (Ibid: p.77-8).  
Thus mirroring aspects of the solidarity and ‘team spirit’ discussed in relation to the police, 
elite military units perhaps exemplify the cultural concept of ‘esprit de corps’ , which though 
difficult to accurately define, combines aspects of ‘team spirit’, ‘group morale’, ‘solidarity’, 
‘fellowship’, ‘duty’ and ‘unit pride’. Such ‘esprit de corps’ is often based on a shared sense of 
pride at membership of an elite unit, having endured and passed the arduous selections and 
continuation training previously discussed in an earlier chapter, and is often reinforced by 
shared traditions, history and specific symbols which form part of that organisational 
culture. Examples might include the award of the ‘Green Beret’ to Royal Marine 
Commandos or USSF, the ‘Red Beret’ to the Parachute Regiment and airborne forces, the 
‘Kepi Blanc’ of the Foreign Legion, earning the ‘Winged Dagger’ and beret as a ‘blade’ of the 
SAS or the ‘Budweiser’ badge of the US Navy SEALS and so forth. Though difficult to 
empirically quantify, this type of organisational, or even unit culture, forms an important 
psychological and mental part of generating team strength in coping with external adversity, 
operational challenges and the loss of colleagues. Thus Sever states in relation to 
organisational culture that, “if the declared values are special and inspirational, employees 
tend to unite around the same ideal” (Sever 2008: p.1).  
Consequently, as well as the more negative aspects associated with occupational and 
organisational cultures, such as hostility to the public, secrecy, occupational deviance and 
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corruption,  organisational culture can also prove an important factor in the internalisation 
of beliefs in a particular organisation or unit and in its objectives and goals. This can clearly 
prove significant, if not critical, to the effectiveness, morale and cohesion of the specialised 
types of policing, intelligence and military counter-terrorist units previously discussed. 
Arguably therefore, organisational culture can be seen as something of a ‘double edged 
sword’, since “culture can possess both negative and positive attributes… organisational 
culture can support the highest professional standards or condone the lowest” (Sever 2008: 
p.1-3). 
c. Policing & Intelligence: Systems and Structures 
As well as the impact of organisational culture on effective counter-terrorism previously 
discussed, the interview data also highlighted the significance of organisational systems and 
structures on this effectiveness. In fact Gultekin argues that organisational culture is directly 
influenced by such systems and structures, stating that “organization size, complexity of 
hierarchy structure, control mechanisms and divisions of labour directly and indirectly 
influence organisational outcomes. These structural aspects also affect administrative 
behaviours and individual behaviours within the organization. Accordingly, structure 
drastically influences organizational culture” (Gultekin 2014: p.510-11). He goes on to argue 
that organisational culture can also be affected by an organisation’s selection processes of 
the types discussed in earlier chapters, “since it can be used to attract, select and preserve 
meticulous personality characteristics in organisations… or alter behaviours within 
organisations”, while “structure may also affect culture through its impact on leadership 
style, because different organizational structures ease different types of leadership, which 
shapes organizational leaders’ behaviours and attitudes” (Gultekin 2014: p.512). 
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This highlights the links between individual skills and capabilities, effective leadership, 
organisational culture and the organisational systems and structures discussed in this 
section, which in effect bring all these factors together, providing a framework for them. 
Consequently, although the focus of the research is on the significance of ‘human factors’ to 
effective counter-terrorism, the interviewees raised the systems and structures of the 
various counter-terrorist organisations they served in, which must be considered due to 
these links and their impact on such ‘human factors’. 
The policing systems and structures in the countries examined for this research varied 
significantly, with most having evolved over time to counter crime, being structured to take 
into account geographical and administrative national divisions (See Table 21 Following). 
However, whilst historically these might have been ideal for local criminal policing, based on 
the concerns and issues raised by various interviewees, the question must be asked as to 
whether some of these policing structures are ‘fit for purpose’ in terms of effectively 
responding to terrorist threats? Such threats not only cross internal boundaries, but as has 
been seen in various attacks and conspiracies over the last decade, are regularly trans-
national in their nature. In addition, these historic organisational structures often seem to 
exacerbate ‘human’ rivalries between certain national policing and intelligence bodies. 
Three main types of policing structure emerged from the data, multiple structures, such as 
the UK and the USA, dual structures, such as France, Spain, Israel and Turkey and the single 
structure, such as Ireland. Each type of national policing structure appeared to have its 
strengths and weaknesses, which impacted on occupational culture, inter organisational 
communication, the sharing and dissemination of intelligence and levels of cooperation and 
rivalry. 
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Table 21: POLICING SYSTEMS & STRUCTURES 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
 Garda CT 
units 
contained in 
‘Crime & 
Security’ 
    Strengths/ 
weaknesses 
of FBI JTTF 
system with 
local police 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Historic 
multiple 
Constabulary 
system (43 + 8 
+ specialists)   
 
Multiple 
Constabularies 
leads to 
problems of 
coordination & 
comms. 
(Bichard 
Enquiry) 
 
Historical 
policing 
rivalries 
between 
Constabularies 
 
Regionalisation 
of counter-
terrorist 
policing in CTU 
 
Need for 
national CT 
Policing and 
formation of 
NCA 
Single 
national 
policing 
body across 
Ireland  
 
Organised in 
6 regions: 
Dublin, 
Northern, 
Eastern, 
Western,  
Southern & 
S.Eastern 
 
However, 
Garda as 
conserve. 
organisation 
& slow to 
change 
 
Rivalry 
between 
specialist & 
geographic 
parts of 
Garda 
 
Dual role 
Airport 
Police work 
closely with 
Garda 
Dual urban/ 
rural police 
structure 
with Police 
Nationale & 
Gendarmerie 
Nationale  
 
Inherent 
rivalry 
between 
both policing 
organisation 
 
Rivalry 
between 
French 
policing & 
intelligence 
organisation 
 
Rivalry 
between 
investigative 
SAT (Paris) & 
SDAT 
(National), 
now in DGSI 
 
Dual 
territorial & 
specialist 
structures of 
PN & GN 
Dual urban/ 
rural police 
structure 
with Policia 
Nacional & 
Guardia Civil  
 
Historic 
rivalry 
between 
both policing 
organisations 
 
Previous lack 
of 
cooperation 
between 
policing & 
intelligence 
bodies 
 
Military roots 
of Guardia 
Civil versus 
modern 
Spanish 
society? 
 
Concern 
Spanish CT 
forces good 
at response 
but not so 
pro-active 
Israeli 
policing 
divided 
into INP 
‘Blue 
Police’/ 
MAGAV 
‘Green 
Police’, 
both 
under 
police 
control 
 
Previous 
tensions 
between 
the INP 
& Shin 
Bet 
 
Previous 
tensions 
MAGAV 
& the 
IDF 
 
6 Comds 
North, 
Central, 
South, 
Jerusal 
Tel Aviv, 
Judea & 
Samaria 
Dual urban/ 
rural police 
structure 
with TNP & 
Jandarma  
 
Rivalry 
between 
the Polis & 
Jandarma 
 
Lack of 
policing and 
intelligence 
cooperation 
despite 
individual 
successes 
 
Jandarma as 
the 
interface 
between 
Turkish 
military & 
Polis 
 
Compulsory 
Polis 
postings to 
SE. Anatolia 
for career 
Multitude 
of policing 
bodies: 
Federal, 
State, 
Municipal, 
Local & 
Tribal  
 
Mass of 
policing 
bodies leads 
to overlap, 
rivalry & 
confusion 
 
Rivalry & 
tensions 
between 
various 
police units 
& also FBI 
 
Internal 
tensions 
within FBI 
between CT 
and 
organised 
crime 
sections 
 
Balancing 
resources & 
demands 
 
The UK has inherited a historical Victorian Constabulary System based around larger 
municipal police forces, special geographical forces and regional or county forces. In total 
there are 43 constabularies in England and Wales, as well as Police Scotland (previously 8 
constabularies) and the PSNI. There are also a number of specialist constabularies, such as 
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British Transport Police (BTP) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Police (McBride & Collins 
2002). A number of UK interviewees expressed concern that having such multiple 
constabularies has led to historical rivalries and problems of coordination, communication 
and the sharing of intelligence for British policing, with some citing the example of the 
Bichard Enquiry.183 Likewise the US, which has historically sought to put a check on 
executive influence, also has a multiple policing structure; however, in its case there are 
over seventeen thousand law enforcement departments and agencies at a series of levels, 
often with geographically and functionally overlapping jurisdictions.184 Many US 
interviewees commented that this mass of law enforcement bodies impinged on both 
regular policing coordination and upon effective counter-terrorism, leading to overlap, 
confusion and rivalry, between the FBI, given primacy for domestic terrorist investigations 
and larger police departments, such as the NYPD and LAPD (US7/23/24).185 
However, in both the UK and US with their very different multiple policing structures, more 
specific structures associated with the regionalisation of counter-terrorist policing were 
raised by the interviewees. In the UK this consists of the Metropolitan Police Counter-
Terrorism Command (CTC - SO15) and the four regional Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs) in 
Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, the West Midlands and Thames Valley. These were 
perceived by national interviewees as better suited to countering the more dispersed nature 
of Islamist terrorism, rather than the previous structures focused on the primacy of London 
based ‘Met –Centric counter-terrorism’ previously used to counter PIRA (Innes & Thiel 
2011). One UK interviewee saw this regionalisation of policing as “a massive step forward’ 
and a ‘halfway house to a national CT policing structure” (UK49), while more recently, this 
drive towards a national counter-terrorist policing structure was highlighted by the Home 
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Affairs Committee recommendation that responsibility for counter-terrorism be removed 
from the Metropolitan Police and transferred to the National Crime Agency (NCA).186 
Dual policing systems have historically been established by France,187 Spain 188 and Turkey189 
with police based in the urban cities and larger towns and ‘Third Force’ gendarmerie type 
officers in the smaller towns, rural areas and countryside. A number of interviews from 
these countries highlighted how such administrative divisions had historically led to 
tensions, rivalry and a lack of cooperation between their national police services.190 A 
French academic specialist explained that “the units report to different ministries… Interior 
for the Police and Defence for the Gendarmerie… so there’s a problem with the exchange of 
information between the forces that report to different ministries” (FR4).  Israel also has its 
policing divided into the INP and MAGAV Border Guards (Katz 1990); however, unlike the 
other countries mentioned, both organisations fall under the single overall command of the 
INP. Interestingly, while Israeli interviewees mentioned organisational rivalry and friction 
with external structures, such as between the INP and the domestic intelligence agency Shin 
Bet and between specialist elements of the MAGAV and the Army, they failed to highlight 
rivalry between the two constituent arms of Israeli policing, possibly because of their joint 
command.191 
Unlike most of the countries examined, Ireland has a single national policing body, An Garda 
Siochana ‘Guardians of the Peace’ (Allen 1999).192 Although one senior officer felt this was 
“a big advantage over most countries” (IR2), another interviewee was concerned that the 
Garda are a “very conservative police force and very slow to change” (IR3). While most of 
the Garda specialist units which deal with terrorism and organised crime reside in the 
‘Crime and Security’ command (IR2/9), 193 as more senior officers in the Garda follow an 
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‘ordinary career path’, they are less inclined to support ‘Crime and Security’ and 
“consequently, even now within the Garda, there is still a rivalry between the specialist sides 
and the geographic organisation” (IR12). On the other hand, Ireland has developed a 
powerful multi-agency capability and approach in the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB), which 
has been active against both ‘subversive’ Republican terrorism and organised crime 
(Williams 2006).194 This successful organisational culture was explained by a Garda officer in 
CAB, who stated, “I as a police officer brought all my powers to the Bureau, so does the 
customs officer, so does the revenue, so does the social worker, and the whole lot come 
together… So you tell me about some terrorist today, I will refer it to one of the teams and 
within a couple of hours you have a full picture within that team room” (IR5).  
With the various countries’ ‘intelligence architecture, a continuing historical legacy which 
emerged was the division of intelligence responsibilities between domestic and foreign 
intelligence organisations, designed around the more traditional roles of internal domestic 
counter-intelligence and external foreign intelligence gathering.195 While domestic counter-
intelligence and external intelligence gathering roles remain responsibilities for such 
organisations, counter-terrorism has generally assumed operational primacy. Given the 
current trans-national nature of modern terrorism, and its transcendence of both internal 
and external security fields and boundaries, such historical organisational divisions have not 
only become blurred, but in some countries have also been the source of major rivalry, 
obstruction and ‘turf wars’ between various national intelligence agencies, often impacting 
on operational capability and contributing to a number of known intelligence failures (Gill & 
Phythian 2006: Chapter 6). Therefore countries with single organisations fulfilling both 
internal and external intelligence roles may theoretically be better structured to 
operationally counter terrorism (Baud 2005: pp.137-40).196 Consequently, the organisation, 
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structure and architecture of these various intelligence organisations may impact on their 
effectiveness to counter terrorism, relationships with other national security and policing 
agencies and indeed, aspects of their organisational culture (See Table 22 Below).   
Table 22: INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS & STRUCTURES 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
1 
  Formation of 
UCLAT in 1984 
to coordinate 
intel. sharing 
Formation of 
CNCA in 2004 
to help 
coordinate 
intel. sharing 
   
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
Historically 
tried & tested 
intel. 
architecture  
of MI5, MI6 & 
GCHQ 
 
Failures in UK 
intel. structure - 
lack of ‘bottom 
up’ capability to 
match ‘top 
down’ &  lack of 
connectivity 
Historical 
development 
of domestic 
Garda S & I & 
external focus 
of G2 
 
Strong 
contacts with 
Garda 
network = 
excellent local 
knowledge 
Benefits of 
amalgamation 
of DST, RG & 
SDAT  to form 
DCRI, now 
DGSI 
 
 
National 
intel. level 
CESID from 
military to 
civilian CNI 
 
Importance 
of CT intel. 
structures 
contained in 
Policia CGI & 
Guardia Civil 
SI  
Historical 
external 
Mossad, 
domestic 
Shin Bet & 
military 
AMAN  
 
Specialist 
field intel. 
capability 
of Mista’ 
Aravim’ – 
‘Being like 
an Arab’ 
National 
intel. 
structure 
of MIT- 
civilian 
increase 
change  
 
Benefit 
of crime-
Terror 
nexus of 
Polis IDB 
FBI NSB or 
separate 
domestic 
intel. 
structure? 
 
FBI intel. 
expansion: 
JTTF, NSB 
2005, FIGs 
2003 
 
FBI Guardian 
System for LE 
reports 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
JTAC formed in 
2003 for CT 
intelligence 
analysis & 
fusion 
 
Regionalisation 
of intelligence 
with RICs/ 
CTIUs 
Benefits of 
organised 
crime & 
terrorist intel. 
both under S 
& I  
 
Garda 
structures 
good for 
Subversives& 
criminals, but 
not so 
applicable to 
Islamists  
 
While more 
operational, 
Ireland not so 
into strategic 
intelligence 
DCRI under 
Police with 
limit of 
influence 
unlike DGSE  
 
Continuing 
rivalry in DGSI 
between 
previous 
structures  
 
French 
‘Maillage’ 
national 
intelligence 
grid between 
Departments, 
Regions, Zones 
& Paris 
 
 
Joint military 
intel. under 
CIFAS 
Significant 
role of 
AMAN 
compared 
to most 
countries’ 
military 
intel. 
 
Intel. 
coverage 
collapse 
post Oslo 
1993-4 & 
return to 
HUMINT 
 
Concept 
of Three 
Circles of 
Intel   
 
Tactical 
HUMINT 
& 
specialist 
field 
intel. of 
Jandarm
a JITEM 
 
Polis IDB 
outside 
the loop 
of Govt. 
policy 
unlike 
MIT 
 
MASK 
National 
Military 
Strategy 
Concept 
Weakness of 
FBI intel. as 
no ‘eyes & 
ears’ on the 
ground 
 
Creation of 
DNI, ODNI & 
NCTC- Intel. 
Reform Act 
2004 
 
DHS post 
9/11, Intel 
Office & RICs 
but  
massive 
bureaucracy 
 
Excess of raw 
data & 
inability to 
analyse 
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A further obstacle which was raised by a number of interviewees as a barrier to effective 
counter-terrorist intelligence, and again a legacy of ‘systems and structures’ inherited from 
the ‘Cold War’ period (Walker 1993), was over-reliance on technological intelligence 
(TECHINT), such as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Communications Intelligence (COMINT), 
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). While these collection 
methods remain essential (Herman 1996), it has often been to the detriment of traditional 
human intelligence (HUMINT) networks. This was reflected by two US interviewees who 
stated that ‘previously US intelligence relied too much on technology rather than human 
intelligence’ (US6/28). Such over-reliance on technology has proved a major systemic 
weakness in countering modern forms of terrorism and insurgency (Baud 2005: pp.123-6).  
As previously discussed, recent attacks by the al-Qaeda network, its affiliates, supporters 
and individuals inspired by its ideology, have tended to rely on non-hierarchical, semi-
independent cells. Since such cells must conspire to plan, prepare and launch an attack, 
human intelligence methods are crucial in identifying a cell, if possible penetrating it, 
establishing their plans, conducting surveillance, identifying members and disrupting or 
arresting them before an attack. Consequently, and particularly since 9/11, there has been a 
concomitant growth in HUMINT capability among most intelligence agencies (Keegan 2003: 
pp.360-5).197 As one Israeli specialist summarised, “the Western World lately became a bit 
addicted to technology, but that’s not enough” (IS10). 
Along with such wider organisational issues, a cross cutting concern raised by interviewees 
at both the Tier 2 and 3 levels, was the level of linkage between the ‘top down’ national 
level intelligence agencies and the ‘bottom up’ community intelligence generated by 
policing intelligence organisations, as discussed in the first analytic chapter. The need for 
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such local policing intelligence to be ‘married to strategic federal level intelligence’ was 
commented upon by a number of US interviewees,198 with one senior LAPD officer stating 
that, “what we aren’t getting is a local perspective, because the FBI is not designed to be the 
eyes and ears of the community, whereas law enforcement understands communities” 
(US18). Likewise a BPD specialist explained that “where I think the disconnect is, is the [lack 
of ] ability for us to push the intelligence we get on the ground level up and their ability to 
push the intelligence they get at a national level down” (US24). UK interviewees also 
perceived domestic intelligence as ‘very much a top down activity, but with a need to 
effectively manage bottom up intelligence’ (UK12/28/38). From around 2005 the UK 
established a number of Regional Intelligence Centres (RICs) both to develop resilience 
outside of London and a regional intelligence focus.199 However, whilst the local police are 
integrated into these, both police and intelligence interviewees believed problems of 
connectivity remained (UK36), as “you cannot have ‘Box’ (MI5) and the RICs sitting in 
splendid isolation, so there is a central role to police and the central intelligence officer. This 
is the basis of ground up field intelligence” (UK28). 
A final cross-cutting organisational culture that emerged in several countries at a Tier 3 
level, related to the national approaches to the collection and exploitation of intelligence. In 
the cases of Ireland, Spain and Israel, interviewees commented on the ‘fast time’ speed and 
exploitation of intelligence. Thus in Ireland a senior Garda explained “we’ll initiate an 
operation within minutes, it might take some time to get in place, but we’ll initiate it in 
minutes” (IR7), while a ‘Crime and Security’ colleague felt this process operated “without the 
paperwork and legal bureaucracy found in the UK” (IR11). Likewise a police interviewee in 
Spain drew a distinction with the UK, stating that while the British spent a lot of time 
developing intelligence in a very scientific way as a highly refined art, “the Spanish approach 
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is very different in that they’ll get an item of intelligence, they’ll look at it, they won’t ignore 
it… they won’t use time by carrying out all sorts of studies and researches, they’ll simply send 
people out to look into it” (SP5). The police specialist explained that this was because of the 
concern that the opportunity to exploit intelligence is very brief, “so they respond very 
quickly, cursorily at times, surprisingly thoroughly at other times” (SP5). A senior Israeli 
police officer highlighted a similar concept of ‘Short Circles’ of intelligence, where the 
operational criticality and timeliness of a piece of intelligence on a planned terrorist attack 
meant it had to be exploited and responded to extremely rapidly, with the time between 
the gathering of intelligence and an operation being up and running measured in hours 
(IS6). 
Nevertheless, other Israeli interviewees were concerned that such an operationally driven 
intelligence focus meant that higher level strategic intelligence became less of a priority and 
might become weakened. This was reflected by interviewees in other countries, with a 
Spanish military officer commenting on his Country’s need to dramatically increase the 
inclusion and quantity of strategic intelligence along with its quality (SP13), while another 
was concerned that the Spanish approach to intelligence was ‘reactive more than pro-active’ 
(SP15). Likewise in Ireland, although operational intelligence has been effective, one former 
Army specialist believed “we are not into strategic intelligence collection and the structured 
use of the intelligence cycle” (IR12). Finally in the US an FBI intelligence analyst stated that 
“since 9/11, intelligence has not been so much strategic, as driving cases at the operational 
and even tactical levels” (US41). 
Consequently, the interview data reflected aspects of Johnson’s ‘Cultural Web’ and 
Gultekin’s emphasis on the impact of systems and structures on organisational culture. 
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Additionally, the data evidenced that across the policing and intelligence fields of the 
various countries, historical systems and structures have evolved which are arguably 
unsuitable for countering modern terrorism or indeed trans-national organised crime. Many 
of these are overly complex, having been added to or adjusted over time, and like any 
machine or operational plan, the more working parts there are, the more chances there are 
for something to go wrong. In many cases, these organisational systems and structures have 
negated effective coordination, communication and the dissemination of intelligence, while 
promoting negative organisational cultures, inter-organisational rivalry and tensions. Thus 
more recently, to better respond to the increased level of threat posed by modern 
terrorism, new regional and joint structures have been developed and older organisational 
systems have been re-structured, updated and expanded. Such measures have improved 
coordination, command and control, the sharing of intelligence, flexibility, streamlining of 
resources and perhaps most importantly, more effective and faster responses to potential 
terrorist threats. It is submitted that they have also impacted on the ‘human factors’ of 
selection and training, leadership, organisational culture, cooperation and communication.   
d. Military vs. Police Firearms? Culture, Mindset & Training 
At the tactical level, despite the type of joint training and close engagement between police 
firearms units and military special forces, which has previously been discussed, the research 
data also raised a very different psychology, mindset and organisational culture between 
the two groups. Thus it was argued that while police firearms units are focused on saving 
life and protecting the public, the military special forces priority is on neutralising the threat. 
This difference of mindset and ethos raised concerns from some of the military interviewees 
that in any Mumbai type or ‘worst case’ scenario, where a ‘bar has been crossed’, the police 
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may be ‘mentally firewalled’ through culture and training to save life and prevent crime, 
rather than striking to aggressively neutralise the threat as the military special forces would 
(UK11/37). As a former senior SAS officer explained, “the SAS are there for the worst case 
scenario. They have the skills, the techniques and the raw operational experience to 
complete such roles. They are used to operating in extremely hostile environments and have 
specialised in counter-terrorist responses. They provide a very hard edge, particularly if you 
were dealing with a Mumbai type scenario. With such a domestic scenario, the SAS overseas 
operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan would pay dividends” (UK37) (Urban 2010). 
Nevertheless, there were also concerns expressed about whether effective leadership, 
decision making and command and control would be exercised during such an incident at 
higher political and strategic levels (UK11/19).   
At the same time, the firearms attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, Utoya, Norway, in 
2011, Westgate Mall, Nairobi in 2013, Ottowa in 2014 and Paris, Copenhagen and Tunisia in 
2015, have heightened concerns over potential future ‘marauding’ attacks, with single or 
multiple terrorist shooters attacking crowded public spaces. This has led police firearms 
teams to: utilise more powerful weaponry and increase training, such as the Metropolitan 
Police SCO19 Teams (UK27/43), modify and expand structures in France (FR12/14)200 and 
introduce additional firearms capabilities in certain forces, such as BTP.201 In the UK, 
additional response plans for such complex firearms attacks have been developed under 
Operation Plato.202 Consequently, along with the national level policing HRU and tactical 
intervention units previously detailed, a number of policing organisations have (either 
historically or more recently) developed regional tactical structures, to better cope with 
geographically distant incidents, speed up response times, provide additional tactically 
trained personnel and coordinate resources. These include the formation of the Garda 
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Regional Support Units (RSU) in 2008 (IR11), the French Brigade de Recherche et 
d’Intervention (BRI) in Paris (FR12), Groupe d’Intervention de la Police Nationale (GIPN), 
based in the main cities across France and its overseas territories (FR14), and Gendarmerie 
Intervention Platoons (PI2G) near Orange and Toulouse (FR14). In addition there are the 
Spanish Policia Grupos Operativos Especiales de Seguridad (GOES) (SP9) and Guardia Civil 
Grupo  Accion Rapide (GAR – previously Grupos Antiterroristas Rurales) (SP2/5/11), the US 
FBI ‘Enhanced’ SWAT teams at around a dozen major cities across the Country and FBI 
SWAT teams at the regional offices (US5).  
However, despite such measures, one SCO19 police firearms instructor questioned whether, 
with such a large scale hostage rescue or tactical intervention, it should become a MACP 
operation? He concluded that “firstly, the military have certain additional assets and 
capabilities for such operations. Secondly, the authorities don’t want the police involved in a 
‘gloves off’ situation as it is more publicly acceptable for the military to use such force. 
Finally, I believe the authorities do not want the police involved if there is a high risk of heavy 
casualties, such as at Beslan” (UK27).203  
A further distinction between police firearms units and military special forces was 
highlighted by Irish interviewees, with an ARW officer explaining that “police forces 
traditionally don’t have as much time to train as they would like, which means that the 
military has more time to train, and we use that time to move things into more complex 
situations and to develop them” (IR8). The corollary was a senior Garda officer and former 
ERU member who stated that “I spoke to the Rangers and my debate with them was, you’ve 
all the time in the world to train and very little practical experience. We have no time to train 
and we’re getting all the practical experience. If we could come somewhere in the middle of 
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that” (IR9). Clearly the same issues apply to police firearms and military special forces in 
other countries and consequently many specialist military units regularly second their 
personnel to policing firearms teams to obtain such regular experience, while on the other 
hand the military also regularly train police firearms teams on additional specialist skills. 
Distinctions were also drawn between types of specialist military units. Thus a former UK 
Intelligence Corps interviewee, who had worked and supported both the SAS and the Royal 
Marines SBS, highlighted differences in background and training between the two Units as 
well as their technical competency. He stated that “currently, the guys in both the SAS and 
the SBS tend to be a lot more IT savvy and are used to more electronics and computers. At 
the same time, the guy’s ages have generally lowered… Generally you find that although all 
the guys at Hereford (SAS) are extremely fit, in other skill sets, you have mixed quality, 
whereas in Poole (SBS), because they all come from the same Royal Marine background, 
they are all at a similar level. In Hereford, because the guys come from a wide range of 
different regiments and corps, they have a myriad of different skill sets, such as technical 
trades and so on” (UK50).   
Regardless of type of unit and whether military or police tactical, the impact of the Mumbai 
terrorist attack in November 2008 (and similar incidents following), with its multiple armed 
terrorists and hostage/barricade situations, demonstrated the criticality of having an 
effective tactical Intervention and hostage rescue capability. Such a situation requires the 
‘human factors’ of effective leadership, enough trained personnel with the right skills and 
capabilities to respond to multiple simultaneous incidents, for these police firearms officers 
or military operators to have the technology, weapons and equipment necessary and 
perhaps most importantly, the right mindset to be able to respond effectively (UK27).  
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e. International Cooperation and Communication  
The research data also highlighted the impact of organisational culture, or at least its 
negative aspects, on the levels of national and international cooperation. Because of the 
complex nature of terrorism, straddling various aspects of national security, effective 
counter terrorism at the national level often requires significant cooperation between many 
different state organisations in the fields of policing, criminal justice, intelligence, security 
and the military (Wilkinson 2006). Historically, because of the negative aspects of 
organisational culture, such as organisational rivalry, excessive secrecy and significant ‘egos 
and empires’, there have been numerous examples of a lack of cooperation in various 
countries, sometimes to the point where it has impacted on operational success. While 
aspects of these issues have already been discussed in relation to national cooperation in 
this chapter, such factors are even more pronounced at an international level (See Table 23 
Following) 
Due to the transnational nature of certain modern terrorist conspiracies, such as 9/11, 
where planning was conducted in one country for an attack in another and launched by 
third country nationals, there has been a significant increase in the level of international 
policing and security cooperation (Wright 2007). At the same time, the nature of terrorism 
has changed, from more traditional terrorist groups looking to make a political statement, 
to less hierarchically structured cells, often motivated by religious extremism, seeking to 
maximize the number of casualties in no warning, mass casualty suicide attacks. Based on 
the level and immediacy of this often trans-national threat to the general public, and 
regardless of ongoing national differences at the top political levels, much of this 
cooperation is facilitated at a bi-lateral level, based on the ‘human factors’ of personal 
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contacts and trust. As a senior FBI official stated, “most US and European countries 
‘practitioners’ have been aggressively working together as they realise that we stand or fall 
together on this issue” (US3). 
Table 23: INTERNATIONAL POLICING COOPERATION 
 UK  IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
1 
The Anglo-
Irish 
Agreement, 
1985, Good 
Friday 
Agreement 
1998 & 
cooperation 
to counter 
PIRA & now 
‘Dissidents’ 
      
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
 Historical 
Irish global 
connection, 
‘outward 
looking’ bi-
lateral 
cooperation 
& support 
for UN & EU 
France as a 
previous 
‘safe-haven’ 
for ETA 
activists  
 
Successful 
policing 
coop. with 
Spain to 
counter ETA  
Importance 
in  signing of 
Acuerdos de 
la Castellana 
1984, as the 
start  of 
increasing 
Franco-
Spanish  
coop. to 
counter ETA 
  At the 
practitioner 
level, the 
US has 
worked 
closely with 
European 
countries 
despite any 
problems at 
political 
level 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Previous UK 
concerns 
over 
allegations 
of individual 
Garda 
collusion 
with PIRA 
Current 
exchange of 
officers 
between 
Garda & 
PSNI leading 
to better 
intel & 
relations 
 
Previous 
concerns 
over alleged 
UK ‘shoot to 
kill’ policy in 
N Ireland 
 
Europol & 
Interpol 
members 
Successes of 
‘truly joint’ 
Franco-
Spanish 
surveillance 
teams 
against ETA 
& extra- 
territorial 
Previous use 
of ‘deniable’ 
paramilitary 
GAL to 
target ETA 
activists in 
France 
 
 
Sense of 
frustration at 
lack of 
international 
cooperation 
in its struggle 
against 
Palestinian 
terrorism 
domestically 
 
Particularly 
due to its 
operational 
experience 
as a 
‘laboratory 
for counter- 
terrorism’ 
Frustration at 
lack of 
international 
support to 
counter the 
PKK, 
particularly 
its overseas 
political & 
fundraising 
arms 
 
Post 9/11 
Turkish 
policing 
experience & 
insight 
countering 
Islamic 
terrorism 
shared 
Concern US 
tends to 
view things 
through 
‘their own 
eyes’ and 
expects 
other 
nations to 
see things 
from their 
perspective 
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Consequently, while much of the emphasis in international policing and intelligence 
cooperation has traditionally been placed on multi-lateral organisations, such as Europol, 
Interpol and the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), the responses from 
interviewees for this research were very-much focused on bi-lateral relationships. The vast 
majority of interviewees who commented on this issue, believed that while multi-lateral 
forums were suitable for less sensitive strategic level sharing and contacts, for the more 
sensitive tactical or operational sharing of intelligence and cooperation, bi-lateral relations, 
usually based on known contacts and trust, were more effective and reliable. In addition, 
with the sharing of sensitive operational or tactical intelligence, such bi-lateral cooperation 
was seen to allow for far greater control over the ‘end-users’ rather than ‘pooling’ 
intelligence into larger multi-lateral forums. As a Spanish Guardia Civil SI intelligence officer 
explained “two is enough, but three, maybe four is more complicated” (SP3). (See Table 24 
Following) 
The UK interviewees felt strongly that the cooperation between the UK and Ireland in the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and continuing policing 
and intelligence cooperation, had proved critical in countering PIRA and reducing the threat 
of ‘Dissident’ Republican groups (Rowan 2003). Consequently, although mention was made 
of previous allegations of individual Garda collusion with PIRA, investigated by the 
Smithwick Tribunal (IR13), the majority commented on the very close cooperation with the 
Garda.204 Likewise for the Irish interviewees, although there was a previous lack of 
cooperation and Irish concerns over RUC and Army actions, “any sense of a ‘shoot to kill’ 
policy by the British security forces has long since gone” (IR12). Currently, ‘the level of Anglo-
Irish cooperation is very high, especially with the PSNI’ (IR4/12), where “Southern Irish police 
go up and work with the PSNI and the PSNI come down and work with Dublin, so the cross 
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border… its nearly becoming a stage where you could kind of nearly go up and work with 
them and expect very little cultural change in what you’re doing day to day” (IR11). The Irish 
interviewees also raised Ireland’s ‘outward looking’ global connections, particularly with the 
US,205 its support for the UN and EU (IR2/7/9/10) and its membership of Europol and 
Interpol through the Garda’s Liaison and Protection unit (IR4/9/10). 
In the case of France and Spain, many of the French interviewees acknowledged that France 
had historically acted as a safe-haven for ETA: as a refuge, for weapons storage, for training 
and the theft of cars.206 However, over time, increasingly successful counter-terrorist 
cooperation between France and Spain had weakened ETA.207 A particular success has been 
the ‘truly joint’ Franco-Spanish police surveillance and investigation teams previously 
discussed, with extra-territoriality, allowing them to operate in the Basque region on both 
sides of the border (FR12). At the same time, a number of the Spanish interviewees 
commented on the historic use of the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion (GAL), a secretive 
para-military grouping, which conducted ‘deniable’ attacks and extra-judicial killings of ETA 
activists in France between 1983 and 1987. This Guerra Sucia or ‘Dirty War’ by the GAL was 
later found to be linked to elements in the Spanish Government of Felipe Gonzalez 
(SP2/4/9) (Woodworth 2002). They pointed out that despite such actions, and particularly 
following the signing of the Acuerdos de la Castellana between Spain and France in 1984, 
that cooperation against ETA between the two countries had improved steadily to the point 
of the joint units previously detailed (SP1/2/3/4/11).  
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Table 24: INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
Traditional 
close 
cooperation 
with English 
speaking 
intel. in the 
‘Five Eyes’ – 
UK, US, 
Canada, 
Australia & 
New Zealand  
 
Previous 
concerns 
over 
cooperating 
with the 
Irish security 
forces 
because of 
allegations 
of leaks and 
collusion 
with PIRA  
 
Importance 
of bilateral 
relationship 
as opposed 
to multi-
lateral 
structures 
 
Internat. 
liaison roles 
of CTELOs 
 
Adaption of 
intel. 
methods to 
Afghanistan 
– ‘The Great 
Game’ 
Previously 
withheld 
intel.  from 
the British 
because of 
concerns of 
alleged 
‘shoot to 
kill’ policy 
but now 
very close 
cooperation 
 
Close 
relations 
with US on 
intel & 
security 
matters 
 
Good EU 
intelligence 
cooperation 
with the 
Club of 
Berne 
Previous 
tensions 
with Spain 
over ‘safe-
haven’ for 
ETA  but 
now truly 
joint Franco 
Spanish 
operations 
 
Coop. with 
N. African 
intelligence 
agencies ‘to 
counter-
terrorism 
before it 
gets to 
France’ 
 
‘Will always 
be intel. 
that must 
remain 
national, 
but some 
can be 
shared, 
especially 
threats’  
 
DCRI now 
DGSI 
benefits 
from police 
control as 
‘easier to 
talk to 
fellow 
police’ 
 
Internat. 
liaison role 
of DCI 
(SCTIP) 
Previous use 
of GAL to 
target ETA in 
France, but 
now joint 
Franco-
Spanish  
operations 
against ETA 
with extra-
territorial 
powers  
 
While keen 
to develop 
internat. 
cooperation, 
traditionally 
loathe to 
share intel. 
with other 
countries 
 
International 
intel. 
cooperation 
seen as 
vital… 
‘Pushing cars 
uphill 
together’ 
 
Close intel. 
cooperation 
with 
Moroccan & 
N. African 
agencies re. 
AQMI in 
Sahel & 
threats to 
Ceuta & 
Melilla 
Frustration 
at what it 
sees as the 
lack of 
internat. CT 
cooperation 
with Israel 
particularly 
given its 
operational 
experience 
 
Concern 
that the lack 
of intel. 
cooperation 
has 
weakened 
CT effect. 
Particularly 
against 
global 
jihadist 
terrorism 
 
Recognition 
of criticality 
of 
‘Intelligence 
Commune.’ 
(IC) both 
nationally & 
between 
countries 
Concerned 
at poor 
internat. 
cooperation 
in 
countering 
the PKK in 
Europe, 
particularly 
its protests/ 
fundraising 
Success of 
internat. CT 
intelligence 
cooperation 
with Alliance 
Base in Paris  
 
Concerns 
‘Fortress 
America’ 
expects 
support 
without 
conditions & 
other 
countries  to 
view the 
situation 
‘through US 
eyes’ 
 
‘While there 
are always 
problems 
between 
countries at 
the political 
level, the 
operators 
will make it 
happen’ 
 
Since 9/11 
far greater 
intel. coop. 
& sharing 
between US 
& partners 
 
Internat. 
liaison roles 
of LEGATs 
 
At a wider level, one French interviewee explained that France had engaged the North 
African countries of the Maghreb, particularly Algeria, having “managed to retain a certain 
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amount of sway and influence with security structures across the other side of the 
Mediterranean and provide advice. So they’re trying to combat terrorism in effect in North 
Africa, as opposed to in France… in advance”  (FR13). Likewise, Spain has cooperated closely 
with Morocco, particularly following a series of suicide attacks in Casablanca in 2003 by al 
Qaida affiliates, which as well as local venues also targeted Spanish interests (SP10/14). 
Various international cooperation and liaison was also discussed in relation to police 
firearms and special forces (See Table 25 Following). In both the UK and Ireland, SCO19 and 
ERU officers respectively mentioned the ATLAS Network which was set up after 9/11, 
providing a forum and bringing together specialist police tactical intervention teams in 
Europe (UK27/IR6) (Block 2007). This “sharing of information and training can only help as it 
might stop you re-inventing the wheel, or could just help you tweak your own procedures” 
(UK27). Consequently, “we have a lot of contact, we train and that, so like cooperation in 
Europe is at a high level… so I’ve visited most of the units in Europe, my lads have been on 
long term courses abroad, so its joint training” (IR6).  
At the same time, military special forces such as the UK SAS and SBS, Irish ARW and US Delta 
not only jointly train internationally in their counter-terrorist roles with similar military 
units, but also with policing units, such as the GIGN, RAID, GEO, UEI, the German GSG-9 and 
FBI HRT, building strong contacts and often exchanging personnel (UK43/IR8/FR9).208 As a 
result of such training a former senior GIGN officer stated that, “we learned a lot with SAS 
training in parachuting, in the rough training to gather intelligence and the SAS also had a 
good exchange with us to learn the GIGN missions, I mean anti-hijack missions, with very 
accurate actions, precise actions” (FR9). Similar international close cooperation, the sharing 
of expertise and joint training were also mentioned by the EOD ‘bomb disposal’ experts 
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(UK21/34/38), with an Irish specialist explaining that “EOD operators from other countries 
have attended our training courses, such as the Spanish Guardia Civil and Policia Nacional, 
the Israelis, the FBI and the Russians and have learnt from that. Likewise, all of them have 
brought little bits of ideas to us” (IR12). 
Table 25: INTERNATIONAL POLICE FIREARMS & MILITARY COOPERATION 
 UK IRELAND FRANCE SPAIN ISRAEL TURKEY US 
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
2 
   Previous 
joint Franco-
Spanish 
operations 
to counter 
ETA cadres- 
Landlord in 
2002 
   
T 
I 
E 
R 
 
3 
SAS regularly 
advise, train 
& operate 
with US & 
other 
Western 
Special 
Forces 
 
Importance 
of ATLAS 
Network & 
international 
police 
tactical 
liaison 
ARW joint 
training 
with 
French 
GIGN, 
German 
GSG-9, 
Dutch BBE 
& Italian 
GIS, 
though 
links with 
SAS not so 
strong 
 
Garda 
ERU joint 
training 
with 
Dutch & 
similar 
European  
police 
tactical 
units 
 
Ordnan. 
Corps 
close 
contact/ 
training 
with  
various 
EOD 
Gendarmerie 
GIGN joint 
training with 
SAS & posting 
of liaison 
officer 
 
Suggestion 
from French 
operator that 
if we could 
set up joint 
French, UK & 
US  Jedburgh 
Teams in 
WWII to 
counter 
Nazism, why 
not now? 
Joint Franco- 
Spanish 
liaison 
teams, 
‘truly’ joint 
& extra-
territorial to 
counter ETA 
Concerns at 
lack of 
international 
cooperation 
with Israel in 
the field of 
counter 
terrorism 
 
Frustration 
that as a 
‘laboratory 
for terrorism’ 
with 
numerous 
tactical 
operational 
experiences 
& lessons, 
Israel is not 
listened to by 
the 
international 
community 
 
Previous 
close coop. & 
joint training 
with Turkish 
military & 
now Greek 
Concern & 
frustration at 
the lack of 
international 
cooperation in 
countering the 
PKK, particularly 
their 
demonstrations 
& fundraising 
 
Concern that 
when American 
military forces 
went into N. 
Iraq in 2003 
during the ‘War 
on Terror’, not 
only did they fail 
to target PKK 
camps, but 
liaised with 
them to 
maintain local 
stability 
US military 
SF close 
relations 
with UK & 
exchange of 
Delta 
personnel 
with SAS & 
close 
relations 
with other 
Western SF 
 
View that US 
military see 
problems 
through ‘US 
Eyes’ & 
unable  to 
comprehend 
or accept 
other 
national 
perspectives 
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While the level of international cooperation between police tactical and military special 
forces appeared particularly strong, one French police tactical firearms officer suggested 
that such international tactical and military cooperation could be even greater (FR12). He 
argued that during WWII with the threat of Nazism and the need to coordinate resistance 
during and following the D Day landings, the Allies formed truly joint ‘Jedburgh Teams’ from 
British, French, American, Belgium and Netherlands special forces. These small three man 
teams performed with great success, playing a vital coordinating role with the local 
resistance forces across occupied Europe (Irwin 2005). Given the current level of threat 
posed by Islamist extremism, he questioned why similar truly multinational  ‘joint teams’ of 
special forces were not being formed and a greater number of ‘joint operations’ were not 
being conducted (FR12). 
However, with interviewees from both Israel and Turkey, the predominant theme which 
emerged was the perceived lack of international cooperation with their respective efforts to 
counter Palestinian terrorism and the Kurdish PKK. In the case of Israel due to its extensive 
operational experience, one military interviewee felt it had become a ‘laboratory in 
terrorism and counter-terrorism’ (IS3) (Byman 2011). Consequently, a security official stated 
that “with the police… we are trying all the time to share our knowledge, because today we 
are working against the same enemy… so we are looking to build a partnership to all the 
countries” (IS11). Similar sentiments were expressed by Turkish interviewees who believed 
that as Turkey had suffered terrorism for ‘forty years with no support’, it had ‘developed a 
great deal of policing and military experience’ (TU2/5). Again it was argued that “there is no 
your terrorism, my terrorism, but a global issue affecting everyone” (TU1). They stated that  
‘particularly since 9/11 and the Istanbul bombings of 2003’ (TU2/3/10), “the mentality of the 
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Turkish National Police is that it is ready to cooperate as much as possible to counter any 
type of terrorism, al-Qaeda, IRA or at any activities anywhere in the World” (TU5).  
Finally, there was a sharp dichotomy between interviewees from the US, with most 
believing that ‘despite problems at a political level, US practitioners have worked closely 
with their European colleagues to develop substantial cooperation’.209 Certainly one retired 
senior UK intelligence official believed that the de facto counter-terrorist model puts the US 
in the centre (UK36). He explained that “this was not planned but just happened with the US 
power, manpower and resources. This puts the UK in an interesting position because of our 
‘special relationship’ with the United States. You can see the benefits of this when you 
compare the relationship of our intelligence services with comparable organisations in other 
countries… joint operations which are truly ‘joint’ and are critical to counter-terrorism” 
(UK36). However, a US security specialist was concerned at “our inability to see things 
through other people’s eyes… either you’re for us or you’re against us. There’s an 
unwillingness to admit that other people have ways of doing things that aren’t the same as 
ours” (US12). An FBI official was also worried that “we have gone too far in some places with 
our counter-terrorist measures such as the idea of ‘Fortress America’, which can prove 
negative in our relations with other countries” (US41). 
When the interview data in this section is viewed through the lens of organisational culture, 
negative factors to effective international cooperation and communication can be 
evidenced, such as tribalism, rivalry, personal fiefdoms and ‘egos and empires’. The data 
identified that while these factors were also common to organisational cooperation at a 
national level, they were more pronounced when it came to international cooperation. 
Arguably, while individual pride and organisational ‘esprit de corps’ are important for 
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motivation and discipline, particularly within specialist police firearms and military special 
forces, this cannot be allowed to develop to such a level that it impacts on operational 
success. Consequently, it is submitted that a critical factor in effective counter-terrorism is 
to mitigate such innate human rivalry, particularly amongst ‘end user practitioners’, through 
joint training and planning, both at the national and international levels. This can improve 
cooperation and communication, develop trust, iron out flaws and problems and enhance 
interoperability and the exchange of tactics, techniques and procedures prior to joint 
operations.   
Nevertheless, the examples also evidenced the significance to international cooperation and 
communication of bi-lateral contact based on ‘human factors’ of ‘tried, tested and trusted’ 
colleagues in the respective countries. This again highlights the significance of building 
personal relationships, but this time with an occupational community of fellow 
‘practitioners’. One Israeli military interviewee explained this by stating that in his opinion 
“to defeat a network you need to build a network” (IS3).  The interviewees provided 
numerous examples of international cooperation to counter terrorist threats, sometimes, as 
in the case of France and Spain, the UK and Ireland, overcoming previous historical 
animosity between the countries and the toleration of terrorist safe havens. In fact, in both 
the cases of the terrorist groups ETA and the PIRA, it was the growing political and 
operational cooperation between respectively France and Spain, the UK and Ireland, which 
proved so vital to the weakening of these terrorist organisations, an end to their terrorist 
campaigns and some measure of peace in respectively the Basque region and Northern 
Ireland.   
357 
 
Consequently, due to the transnational nature of terrorism, it is argued that international 
cooperation and communication is vital, not only for the sharing of ideas, expertise and best 
practice, but equally to properly coordinate complex international counter-terrorist 
operations. The interview data suggests that while multi-national structures are important 
for strategic level coordination and diplomatic or political cooperation, at the more 
operational level, practitioners prefer bi-lateral relationships, often based on the ‘human 
factors’ of mutual trust and friendship, where the end-users of sensitive intelligence can be 
better controlled. This reflects aspects of organisational culture, particularly the behaviour 
and values of individuals within organisations and inter-organisational relations. Much of 
this bi-lateral trust is developed over time through training or working on operations 
together, sharing the same difficulties and conditions and overcoming the same mutual 
problems and obstacles. 
f. Mirror Image: Organisational Cultures and Ideology 
As with all the ‘human factors’ previously discussed, organisational cultures, and the 
ideologies and behaviours behind them, have their mirror image in terrorist and insurgent 
groups. Thus while the previous sections of this chapter have discussed the impact of 
organisational cultures on counter-terrorist organisations, affecting their capabilities, 
cooperation and communication, the mirror image of such organisational cultures and 
supporting ideology can equally affect the structures, behaviour, attack cycles and threat 
posed by terrorist organisations. The impact of these different ideologies and the drivers 
behind them has already been detailed within the ‘Typologies of Terrorism’ Section in the 
previous literature review at the start of the thesis.  
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Arguably the events of 9/11 and numerous international terrorist attacks which have 
followed, have highlighted the fact that terrorism itself, and the potential threat it poses at 
the start of the 21st Century, has changed significantly since the inception of modern 
terrorism in the late 1960’s (Hoffman 2006, Guelke 2006). It is suggested that this is 
predominantly due to a growing shift in the organisational culture and ideological 
motivation behind a number of currently active terrorist groups away from the more 
coercive political or nationalist positions, such as ETA and PIRA, towards terrorism driven by 
religious extremism (Stern 2003, Juergensmeyer 2001). It is submitted that such religiously 
motivated terrorism poses a greater threat than its more secular political and nationalist 
equivalents for a number of reasons:  
Firstly, whilst political or nationalist groups have some restraining concerns, are conscious of 
negative publicity210 and have more of an emphasis on achieving political statements and 
gaining publicity through their attacks, most religious groups are less concerned by such 
matters, with a focus on inflicting the maximum number of casualties. Generally, though not 
always (such as the PKK), this can be seen in examples of political and nationalist groups 
more deliberate targeting of selected individuals, telephone warnings prior to bomb attacks 
in public areas and sometimes bomb attacks against buildings at night or at weekends.211 By 
comparison, religious extremist individuals or groups have tended to launch large scale 
(often suicide) attacks with no warning, and with explosive devices regularly enhanced with 
fragmentation, in an attempt to inflict the maximum number of indiscriminate casualties.212  
Secondly, political or nationalist groups tend to have more tangible temporal objectives, 
such as an independent Palestinian or Basque homeland, or a united Ireland, which allow 
some, albeit often limited, interface and dialogue with the authorities (Bregman 2005, 
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Rowan 2003). Religious groups however, often have a set of intangible theological, spiritual 
or eschatological goals, based on a different ‘worldview’, often providing little or no 
opportunity for common interaction or negotiation.  
Thirdly, although political and nationalist groups are traditionally typically geographically 
localised, by the very nature of their campaigns, religious extremism tends to present a 
nebulous global ideological phenomenon (Sageman 2004, Sirrs et.al.2004, Schweitzer & 
Shay 2003), much harder to pin down and isolate. This in turn means that while many 
political and nationalist groups are domestic in nature, presenting an internal threat, a 
number of religious groups are truly international, such as the al Qaeda and Hezbollah 
networks, presenting an increased external level of threat (Gunaratna 2002, Levitt 2013). 
Finally, religiously motivated terrorism may effectively undermine many traditional 
defences, both physical and legal, most of which are based around the deterrent threat of 
capture, imprisonment, injury or death. Whereas political or nationalist groups may be 
deterred, or will seek a softer target, such defences may not deter a religious suicide 
bomber, who not only has no fear of injury or death, but actively seeks it in martyrdom 
(Sookhdeo 2004, Silke 2006). 
When this mirror image data is considered in relation to the ‘human factor’ of 
organisational culture, it becomes apparent that the shift in the predominant ideological 
driver for terrorism/insurgency from political and nationalist ideologies to religious 
extremism, has also impacted on organisational culture. Arguably therefore, this shift in 
ideology and its associated organisational culture, has not only changed the nature of 
terrorism and insurgency over the last couple of decades, but has also affected many 
terrorist or insurgent groups targeting priorities, increased the level of threat they pose, and 
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made it increasingly difficult for the police and security forces to counter them, due to the 
loose networks of cells as part of a transnational global ideology. 
g. How Significant are Organisational Cultures?  
After reviewing the data which emerged from the various interviews, it became clear that it 
supported aspects of the concepts previously outlined, particularly the ‘Cultural Web’ of 
Johnson and Gultekin’s arguements regarding the impact of systems and structures on 
organisational culture. At the same time, the interview data reflected the arguement that 
occupational and organisational culture can underpin both the worst individual and group 
behaviour or indeed the very best. These negative aspects of both occupational and 
organisational culture amongst policing and other security forces, such as hostility, secrecy, 
isolation and deviance, clearly impact on the public, undermining the effective engagement 
and interaction with local communities, which it has been argued are so critical to both 
effective counter-terrorism in a domestic environment and counter-insurgency overseas. 
The flipside is the role organisational culture can play in supporting positive ‘human factors’, 
such as ‘team spirit’, morale, and a sense of humour.  
In such demanding fields as domestic counter-terrorism or overseas counter-insurgency, 
individual officers and operators are likely to come under intense levels of stress, leading to 
the body producing high levels of the ‘stress hormone’ Cortisol, which can prove harmful 
over an extended period of time. This is countered by secretion of the hormone Dopamine, 
which can be generated by positive emotions and humour. Consequently even at the level 
of the individual operator, a culture of ‘team spirit’, morale and humour can prove critical, 
“such as suggesting it’s about time to get the brews on when coming under (ineffective) 
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enemy fire” (UK22).213 Such positive organisational culture is arguably exemplified by the 
‘esprit de corps’ found in small teams of elite military units.  
However, reflecting both Johnson’s and Gultekin’s concepts, the data also evidences that at 
the organisational level, the ‘human factors’ associated with culture can be significantly 
shaped by an organisation’s systems and structures, the effectiveness of leadership and 
associated command and control infrastructure. In particular, this can affect cooperation 
and communication, internally, nationally and internationally at the micro, meso and macro 
levels, having a profound impact on the effectiveness of both domestic and international 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. In particular the research data highlighted the 
significance of the ‘human factor’ of individual personal relationships and contacts between 
counter-terrorist operators in different organisations and countries, rather than the larger 
multi-lateral organisations at the more strategic levels. Consequently it is argued that the 
‘human factor’ of organisational culture is highly significant to the overall effectiveness of 
counter-terrorism at both the individual and the organisational levels. 
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10. Community Engagement 
a. Introduction 
This final analytic chapter will take the research back full circle, returning to the ‘human 
factors’ of community engagement and personal relationships. However, unlike the first 
analytic chapter, which was focused on the role of those relationships in building 
community trust in the police and security forces, this chapter will explore engagement and 
relationships pertaining to the communities own capabilities to counter terrorism through 
public resilience, awareness, and social cohesion. These are very much based on the 
relationships, dialogue and networks within those communities.  
As an earlier section, ‘The Unlikely Counter Terrorists’ demonstrates, members of the public 
can fulfil important roles in countering terrorism. The role of non-state community actors in 
effectively ‘self-policing’ their own communities over a range of counter-terrorist (and 
criminal) roles, often extending beyond the reach of formal policing and security 
organisations, is particularly significant at this time of austerity with reductions in both 
personnel and funding. The scale of these cutbacks is highlighted by one specialist who 
explained that “the UK police service is under significant threat in its ability to respond to the 
ever increasing demands being made upon its services, particularly because of the on-going 
public sector financial austerity programme. Many Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) 
have warned that further cuts will mean fewer officers. Some have forecast budget cuts until 
2019, with others saying 2020. Among them are Kent Police with a £61 million budget cut 
over the next four years; South Yorkshire Police, with a £49 million reduction between 2016 
and 2020; Merseyside police with £47.5 million less between 2016 and 2019; and Thames 
Valley Police, at £33 million between 2016 and 2018. By 2020, the Metropolitan Police has to 
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save £1.4 billion, with £800 million of new cuts to be made in the coming year” (Swain 2015). 
Similar cuts are equally impacting the policing of communities across many other countries. 
In the wider field of resilience, when preparing for physical emergencies, whether man 
made or natural, such “community resilience is based on a culture of preparedness, in which 
individuals, communities and organisations take responsibility to prepare for, respond to and 
recover from emergencies” (Safer Scotland 2013: p. 4). These principles are equally valid 
when discussing aspects of a community’s social, ideological and cultural resilience, 
identifying internal vulnerabilities and potential weaknesses within the community in order 
to build resilience and better counter ideologies that weaken or undermine social cohesion. 
Thus the same principles of building resilience outlined in the UK Government document are 
equally valid for the threat posed to certain communities by violent extremism and 
radicalisation, providing a useful framework with which to view the data (Safer Scotland 
2013: p. 2). These consist of: 
 Awareness – Engagement with communities to develop a shared understanding of 
the risks they face 
 Landscape Review – Establish what assets are available, both amongst responders 
and the communities themselves 
 Option Appraisal – Establish a strategic approach, deciding who to engage with, in 
what order of priority and how support will be offered 
 Develop and Implement Support with Communities – Creating local activism is key 
to long-term success  
Though clearly the framework was designed for a very different environment and 
circumstances than the overseas counter-insurgency discussed previously, these principles 
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do highlight aspects of the concept of ‘human terrain’ and the importance of community 
engagement examined in the first analytic chapter, specifically the critical importance of 
developing a detailed understanding of the social, cultural, political, demographic and 
linguistic aspects of the community. Consequently, this chapter will consider the resilience 
of communities to terrorism and their role in counter-radicalisation while providing counter 
narratives. Though difficult to accurately define the factors behind such ‘community 
resilience’, an Australian Government document states that “community resilience means 
the capacity of communities to respond positively to crises. It is the ability of a community to 
adapt to pressures and transform itself in a way which makes it more sustainable in the 
future. Rather than simply ‘surviving’ the stressor or change, a resilient community might 
respond in creative ways that fundamentally transform the basis of the community. Possible 
stressors include the broader economic and physical environment influence, as well as 
communities’ internal vulnerabilities” (Australian Social Inclusion Board 2009).  Given the 
nature of current terrorist threats and in particular their internal exploitation of individuals 
and institutions within communities for their own purposes, the chapter will question 
whether a way forward in effective counter-terrorism is the support,  development and 
enhancement of communities against terrorism.  
b. Public Resilience 
While much recent focus has been on the resilience of organisations, technical systems, 
structures and physical infrastructure in the face of potential terrorist threats (Flynn 2004), 
given the community based nature of recent terrorist conspiracies, arguably an important 
‘human factor’ in countering this threat is the level of public resilience found in these local 
communities. Clearly this level of resilience varies widely between individual communities 
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within the various case study countries, in part based on both ‘community’ and ‘national 
culture’, reflecting aspects of the ‘organisational culture’ discussed in the previous chapter, 
but writ large. It is also dependant on the type of historical experience and expertise 
previously discussed, but in this case pertaining to the local community. Thus it is argued 
that the frequency and nature of terrorist attacks impacting on a community, will also affect 
the level of this resilience. As a government publication states, “approaches to building 
community resilience will be different in different places, and should reflect the 
characteristics of communities, their different risk environments and local decisions about 
priorities. In practice, community resilience will reflect the diversity of… communities and the 
risks which they face” (Safer Scotland 2013: p. 5).  
Given this historical experience and number of attacks against the public in Israel, a military 
specialist explained that psychologically “you put the fear as part of your life, you don’t blow 
it out of all proportion, so when you embrace fear, you learn to live with it, it’s easier” (IS10). 
Resulting from the previous level of these attacks, other Israeli interviewees discussed their 
involvement in public awareness and education as a means of developing greater public 
resilience to terrorist attacks since ‘public knowledge is power and reduces the fear of the 
unknown’ (IS3/4/5/7). This is supported by Durodie and Wessely, who state that “one 
primary role is to fill the information vacuum before rumours, myths, misinformation and 
ultimately hoaxes can take their course. Rapid, timely, clear and repeated facts and data 
need to be at hand and presented by trusted sources, appropriate to the relevant 
communities. Much of this can be prepared in advance, but needs to be specific and robust, 
rather than general or vague… If the best form of defence is offence, it is time societies 
moved on to promoting what is known and what they are for, rather than fearing the 
unknown and what they are against ” (Durodie & Wessely 2002: p. 1902). These actions to 
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strengthen community resilience reflect aspects of ‘the Four E’s of Community Resilience’ 
proposed by Edwards (Edwards 2009: Chapter 8): 
 Engagement – Dialogue, feedback and engagement between central government, 
local authorities, emergency planning officers, the emergency services, individuals 
and communities 
 Education – Educating individuals and communities about resilience through 
tailored education programmes 
 Empowerment – Ensure communities have the tools, resources and training to act 
through empowerment 
 Encouragement – Formal and informal institutions and organisations need to 
encourage individuals and communities to play a role through tailored templates 
specifically developed for particular communities 
Aspects of this framework, particularly the provision of education for public awareness, 
highlight the role the academic community can play, by informing politicians, administrators 
and the wider public’s awareness regarding terrorism and insurgency, through their 
collection, analysis and dissemination of research data (Silke ed. 2011). As an Israeli military 
specialist and academic explained, “there is the developing use of social science measures as 
a means of assessing terrorist organisations. These include Systems Analysis, Chaos Theory 
and Fractiles, as a way of understanding and countering terrorist structures… there is the 
growing application of business measures as a means of assessing and sharing knowledge 
on terrorism, such as the use of Knowledge Management and other measures… 
Unfortunately the terrorist organisations are also learning to employ such measures” (IS3). 
Such research is particularly relevant in identifying the causal factors and stages behind a person’s 
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adoption of a ‘worldview’ shaped by violent radicalisation, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Clearly however, there is a fine line between increasing public awareness and 
causing panic, a balance which must be carefully tailored to the specific societies and 
communities being engaged (Durodie & Wessely 2002). 
The differences between communities and the ensuing importance of carefully tailoring 
awareness and education to suit particular communities, was highlighted at a national level 
by a French police specialist who had worked in the UK. He pointed out that “in France, we 
are in a state of ‘equal entitlement’, meaning that in France the population considers that in 
order to protect oneself from the threat of terrorism, we ask for the Government to take 
measures. In the UK… it seems to me that one asks more of the population, ‘take care, be 
vigilant’, ‘be aware of what’s happening’, ‘tell us if you see something’. It’s up to you to 
watch if there’s a problem, we the police for example, we will take measures… In great 
Britain the population is put in charge and made liable, whereas in France, we consider it’s 
the job of the Government to ensure security” (FR12).   
A further factor which was raised generally by a number of interviewees from different case 
study countries, and which is supported by the frameworks previously discussed, is the need 
to establish a strong dialogue and build networks and contacts amongst both community 
leaders, but also activists within the community at the ‘grass roots level’. As the UK 
Government publication on resilience states, “in seeking to build community resilience, it is 
important to establish what organisations are active in an area and try to identify both 
organisations and individuals that could ‘anchor’ community resilience work in different 
communities… It is also important to consider the role that existing community activists and 
elected members can play” (Safer Scotland 2013: p.19)   
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One Spanish interviewee pointed out that for the British public after the 7/7 bombings of 
2005 it had been ‘Business as Usual’, whereas he was concerned that following the Atocha 
bombings on the rail network in Madrid in 2004, there had not been the same level of 
Spanish public resilience (SP16). The flipside was a policing specialist who raised the Spanish 
response in relation to the death of a police tactical team leader, Francisco Javier 
Torronteras, and critical wounding of other officers, when a Spanish Police GEO intervention 
team led by Torronteras attempted to enter the Leganes flat of the Madrid Cell responsible 
for the Atocha bombings. At the moment the GEO team initiated their tactical entry into the 
flat, the terrorists promptly blew themselves and the flat up. Subsequently, “the attitude 
was very much sort of shrugging of the shoulders and saying, ‘hey, but the bad guys were 
killed… one of ours went down and a lot were wounded, but that’s what happens’. Had the 
same situation occurred in the UK, the approach would have been totally different” (SP5).  
Regardless of specific national cases, the importance of building the ‘human factors’ behind 
public and community resilience was perceived by numerous interviewees, while their 
inputs mirrored a number of the factors highlighted by the various concepts and 
frameworks examined for this section. In particular they raised the importance of tailoring 
responder engagement for the particular nature and type of community, the significance of 
providing education and information for community awareness, the criticality of building 
contacts and networks within the community and an awareness of the differences between 
national and community cultures.  
c. Counter Narratives 
As was detailed in the ‘Typology of Terrorism’ section, contained in the earlier literature 
review, the different types of terrorist and insurgent groups are strongly motivated and 
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driven by various forms of religious, nationalist, political, racial or ideological extremism, 
which they use to justify their acts of violence (Bjorgo 2005, Reich 1998). Often such 
ideological drivers lead groups to develop strong narratives in support of their cause, which 
are justified and supported by these extremist ideologies. Such narratives have been 
defined as “powerful resources for influencing target audiences; they offer an alternative 
form of rationality, deeply rooted in culture, which can be used to interpret and frame local 
events and to strategically encourage particular kinds of personal action” (Corman 2011: p. 
42). In the case of terrorism and insurgency, and reflecting earlier discussions in the thesis 
regarding the ‘propaganda of the deed’, Schmid argues that “for too long terrorism has been 
understood primarily in terms of (political) violence. Gradually it has been realised that it 
should be understood more in terms of communication and propaganda. Violence aims at 
behaviour modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same by persuasion. Terrorism 
is a combination of the two, using demonstrative public violence as an instrument of 
psychological warfare” (Schmid 2014: p. 1). 
Historically, many terrorist and insurgent groups over the years have utilised such narratives 
to gain the support of elements within their constituent communities, generate funding and 
attract recruits. Most recently al Qaeda (AQ), its various affiliate, associate or successor 
groups, such as the so called Islamic State (Da’esh), have taken the Salafist and Jihadist 
elements of their ideology and built a “political narrative on the religious tradition of Islam, 
appropriating and transforming key elements from the Qu’ran and the Hadith, from 
Mohammed’s life story and from the early history of Islam for its own ideological purposes” 
(Ibid: p.4). As numerous conspiracies and attacks since before and after the events of 9/11 
have demonstrated, such global narratives not only attract the support of elements from 
within communities in their main ‘theatres of operations’, such as parts of the Middle East, 
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Africa and South East Asia, but also from amongst some members of diaspora communities 
in ‘Western’ and European countries (Clutterbuck & Warnes 2011). Silber, a former director 
of intelligence analysis with the NYPD, categorises these into three main types of 
Plots/conspiracies: Al Qaeda ‘Command and Control’, ‘Suggested/Endorsed’ and ‘Inspired’ 
plots (Silber 2012). As a result there has been a growing concern at the minority of young 
Muslims within diaspora communities who might be vulnerable and susceptible to such 
narratives, either traveling abroad for training and conflict and/or launching attacks on their 
home countries. This has led to what has been referred to by the authorities as ‘the Battle of 
Ideas’.  
Along with the various other ‘hard’ measures that can be used to counter these terrorist 
and insurgent threats, such as police investigations, intelligence development and military 
or police tactical interventions, which have already been discussed in the previous chapters, 
‘soft’ measures can also be utilised, such as building the community relationships discussed 
in the first analytic chapter, and community counter-narratives. As Briggs and Feye explain, 
“counter-narratives cover a broad range of strategies with different aims and messages, 
including picking apart violent extremist ideologies through eroding their intellectual 
framework, attempting to mock, ridicule or undermine the credibility/legitimacy of violent 
extremist messengers; highlighting how extremist activities negatively impact on the 
constituencies they claim to represent, demonstrating how the means they adopt are 
inconsistent with their own beliefs; or questioning their overall effectiveness in achieving 
their stated goals”   (Briggs & Feye 2013: p.23). 
Consequently a range of initiatives have been introduced in European, North American and 
other ‘Western’ countries, which seek to develop closer ties and engagement with these 
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diaspora communities, while providing some element of counter-narratives to the al-Qaeda 
type of Salafi-Jihadist messages (Heffelfinger 2010). While space and focus do not permit a 
detailed examination of these, a single example will suffice, the UK’s Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy CONTEST. This was raised by a police specialist who explained that “as a result of 
9/11, CONTEST was developed and introduced… it deals with the full cycle of terrorism. In a 
nutshell, ‘Prevent’ deals with stopping radicalisation, while ‘Pursue’ deals with disrupting a 
radicalised individual involved in a conspiracy. Those two ‘Ps’ deal with the threat posed by 
terrorists or potential terrorists… Following on from that are ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’. ‘Protect’ 
deals with ‘target hardening’ and ‘Prepare’ deals with resilience, meaning returning to 
normal as soon as possible. Those two ‘Ps’ deal with the vulnerabilities that exist within the 
targeting that the threat brings” (UK48).214   
Clearly, for this section examining counter-narratives, the most relevant part of the wider 
CONTEST Strategy is the ‘Prevent’ Strand. In the most recent UK Government publication on 
CONTEST, three key roles were outlined for the ‘Prevent’ Strand (Home Office 2011):  
 Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those 
who promote it 
 Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support 
 Work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith,  
charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of radicalisation which we 
need to address 
However, despite this strategy and its associated structures, a senior UK Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre (JTAC) official was concerned that “AQ are very effective at doing their 
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propaganda and media, and you can put a very strong case supporting their arguments in 
much the same way that Republicans can make a very strong case for a unified Ireland. You 
can make a very cohesive case that Muslims have been victimised and oppressed, and you 
can demonstrate examples, all sorts of things that will not play well in the media and we’re 
not very effective at putting together a counter argument” (UK8). He went on to explain the 
problem in the UK at a strategic level, asking “Well who in the UK owns the portfolio of 
countering that? Is that the Home Office, is it the FCO, is it intelligence or military? It doesn’t 
sit anywhere and I don’t think we do it very well. It’s not underhand, but I don’t think we 
coherently and well argue our case… the danger is it sort of falls between camps” (UK8). 
While responsibility for the ‘Prevent’ Strand of the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy 
(CONTEST) falls under the Home Office and Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG), there has certainly been some previous confusion over ownership and 
implementation (HMSO July 2011). 
Similar concerns were raised by a former senior military ‘source handler’, who stated that 
“although al-Qaeda have put their public message out, what we’ve done in terms of 
communications strategy is rather than break them up, we have not deconstructed the 
terrorist narrative. We have used the theme of appealing for them to uphold UK society’s 
values, but the radicalised have specifically rejected these” (UK32). This was reinforced at 
the international level by a former US diplomat, who believed that “one of the failures that I 
think we have is we don’t really respond to these things. You know when somebody puts out 
a polemic directed at you; you need to respond in some ways. You can’t fight a war of ideas 
through pantomime, you have to be out there and we have been totally ineffective at that” 
(US6).  
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d. Mirror Image: Radicalisation 
Underlying many of the other mirror image terrorist and insurgent ‘human factors’ 
previously considered in the earlier chapters is radicalisation. Radicalisation acts as a 
catalyst and driver to an individual’s internalisation of extremist ideology, which may lead 
on (though not necessarily) to violent actions. Whilst it is acknowledged that violent 
radicalisation can, and has historically been manifest as a key factor in the motivation of 
various extremist political, nationalistic, ideological and racist acts of violence, such as those 
committed by Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA) in the United Kingdom, since the events of 11th of September 2001 and the 
many ‘Islamist’ terrorist attacks which have followed, much of the focus has been on the 
impact of such radicalisation within minority Muslim communities. Although it is clear that 
the vast majority of Muslim citizens within such minority communities are peaceful, 
integrated and active members of their respective societies, it must be acknowledged that 
currently one of the main security concerns emanates from terrorism which is based on an 
“abusive interpretation of Islam” (EU Commission 2005: p.2), a key driver of which appears 
to be violent radicalisation, opposing the basic principles of dialogue, toleration and respect, 
upon which many ‘liberal democratic’ societies are built. 
Violent radicalisation has been defined by the European Commission as “the phenomenon of 
people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism,” (Ibid: p.2) 
while an official report by the Netherland’s General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) 
refers to radicalism as “the active pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in 
society which may constitute a danger to the continued existence of the democratic legal 
order, and which may involve the use of undemocratic methods that may harm the 
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functioning of the democratic legal order” (AIVD 2004: p.13). The Netherlands report goes 
on to identify several categories of radicalism which pose a threat to the democratic order; 
Antidemocratic radicalism which rejects democracy and seeks to replace it with a different 
system of government, Undemocratic Radicalism which is willing to use undemocratic 
means, whether violent or not, to achieve its goals, and Radicalism Undermining Democracy 
which, while not intentionally anti-democratic, may hamper or undermine the democratic 
order (Ibid: pp.14-15). The process of violent radicalisation itself has been described in a 
New York Police Department (NYPD) monograph, in terms of a four stage process, consisting 
of pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and what is described as jihadization 
(Silber & Bhatt 2007). 
Nevertheless, however one defines or describes such violent radicalisation and its processes 
in relation to the Muslim community, it is clearly a complex phenomenon and consequently 
any analysis must bear in mind a number of factors and issues when examining the wider 
subject of violent radicalisation. Perhaps the most obvious of these is that there is no one 
clear explanation for the processes behind violent radicalisation, but rather a myriad of 
potentially causal factors which vary between radicalised Muslims from different national 
and ethnic backgrounds, denominational groups, and with varying individual motivations. In 
addition to these internal factors from within the community, consideration must also be 
given to externally derived factors, which also impact across the wider non-Muslim 
community, such as class, employment and socio-economic and political status. In the 
context of the majority of most case study countries (clearly excluding Turkey), a further 
external factor to consider is the minority status Muslims and Islam hold within their wider 
national societies. Thus, critical to the examination of this issue is an understanding and 
awareness of the cultural, historical and religious diversity within the broad Muslim 
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community, rather than accepting the portrayal or description of the community in terms of 
a monolithic bloc, as some European and International media have been apt to do.   
A number of other key issues relating to violent radicalisation must also be considered, such 
as the relationship between the wider Muslim community and violently radicalised Muslims, 
often younger second and third generation males, who are willing to use violence in 
response to perceived challenges to their community, and who seek to mobilise Muslim 
support for their version of a ‘true’ Islamic society (Wiktorowicz 2004). It must also be noted 
that the vast majority of Islamic institutions within the case study countries, such as 
Mosques, schools/madrassas, associations/societies, and charities, along with their religious 
and political leaders, have not only played an important role in the cultural and religious life 
of the Muslim communities they serve, but have also acted as points of interface and 
contact with the wider non-Muslim community and the national authorities of their 
countries (Cesari & McLoughlin 2006).  
Nevertheless, some of these institutions, and the individuals associated with them, have 
utilised their positions of authority and respect to act as catalysts and a focus for the 
inculcation and dissemination of violent radicalisation. Finally, consideration must be given 
to the judicial and political position of the Muslim community and Islam as a religion within 
European nations (Shadid & van Koningsveld 2007). Broad counter-radicalisation or counter-
terrorist measures introduced by a country, or indeed official statements referring to them, 
which fail to adequately differentiate between mainstream Islam, the wider Muslim 
community and the small minority of individuals who have been violently radicalised, run 
the risk of being labelled ‘Islamophobic’, exacerbating perceptions of discrimination and 
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isolation, and ultimately proving counterproductive by furthering the conditions conducive 
to radicalisation. 
Whilst, as has been mentioned, there are numerous causal factors in the growth of violent 
radicalisation which vary widely between different Muslim communities and individuals 
within the case study countries, a number of key factors have been identified as either 
significant catalysts or facilitators in this process. Perhaps one of the most significant of 
these is the impact on the individual of perceptions of discrimination and exclusion as part 
of a minority group, leading to feelings of alienation from the wider society. These emotions 
and feelings of exclusion can result in a concomitant desire to ‘belong’ to an exclusive group 
or movement, leaving the individual open to exploitation. As has been seen such individuals 
are vulnerable to the powerful ideas and inflammatory rhetoric of charismatic leaders in 
positions of influence (O’Neill & McGrory 2006), particularly when away from the usual 
social support of family and friends. Hence the process of individual radicalisation is often 
associated with social ‘hotspots’ where contact with such charismatic leaders and 
likeminded groups of individuals can occur. Examples have included societies at schools and 
universities, outward bound and adventure sports groups, mosques, religious centres and 
other places of worship, radical bookshops and community centres, and prisons or young 
offender institutes (Warnes & Hannah 2008). 
Particularly vulnerable to such exploitation are young people, who have not yet had the life 
experience, or developed the maturity, with which to objectively judge such overtures and 
approaches. This has been shown to be particularly the case amongst second and third 
generation offspring of minority immigrant groups within European states. “Young people 
born to immigrant parents and brought up in Europe often have different expectations of the 
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country in which they live from those of their parents. Many do not feel allegiance to their 
parents or grandparents’ countries of origin, religion or cultural background, and thus can 
only really be part of the country where they have grown up and live, but yet they may 
sometimes encounter discrimination within those societies, often due to their cultural, 
linguistic, religious, national and physical differences” (EU Commission 2005: p.14). The 
resulting alienation from both their cultural roots and the society in which they live leaves 
them vulnerable to the radicalisation processes previously described, particularly as some 
find a sense of group inclusion through adopting an extremist interpretation of Islam.  
The use of the internet has effectively expanded the capacity for such radicalization by 
creating a ‘virtual’ network of likeminded individuals, ‘radical preachers’, and web sites 
which mirror the perceived injustices and inequality felt by the individual (Bailey & Grimaila 
2006). The great concern relating to the utilisation of the internet as a means of 
radicalisation and incitement, are inherent in the difficulties of controlling and monitoring 
the flow of information on it, its real time impact and its global reach. Although various 
legislation and measures have been introduced, both by many countries, there are 
obviously major problems in curtailing the use of this medium as a means of radicalisation. 
The media, particularly in ‘open’ societies, can also play a critical role in the area of 
radicalisation, and as discussed in the previous technology chapter, is in effect a ‘double 
edged sword’. While some media has been deliberately utilised to contribute to violent 
radicalisation, the mainstream media must tread a fine line between keeping the public 
informed of ongoing developments, while avoiding adding to the ‘propaganda of the deed’.     
Unfortunately, there have been a number of examples, particularly following major terrorist 
incidents, such as 9/11, the Madrid rail bombings of 3/11 and the London bombings of 7/7, 
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where an element of public reaction, sometimes aggravated by inflammatory journalism, 
has led to the negative labelling of Islam, and the Muslim community as a whole. As well as 
leading to attacks against individuals and institutions within the community in the short 
term, such ‘stereotyping’ has only exacerbated the situation by fuelling tension and 
discrimination, thus inadvertently leading to the growth of violent radicalisation in the 
longer term, while also acting as a catalyst for right wing extremists. As the 1995 Oklahoma 
bombing by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, the 1999 bomb attacks on London minority 
communities by David Copeland and the 2011 Norway bomb and firearms attacks in Oslo 
and Utoya Island by Anders Breivik demonstrate, right wing and neo-Nazi extremists are 
more than capable of terrorist actions themselves.  
While various policing, intelligence and military  responses have helped mitigate and control 
the threat posed by Jihadi-Salafist networks in the immediate term, their transformation 
into a global ideological movement, means that the networks will continue to regenerate 
through violent radicalisation, and thus the threat will remain (Denece 2004). Consequently 
in the longer term, “if no effort is made to counter or dilute the ideology of extremism, then 
support for the al-Qaeda model of Islam among radicalised Muslims will only increase, which 
means that the military campaign against al-Qaeda, even if pursued unrelentingly, may last 
for decades” (Gunaratna 2003). 
Amongst the ‘soft’ measures being introduced to counter such ideology and the influence of 
violent radicalisation as a driver behind terrorist attacks, are an increasing number of 
policies aimed at ensuring greater integration of Muslim minority groups, particularly recent 
immigrants, into the wider society.215 As discussed in the first analytic chapter, a key factor 
in such integration is ensuring that a meaningful dialogue is maintained between the 
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authorities, along with their representatives, and the Muslim minority in the wider society. 
In countering violent radicalisation, such a dialogue and engagement with this community is 
critical, in particular with key moderate religious, political, social, and business leaders, and 
others in the community, who can act as ‘credible messengers’, providing a voice of reason 
and a counterweight to radical ideologues within the Muslim community. 
At a more strategic diplomatic and political level, European and ‘Western’ countries , their 
associates and the international community can seek to identify the root causes of genuine 
and perceived injustices against the Muslim world, and where possible, attempt to address 
some of these key issues, whether political, legal or economic, while building both a strong 
dialogue and actively supporting moderate Muslim political and religious leaders, both in 
Europe and in other countries, in particular where Muslim countries face continuing attacks 
by al-Qaeda, its affiliates and successor organisations such as the so called Islamic State (IS).  
e. The Way Forward? Communities Against Terrorism 
The data in this final analytic chapter has evidenced the importance of utilising engagement 
to build strong community resilience and establishing effective counter-narratives, in order 
to counter the threat posed to community cohesion by the type of violent radicalisation and 
extremism detailed in the previous section. As the interviewees highlighted, these measures 
are very much reliant on a range of ‘human factors’, whether developing personal 
relationships, engaging in inter-community dialogue, delivering education and awareness, 
building networks and contacts or encouraging key individuals within the community. Many 
of these factors were supported by the various concepts and frameworks detailed in 
academic and government publications relating to the subject. 
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However, the research data also highlighted the concerns of a number of interviewees at 
the lack of effectiveness of official government counter-narrative strategies, where arguably 
a key factor reducing their effectiveness was the credibility of the ‘messenger’ (Heffelfinger 
2010). This raises the importance of communities themselves acting to counter the threat of 
violent radicalisation and terrorism, which was recognised by Susan Schofield’s statement 
that “community voices speak the loudest” (Schofield Undated).216 This is supported by 
Staniforth and Sampson 2013), who state that, “terrorists live within communities and 
terrorists operate within communities. The community model therefore seeks to harness the 
collective attributes of communities, by creating long-term trusted relationships between 
charities, groups, residents, schools, clubs and associations, all of whom have a role in 
challenging unacceptable behaviours and extremist views which may, over time, evolve and 
lead to acts of violence and to terrorist activity” (Staniforth and Sampson 2013: p. 271). This 
was also reflected by examples raised in the different case studies which supported the role 
of communities against terrorism. The Spanish interviewees in particular highlighted a 
number of examples and actions which evidenced this significance.  
Thus in Spain “representative groups such as the Association of Immigrants have always 
immediately shown their revulsion at these attacks, especially after 11M” (Atocha 
bombings) (SP6) and “this is preached in Spain’s Mosques and centres of worship” (SP8). In 
fact, following the Atocha rail bombings on the 11th  March 2004, a number of strict security 
measures were introduced, including stops and searches which significantly impacted upon 
the Muslim community, however, “the leaders of the Muslim community in Spain came out 
very much in favour of these measures and they exalted their fellow Muslims to comply with 
the measures, and the reason was that they were very conscious of the fact that… to ensure 
its own security and that for them to co-exist in that culture, they had to impress upon their 
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fellow Muslims that they should fit in with the measures that were being implemented” 
(SP5).  
Perhaps more significantly, a senior Policia CGI officer pointed out that “some of the leaders 
of the Islamic community in Spain have made clear declarations denouncing the terrorist 
phenomenon… the Secretary General of the Islamic Commission of Spain in March 2005… 
declared that Osama bin Laden and his organisation al Qaeda, along with all those who use 
the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet as justification to commit acts of terrorism, have no 
relation to Islam. At the same time, the Secretary General of the Islamic Commission of Spain 
has spoken out against the political demands that were made public… upon which Osama 
bin Laden and his organisation maintain the threat against Spain, based upon the 
reoccupation of Al Andalus”  (SP8).  
The Turkish interviewees previously raised the understanding they had of the Islamist based 
threat of ‘Religious Terrorism’, because of their own Muslim faith, stressing that such 
terrorism was a corruption of their fundamental beliefs (TU5/10/12/14). Effectively part of 
the wider community themselves, the background to the type of ‘Sight Orientated Policing’ 
previously mentioned provides a useful example of both building resilience and countering a 
narrative. As a senior IDB Polis intelligence officer explained, “in the past we thought that 
terrorism was a threat that could only be handled by security officials… In terms of police 
options as well as the regular measures we started to find, we offered some solutions to 
solve the social and economic problems associated with terrorism. With the development of 
this understanding, we established what we call ‘Sight Orientated Policing’. To clarify, we 
reinforced our police intelligence service and ensured it was directed at the right persons, 
this is because people negatively affected by security measures are vulnerable to terrorist 
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ideology… we identified the ideological background to problems in order to solve them” 
(TU3). 
More recently, examples of community counter-narratives have been headlined in the UK, 
when numerous Imams and community leaders wrote an open letter calling on British 
Muslims not to travel to Iraq or Syria to take part in fighting. This came after young 
members of the community travelled to take part in violent Jihad and appeared on an 
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS or Islamic State) propaganda video (Saul 2014). 
Following this, a filmed appeal for the release of British hostage Alan Henning was made by 
several Imams and circulated on social media, while a further open letter from leaders of 
the Muslim community was distributed, appealing for his release (Wright 2014). At a wider 
level, the ‘Not in my Name’ Campaign was established amongst British Muslims to reject 
Islamic State (IS) ideology and actions.  
Consequently, as Heffelfinger summarises, “it may not be possible to entirely eliminate the 
jihadist movement, nor every sympathiser of al-Qaeda, but their support – and ultimately 
their influence and capability – can be greatly reduced by undermining their religious 
legitimacy and ideological justifications for violence” (Heffelfinger 2010: p. 25). Arguably, 
the interview data suggests that the most effective way of achieving this is through the 
‘human factors’ of strengthening community engagement and resilience, developing 
effective counter-narratives and ultimately enhancing and building communities against 
terrorism.  
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11. Conclusion: The Significance of Human Factors to 
Effective Counter-Terrorism  
a. Summary: The Significance of Human Factors 
Throughout this thesis, the data from counter-terrorist practitioners in the fields of policing, 
intelligence and the military, those who have actually experienced and taken part in 
counter-terrorism, has evidenced the significance of ‘human factors’ to effective counter-
terrorism. Indeed, because of the cross cultural nature of the ‘Mark 1 Human Being’, it has 
been argued that many of these ‘human factors’ are eminently transferable from the 
domestic to an overseas counter-insurgency environment. Whether such counter-terrorism 
or counter-insurgency was discussed by the interviewees in relation to personal 
relationships, individual capabilities, effective leadership, the technical interface, 
organisational culture or community engagement, the ‘golden thread’ of the ‘human factor’ 
runs through all these areas. Although these ‘human factors’ have been affected by external 
aspects, such as an organisation’s systems and structures, the nature and level of leadership 
and associated command and control, in every area examined they have arguably played a 
significant role, often proving critical to operational effectiveness.  
Thus the initial analytic chapter evidenced the importance for counter-terrorists of personal 
relationships in building trust, generating legitimacy and establishing institutional authority 
with local communities. Ultimately, it is submitted that both local understanding and the 
generation of community intelligence are predicated on such personal relationships. At the 
individual level, the research interview data demonstrated the importance of counter-
terrorists having certain innate mental, psychological and physical aptitudes, which training 
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can build upon and develop, particularly in the area of the specialised policing, intelligence 
or military units more directly involved in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. The 
data also demonstrated that the ‘human factors’ behind leadership impacted across both 
types of organisation (whether policing, intelligence or military) and at all levels – strategic, 
operational and tactical. However, it also became clear that no matter how effective the 
leadership, the impact of this particular ‘human factor’ was affected by the nature of 
associated command and control structures, linked to the speed and dissemination of 
leadership command decisions, and those intelligence structures, which informed  them. 
In the case of the human interface with technology, the research data highlighted that no 
matter how advanced the technology, without the ‘human factors’ of appropriate training 
and skills to operate it, such technology could become ‘mere window dressing’, promoting a 
potentially dangerous over-reliance and lack of redundancy. Additionally, the two-way 
relationship between the individual counter-terrorist operator and the unit or organisation 
they serve in, can have a significant effect on the development of organisational culture. 
Just as the negative aspects of such organisational culture can bring out the worst in 
individuals, undermining the effectiveness of counter-terrorism, its positive aspects can also 
act as a catalyst for the best ‘team spirit’, morale and esprit de corps. Consequently, 
organisational culture plays a highly important role in counter-terrorism, particularly in the 
areas of internal, national and international cooperation and communication.  
The last area highlighted by interviewees in the research data, was community engagement, 
where relationships, networks, and effective counter-narratives from ‘within’ the 
community are very much dependent upon various ‘human factors’. This engagement, and 
its resulting resilience, was considered particularly critical in countering the type of 
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radicalisation previously discussed, and the associated threat posed by modern forms of 
Islamist terrorism, exploiting vulnerable individuals and institutions within communities and 
weakening their cohesion. However, while still reliant on ‘human factors’, such community 
resilience differed from the previous areas examined, as its focus was on individual 
members of the public and their communities, rather than policing, intelligence and military 
counter-terrorists and the units or organisations they serve. This distinction from policing, 
intelligence and military responses is reflected in the ‘Community Model’ of counter-
terrorism, which will be discussed shortly. 
b. Criminal Justice vs. War Models of Counter-Terrorism  
In several cases, the analytic research chapters have highlighted the tensions between 
policing/criminal justice responses and military responses to terrorism. Traditionally, these 
tensions have been reflected by two main conceptual models of counter-terrorism, the 
‘Criminal-Justice Model’ and the ‘War Model’ (Sometimes referred to as the ‘Military 
Model’). The ‘Criminal-Justice Model’ sees terrorism as a form of violent criminal offence, 
responding through intelligence led policing, investigation and the courts, processing 
terrorists through the criminal justice and penal systems and basing itself on the rule of law. 
Thus Clutterbuck argues that “terrorism inevitably involves the commission of violent crimes 
such as murder, grievous assault and kidnapping. Consequently the investigation, trial and 
punishment of the perpetrators of these offences, irrespective of the motive behind their 
commission are unequivocally a matter for the wider criminal justice system and, in 
particular, the police” (Clutterbuck 2004b: p. 142).  
On the other hand, the ‘War Model’ sees terrorism as a form of low intensity conflict, 
responding through intelligence and military operations, targeting terrorists and basing 
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itself on the rule of war. Consequently, Hoyt states that “terrorist violence is fundamentally 
tactical: Small numbers of activists with increasing, but still limited firepower, engage In 
attacks that resemble ambushes rather than set piece battles. However, terrorists do not 
engage in continuous combat, in linear combat, or (in most cases) in sequential attacks – 
therefore, a wide range of military options deriving from the Western focus on the 
operational level of war may be inapplicable. Critical concepts such as continuity, pursuit, 
and the culminating point of victory must be re-examined in a conflict against small, ruthless 
groups that do not shirk from violating the laws of war” (Hoyt 2004: pp. 162-3).  
The critical discussion driving the distinction between these two models is the dilemma 
facing liberal democratic societies of effectively responding to the threat of terrorism, 
without over-reacting, or introducing measures which undermine the very values and 
freedoms they are seeking to defend (Wilkinson 2006). As the earlier discussion between 
police tactical firearms units and military special forces in the ‘organisational culture’ 
chapter highlighted, “in the criminal justice model, it is the police who exercise the state’s 
monopoly on the use of violence. The rules of engagement, so to speak, involve the use of 
minimal force, which requires an exercise of judgement on the part of the officer(s) involved. 
Military rules of engagement, on the other hand, require the maximal use of force, designed 
to overpower the enemy” (Crelinsten 1998: p. 399). The distinctions between these two 
models of counter-terrorism were made particularly clear in the various types of response 
deployed following the 9/11 attacks of 2001 (Wright 2006).  
Nevertheless, while theoretically many democratic states have based their domestic 
responses to terrorism around the ‘Criminal-Justice Model’, treating terrorism as a crime, in 
reality most countries have adopted a ‘Hybrid Model’, which Pedahzur and Ranstorp 
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describe as the ‘Expanded Criminal Justice Model’ (Pedahzur and Ranstorp 2001). Here, 
while the primary focus is on the criminal justice system, the military are used either 
domestically in a Military Aid to the Civilian Power (MACP) role for security or in ‘worst case 
scenarios’, such as tactical intervention and hostage rescue (as well as in overseas military 
counter-insurgency operations). Consequently, whichever model is followed, the main ‘state 
actors’ dealing directly with terrorism on the ground are the police, the intelligence services 
and elements of the military, who form the primary focus of this research.   
c. Community Model & Possible ‘Intelligence’ Model 
However, more recently, a further type of ‘Community Model’ has been advanced, which as 
discussed previously, relies on the generation of trust by the authorities, strong local 
community interface, dialogue and an effective counter-narrative aimed at countering the 
radicalisation of vulnerable individuals within the community. Consequently, Staniforth, 
Walker and Osborne argue that, “an effective counter-terrorism strategy should now be 
underpinned by a community approach as national security continues to depend upon 
neighbourhood security. Empowering communities, listening to their grievances and 
concerns and supporting their activities and aspirations will all serve to build confident 
communities that are robust and ready to reject not just anti-social behaviour or low level 
criminality but also terrorism” (Staniforth, Walker and Osborne 2010: p. 76). Further, 
Pickering et. al. state that such a ‘Community Model’ has been “increasingly informed by the 
work of Martin Innes (2004, 2006)… In advocating for a Community Intelligence based 
approach to counter-terrorism policing, Innes has argued that Neighbourhood Policing as a 
specific UK based form of community policing, can be used to prevent and deter terrorist 
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incidents through the manufacture of community intelligence ‘feed’” (Pickering et. al. 2008: 
p. 26).  
As well as the role of intelligence in underpinning various policing and military responses, 
the research interviews also highlighted an emerging fourth potential ‘Intelligence Model’ of 
counter-terrorism, based around the F3EA (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse…) and more 
traditional Intelligence cycles. This focuses on the intelligence signatures, command and 
control and information and communication aspects of terrorism, responding through the 
tasking and direction of various human and technical intelligence assets to collect, collate, 
evaluate and interpret intelligence, in order to identify and ‘Find’ terrorist cells or individual 
‘lone actors’. It then uses the longer term cultivation and development of intelligence 
through TECHINT, human sources (HUMINT) and surveillance to ‘fix’ the terrorists’ lifestyles 
and contacts. Finally it ‘finishes’ by disrupting, arresting or targeting the terrorist threat, 
before exploiting, analysing and re-tasking for further action. Depending on the operational 
environment and indeed the country involved, this model may or may not operate under 
the rule of law. As will be argued later in this conclusion, it is submitted that such meso-level 
models of counter-terrorism should not be seen in isolation, or indeed in terms of ‘either-
or’, but rather as different forms of a broader ranging set of ‘tools’ which can be utilised as 
part of a more holistic response to terrorism, dependent upon the circumstances, 
environment, nature and level of the threat.  
d. Linear Spectrum of Responses: Dialogue to Firearms 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, and as discussed at the start of this 
conclusion, ‘human factors’ can be seen running through aspects of all these models of 
counter-terrorism, whether ‘Criminal Justice’, ‘War’ (Military), ‘Community’ or proposed 
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‘Intelligence’ and indeed, whether involving the police, intelligence, military or local 
communities. At the same time the research has highlighted three closely interlinked 
aspects in the role and use of the various ‘human factors’ examined, namely the individual 
counter-terrorist practitioner (officer, official or operator), the ‘human factor’ they are 
utilising and the environment and circumstances they are using it in. Clearly individual 
counter-terrorist measures can vary considerably depending on the nature of these three 
changeable aspects (See Figure 3). 
Figure 3: The Three Aspects of Individual Counter-Terrorism  
 
 
 
 
 
While continually considering these three aspects, and based upon the emerging themes 
from the research, a ‘holistic’ approach to counter-terrorism has been developed, which 
bridges the traditional divides between the ‘Criminal Justice’, ‘War’ and other models of 
counter-terrorism and their associated responses. This highlights a level of operational 
flexibility and the need to respond appropriately across a linear spectrum of responses in 
relation to the environment, nature and level of the threat posed. Thus it is argued that the 
significance of ‘human factors’ to effective counter-terrorism can be seen, whether from 
utilising ‘soft power’ dialogue, engagement and building personal relationships with local 
communities at one end of this spectrum of responses, all the way up to the ‘hard power’ 
Practitioner 
Environment Human Factors 
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use of police firearms teams or military special forces in a tactical intervention role at the 
other. While the use of community dialogue may be inappropriate in dealing with armed 
terrorists launching a marauding firearms attack against the public, where an immediate 
tactical response is required, such dialogue, engagement and the resultant generation of 
local community intelligence might have identified the cell or ‘Lone actor’ at an earlier stage 
of their planning cycle; Thus allowing the generation of HUMINT, surveillance and the use of 
police to arrest them prior to the commencement of their attack.  
e. Three Levels of Counter-Terrorist Response 
This broader linear ‘holistic’ response to counter-terrorism is built upon three levels of 
response, all based on ‘human factors’, from the micro, through the meso to the macro. 
Each of the ascending levels, from micro to macro is grounded upon the proceeding level, 
thus for example the various models of counter-terrorism at the meso level are built upon 
the individual ‘human factors’ detailed at the micro level (See Figure 4). 
Figure 4: The Three Levels of Counter-Terrorist Response 
 
MACRO:
'Holistic' 
Linear Spectrum
MESO: Models of Counter-Terrorism:
'Criminal Justice', 'War', 'Community' & 
'Intelligence' 
MICRO: 'Human Factors' in counter-terrorism: Personal 
Relationships, Individual Capabilities, Effective leadership, 
Technical Interface, Organisational Culture & Community 
Engagement 
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Traditionally, counter-terrorism has regularly been considered in terms of developing 
effective systems and structures. However, at the micro level, the emerging data from the 
thesis highlights the significance of considering effective counter-terrorism not so much in 
terms of broad ‘measures’ or ‘systems and structures’, but rather in terms of those ‘human 
factors’ which underpin them, with a ‘human centric’ focus at the level of the individual 
counter-terrorist operator. As has been detailed, these include building trust with 
individuals and communities through personal relationships, identifying and developing the 
individual skills and capabilities of police officers, intelligence officials and military operators 
and providing effective leadership, command and control at all levels, from the tactical 
through the operational to the strategic. Such ‘human factors’ emerging from the research 
data also included the importance of an effective socio-technical interface to maximise 
‘joint-optimisation’ between human operator and technical equipment, developing a 
productive organisational culture, team spirit and ‘esprit de corps’ and encouraging 
community engagement and resilience to strengthen communities against terrorism.  
As outlined, at more of a meso level, counter-terrorism has been seen in terms of ‘models’ 
of response, in particular the ‘Criminal Justice’ and ‘Military’ or ‘War’ model. While the 
former views terrorism as a violent political or ideologically motivated crime, responding 
through policing and the criminal justice system under the rule of law, the latter sees 
terrorism rather as a form of low-intensity conflict to be responded to through the use of 
military operations and the targeting of terrorist leadership and infrastructure under the 
rules of war. This traditional dichotomy and friction between these two models of response 
was highlighted by the interviewees, particularly those from the respective policing and 
military backgrounds. Perhaps this difference was most significantly highlighted in the 
earlier section outlining the differences between the culture, mindset and training of police 
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firearms intervention teams and military special forces. While many police firearms teams 
focus on the protection of the public and the preservation of life, even that of the 
perpetrator, military special forces are trained to aggressively neutralise the threat utilising 
whatever level of force is necessary. The background to this wider dichotomy and friction 
between responses to terrorism is due in part to the complex nature of terrorism itself, 
which combines a mixture of religious, political, ideological and racial motivations, various 
psychological justifications for the use of violence, the adoption and use of military style 
training, tactics, techniques, procedures and weaponry, all supported by a wider 
overarching criminal intent. However, particularly since the events of 9/11 in 2001, the 
Community ‘model’ of counter-terrorism has emerged, which as previously outlined focuses 
on the generation of community trust through interface, engagement and dialogue, the 
development of counter-narratives and the collective efficacy of the community itself (See 
Sampson et. al. 1997 and Morenoff et. al. 2001).  
f. ‘Holistic’ Spectrum of Counter-Terrorism 
However, as can be seen reflected in the previous analytical chapters, the examined 
interview data highlighted emerging themes and issues which covered aspects from all 
three counter-terrorist models, as well as a possible fourth ‘Intelligence Model’. 
Consequently, at the macro level, the emerging data supports the ‘holistic’ approach to 
counter-terrorism outlined, which bridges these traditional divides and provides a level of 
operational flexibility. This incorporates aspects and responses from all these models in the 
type of wider linear spectrum of response ‘tools’ previously described, from personal 
relationships to tactical intervention, very much dependent upon the environment, 
circumstances, level and nature of threat. 
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Figure 5: ‘Holistic’ Linear Spectrum of Counter-Terrorism 
 
 
 
As a result, although “most studies of terrorism stress either law enforcement or military 
force, with adherents on one side or the other, sometimes turning the debate into virtually a 
theological contest” (Cronin 2004 p. 8), all measures raised are considered as part of this 
‘holistic’ response to terrorism based on the nature, circumstances and level of the threat 
experienced. While this emerging concept tends to support Cronin’s argument, quoted 
earlier in the thesis, that “the response must include law enforcement and military means, 
depending on the situation” (Cronin 2004 p.8), and this was supported by many of the 
respondents, the interview data detailed throughout the research also highlighted the 
distinctions between these two approaches.  
Consequently, it is submitted that this dichotomy is more about when and how such 
responses are utilised, with divisions being exacerbated and highlighted when the responses 
are used inappropriately, or in the wrong situation, rather than as part of a linear and 
‘holistic’ approach to counter-terrorism. This is particularly the case when the nature or 
level of threat requires either more nuanced or specialised types of response. As the 
previous example demonstrates, these responses may range from personal relationships 
and community engagement by local police, all the way up to tactical intervention by police 
firearms or military special forces teams, with each response being appropriate to the 
particular circumstances encountered. 
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g. Conclusion 
In conclusion therefore, based on the emerging issues and evidence raised by the interview 
data for this research concerning ‘human factors’, it is argued that rather than conceptualise 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in terms of specific ‘models’ or broad types of 
response, a more holistic approach should be taken, based on a ‘tool box’ of measures, with 
a linear spectrum of bespoke responses all the way from the ‘soft power’ of dialogue and 
community engagement right up to the ‘hard power’ of police tactical and military 
intervention, depending  upon the environment, circumstances, level and nature of the 
threat. As Wilkinson states, “there is no universally applicable counter-terrorism policy for 
democracies. Every conflict involving terrorism has its own unique characteristics. In order to 
design an appropriate and effective response, each national government and its security 
advisers, will need to take into account the nature and severity of the threat and the 
political, social, economic and strategic context and the capabilities and preparedness of 
their intelligence, police and judicial systems, their anti-terrorism legislation and when 
necessary, the availability and potential value of their military force in aid of the civil power”  
(Wilkinson 2006: p. 203).  
Critically, the various community, policing, intelligence and military responses, and the 
‘human factors’ associated with them, which were previously discussed, should be 
considered and utilised first and foremost based upon their utility and suitability, bearing in 
mind the principles of proportionality, legality, accountability and necessity (PLAN).217 Over-
reaction and the use of unsuitable, inappropriate or excessive types of counter-terrorist, or 
counter-insurgency measures, is likely to merely exacerbate the situation, generating a cycle 
of further extremism and terrorism (Silke 2005). Given the significance of ‘human factors’ in 
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effective counter-terrorism evidenced by the practitioners in this research, it is argued that 
consideration of such sociological ‘human factors’ should form a critical part of any 
deliberations or decisions regarding which response ‘tools’ to select, in order to most 
effectively respond to the threats currently posed by terrorism and insurgency. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 The phrase ‘Operator’ is regularly used in military circles to refer to highly trained individuals in military 
special force units or fulfilling other specialist roles. 
2 Anonymous, sanitised and generalised details of interviewees will be provided in the appendices. While 
providing some insight into the nature and level of the individual interviewee and their unit, service and 
background, these will protect their anonymity and other aspects of sensitivity. 
3 See Clutterbuck, L. and Warnes, R. (2013) ‘Interviewing government and official sources – An introductory 
guide’ in Dolnik, A. (ed.) Conducting Terrorism Field Research – A Guide, London: Routledge.  
4 See for example Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) (2006) Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 
7th July 2005. London: HMSO. Cm 6785 pg iv, final paragraph 
5 See following Definitions section. 
6 See following Methodology Chapter. 
7 Discussion with former US State Department Official, February 2007.  
8 However, seen within the context of Northern Ireland since the early 1970’s (English 2003, Moloney 2002, 
Geraghty 2000), or the Basque region of Spain (Mees 2003, Kurlansky 2000, Clark 1984), the premeditated 
killing of police officers and soldiers by both the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and Basque separatist 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) would not fall under such concepts. 
9 See Combs (2006 Chap. 8) , Wardlaw (1989 Chap. 9) and Gal-Or (1985 Various)  
10 ‘The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’ 
11 ‘Any activity that involves an act that: is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical 
infrastructure or key resources; and must also appear to be intended, to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping’ 
12 See ‘Counter-Terrorist Responses’ Section following.  
13 The Peace of Westphalia 1648 established the model for future international conventions and modern 
nation states, bringing peace after a lengthy period of religious conflict in Europe and framing protocols for 
future conflict amongst nation states. See (Bobbitt 2002). 
14 Originally published in French in 1985 under the title Terrorismes et Guerillas. Paris: Flammarion. 
15 From the testimony of George Tenet, Former Director of the CIA, to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 24th February 2004, discussing al-Qaeda, the affiliate phenomenon, and stateless zones.   
16 Jewish and Christian extremism were also covered during research in Israel and the United States 
respectively. 
17 This is one of a handful of attacks by terrorists utilising non-conventional nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons. For details of such attacks see Stern (1999) pp.60-68 and for details of Sarin and similar weaponry 
see Jane’s (2002).  
18 A number of authors have examined this increasingly common tactical phenomenon including: Gambetta 
(2006), Pape (2005), Bloom (2005), Pedahzur (2005), Oliver & Steinberg (2005), Khosrokhavar (2005), Reuter 
(2004), Davis (2003) and Ganor (2001). 
19 In particular the example of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by the 
Serbian nationalist ‘terrorist’, Gavrilo Princip, in 1914 (Otte 1997). 
20 As the examples of David Copeland in the United Kingdom and Eric Rudolf in the United States demonstrate 
(Kushner 2003, Juergensmeyer 2001a). 
21 Clearly, such social and class divisions between terrorist leadership and the people they claim to be 
representing are not limited to extreme left groups.  
22 The historical Tupameros and Montoneros in Uruguay and Argentina (Calvert 1997, Gillespie 1995, Gearty 
1991), Sendero Luminoso in Peru (Scott-Palmer 1995, Strong 1993), and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia (FARC) in Columbia (Zackrison 2002, Ramirez 1997). 
23 See also the German Red Army Faction (RAF) (Peters 2004, Rojahn 1998, Kellen 1998, Merkl 1995), the 
Italian Red Brigades (BR) (Giorgio 2003, Ferracuti 1998, Drake 1997, Della Porta 1995, Meade 1990) and the 
Greek Revolutionary Organisation 17 November (EO17N) (Kassimeris 2006 & 2001, Bossis 2003). 
24 Such concepts are clearly equally applicable to societies dealing with other forms of terrorist threat, 
particularly in the post 9/11 world.  
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25 The term ‘Monkey Wrenching’ refers to the practice of driving long metal spikes into trees about to be 
felled, with the intention of damaging equipment and injuring loggers (See Laqueur 1999 p.202 and White 
2002 p.233). 
26 See previous ‘History & Definitions’ Section regarding the start of ‘Modern’ terrorism.  
27 For example PIRA -Harrods 1983 (McGladdery 2006), ETA-Hipercor 1987 (San Sebastian 2003), RIRA-Omagh 
1998 (Mooney & O’Toole 2003).  
28 As evidenced by telephone warnings (PIRA, ETA) and attacks on symbolic buildings (Corsican & Breton 
separatists).  
29 Differences have been drawn between more reactive and defensive ‘Anti-terrorist’ measures, as opposed to 
more proactive and offensive ‘Counter-terrorist’ measures. For the purposes of this research, ‘counter-
terrorism’ will be used to refer to all measures, both offensive and defensive.  
30 Historic examples include the Acuerdas de la Castellana signed in 1984 between France and Spain agreeing 
to cooperate against ETA (Reinares & Jaime-Jimenez 2000) , the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, countering the 
PIRA (O’Halpin 2000, Clutterbuck 1990) and the Adana Agreement of 1998, between Turkey and Syria, 
expelling Abdullah Ocalan from Syria and ending Syrian support for the PKK, after the threat of Turkish military 
action. (Larrabee & Lesser 2003). 
31 Reportedly an acronym for Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, Violence Internationale. 
32 Such as the European Arrest Warrant and the Framework Decision on the Freezing of Assets of Suspects 
(New York University 2006a). 
33 Such as the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1978. 
34 The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999, and the draft International Convention for the 
Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism 
35 Such as the UK: Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 
2001, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Terrorism Act 2006, Ireland: Offences Against the State Act 1939, 
France: Law 86-1020, Law 96-647, Securite Quotidienne Law 2001, Spain: Ley Antiterrorista 1978, Organic 
Laws, Political Party Law 2002, Israel: Prevention Of Terrorism Ordnance No. 33 1948, Defence (Emergency) 
Regulations 1945, Turkey: Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 (Terorle Mucadele Kanunu) 1991, US: Omnibus Diplomatic 
Security and Anti-terrorism Act 1986, Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, PATRIOT Act 2001. 
36 Such as electrical power systems (Badolato 2003), telephone systems, gas pipelines, dams, water systems, 
nuclear power plants, computer information systems and oil rigs. 
37 Such as access controls, screening, barriers, perimeter fencing, intrusion detection systems, and security 
guards or law enforcement personnel, designed to both deter and detect terrorists. 
38 They highlight a mnemonic to summarise the attractive features of a potential target, EVIL DONE: Exposed, 
Vital, Iconic, Legitimate, Destructible, Occupied, Near, Easy.  
39 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) 1988 (Hesse & Charalambous 
2004).  
40 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) 2004 (Toddington 2004 & Petersen 2003) 
41 ‘Crime prevention through environmental design’. 
42Increasingly, “the potential for coordinated attacks means that local responders must have the capacity to 
respond to multiple incidents at multiple locations” (Houghton & Schachter 2005 p.15). 
43 See Bolz 2005 for examples and techniques of bomb scene preservation and investigation.  
44 This unit also fulfils the domestic intelligence role. 
45 Established in 1923. 
46 Key historical examples of such policing include the work of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) (Doherty 
2004, Barker 2004, Ryder 1992a), the Spanish Cuerpo Nacional de Policia (CNP) (Jimenez 2002, Maguire 1995) 
and Ertzaina (Otalora & Calabor Undated, Trevino 1982), the Israeli National Police (INP) (Haberfeld & Herzog 
2000, Meyr 2000) and the Turkish National Police (Turkish National Police 2004, Caglar 2003). 
47 For ‘intelligence cycle’ procedures utilised to generate such actionable intelligence see Wardlaw (1989 
pp.138-45) and Gill and Phythian (2006), while Baud (2005) examines resulting products. 
48 Seger (1990 pp.83-9), Hoffman (2006 pp.249-50) and Combs (2006 p.259) point out that terrorist 
organisations utilise some of the same intelligence gathering methods to assist in their target selection and 
operational planning. 
49 Such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and the use of advanced computer 
systems 
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50 Examples include the German use of the Kommissar computer system (Combs 2006 p.253) and the 
international monitoring of mobile and satellite telephones (Keegan 2003 p.361).  
51 Such as the UK’s Security Service (MI5) (Hollingsworth & Fielding 2003, Andrew 1986) and Secret Intelligence 
Service (MI6) (Smith 2004, Urban 1997), the French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) (Chalk and 
Rosenau 2004, Merlen & Ploquin 2003) and Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE) (Warusfel 
2003, Porch 1997), the Israeli Shin Bet (Black & Morris 1991, Katz 1990, Deacon 1977) and Mossad (Thomas 
2006 & 2000, Payne 1990), the US FBI (Holden 2005, Clarke 2004, Lance 2003) and CIA (Kessler 2003, Pillar 
2003, Powers 2001), the German Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV) (Thuillier 2000) and 
Bundesnachrichtendienst  (BND) (Todd & Bloch 2003) and the Italian Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza 
Democratica (SISDE) (Jamieson 2000, Baud 1998) and the  Servizio per le Informazioni e le Sicurezza Militare 
(SISMI) (Thuillier 2000).   
52 Such as the Spanish Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), (Bennet 2002, Thuillier 2000), Turkish Milli 
Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT) (Bennett 2002, Baud 1998), and Dutch Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst 
(AIVD) (Punch & Cramphorn 2006, Muller 2003). 
53 Such as the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) (Intelligence & Security Committee 2006), the French 
Unite de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-terroriste (UCLAT) (Premier Ministre 2006, UCLAT 2003), the Spanish 
Centro Nacional de Coordinacion Antiterrorista (CNCA 2005), German Gemeinsame 
Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ) (Dietl 2006) and the US National Counter Terrorist Center (NCTC), the Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), various Joint Regional Intelligence Centres (JRICs) and other intelligence ‘Fusion’ 
cells (9/11 Commission 2005) 
54 Such as the UKUSA accord, CAZAB group, Le ‘Safari Club’, Le Club Mediterranee, the Kilowatt Group and the 
Club of Berne (Baud 2005 pp.253-265).  
55 Australian intelligence officer quoted in Linklater, M. ‘Riyadh’s lesson: Spies in the Sky have never been a 
Match for Spooks in the Souks’, Times 15/05/03. 
56 For the purposes of  this research the word ‘paramilitary’ is used to refer to either ‘third force’ gendarmerie 
type units, or specialist units employed by intelligence organisations.   
57 Such as the British military in Northern Ireland (Taylor 2002, Urban 1992, Ryder 1992b, Dewar 1990 & 1985, 
Barzilay 1973-8), Spanish forces in the Basque region (Ramos 2005, Harclerode 2000), the Turkish military in 
South Eastern Anatolia (Akinan 2007, Agar 2004, Scott 2000 & 1998, Charlier 1995), Israeli forces in Israel, the 
West Bank and Gaza (Herzog & Gazit 2005, Van Creveld 2002, Bregman 2002, Gal-Or 1990), Indian troops in 
Kashmir (Burke 2006, Santhanam 2003, Margolis 2001), and the Russian army in Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus region (Hahn 2007, Murphy 2006,  Schultz & Dew 2006, Seely 2001, Smith 2001, Oliker 2001). 
58 Such as the stationing of light tanks outside Heathrow in 2003 (Boim & Burdette 2004); The use of the Irish 
Army, to assist in kidnap enquiries (Howard 2004, Davidson 2003) and the protection of security vans, 
particularly after the 1996 murder of Detective Garda  McCabe during a terrorist fundraising robbery (Horgan 
2005, Allen 1999); French use of high profile army patrols in the Metro as part of their Vigipirate security plan 
following bombings in 1995-6 (Parmentier 2006, Gregory 2003); Spanish military patrols of trains following the 
Madrid rail bombings of 2004 (Jordan & Horsburgh 2005a, Dossiers Actuels 2004), the clampdown by the 
Italian army in Sicily following the Mafia killings of Judges Falcone and Borsellino in 1992 (Jamieson 2000, 
Husson 1994), the use of Australian forces for security after a bomb attack on the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in 1978 (Wardlaw 1989), and the saturation of Montreal by Canadian troops in 1970, to 
counter the FLQ (Combs 2006).  
59 Also German Bundesgrenzschutz Border Guards (Malthaner & Waldmann 2003, Meyr 2001, Horchem 1993) 
Italian Carabinieri (Lutiis 2003, Stortoni-Wortmann 2000, Ludovici 1998), Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussee  
Royal Military Police (Benyon 1993) and Belgium Gendarmerie Royale/Rijkswacht (Laufer 1988). 
60 Such as the UK SAS (Geraghty 2002, Davies 1996, Adams 1988a) and Metropolitan Police Specialist Firearms 
Officer (SFO) Teams (Gray 2006, Collins 1998), Irish Army Ranger Wing (ARW) (Irish Defence Forces 2001, Katz 
2000) and Garda Emergency Response Team (ERT) (Bennett 2003, Walsh 2003, Mooney & O’Toole 2003), 
French Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) (Bernard 2003, Micheletti 1999a, Lloyd 
1995) and Police Recherche Assistance Intervention Dissuasion (RAID) (Ministere de l’Interieur 2005, Ryan 
2003, Courtois 1999), Spanish Guardia Civil Grupo de Accion Rapida (GAR) and Unidad Especial de Intervencion 
(UEI) (Diez 2000, Guardia Civil 1994) and Policia Grupo Especial de Operaciones (GEO) (Diez 2001, Katz 1995), 
Israeli Sayeret Matkal (Netanyahu 2002, Betser 1996, Katz 1993 & 1992a) and Border Guards Yamam (Meyr 
2003, Katz 1993), Turkish Ozel Harekat Polisi, (Metzner & Friedrich 2002, Dilmac1997), and US 1st Special 
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Forces Operational Detachment – (SFOD) Delta (Griswold & Giangreco 2005, Haney 2002, Adams 1988b, 
Beckwith 1984), Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) Team 6 (Couch 2005, Pfarrer 2004, Dunnigan 2003, Tomajczyk 1997) 
and US FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) (Holden 2005, Whitcomb 2001). 
61 In a fairly unique hostage rescue operation in 1978, the French deployed their Foreign Legion Paratroopers 
to rescue European expatriates in Kolwezi, Zaire (Simpson 1999).  
62 Such as the Israeli use of Mossad ‘Wrath of God’ hit squads after the 1972 Munich attack on its athletes 
(Jonas 2006, Klein 2005, Reeve 2000, Tinnin 1976), its targeting of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
activists in ‘targeted killings’ (Hafez & Hatfield 2006, Ganor 2005a), the Spanish use of mercenaries in Grupos 
Antiterroristas de Liberacion (GAL) hit teams, to target ETA activists in France during the 1980s (Satue 2005, 
Woodworth 2002, Rivers 1985), the collusion of British security forces with Loyalist terrorists to target 
members of PIRA (Stevens 2006, J. O’Brien 2005, Davies 1999), and the use of air strikes, unmanned drones 
and missiles by the US to target both the al-Qaeda network and individuals (Maogoto 2006). 
63 Such as the UK military’s 14 Intelligence Company (Rennie 1997) and Force Research Unit (FRU) in Northern 
Ireland (Harclerode 2000, Weale 1997), the various Israeli military and Police Mista’aravim Arabists in the 
West Bank and Gaza (Miller 2002, Katz 1993) and Turkish Ozel Tim ‘Special Teams’ (Aktan & Koknar 2002, 
Panico 1996) in South Eastern Anatolia. 
64 Such as the United Kingdoms Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) (Griffin 2006), United States 
Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) (Smith M. 2006, White 1992) and ‘Paramilitary’ CIA Special Operations 
Group (SOG) (Schroen 2006, Southworth & Tanner 2002). 
65 Additionally in  2001 it was shockingly demonstrated that large passenger aircraft full of aviation fuel could 
be used as massive blast-incendiary suicide bombs 
66 This recommended six responses: Greater police and judicial cooperation, improved diplomatic activity with 
the US and defence and security in Europe, improved humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, improved airport 
security across Member States, improved targeting of terrorist finance with additional measures to those 
recommended by the UN Convention, and finally improved emergency preparedness between the Member 
States.  
67 These recommended the ratification and implementation of UN instruments, criminalising money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, freezing and confiscating terrorist assets, reporting suspicious 
transactions, improving international cooperation, licensing Hawala remittance agents, including key 
information on wire money transfers, and reviewing laws and regulations for their adequacy to monitor.  
68 Due to their very nature and ‘openness’, democratic societies are far more prone to terrorism than 
authoritarian regimes, which are fully prepared to use brutally  repressive means to eliminate such a threat 
and hence have historically not been targeted to the same degree.     
69 Such liberties are enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): the right to life, the 
prohibition of torture, the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for private 
and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly 
and association.  
70 Such as the Oklahoma bombing of 1995 (Linenthal 2001), Omagh bombing of August 1998 (Mooney & 
O’Toole 2003), bus, café and store suicide attacks in Israel (Catignani 2005), the 9/11 attacks (Hampton 2003, 
Baxter & Downing 2001), the Madrid train bombings of 2004 (Vidino 2006), the 7/7 London bombings (Ahmed 
2006, Tulloch 2006) and the Beslan School siege (Phillips 2007). 
71 It is submitted that just as it was found that an effective way to counter guerrilla warfare was to use small 
groups of special forces utilising the same tactics and techniques as the guerrilla’s, so too, to counter an 
ideologically driven global movement involved in terrorism, the authorities must also respond by introducing 
counter-ideology.  
72 The phrase ‘Re-imagining Counter-Terrorism’ was coined by US interviewee number six (US6)… See 
Methodology chapter following.   
73 Many specialists differentiate between the more proactive ‘counter-terrorism’, including intelligence, 
military and police options, and the more reactive ‘anti-terrorism’, including legislation and various security 
measures. For the purpose of this research ‘counter-terrorism’ has been used to describe all measures used to 
counter terrorism, whether proactive or reactive, offensive or defensive, without differentiation.  
74 N = 172 interviews of senior and specialist police officers, intelligence officials and military Special Forces 
operators. 
75 With the exception of the specific questions pertinent to Christian and Jewish religious extremism in the 
United States and Israel. 
400 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
76 These can be considered ‘Key Informant Interviews’ because of the privileged position and access to subject 
knowledge and expertise of both senior and specialist interviewees. For more details on ‘Key Informant 
Interviews’ and a detailed analysis of interviewing methodology, see Fielding as referenced.  
77 These are the Metropolitan, Thames Valley, Greater Manchester, West Midlands and West Yorkshire Police. 
78 The phrase ‘circular reporting’ has been taken from the field of intelligence, where the same strand or piece 
of intelligence is continually repeated by different sources and can consequently take on an inappropriate 
significance. In this context ‘circular reporting’ is used where the same academic material is continually 
adapted, referenced and repeated over a period of time, resulting in a similar effect.  
79 The concept of human terrain is described as ‘a broad and complex subject which brings together sociology, 
political science, geography, regional studies, linguistics and intelligence. Its scope ranges from understanding 
individuals, particularly key leaders, through groups to societies and trans-national influences’ Army Field 
Manual (AFM) – Countering Insurgency, Vol 1 – Part 10 (Warminster, Ministry of Defence (MOD), 2010). pp. 3-
4 
80 Researcher’s experience based on eleven field research visits to both Iraq and Afghanistan between 2008-
13.  
81 In the first, a landlord’s report that two tenants had failed to pay their rent led to the tenants making off 
when the local Gendarmerie arrived, the subsequent search of the flat and recovery of part of eight and a half 
tons of stolen ‘Titadyne’ commercial explosive. This had been stolen by the Basque terrorist group Euzkadi ta 
Askatasuna (ETA - Basque Fatherland and Freedom) and the Breton separatist group Armee Revolutionnaire 
Bretonne (ARB - Breton Revolutionary Army) in a joint raid on the Cotes d’Armor factory in Plevin, Brittany in 
1999. Some of the unrecovered explosives were subsequently utilised in fatal bomb attacks in both France & 
Spain. In the second incident, a Spanish couple renting a flat in the Bordeaux region, paid a large amount of 
cash up front for several months in advance. This raised the landlord’s suspicions, which he reported to the 
local Gendarmerie. As a result, one month later in September 2002, following a joint Franco-Spanish police 
operation, the couple were arrested and identified as the heads of the military wing of ETA. 
82 This forms the primary element in the construction of the Home Made Explosive (HME) ANFO (Ammonium 
Nitrate and Fuel Oil), a powerful ‘shifting’ explosive, regularly used by terrorist groups such as the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA).  
83 HMTD – Hexa-Methylene Tri-Peroxide Diamine, a very unstable Peroxide based HME.  
84 Irish ‘Peacekeepers’ have served in Congo, Cyprus, Sinai, Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, East 
Timor, Afghanistan and Chad.  
85 Interviews SP3, SP5, SP7, SP8, SP10, SP11, SP12, SP13 and SP15 
86 The example also shows similar aspects to the Symbolic Assailant Theory, again originally framed around 
domestic policing (Skolnik 1966), viewing all individuals from a particular group or community as potential 
threats until they can prove otherwise. However, this clearly does not have the same ‘resonance’ or 
applicability in an overseas counter-insurgency environment, where the friendly local farmer or market trader 
in the daytime may well be involved in planting Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or ambushing military 
patrols at night – Based on various researcher conversations with Coalition forces in Afghanistan.   
87 Interviews UK1, UK6, UK11, UK15, UK18, UK33 and UK36.  
88 Interviews IR1, IR2, IR3, IR4, IR7, IR9 and IR11.  
89 The Garda National Surveillance Unit (NSU) sits under the command of ‘Crime and Security’ in Dublin, and is 
the premier national unit responsible for conducting surveillance and generating intelligence on terrorists and 
organised criminals in Ireland.   
90 Interviews US1, US3, US5, US8, US13, US25, US30, US34 and US41. These 17 Intelligence agencies are: Air 
Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, 
Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps 
Intelligence, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security 
Agency, Navy Intelligence and Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  
91 Interviews FR1, FR2, FR4, FR7, FR10, FR14 and FR15. 
92 The Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action (BCRA) was General de Gaulle’s Free French specialist 
intelligence organisation, while the 11th ‘Shock’ paratroops was a specialist military unit utilised by the French 
intelligence services for ‘Direct Action’.  
93 In July 1973 a Mossad hit team shot and killed a Moroccan waiter, Ahmed Bouchiki in the small Norwegian 
town of Lillehammer. It later became clear he had been mistakenly identified as Ali Hassan Salameh, a leader 
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in the Palestinian Black September organisation and the mastermind of the 1972 killings of Israeli athletes at 
the Munich Olympics. 
94 Increasing concerns over the wearing of military uniforms in public have been raised in the UK following the 
murder of Drummer Lee Rigby by Islamist extremists outside Woolwich Barracks in May 2013. 
95 A Man Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) is a shoulder launched Surface to Air Missile (SAM). As well 
as troops, ‘Scimitar’ Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicles (ARV) were deployed around Heathrow Airport, along 
with less visible security measures. 
96 Interviews US12, US17, US19, US26, US28, US35 and US39.  
97 This notably included additional airport security at numerous airports across the US following the 9/11 
attacks and in 2006 during Operation Overt in the UK, a conspiracy to down trans-Atlantic airliners with liquid 
explosives (US26).  
98 Interviews US3, US5, US7, US11, US17, US34, US39 and UK43.  
99 On several previous historical occasions the Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri (TSK) or ‘Turkish Armed Forces’ have 
directly intervened domestically and seized power when they perceived the political system as having failed, in 
1960, 1971 and 1980. Additionally in 1997 through its influence, the Turkish military forced the Islamist 
government of Necmettin Erbakan out of office in a ‘bloodless coup’.  
100 In fact in Israel, while the Druze and Circassian minorities also complete mandatory military service along 
with the Jewish majority, the ‘Ultra-Orthodox’ Jewish Haredim have previously been granted exemption. This 
has led to significant tensions between secular and religious elements in Israeli society (Rubin 2012). 
101 This is based on the researchers experience conducting field research in both Iraq and Afghanistan between 
2008 and 2013. 
102 The US Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Orientated Policing Services (COPS) states that ‘Community 
Policing is a philosophy that promotes organisational strategies which support the systematic use of 
partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to 
public safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime’. See www.cops.usdoj.gov In a different 
policing environment, the Northern Ireland Policing Board point out that ‘A major objective for the PSNI (Police 
Service of Northern Ireland) is to establish active partnerships between the police, the community and other 
relevant bodies through which crime, service delivery and police-community relations can be analysed and 
appropriate solutions designed and implemented’. See www.nipolicingboard.org.uk  
103 Researchers experience while serving on a uniformed response team from 1998 to 2002. 
104 Within the United Kingdom for example, Community Policing forms an important element in the ‘Prevent’ 
strand of the wider UK ‘National Counter Terrorist Strategy’, widely known as CONTEST.  
105 Interviews UK1, UK2, UK7, UK12, UK13, UK14, UK16, UK20, UK28, UK33, UK35, UK36, UK41 and UK45.  
106 However, over a number of decades the Guardia Civil has paid a high price in hundreds of casualties for its 
success against ETA. See In Memoriam, Viquera (undated) pp.256-7  
107 Interviews US1, US2, US9, US16, US26 and US27.  
108 Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS). 
109 Although the concept of Intelligence led Policing (ILP), emerged during the 1990s, the actual development 
of intelligence work as a police function is much older. Consequently, while ILP has been described as ‘a 
strategic, future-orientated and targeted approach to crime control focusing upon the identification, analysis 
and management of persisting and developing problems or risks’, the development of such pro-active 
intelligence in a counter terrorist context can be traced back to the latter part of the 19th Century and the 
formation of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. 
110 Researcher conversation with FBI official in 2007.  
111 Interviews US12, US14, US15, US18, US20, US21, US23, US28 and US34. 
112 Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) and Observation Posts (OPs).  
113 Based on the researcher’s various conversations with Israeli interviewees and security officials.  
114 These are NORFORCE responsible for the Northern Territory and Kimberley Region, the Pilbara Regiment, 
responsible for the Pilbara Region and the 51st Battalion Far North Queensland Regiment, responsible for the 
North Queensland Region.   
115 Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO), responsible for specialist police 
units including those focussed on counter-terrorist roles, such as SO15 Counter-Terrorism Command.  
116 See details of NYPD Operation Nexus available on https://www.nypdshield.org/public/nexus.aspx  
117 For more details  of Project Griffin, see www.projectgriffin.org.uk  
118 Of which one aspect is terrorism, along with propaganda, subversion, guerrilla warfare etc.  
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119 ‘Accidental Guerrillas’ are defined by Kilcullen as members of a local community who take up arms in 
support of Islamist groups not in response to the ideology of al Qaeda and its affiliates, but rather because of 
the impact on the local community of the Western military backlash. 
120 See Tyler, Jackson, Bradford, Hough, Myhill & Quinton etc. previously detailed at the start of the Chapter. 
121 Interviews UK3, UK9, UK16, UK28, UK30, UK31, UK36, UK37, UK41, UK45, IR1, IR2, IR4, IR7, IR13, FR1, FR2, 
FR6, FR7, FR8, FR11, SP1, SP6, SP7, SP8, IS2, IS4, IS5, IS6, IS9, IS16, IS17, IS18, IS19, TU1, TU6, TU10, TU11, 
TU14, US4, US5, US10, US25, US27 and US28.  
122 ‘Jarking’ is a means of covertly placing a hidden transmitter in a weapon, allowing the movement of the 
weapon to be followed on a monitor by the police and security forces.  
123 Stake Knife was the codename for Freddie Scappaticci, a high level source developed over years within the 
PIRA.  
124 This highlights the moral dilemma source handlers face of balancing the need to protect the public and 
preserve life with the need to protect a source who provided the intelligence, when by acting on that 
intelligence and preventing an attack, you may expose the source.  
125 The PIJ is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.   
126 The traditional model of ‘Find’, ‘Fix’ and ‘Finish’ has been expanded and developed during recent conflicts 
to the recurring F3EA Concept – ‘Find’, ‘Fix’, Finish’, ‘Exploit’, ‘Analyse’…. ‘Find’, ‘Fix’, ‘Finish’ etc.  
127 ‘Box’, named after their Box 500 post box address is a nickname for MI5, the Security Service.  
128 The difficulty and danger of operating in this environment were highlighted by ETA training in counter 
surveillance (SP1) and the fact that one ETA group was arrested and found to have been planning an attack on 
the surveillance team monitoring them, having already collected significant information on their vehicles and 
personnel (FR6).  
129 In December 2007 two Spanish Guardia Civil officers, Raul Centeno and Fernando Trapero, part of a joint 
Franco-Spanish surveillance team operating in Capbreton, close to Biarritz in France were murdered by ETA. 
While observing three ETA suspects, two men and a woman, in a cafeteria, it appears they were compromised. 
Attempting to leave, they were followed into a car park and both shot in the head. It is believed that although 
previously Spanish Policia and Guardia Civil officers operating in France were unarmed, following this incident, 
Spanish officers are now officially permitted to carry arms when operating on French territory. Conversation 
with French Police Official 2009.   
130 Based on researcher’s personal experience and conversations with operational colleagues & interviewees. 
131 Based on the researcher’s personal experience and knowledge. 
132 Researcher conversation with an SAS SNCO in 2012.  
133 Researcher conversation with NI officer in Autumn 2013.  
134 EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Bomb Disposal) 
135 Author interviews with many policing and military specialists in various countries.  
136 1st Regiment Parachutiste d’Infanterie de Marine – French Special Forces Regiment  - Equivalent to UK SAS. 
137 This was particularly highlighted by the Real IRA (RIRA) bombing of Omagh town centre on 15 th August 
1998, which killed 29 victims. The car bomb had been constructed in the South and driven over the border to 
target the North. For more details of the attack and following investigation (Dudley-Edwards 2009)  
138 Interviews US7, US14, US16, US18, US19, US22, US26, US27, US31, US34, US39 and US41. Examples of such 
pre 9/11 overseas attacks against US personnel and interests include:  
 The 1983 lorry VBIED (Vehicle borne improvised explosive device) attacks by Shiite Hezbollah affiliates 
on the US Embassy and the US Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. 
 The kidnapping, and in some cases murder, of US diplomatic, military and civilian personnel in Beirut 
and Lebanon by Hezbollah affiliates during the 1980s, including the CIA Station Chief, William Buckley 
 The September 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, by Hezbollah affiliates and murder of passenger and 
US Naval Diver Robert Dean Stethem  
 The October 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro by Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 
terrorists and the subsequent murder of US passenger Leon Klinghoffer 
 The 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 by Libyan agents, with the death of all 259 on board the 
aircraft, of whom 189 were US citizens, and 11 people on the ground in the Scottish town of 
Lockerbie, killed by falling debris.  
 The 1996 tanker VBIED attack by Saudi extremists, possibly linked to the al Qaeda network, on the US 
Air Force barracks in Dhahran, eastern Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 US military personnel.   
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 The 1998 synchronised truck VBIED attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by the al 
Qaeda network, which killed 224 people, including 12 American Embassy staff and wounded around 
4,500  
 The 2000 maritime suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Aden Harbour, Yemen, by the al Qaeda 
network, killing 17 US sailors and wounding 39 others.    
139 Interviews IR1, IR3, IR4, IR6, IR7, IR9 and IR11.  
140 Interviews IS1, IS3, IS4, IS5, IS7, IS8, IS9, IS11, IS12, IS16 and IS17.  
141 Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre – ‘First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups’ 
(GRAPO) and Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi – ‘Turkish Peoples Liberation Party/Front’ (DHKP/C).  
142 Interviews FR1, FR2, FR4, FR7, FR9, FR10, FR12 and FR14.  
143 Interviews UK1, UK2, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK7, UK8, UK9, UK10, UK11, UK13, UK14, UK17, UK18, UK20, UK21, 
UK23, UK24, UK31, UK36, UK38, UK41 and UK48.  
144 Interviews UK1, UK6, UK7, UK17, UK20, UK24, UK37 and UK38.  
145 Interviews IR1, IR3, IR9, IR10, IR11, IR12 and IR13.  
146 Interviews IR1, IR3, IR8, IR9, IR10, IR11, IR12 and IR13.  
147 Interviews US4, US5, US9, US10, US11, US16, US23, US25, US27, US28 and US29.   
148 This is also supported by Goodman, who states regarding the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
in 1995 that, “Israel had been so focused on the Palestinians that it never took a deep look at itself… The secret 
service had its eye on the crazies from the Jewish underground and their associates, but they were known to 
have more bark than bite and were certainly not thought to have it in them to assassinate a Prime Minister. 
The Prime Minister’s bodyguards at the mass peace event were looking for terrorists with Arab profiles, not a 
seemingly ordinary Jewish student in a windbreaker” (Goodman 2011: p.63).  
149 Interviews UK21, UK23, UK36, UK37 and UK38.  
150 Interviews UK11, UK19, UK22, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK37, UK38, UK43, UK51, IR6, IR8, IR9, FR9, FR12, FR13, 
SP2, SP3, SP11, SP13, SP15, SP16, IS3, IS6, IS9, IS10, IS15, IS16, IS17, TU4, TU8, TU9, TU12, US5, US11, US18, 
US23, US30, US31, US32, US35, US37, US38 and  US42. 
151 Decree no. 2002-890 of 15th May 2002 relating to the CSI establishes membership to include the Prime 
Minister, the relevant ministers and the Permanent Secretary of National Defence. A permanent Secretary 
General of the CSI is appointed by the President and serves under him.  
152 Interviews UK11, UK19, UK22, UK25, UK37 and UK43. The UKSF currently comprises: 
 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (22 SAS) 
 Special Boat Service, Royal Marines (SBS) 
 Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) 
 Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) 
 18 (UKSF) Signal Regiment (18 SIG REGT) 
o 264 (SAS) Signals Squadron 
o SBS Signals Squadron 
o 267 (SRR) Signals Squadron 
o 268 (SFSG) Signals Squadron 
 Special Forces Reserves (SF – R) 21 and 23 Special Air Service Regiments (21 & 23 SAS), 63 SAS Signal 
Squadron and SBS Reserve 
For more details see (Heyman 2011) 
153 ‘Deuxieme Cercle’ or ‘Second Circle’ units do not fall directly under the command or order of battle (ORBAT) 
of the COS Special Operations Command, but rather have an arrangement with it, where they can be called 
upon to assist its units with their specialised skills and expertise. Such specialised ‘Second Circle’ units include 
the Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), the Groupement de Commandos Parachutistes 
(GCP- previously known as CRAP, Commandos de Renseignement at d’Action en Profondeur or Long Range 
Reconnaissance and Direct Action Commandos) of the various French Parachute units in the 11th Airborne 
Division, the 17th Regiment de Genie Parachutistse (17eme RGP – Airborne Engineers), Chasseurs Alpins 
mountain troops and its Groupement de Commandos Montagne (GCM) and elements of the Direction 
Renseignements Militaire (DRM - French Military Intelligence) For more details see (Micheletti 1999b). 
154 The COS which is directly under the orders of the Chef d’Etat-major des Armees (CEMA) currently 
comprises: 
 French Army Brigade des Forces Speciales Terre (BFST):  
o 1st Regiment Parachutiste d’Infanterie de Marine (1er RPIMa) 
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o 13th Regiment de Dragons Parachutistes (13e RDP) 
o 4th Regiment d’Helicopteres des Forces Speciales  (4e RHFS) 
 French Naval Commando Units: 
o Commando Hubert (CASM – Combat Diver unit) 
o Commando Jaubert 
o Commando De Montfort 
o Commando De Penfentenyo 
o Commando Kieffer 
o Commando Trepel 
o L’Escouade de Contre-Terrorisme et de Liberation d’Otages (ECTLO – Specialist maritime 
hostage rescue and intervention unit) 
 French Air Force Special Units:  
o Commando Parachutiste de l’Air No. 10 (CPA 10)  
o L’Escadron de Transport 3/61 Poitou 
o L’Escadrille Speciale Helicopteres (ESH) 
For more details on the COS see (Poulet Undated)  
155 The MOE currently comprises: 
 Grupo de Operaciones Especiales (GOE III) ‘Valencia’ 
 GOE IV ‘Tercio del Ampurdan’ 
 GOE XIX ‘Legionario Maderal Oleaga (formerly the BOEL - Spanish Legion Special Operations Unit) 
 A specialist transmissions/communications Company 
 Various transport, technical and other specialist support units 
For more details of the MOE, see (Diez 2011) 
156 The Ozel Kuvvetler Komutanligi (OKK) contains the Army ‘Bordo Bereliler’ or ‘Red Berets’, who along with 
the Turkish Navy’s Su Alti Taaruz (SAT – SEALs/Combat Divers) and Su Alti Savunma (SAS – UDT) combat divers 
are Turkey’s premier units.  
157 Interviews US11, US30, US31, US32, US35, US37, US38, and US42. SOCOM is commanded by a four star flag 
or general officer, the Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). Currently it comprises: 
 US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
o 1st Special Forces Group (SFG) (Fort Lewis – Washington) 
o 3rd SFG (Fort Bragg – North Carolina) 
o 5th SFG (Fort Campbell – Kentucky) 
o 7th SFG (Eglin Air Force Base – Florida) 
o 10th SFG (Fort Carson – Colorado) 
o 19th SFG – National Guard (Camp Williams – Utah) 
o 20th SFG – National Guard (Birmingham – Alabama)  
o 75th Ranger Regiment (Fort Benning & Hunter Airfield Georgia and Fort Lewis – Washington) 
o 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) 
o 95th Civil Affairs Brigade 
 US Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) 
o Sea Air Land (SEAL)Teams 
o SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams  
o Special Boat Teams (SBT) 
o Various specialist communications, transport and support elements 
 US Air Force Special Operations Command (USAFSOC) 
o Various Special Operations Wings (SOW), Special Operations Group (SOG) and Special 
Operations Squadrons (SOS) containing: 
 Pararescuemen (Combat Search and Rescue – CSAR) 
 Combat Controllers (Combat Control Teams – CCT) 
 Special Operations Weathermen 
 Combat Aviation Advisors 
 US Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 
o 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion (MSOB) 
o 2nd MSOB 
o 3rd MSOB 
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For more details on the historical background of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the structure and 
components of SOCOM, see (Schemmer 2003).  
158 Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a sub-unified command of SOCOM and has a primary focus on 
international counter-terrorism. It comprises the most elite units from the US Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
including: 
 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta (SFOD – D) (Delta or Combat Applications Group - 
CAG) 
 SEAL Team 6 (ST6 or Development Group - DEVGRU)  
 Elements of 160th SOAR (Night Stalkers) 
 The Intelligence Support Activity (ISA – the ‘Activity’, ‘Gray Fox’ and various other cover names)  
 Various other covert specialist communication and transport elements 
159 Details taken from Zitun, Y. ‘IDF to unite Elite Units in New Commando Brigade’. Ynet News 7/7/15 available 
at www.ynetnews.com 
160 Police Nationale: 
 Recherche, Assistance Intervention Dissuasion (RAID) 
 Groupe d’Intervention de la Police Nationale (GIPN) 
 Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI) 
161 Gendarmerie Nationale: 
 Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) 
 Escadron Parachutiste d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (EPIGN) 
 Groupe de Securite de la President de la Republique (GSPR) 
162 Interviews UK2, UK3, UK7, UK8, UK10, UK21, UK33 and UK37 
163 Interviews US11, US12, US15, US16, US19, US22, US24 and US26 
164 Interviews US7, US15, US24, US26, US34 and US41. 
165 Within the UK there are Five threat levels (Walker & Osborne 2010):  
 Critical – An attack is expected imminently 
 Severe – An attack is highly likely 
 Substantial – An attack is a strong possibility 
 Moderate – An attack is possible but not likely 
 Low – An attack is unlikely 
166 Again the space and focus of the thesis will not permit entering into moral or ethical discussions regarding 
the use of ‘drone strikes’. For a detailed examination of this issue, see the various publications referenced in 
the main text.  
167 The ‘Security Fence’ construction only really began in 2002 as the level of suicide attacks increased, in 
particular the Seder attack in 2002. This construction added to the already existing 47km of security barriers 
around Gaza, which were originally constructed in 1994. The ‘security fence’ will eventually be around 700km 
long and comprises a mixture of both chain link fencing and reinforced blast proof walled sections of around 
30km in the more populated areas. These concrete walls provide additional protection from direct small arms 
fire. The ‘fence’ is further enhanced with both visible and invisible security measures which include various 
intrusion-detection systems on both sides of the ‘fence’ linked to control rooms, which identify any violations. 
On the Israeli side a military road allows units to rapidly converge on the site of any intrusion, while an area of 
raked sand identifies violations and potential directions of travel. On the Palestinian side an ‘anti-tank’ ditch 
stops vehicles, while razor wire provides an additional obstacle to individual attackers. Finally, the ‘security 
fence’ and its checkpoints are monitored by watchtowers and sector patrols of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
and the MAGAV ‘Green Police’ border guards. Nevertheless, the ‘Security Fence’ is not hermetic and there are 
gaps in it between the West Bank and Israel. Based on details contained in (Byman 2011: Chapter XXII ‘Building 
the Security Barrier’)  
168 See Figure 25.1 ‘Suicide Attacks 2000 – 2008’ (Byman 2011: p.366)  
169 Interviews  IS2, IS4, IS8, IS9, IS17 and IS18. 
170 Explosives and acronyms will be detailed later in the chapter.  
171 In fact this reliance by the leadership of the al Qaeda network on human couriers to carry and disseminate 
messages and propaganda, proved critical to identifying the location of Osama bin Laden and his key 
lieutenants in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and the launching of Operation Neptune Spear in May 2011 (Pfarrer 2011, 
Bowden2012 & Bergen 2013). 
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172 This “provided a highly effective and reliable means of giving the bomb disposal officer a close up view of a 
bomb without having to approach the device, and of delivering a means of neutralising the bomb” (Wilkinson 
2006: p.95). 
173 In order of importance the Met EXPOs priorities are saving life, saving property, preserving forensic 
evidence and restoring normality. Given at briefing attended by author  
174 The Factions Armees Revolutionnaires Libanaises (FARL) – Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction - (Janke 
1983). 
175 Tecnicos en Desactivacion de Explosivos (TEDAX- Bomb disposal experts) and NRBQ (Nuclear, Radiological, 
Biological, Chemical) 
176 On the 11th March 2004, ten bombs exploded on trains in the vicinity of Atocha Station, Madrid, killing 190 
people and leaving nearly 1800 injured. Investigations identified the Madrid cell of Salafia Jihadia responsible 
for the attacks, with links to the Groupe Islamique Combatant Marocain (GICM) and the wider al Qaeda 
network. 
177 Author visit and meeting with Turkish Polis Bomb Disposal officers at their HQ in November 2013.  
178 Various researcher conversations with current and former bomb disposal specialists.  
179 Raised during a researcher conversation with a technical specialist in June 2014. For more details see 
www.fbiagentedu.org/careers/tactical-operations/hazardous-devices-school/  
180 Researcher’s personal knowledge. 
181 Researcher’s personal knowledge   
182 That is that without a back-up system or option, you are setting yourself up to fail.  
183 Interviews UK1, UK7, UK11, UK16, UK29 and UK41. The Bichard Enquiry, which led to a public report related 
to child protection, followed the murders in August 2002 in Soham, Cambridgeshire, of two schoolchildren 
Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, by Ian Huntly, who was working as their school caretaker. Amongst other 
issues, this highlighted the need for better communication and intelligence sharing between police 
constabularies.  
184 At the national federal level under the Department of Justice (DoJ) are such agencies as the FBI, United 
States Marshals Service (USMS), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), while under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are the United States 
Secret Service (USSS) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA). At the state level are numerous ‘State 
Police’, ‘Highway Patrols’, ‘State Troopers’ and ‘State Capitol Police’. At the municipal level, many larger towns 
and cities have their own police, which can range up to such major forces as the New York Police Department 
(NYPD), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Chicago Police Department (CPD) and Boston Police 
Department (BPD). Finally, at the local level some towns have their own small law enforcement organisations, 
or even a single officer acting in the role of a ‘town marshal’. In addition there are many other small law 
enforcement forces at a local level responsible for policing local parks, rivers, university campuses and indeed 
tribal areas. Many US interviewees commented that this mass of law enforcement bodies impinged on both 
regular policing coordination and upon effective counter-terrorism, leading to overlap, confusion and rivalry, 
particularly between the FBI, given primacy for domestic terrorist investigations, and larger police 
departments such as the NYPD and LAPD (US7/23/24). 
185 Under Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the FBI is the lead agency for investigating incidents of 
domestic terrorism in the United States. PDD-39 was signed in June 1995 by President Clinton and this 
classified document lays out national policy on counter-terrorism, assigning specific roles and tasks to 
designated federal agencies.  
186 Details of the Home Affairs Committee – Seventeenth Report on Counter Terrorism is available on 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/231/23103  
187 The French Police are a national body with strong centralised command and control from Paris. Its 
territorial structure is based around the Paris Prefecture de Police, two Directions Regionales in Ajaccio and 
Versailles, and the nine Directions Interregionales, with headquarters at Bordeaux, Dijon, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, 
Orleans, Rennes, Strasbourg, and Antilles-Guyane. In addition it is operationally structured around a number of 
major Directorates. These cover traditional uniformed and judicial policing, the maintenance of public order, 
international relations and national security, with several working on different aspects of counter-terrorism. 
The Gendarmerie is also a disciplined, centralised, national organisation, which has some responsibilities in 
security and the investigation of terrorism. From 2005, a new organisational structure was created, and rather 
407 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
than the traditional nine territorial policing regions, this was expanded to twenty-two regions which 
correspond with the French national Regions Administratives 
188 The Spanish Policia Nacional are a national body, directed by the Direccion General de Policia (DGP) or 
‘General Directorate for Police’, which is headquartered in Madrid, and falls under the control of the Ministry 
of the Interior. Geographically, the ‘National Police’ is organised on a regional basis, with thirteen regional 
headquarters including the Balearic and Canary Islands. Specialisations within the organisation are 
administratively divided into five Comisario Generales or ‘General Commissaries’, the Comisaria General de 
Informacion, Comisaria General de Policia Judicial, Comisaria General de Seguridad Ciudadana, Comisaria 
General de Extranjeria y Fronteras and the Comisaria General de Policia Cientifica. Due to its dual nature, 
combining both military and policing aspects, the Guardia Civil falls under two Ministries. The Ministry of the 
Interior is responsible for services, salaries, assignments and equipment, controlling the Direccion General de 
la Guardia Civil (DGGC), while the Ministry of Defence is responsible for promotions and military missions. 
Administratively, the organisation is structured into three Subdireccion General: de Operaciones, de Personal, 
and de Apoyo (support). Under the Subdireccion General de Operaciones two commands in particular are 
involved in counter-terrorism, the Jefatura de Investigacion e Informacion, which controls the Guardia Civil 
Servicio de Informacion ‘intelligence service’ and the Jefatura de Unidades Especiales y de Reserva, which 
controls tactical intervention and bomb disposal units. 
189 The Turkish National Police (TNP) operates under the centralised command of the Emniyet Genel 
Mudurlugu, or ‘General Directorate of Security’, based in Ankara and led by the General Director of the Turkish 
National Police, who is answerable to the Minister of the Interior. Under this national headquarters are several 
specialist Departments within the Polis fulfilling specific counter-terrorist roles, notably the Departments of 
Intelligence, Anti-Terrorism and Special Operations. Geographically, the organisation has eighty one 
Directorates of Provincial Polis, responsible for policing cities in Provinces across the country, each of which 
has its own Intelligence, Anti-Terrorism and Special Operations units, the latter often being referred to as Ozel 
Harekat Tim, or Ozel Tim, literally ‘Special Operations Teams’ or ‘Special Teams’. The Jandarma relies 
predominantly on conscripts serving their compulsory military service to provide the bulk of its manpower and 
is structured along centralised military control, with the Jandarma Genel Komutanligi or ‘General Command of 
the Gendarmerie’ headquartered in Ankara and normally commanded by a serving four star General on 
secondment from the Turkish Army. As part of the Turkish Armed Forces, the General Command of the 
Gendarmerie answers to the General Staff in matters relating to military training, education and operations, 
and the Ministry of the Interior in relation to its policing and public order duties. The organisation is structured 
around four administrative Commands: Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Logistics, and is geographically 
distributed across rural areas in Turkey’s eighty one Provinces and 957 Districts. 
190 Interviews FR2, FR4, FR13, SP4, SP5, TU5 and TU8. One example detailed by a police specialist in Spain 
provides an exemplar of how such policing structures can negatively impact on counter-terrorist policing (SP5). 
Following the Atocha bombings of 11th March 2004 (11-M), as the explosions occurred in Madrid, the initial 
investigation was conducted by the Policia under the direction of one judge.190 On the 2nd of April an explosive 
device was found on the high speed rail line outside of Toledo. This device was clearly constructed by the same 
bomb maker as a similar unexploded bomb, recovered after the earlier attack in Madrid. However, although 
the evidence suggested it was planted by the same terrorist cell, because this was recovered in a rural area, a 
second investigation was begun under the Guardia Civil, led by another judge. The following day, the 3rd April, 
the ‘Madrid Cell’ was tracked down to a flat in the urban area of Leganes, a working class commuter town 
South of Madrid, and an armed standoff with the authorities began. When the Policia GEO special operations 
team attempted a tactical entry into the flat, the terrorists blew themselves up, killing GEO officer Francisco 
Javier Torronteras and critically wounding a number of others (SP2/4/5/9). Although all the incidents were 
linked, a third investigation began under the Policia. Eventually, months later, it went up for a decision at a 
higher court and it was decided that it should be consolidated into one investigation under a single judge.  
191 There are six geographical and municipal Israeli police commands: North, Central, South, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv 
and Judea & Samaria.  
192 There are six Garda regional commands: Dublin, Northern, Eastern, Western, Southern and South Eastern 
193 This includes Security & Intelligence (S & I), the Special Detective Unit (SDU – ‘Special Branch’), the National 
Surveillance Unit (NSU), the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) and Liaison & Protection.  
194 Interviews IR4, IR5, IR8, IR9 and IR11. 
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195 Respective examples raised by interviewees included the UK’s Security Service (MI5) and Secret Intelligence 
Service (MI6) (Andrew 2009 & Corera 2012), the French DGSI and Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure 
(DGSE) (Porch 1997), the Israeli Shin Bet (Israeli Security Agency ISA or General Security Service GSS) and 
Mossad (Mossad Merkazi Le’mode’in Ve’tafkidim Meyuchadim – ‘Institution for Intelligence and Special Tasks’) 
(Pedahzur 2010), and the US FBI and CIA.  Similar examples from other countries include the German 
Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Bundesnachrichtendienst  (BND) and the Italian Servizio per le 
Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica (SISDE) and Servizio per le Informazioni e le Sicurezza Militare 
(SISMI).Though less clearly defined, the Irish Garda Security and Intelligence (S & I) Section focus on domestic 
intelligence and security, including both terrorism and organised crime, while the Irish Army G2 tend to have a 
more external focus on threats to Ireland (Walsh 2010).  
196 Such as the Spanish Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), Turkish Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT) and 
Netherlands Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD). 
197 Interviews UK 9, UK10, UK22, IS9, US4, US6, US27 and US28. 
198 Interviews US9, US22, US24, US26 and US36.  
199 The RICs are now known as Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) 
200 Such as the ‘New’ GIGN and the Police FIPN, the latter overseeing the national RAID, Paris BRI and regional 
GIPNs. 
201 Researcher conversation with BTP firearms officer during August 2013.  
202 In November 2008, ten Kashmiri  Lashkar –e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists attacked a number of targets in Mumbai, 
India, particularly those frequented by tourists, killing 179 victims, while in September 2013, a number of 
attackers from the Somalia based al-Shabab targeted the Westgate Mall shopping centre in Nairobi, killing 67. 
Operation Plato is the UK operational title for such an incident type, and has been used in the public domain. 
203 On September 1st 2004, dozens of well-armed Chechen terrorists seized School Number One in Beslan, 
North Ossetia Southern Russia, taking possibly up to 1200 teachers, children and their parents hostage. These 
were herded into the main gymnasium, where they were surrounded by various IEDs. After a couple of days of 
negotiation, some of the explosives detonated and Russian security forces, in particular the national level FSB 
Alfa and Vympel intervention Units, launched an Immediate Action (IA) intervention at the School. In the 
ensuing fighting, around 330 hostages were killed and 610 injured, while Alfa and Vympel allegedly lost 11 
officers.  
204 Interviews UK6, UK9, UK11, UK15, UK16, UK23, UK24 and UK49 
205 Interviews IR7, IR10, IR11, IR12 and IR13 
206 Interviews FR4, FR5, FR6, FR7, FR8, FR9, FR10, FR11 and FR12 
207 Interviews FR1, FR2, FR4, FR5, FR6, FR7, FR8, FR10, FR12 and FR15 
208 The German Grenzschutzgruppe 9 was formed from the Federal Border Guard in 1972, following the failure 
of the Bavarian police to rescue Israeli athletes at Furstenfeldbruk Airfield (Scholzen & Froese 2007).  
209 Interviews US3, US4, US5, US8, US13, US15, US24, US25, US30, US32 and US33. 
210 For example the PIRA attack at Harrods in 1983, the ETA attack on the Hipercor Supermarket in 1987 and 
the RIRA bombing of Omagh in 1998.   
211 Such as the PIRA bombings of the City of London in the 1990’s and FLNC/Corsican separatist group 
bombings of French Government buildings. 
212 Such as the Tokyo Subway 1995, Oklahoma 1995, Tel Aviv & Jerusalem buses, shops and restaurants, 9/11, 
Bali 2002, Istanbul 2003, Madrid 2004 and London 2005. 
213 Researcher conversation with SAS officer UK22. 
214 Following the 9/11 attacks of September 2001, the United Kingdom (UK) Government conducted a review 
of its long term strategy for counter-terrorism, under the auspices of the Counter Terrorism Strategy Team of 
the Cabinet Office led by Denis Keefe. The findings of this study were approved by the Prime Minister in April 
2003, as part of the wider United Kingdom (UK) ‘National Security Strategy’ and developed into a long-term 
plan for countering the threat posed by terrorism. This was in the form of the ‘National Counter Terrorist 
Strategy’, often referred to as ‘CONTEST’, a cross-government counter-terrorism strategy comprising both 
open and classified elements, based around four main work streams, each with a specific objective: 
 Prevent: The prevent strand seeks to counter-terrorism by countering the underlying causes of 
violent radicalisation of individuals. This is achieved through: 
o Tackling disadvantage and supporting reform by addressing structural problems in the UK 
and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination 
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o Deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become 
terrorists by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others 
can operate 
o Engaging in the battle of ideas by challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can 
justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to 
do so 
 Pursue: The pursue strand seeks to disrupt terrorists and their operations through: 
o Gathering intelligence and improving the ability to identify and understand the terrorist 
threat 
o Disrupting terrorist activity and taking action to frustrate terrorist attacks and to bring 
terrorists to justice through prosecution and other means, including strengthening the legal 
framework against terrorism  
o International co-operation by working with partners and allies overseas to strengthen our 
intelligence effort and achieve disruption of terrorists outside the UK.  
 Protect: The protect strand seeks to reduce the vulnerability of both the public and UK interests both 
within the UK and overseas through: 
o Strengthening border security, so that terrorists and those who inspire them can be 
prevented from travelling here and we can get better intelligence about suspects who 
travel, including improving our identity management, for example by the use of biometrics 
o Protecting key utilities by working with the private sector 
o Reducing the risk to transport networks and the impact of attacks through security and 
technological advances 
o Protecting people in crowded places, going about their daily lives 
 Prepare: The prepare strand seeks to ensure that the UK is as ready as it can be for an attack 
through: 
o Identifying the potential risks the UK faces from terrorism and assessing their impact 
o Building the necessary capabilities to respond to any attacks 
o Continually evaluating and testing our preparedness, including by frequently exercising to 
improve our response to incidents and learning lessons from incidents that do take place 
215 See Commission of the European Communities (2005) Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: A Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration of third-country nationals in the 
European Union. Brussels, 01.9.2005: COM (2005) 389. 
216 UK Director General of ‘Cohesion and Resilience’ at Communities and Local Government 
217 A mnemonic utilised as part of police operational planning.  
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APPENDIX A: COUNTRY CODES 
UNITED KINGDOM: PROs & CONs HIGHER CODES 
PROs 
POLICING 
1. Respect/Image of UK Policing 
2. Historical Experience of ‘Irish’ Terrorism 
3. C2 Systems: COBRA, Gold-Silver-Bronze 
4. CONTEST Strategy 
5. Met. Police CT expertise: SO13 Anti-Terrorist Branch and SO12 Special Branch  
6. RUC Organisational Expertise, Particularly Special Branch 
7. Community Policing and Local Contacts 
8. Regionalisation of Counter-Terrorist Policing (CTUs) 
9. BTP Expertise on Rail Network 
10. Section 44 Stop & Search Powers 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Long History and Experience of Intelligence 
2. Regionalisation of Intelligence (RICs / CTIUs) 
3. Use of Tasking & Coordination Groups (TCGs) in Northern Ireland (model) 
4. JTAC Fusion Capability 
5. Actioning of Intelligence in Northern Ireland – Find (SB) Fix (E4) & Finish (HMSU) 
6. Army Intelligence and Actioning in N. Ireland – Find (FRU) Fix (14) & Finish (SAS 
Troop) 
7. Previous Positive Relations of Intelligence with Police 
8. Improvements in Intelligence post 9/11 and Post 7/7 
9. Historical HUMINT Experience and Capability – Northern Ireland 
10. Adaption of Intelligence to Afghanistan – The ‘Great Game’  
MILITARY 
1. Army Experience of MACP and MACA in post-colonial wars and Northern Ireland 
2. Role & Experience of British Army in Northern Ireland 
3. Special Forces Trinity in Northern Ireland – FRU, 14 Int and SAS Troop 
4. Breadth of Skills, Capabilities of Roles of Special Air Service (SAS) 
5. SAS and SBS Operational Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan 
6. The Support role of the Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) 
7. Army Royal Logistic Corps (ex RAOC) EOD Experience and Expertise 
8. Experience and Maturity of CO19 Officers 
9. Royal Ulster Constabulary HMSU Operational Experience 
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10. SAS as a ‘Surgical Response’ to a Worst Case Scenario 
11. ATLAS Network and International Police & SF Cooperation, particularly UK & US 
CONs     POLICING 
1. UK Multiple Constabulary System (43 in England and Wales) 
2. Break up of National Special Branch System 
3. Disbanding of RUC for PSNI and Lack of Organisational Knowledge 
4. UK Adversarial Legal System, designed for Crime… Suitable for Terrorism? 
5. Change from ‘Irish’ Terrorist Threat to “Islamist’ 
6. ‘Met-Centric’ and London Focused Resources 
7. Historical Policing Rivalries 
8. Problems and Failures of the Met’s SO15 Counter-Terrorism Command 
9. Negative Impact of Civil Liberties in the UK on Operational Effectiveness 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Adjustment from ‘Irish’ to ‘Islamist’ Focus of Counter-Terrorist Intelligence 
2. Lack of UK ‘Bottom Up’ Capability to match ‘Top Down’ 
3. Break up of tried and tested Historical Special Branch System 
4. Rivalry, Overlap and Limited Resources Between Intelligence Organisations 
5. Impact of RIPA 2000 on Intrusive Surveillance Operations 
6. Disbandment of RUC Special Branch and Loss of Capability 
7. Failures in the UK Policing and Intelligence Structure 
8. Organisational Loss of ‘Cold War’ and ‘Irish’ Experience 
9. Silos and Lack of Connectivity in Architecture of Intelligence Systems and 
Structures 
MILITARY 
1. Problem in Domestic Counter-Terrorism of Coordinating Army and Police C2 
2. Police Mindset and ‘Mental Firewall’ 
3. Mixed Police Firearms Capability 
4. Concerns over ‘Excessive Force’ 
5. Police Firearms Operational Experience in Domestic Interventions vs. Military SF 
6. UK Special Forces Skills, Fitness and Training 
7. Negative Impact of ‘Political Correctness’ and the Media 
8. While Police Tactical can Conduct Lower Scale Interventions, More Complex CTLI 
and CTMI require the SAS and SBS 
9. UK Public Concern at Military use in a Domestic Role 
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IRELAND: PROs & CONs HIGHER CODES 
PROs 
POLICING 
1. Traditional Public Regard and Fondness for the Garda Siochana 
2. Single National Policing Body across Ireland (except Airport Police) 
3. Long Garda Experience against ‘Subversive’ Republicanism 
4. Specialist Crime and Security Units roles in Counter-Terrorism 
5. SDU, NSU, S & I, Liaison & Protection and Emergency Response Unit (ERU) 
6. ‘Soft Power’ role of GRIDO and Ethnic Liaison Officers (ELO) at the various stations 
7. Instilling Counter Terrorist Awareness in Rank and File to be ‘Eyes and Ears’ 
8. Strength of Local Community Contacts amongst Rural Garda  
9. Multi Agency approach of Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) 
10. Flexibility of Offences Against the State Act (OSA) 1939 
11. Section 2 OSA 1998 for Interviews with Dissident Republicans 
12. Use of Special Criminal Court (SCC) Dublin for Terrorist Trials 
13. Coordinating Role of National Security Committee (NSC) 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Internal and External Roles of Garda S & I and Army G2 
2. Intelligence Benefits of ‘Republican’ Cultural Understanding 
3. Long Experience of Operations against ‘Subversives’ 
4. Cooperation Between S & I and Army G2 
5. Benefits of Organised Criminal and Terrorist Intelligence under S & I 
6. Surveillance and Hides Skills and Expertise of National Surveillance Unit (NSU) 
7. Strong Relations Between S & I  and Local Garda with Community Knowledge 
8. G2 Cultural and Linguistic Understanding from Overseas Operations eg. UNIFIL 
MILITARY 
1. Due to its ATCP (MACP) Roles the Irish Army is ‘Part & Parcel’ of Irish Life 
2. Transfer of Domestic ATCP Roles to Overseas Peacekeeping Operations 
3. Irish Army Experience during the ‘Troubles’ 
4. Strong Emphasis on Police Primacy Despite these Roles 
5. SF & CT Skills and Capabilities of Army Ranger Wing (ARW) 
6. ARW Joint Training with French GIGN, German GSG-9, Dutch BBE, & Italian GIS 
7. Irish Army Ordnance Corps EOD Capability 
8. Domestic ‘Constabulary Navy’ Role of Irish Naval Service (INS) and Interceptions 
9. Operational Experience and Expertise of Garda Emergency Response Unit (ERU) 
10. Regional Firearms Capability of Regional Support Units (RSU) 
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11. Use of AW 139 Helicopters to Deploy ERU and ARW Teams in Domestic Roles 
CONs 
POLICING 
1. Historic Irish Dislike of Authority 
2. Lack of Minority Membership and Lack of Access & Understanding in Garda 
3. Lack of knowledge and Experience of Islamist Extremism 
4. Rivalry Between Specialist and Geographic Parts of the Garda 
5. Garda as Conservative Organisation, Slow to Change 
6. Problems of Manpower and Resources Policing Remote Rural areas 
7. Previous Lack of Anglo-Irish Cooperation to Counter the PIRA 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Lack of Intelligence and Access to Minorities, particularly Muslim 
2. Lack of ‘Jointness’ Between Garda S & I and Army G2 
3. Concern at Inter Unit Rivalry in the Garda 
4. Lack of Manpower and Resources of Security and Intelligence (S & I) 
5. Garda Systems and Structures good for Subversives and Criminals, but not 
Islamists 
6. Risk of National Surveillance Unit (NSU) Team Identification 
7. Concerns at Threat posed by Dissident Republican ‘Counter-Intelligence’ 
8. Previous withholding of Intelligence to the British but now Greater Cooperation  
9. Impact of Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009 on Intrusive Surveillance 
MILITARY 
1. Speed of Emergency Response Unit Response (ERU)? 
2. ARW Training and Equipment versus ERU Operational Experience 
3. ARW Doesn’t have Continual Operational Experience (unlike UK SAS) 
4. Impact of Abbeylara Shooting 2000 on Emergency Response Unit 
5. Pressure from Judge Barr Report and Hostile Media on ERU 
6. Use and Effectiveness of Non-Lethal Options (Gort Incident 2006) 
7. Concerns at Small size of INS Impacting on its Effectiveness 
8. Irish Military seen by Public as Peacekeepers, not Aggressors 
9. Small Size and Limited Resources of Irish Military 
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FRANCE: PROs & CONs HIGHER CODES 
PROs 
POLICING  
1. Concept of ‘Specialisation, Coordination et Centralisation’ in Counter-Terrorism 
2. Historical Experience against North African GIA, GSPC and AQMI 
3. Expertise and Experience of DNAT now renamed SDAT and part of DGSI 
4. Role and Expertise of Paris Police Prefecture SAT 
5. Previous Expertise and Contacts of RG and DST, now amalgamated to form DGSI 
6. Overseas Capability and Domestic Local Knowledge of Gendarmerie Nationale 
7. Regional EOD Capability of Securite Civil 
8. Economic CT Investigation Expertise of TRACFIN, DNRED and FINTER  
9. French Counter-Terrorist Laws (86-1020 96-647, Securite Quotidienne etc.) 
10. Pre-Emptive Arrest Power of Association des Malfaiteurs 
11. Centralisation of CT Investigative and Legal Processes and Juge d’Instruction 
12. Coordinating role of UCLAT and CILAT  
INTELLIGENCE  
1. Benefit of amalgamating  the DST and RG to form the DCRI, now DGSI 
2. Historical Intelligence experience of countering Islamist extremists & in Algeria 
3. Cultural benefit of Corsican and North African origin Intelligence Officers 
4. Joint Franco-Spanish Surveillance Teams and Extra-Territoriality to Counter ETA  
5. Skills and Capabilities of DGSE 
6. Formation of UCLAT in 1984 to Coordinate the Sharing of Intelligence 
7. French ‘Maillage’ or National Intelligence Grid  
8. Significant HUMINT intelligence development amongst minority communities 
9. Reformation of DRM in 1993 following Intelligence Failures of First Gulf War in 
1991 
10. The Specialist ISR and LRRP type skills of 13eme Regiment Dragon Parachutistes  
MILITARY  
1. Professionalisation of French Military System since 1996 
2. Public Acceptance of Military in Public Life and used to seeing uniforms 
3. Formation of COS to Centralise Command and Control of French SF in 1992 
4. Skills and Capabilities of 1er RPIMa, the ‘French SAS’ and CRAP Parachutists 
5. Skills of Police FIPN Units:- RAID (National), BRI (Paris), GIPN (10 x Regional) 
6. Skills of Gendarmerie GIGN Elements: - FI (GIGN), FOR (EPIGN), FSP (GSPR) 
7. Regional Gendarmerie PI2G Units at Orange and Toulouse 
8. Establishment of UCOFI to coordinate Police and  Gendarmerie Firearms Units 
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9. French Militaries MACP role in Vigipirate Plan  
10. Foreign Legion not just as elite Military Unit, but as a Cultural Pool for Operations 
11. Maritime CTM Capability of Commando Hubert 
12. French Military Transport Helicopters to Support RAID and GIGN 
CONs 
POLICING  
1. Dual Structure of Policing with Police and Gendarmerie 
2. Inherent Rivalry Between both Policing Organisations 
3. Previous Political Interference 
4. Changes of Personnel 
5. Rivalry Between Investigative National SDAT and Paris SAT  
6. Rivalry Between French Policing and Intelligence Organisations 
7. ‘Dragnet Roundups’ of Muslims in Counter-Terrorist Investigations 
8. WWII Collaboration by Police and Gendarmerie and Lack of Public Trust 
9. France as a previous ‘Safe-Haven’ for ETA 
10. Vigipirate Security Plan: Pros and Cons 
INTELLIGENCE  
1. Continuing Rivalry in DGSI between Previous Structures 
2. Historical Culture of ‘Direct Action’ in DGSE, which has caused Embarrassment  
3. DCRI as a Direction Centrale under Police Control with Subsequent Limit of 
Influence, but now DGSI  
4. Rivalry Between DGSI and DGSE 
5. Marginalisation of Individual Freedoms for Group Security? 
6. Historical Legacy of Covert Actions and Serious Human Rights abuses from Algeria 
7. Possible Weakness of UCLAT, not a Decision Making organisation and in MOI   
MILITARY  
1. Army Politics and Excesses in Algeria 
2. Rivalry Between RAIDs Tactical and Surveillance Elements 
3. Rivalry Between the Army and Gendarmerie ‘Immortals’ 
4. Rivalry Between Police RAID and Gendarmerie GIGN 
5. RAID Surveillance Issue, where its Officers do not blend in with Public 
6. C2 Issues Regarding both RAID and GIGN  
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SPAIN: PROs & CONs HIGHER CODES 
PROs 
POLICING 
1. Public Perspective of Policia Nacional Professionalism versus Municipal Police 
2. Spanish Policing Model of Upholding the Law, Not Serving the Public 
3. Historical Experience of Countering Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 
4. Basque Region Ertzainas (‘Protectors of the People’) Formed in 1982 
5. Tried and Tested Counter-Terrorist Systems & Structures adjusted for Islamists 
6. Counter-Terrorist role of Policia Nacional Commissario General de Informacion 
(CGI) 
7. Overseas Capability and Domestic Local Rural Knowledge of Guardia Civil  
8. EOD Skills of Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil TEDAX Bomb Disposal Teams 
9. Economic CT Skills of SEPELAC 
10. Spanish Ley Antiterrorista 1978, Organic Laws and Political Party Law 2002 vs. ETA 
11. Centralisation of Terrorist Cases at the Audiencia Nacional  
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Successful use of HUMINT and TECHINT to Counter ETA 
2. Spanish Culture of Speed and Exploitation of Intelligence 
3. National Intelligence level CESID (Military) to CNI (Civilian) 
4. Formation of CNCA in 2004 (Post Atocha Bombings) to improve Fusion & 
Coordination 
5. Joint Military CIFAS for Armed Forces Intelligence 
6. Policia CGI and Guardia Civil Servicio de Informacion (SI) Policing Intelligence 
7. Specialised Role and Successes of GC Grupo de Informacion Exterieur (GIE) 
8. Successes of Joint Franco-Spanish Surveillance Teams against ETA 
MILITARY 
1. From a Larger Conscript to a Smaller Professional Army  
2. Element of Public Re-Assurance in MACP roles, such as Rail and CNI Security 
3. Large Numbers of Muslim Troops in Regulares and Spanish Foreign Legion 
4. Formation of MOE to Control Boina Verde Units of the Army GOE and Navy UOE 
5. CT Skills and Capabilities of Policia Nacional GEO based at Guadalajara 
6. CT Skills and Capabilities of Guardia Civil UEI based at Valdemoro 
7. Use of MOE Units to train Policing Tactical Units, but also Countering ETA? 
8. Regional Tactical Capability of Grupos Operativos Especiales de Seguridad (GOES) 
9. Skills, Capabilities and Experience of Grupo de Accion Rapida (GAR) 
10. Spanish Military TEDAX and NATO EOD Centre of Excellence 
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11. Spanish Military MACP Role in the Anti-Terrorist Protection and Prevention Plan- 
PPPA   
CONs 
POLICING 
1. Dual Policing Structure with Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil 
2. Historic Rivalry Between Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil 
3. Previous Lack of Cooperation Between Policing and Intelligence Bodies 
4. Blinkered Focus on Threat of ETA prior to Atocha 11-M Bombings 
5. Policing Failure to Address Local Cultural Issues 
6. Initial Ertzainas Infiltration and Leaks 
7. Military Roots of Guardia Civil versus Modern Spanish Society 
8. Police Culture of Separating Criminality and Terrorism 
9. Political Influence and Pressure Regarding the Ceasefire with ETA 
10. Previous Covert use of the GAL to Counter ETA in French ‘Safe Haven’ 
11. Weakening of Counter-Terrorism Capabilities to Protect Civil Liberties 
12. Concern Spanish Population are Not Resilient to Terrorism 
13. Historical Francoist Legacy of Fear, Particularly with Guardia Civil 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Intelligence Lack of Focus on Islamists because of Concern with ETA 
2. Lack of Spanish Cultural Knowledge of Muslims, despite History of El Andulus 
3. Sometimes Spanish Intelligence is less Methodical and more Cursory 
4. Spanish Intelligence tends to be more Reactive and Responsive than Pro-Active 
5. Lack of Intelligence Cooperation and Pooling Between Intelligence Organisations 
6. Historic Duplication, Overlap and Rivalry 
7. Traditionally Loath to Share Intelligence Internationally 
8. Difficulty of mitigating ETA Counter-Surveillance Skills 
MILITARY 
1. Despite Re-assurance, Public still Uncomfortable about Uniforms and Francoist 
Legacy 
2. Issues of using the Military for Security Roles (BRIPAC shooting of Car Thief!) 
3. Still a lack of Cooperation and Coordination Between the Military and Police 
4. The Spanish Government are Reluctant to use their Military Domestically  
5. Rivalry between GEO and UEI as part of the Policia versus the Guardia Civil 
6. The Previous use of the Paramilitary Organisation GAL to target ETA  
7. The Francoist Legacy in the Military (Spanish Legion) and 1981 Attempted Coup 
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ISRAEL: PROs & CONs HIGHER CODES 
PROs 
POLICING 
1. Israeli Policing Divided into INP ‘Blue Police’ & Mishmar Hagvul MAGAV ‘Green 
Police’ 
2. Israeli National Police (INP) Historical Experience Countering Palestinian Terrorism 
3. Important Role of Mishmar Ezrachi Civil Guard comprising part-time volunteers 
4. Ethnic diversity of the Civil Guard and MAGAV, (Respectively Israeli Arabs and 
Druze)  
5. A good Cultural Understanding of Jewish Extremists 
6. Good Local Knowledge of Various Communities, including Minorities 
7. INP close links with Local Security Guards in the 3rd Circle of Security 
8. MAGAV Provide a strong Counter-Terrorist Capability on the Ground 
9. Israeli Police Expertise in dealing with Post-Incident Response 
10. Skills and Capabilities of INP Hablanim ‘Sappers’ EOD, but Psychological Impact? 
11. Current Israeli Anti-Terrorist Legislation based on UK Mandate Legislation 
12. Role of Presiding Magistrates and the Israeli Supreme Court 
13. The Coordinating role of the NSC, CT Bureau and Special Advisor on Terrorism 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Intelligence seen as Vital to the Survival of the State 
2. Critical Domestic Counter-Terrorist role Played by Shin Bet (GSS, ISA, Shabak) 
3. External Counter-Terrorist role of Mossad (‘Wrath of God’ Teams, Beirut 73, Tunis 
88) 
4. Capabilities of Mista’Aravim role: Sayeret Duvdevan (Unit 217), YAMAS & 
Gideonim 
5. Infiltration and Monitoring of Jewish Extremists by Intelligence Organisations 
6. ‘Short Cycles’ of Intelligence to Incident Commander & Speedy Response to 
Incidents 
7. Extensive Human Source Networks of Sayanim 
8. Focus on ‘Fast Time’ Tactical and Operational Intelligence 
9. Significance in Intelligence Architecture of AMAN Military Intelligence  
10. Skills and Capabilities of INP Intelligence Section, both Organised Crime & 
Intelligence  
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MILITARY 
1. Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) Reservist Miluim System, with three years’ service at 
18 
2. Tension over ‘Orthodox’ Jewish Non-Service, while Druze also serve as Conscripts 
3. Critical Historical Role of IDF in the Formation of the Nation and Previous Conflicts 
4. Historical use of Special Forces and Commando elements such as Wingate’s SNS 
5. A wide number of Sayeret ‘Reconnaissance’ Units for Various SF Roles (Unlike UK 
SAS) 
6. Military: Matkal (Unit 269), Shayetet (S13), Shaldag (Unit 5101), Lotar Eilat (Unit 
7707)  
7. Policing: MAGAV YAMAM, INP Gideonim (Unit 33),INP YASAM 
8. Prison Service: Masada Unit, Nachson Unit  
9. Counter-Terrorist (‘Lotar’) Training at Mitkan Adam Base (Unit 707) 
10. T’zahavach Plan introduced in 1990 for C2: Takeover, Engagement & Assisting 
Units    
CONs 
POLICING 
1. INP are so busy fulfilling Security Roles that this impacts on their Routine Police 
Roles 
2. Previous Tensions between the INP and the Shin Bet regarding domestic terrorism 
3. INP Priority is Countering the Threat of Terrorism, not ‘Hearts and Minds’ 
4. Lack of Financial Investigation Capability in Israel to that found in some Countries 
5. Legislation and Systems Less Structured to Counter Jewish Extremism 
6. Concern over Physical Excesses and use of Lethal Force during rioting and Intifada 
7. Previous Rivalry and Tensions between MAGAV and the IDF 
8. The Multitude of Security Systems has led to Fragmented Command and Control 
9. The Security Fence: Protection of Lives & Security versus Local Community 
Disruption 
10. The Security Fence: Developing a costly ‘Maginot’ Mentality 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Impact and use of ‘Targeted Killings’: International Opprobrium and ‘Chaos Theory’ 
2. Shin Bet versus Israeli National Police (INP)  
3. Intelligence Coverage Collapse Post Oslo 1993-4 and Return to HUMINT 
4. Difficulties of conducting Mista’Aravim Operations 
5. Dogmatic Focus on Palestinian & Hezbollah ‘Enemy’ (Jewish Extremist & Al Qaeda) 
6. Frustration at lack of Intelligence Cooperation with Israel Internationally 
7. Lack of Intelligence Cooperation Domestically 
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MILITARY 
1. Despite Home Command, need for a Single Special Forces Command (Like SOCOM) 
2. Mainly Young National Service Conscripts Lacking Maturity and Experience 
3. Issues in use of Military Units for Targeted Killing 
4. Previous Rivalry between Sayeret Matkal and YAMAM 
5. Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) versus MAGAV 
6. Problems of Military Egos and Empires 
7. Criticism of impact of Military Operations on Civilians 
8. Use of the Military in a Public Order type Role 
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TURKEY: PROs & CONs HIGHER CODES 
PROs 
POLICING 
1. General Turkish Public Support of the Turkish National Police (TNP) 
2. Long Turkish National Police (TNP) Experience of Countering the PKK 
3. Compulsory Polis Postings to S.E. Anatolia as part of the Promotion Process 
4. Due to their Muslim Backgrounds, a better Understanding of Religious Terrorism 
5. Specialised Polis Counter-Terrorist Units: IDB (1983), ATD (1986) and Ozel Tim 
(1993) 
6. Improvement in Counter-Terrorist Training and Skills within TNP 
7. Importance of Cevik Kuvvet Polisi (CKP), Public Order Police, in Countering 
Serhildan 
8. The Jandarma (Gendarmerie) as the Interface between Turkish Military & the 
Police 
9. Local Knowledge and Rural Contacts of Jandarma   
10. EOD Skills of TNP Bomba Imha Polisi 
11. Economic Counter-Terrorist Roles of TADOC and MASAK 
12. Powers of Turkish Counter-Terrorist Law 3713 of 1991 
13. Use of ‘Repentance’ Law 3419 of 1988 
14. Central Coordination of Milli Guvenlik Konseyi (MGK) or National Security Council   
INTELLIGENCE 
1. The Importance of Intelligence in Maintaining the State and Security of Turkey 
2. Long Intelligence History of Countering the Partiya Karkera Kurdistan (PKK) 
3. Cultural Understanding of Islamists and use by IDB of ‘Sight Orientated Policing’ 
4. Roles and Capabilities of Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT), Polis IDB and JITEM 
5. External Counter-Terrorist role of MIT (Kidnap of Abdullah Ocalan, Nairobi 1999) 
6. Rural Contacts and Local Community Knowledge of JITEM in S.E. Anatolia 
7. Crime-Terror Intelligence of Polis IDB and its use of HUMINT to Counter PKK 
8. JITEM use of ‘Turned’ terrorists for HUMINT and ‘Pseudo Operations’ Against the 
PKK 
9. Turkish Government Department being Established for Intelligence C2 
MILITARY 
1. Conscript Based and 2nd Largest Army in NATO (After the United States) 
2. General Public Understanding and Support of the Turkish Army 
3. Size and Resources allows the Turkish Army to ‘Flood’ an area of Operations 
4. Numerous Large Scale Cross-Border Operations into N. Iraq to Counter PKK 
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5. Long History of using SF & Commando Units dating back to Attaturk & 
Independence 
6. Formation of Ozel Kuvvetler Komutanligi (OKK) ‘Special Forces Command’ 
7. SF Bordo Bereliler (Red Berets) and Kommando Mavi Bereliler (Blue Berets) versus 
PKK 
8. Harsh Training, Skills and Capabilities of Special Forces and Kommandos 
9. Impact of using Helicopters from the Turc Kara Havaciligi (TKH) against the PKK 
10. Use of Artillery and Heavy Mortars as Fire Support Against the PKK 
11. Maritime Counter-Terrorism Skills of the Su Alti Taaruz/Savunma (SAT/SAS) Divers 
12. Skills and Capabilities of Polis Ozel Harekat Tim ‘Special Operations Teams’ 
13. Positive Impact and Security of Village Guards on Rural areas of S.E. Anatolia 
CONs 
POLICING 
1. Dual Policing Structure with Turkish National Polis (Urban) and Jandarma (Rural) 
2. Legacy of Fear from Previous Times, particularly Jandarma in S.E. Anatolia 
3. Jandarma Conscripts Lack of Maturity Compared to the Polis  
4. Rivalry between the Polis and the Jandarma 
5. Lack of Policing and Security Cooperation despite individual success 
6. Focus on the PKK to the extent that threat from Islamists was Marginalised 
7. Islamists seen as a Threat to ‘Western Interests’ in Turkey, not to Turkish State 
Itself 
8. The Jandarma’s Over-Reliance on Manpower rather than Skills or Technology 
9. Previous Concerns over the use of DGM ‘State Security Courts’ & Periods of 
Detention 
10. Concerns over Abuses of Human Rights and Civil Liberties in S.E. Anatolia 
11. Difficulty of Understanding or Dealing with Extreme Left Wing DHKP/C 
12. Frustration at Lack of International Support for Turkey in its Counter-Terrorism 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Rivalry and Lack of Intelligence sharing between the MIT and the Polis IDB 
2. Lack of Cooperation and Coordination between Intelligence Agencies 
3. Concern over the use of Figures and Statistics to ‘Ramp Up’ the PKK Threat 
4. Poor International Cooperation to Counter the PKK 
5. JITEM links to Serious Human Rights Abuses and Shadowy ‘Deep State’ 
6. Allegations Intelligence allowed Turkish Hizbullah to Target the PKK (Hizb-Contra) 
7. Polis IDB Outside the Loop of Government Policymakers, Unlike the MIT 
MILITARY 
1. Disruption to Life and Careers of Compulsory Military Service 
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2. ‘Political Power’ of the Turkish Army and examples of Previous Coups (60, 71, 80, 
97) 
3. Young Conscripts versus Career Special Forces Soldiers 
4. Corruption and Criminality of Village Guards 
5. Over Reliance of Manpower, both Army and Jandarma 
6. Focus on the PKK to the detriment of Islamist Threat 
7. Impact of Military Operations on Kurdish Civilian Population 
8. Human Rights Violations and links to the ‘Deep State’ of Military and Intelligence 
9. Whose Human Rights? Terrorists versus Conscript Soldiers & their Families 
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PROs           UNITED STATES: PROs & CONs HIGHER CODES 
POLICING 
11. Multitude of Policing bodies: Federal, State, Municipal  Local (+ Tribal) 
12. FBI Primacy for domestic terrorist incidents but local police initial response  
13. CT Units in larger Police units: NYPD Intel Division & CT Division, LAPD ATIS & ATD 
14. FBI and Police successes since 9/11 against domestic ‘home grown’ & International 
15. Strengths of JTTF Structure: FBI resources & intelligence with local police 
knowledge  
16. Local community policing and knowledge of NYPD, LAPD and BPD 
17. Level of Counter-terrorist resources – funding & manpower, available to large units 
18. Demographic & Linguistic skills contained in NYPD & Operation Century 
19. NYPD, LAPD & BPD CT & Sy Ops: Op. Hercules, Nexus, Surge, Archangel, SOTAC & R 
95 
20. Importance of economic counter-terrorism as a tool and role of FINSEN & police 
FIUs  
21. Pros & Cons of powers contained in PATRIOT Act 2001   
INTELLIGENCE 
11. FBI NSB or separate domestic intelligence structure – Increased layer of 
bureaucracy? 
12. FBI Intelligence increase post 9/11: JTTF network, NSB 2005, FIGs (+ SET) 2003, 
LEGATs  
13. Creation of DNI, the Office of DNI (ODNI) and NCTC after Intelligence Reform Act 
2004 
14. DHS Role, Office of Intelligence & Regional Intelligence Centers (RICs – Fusion 
Centers) 
15. Increased Post 9/11 intelligence expansion - cooperation: FBI, CIA, NSA and 
exchanges 
16. NYPD Intelligence Division Capabilities, Liaison Officers, Field Int Officers & UC 
policing 
17. LAPD Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section (ATIS) & involvement in JRIC  
18. The PATRIOT Act 2001 has helped break down the ‘legal wall’ of the FISA Act 1978 
19. Coordinating role of Homeland Security Committee & National Security Committee 
20. In 2006 President adopted ‘national network’ for intel identifying responsibility 
21. Technological capabilities in SIGINT and TECHINT and the role of the NSA 
22. Dramatically increased focus on developing HUMINT Capability 
23. Increased influence and capabilities of DIA and US Military Intelligence with 
conflicts 
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24. Specialist Intelligence capability of the ISA (Activity) and CIA Special Operations 
Group  
MILITARY 
12. Size, technological capability and ability to intervene of the US Military  
13. Command & Control roles of SOCOM, JSOC and NORTHCOM  
14. Skills & capabilities of JSOC ‘Tier 1’ units: 1st SFOD Delta and SEAL Team 6 
(DEVGRU) 
15. Wider US SOF capability: Special Forces (FID), Rangers (DA & support) & Civil 
Affairs 
16. MARSOC and USMC Force, Battalion and STA Recon skills, capabilities and roles 
17. FBI Tactical unit capabilities: Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), Enhanced SWAT & SWAT  
18. NYPD Emergency Support Unit (ESU), LAPD SWAT and BPD SWAT skills & 
capabilities 
19. Joint training between military & policing tactical intervention units 
20. ‘Synergy’ between SOF, technology and intelligence in Afghanistan at ‘industrial’ 
level  
21. Critical importance of embedded intelligence elements in tactical teams  
CONs:  POLICING 
10. Mass of policing bodies leads to overlapping jurisdictions, rivalry, confusion & 
tension 
11. Rivalry and Tensions between FBI and municipal and local policing bodies 
12. Most US Law enforcement have to focus their resources on organised crime and 
gangs 
13. Previous C2 Problems at incidents: Example of NYPD and FDNY at 9/11 
14. Weaknesses of JTTF structure: Fulfills CT obligations, friction, lack of local control 
etc. 
15. FBI Counter-Terrorism vs. FBI Organised Crime re. focus, funding & manpower 
16. Rivalry between major police units: NYPD vs. LAPD, BPD vs. NYPD etc. 
17. Lack of resources & budget amongst smaller policing bodies impacts level of CT 
focus  
18. Lack of minority community access for police  
INTELLIGENCE 
10. Impact of FISA Act 1978 and ‘firewall’ between foreign intel & domestic law 
enforce. 
11. Failure of intelligence cooperation between CIA and FBI pre 9/11 
12. Weaknesses of FBI intelligence systems and structures –no community ‘eyes & 
ears’ 
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13. Weaknesses of DHS structure and mass of ‘Fusion’ Centers (RICs) 
14. Streetwise ‘Investigative’ Detective vs. Civilian Intelligence Analyst 
15. Excessive quantity of raw intelligence, inability to fully analyse- increased 
bureaucracy 
16. ‘Cold War’ intelligence architecture focus on TECHINT & HUMINT weakness pre 
9/11 
17. Continuing ‘Turf Wars’, overlap, ‘Siloing’ and lack of sharing amongst intel Orgs. 
18. Continuing rivalry & obstruction between Pentagon and the Intelligence 
Community 
19. Negative impact of political correctness, sensitivities and inability to ‘profile’  
MILITARY 
10. Impact of ‘Posse Comitatus’ on domestic use of the military 
11. Previous weak military response pre 9/11 
12. Iraq as a sidetrack to countering  AQ & the Taliban in Afghanistan  
13. Rivalry between the various US Military services  
14. Concern ‘Tier 1’ units have been tasked inappropriately  
15. Drone Strikes: Effectiveness in ‘no go’ areas versus international concerns 
16. Counter-Terrorism a perishable skill and need for continual training & operational   
17. Poor Civilian leadership and lack of military experience and understanding  
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APPENDIX B: 
 
Appendix B provides a sanitised list of all 172 interviews completed for this research. Due to 
the sensitive nature of these details and ease of control of end users, this is produced as a 
separate stand-alone hard copy document, which was supplied prior to the viva, rather than 
part of the wider electronic document.  
The interviews are listed by Country chronologically:  
 United Kingdom 
 Ireland 
 France 
 Spain 
 Israel 
 Turkey 
 United States 
Each interview entry contains four pieces of information: 
 Sanitised detail of interviewee, such as ‘Senior Officer in organisation X’ are 
provided to allow a level of provenance for the information and insights they 
provide (No names or specific ranks are recorded, though known to the researcher). 
 
 Date of Interview 
 
 Location of interview  
 
 Code – As detailed in the Methodology Chapter, each interviewee was provided a 
Unique Reference Number (URN), for referencing purposes. This was based on both 
the country and sequence of interview. Thus UK1 was the first UK interview, while 
TU5 was the fifth Turkish interview and so forth.  
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APPENDIX C: TEN PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 
 
Ten principles of counter-terrorism emerged from interviewing the various police offices, 
intelligence officials and military operators for this research. These ten principles are closely 
interrelated to the various ‘human factors’ previously discussed. The ten overarching 
principles identified by the research behind this thesis are:   
1. Public and Organisational Perception 
To develop an understanding of the community and effective local intelligence, it is critical 
to generate public and organisational trust, through positive engagement, interface and 
communication with the local community. Negative historical legacies, a poor organisational 
perception and the failure to generate public trust negate the effectiveness of such local 
community based counter-terrorism.  
2. Community and Culture 
As well as the criticality of interacting and engaging with the local community to develop 
public trust and a positive perception, police and security forces should seek to mobilise 
local volunteers and security guards to act as additional ‘eyes and ears’, effectively 
becoming ‘force multipliers’ in wider counter-terrorist security planning. In addition, the 
linguistic, cultural and demographic skills of individual officers, officials or operators 
amongst counter-terrorist organisations must be properly leveraged to support either overt 
community engagement or more covert specialist counter-terrorist roles. These should 
always be carefully firewalled. 
3. Individual Characteristics, Abilities and Training 
To maximize the effectiveness of counter-terrorist capabilities, it is essential for the 
individual police officer, intelligence official or military operator to not only have the right 
physical attributes and skills, but perhaps more importantly the right mindset, ethos and 
personal qualities. Consequently, while individual training is critical, organisations must 
ensure the ‘right people’ receive it, otherwise its longer term benefits and effectiveness are 
negated. At the same time it is important to be aware that certain skills and abilities can 
only be acquired through operational or street experience, often associated with local 
understanding and situational awareness.   
4. Experience and Expertise 
While historical experience and expertise clearly benefit both individual and organisational 
understanding of a particular type of terrorist threat, this must not allow a blinkered 
approach to new threats, their underestimation, or an over-reliance on previously tried and 
tested counter-terrorist approaches, despite their unsuitability for countering new threats. 
At the same time, hard earned organisational knowledge, experience and expertise must 
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not be lost through the disbanding or neglect of existing counter-terrorist organisations and 
units for political, cultural, historical, social or financial reasons.  
5. Command and Control 
Effective leadership, command and control is necessary to successfully respond to both 
terrorist threats and following incidents. This requires clear lines of communication, speedy 
decision making processes, operational flexibility, effective coordination, delegation of 
authority, the timely dissemination of intelligence and appropriate support elements. These 
factors are critical to successful command and control and must not be negated or 
undermined by excessive bureaucracy, a rigidly hierarchical command structure, time 
delays, excessive political influence, lack of delegation, continual micro-management, 
‘second guessing’ and the impact of ‘political correctness’.  
6. Systems and Structures 
Historically, policing, intelligence and military systems and structures have developed which 
are unsuitable for countering modern terrorist threats. Many are overly complex, negating 
effective coordination and communication, while leading to inter-organisational rivalry. 
Appropriate or adapted systems and structures are necessary to ensure improved 
communication and coordination, command and control, better dissemination and sharing 
of intelligence, improved use of resources and ultimately more effective counter-terrorist 
responses. 
7. Support, Innovation and Technology 
To be effective, those policing, intelligence and military organisations involved in counter-
terrorism must be properly supported with personnel, funding, equipment and other 
appropriate support. Likewise, innovation and the development and use of technology 
critically underpin many counter-terrorist measures. However any technology must be fully 
integrated with skilled personnel who can properly use it, otherwise it can prove to be 
nothing more than mere ‘window dressing’  
8. Organisational Skills, Capabilities and Roles 
Policing, intelligence and military organisations involved in counter-terrorism must 
constantly adapt and update their skills and capabilities, and where necessary expand their 
roles, to effectively counter the continually mutating and ‘learning’ nature of terrorist 
groups and the threats they pose. These counter-terrorist skills, capabilities and roles must 
be carefully based around operational experiences and any resultant lessons derived from 
them, being enhanced by realistic training and further operational experience. However, 
their effectiveness can be negated by poor command and control, a lack of political will, 
inappropriate equipment and a lack of both the training and operational experience 
detailed.   
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9. Cooperation and Liaison 
 
a. National 
At a national level, individual ‘egos and empires’, and the subsequent rivalry between 
organisations involved in counter terrorism, cannot be allowed to develop to such an extent 
that it affects operational effectiveness. Joint training and operations, mutual understanding 
and respect, and the exchange of personnel between organisations can help in significantly 
mitigating this.  
b. International 
International cooperation between police and security forces involved in counter-terrorism 
is vital and must be constantly encouraged, due to the transnational nature of terrorism. 
Not only is this international cooperation critical in the sharing of ideas, expertise, best 
practice and training, but equally in the effective coordination of complex international 
counter-terrorist operations. Much of this co-operation is bi-lateral in nature, often based 
on mutual trust and friendship between ‘practitioners’ who have worked or trained 
together.   
10. Civil Liberties, Political Influence and Resilience 
A careful balance must be made in the introduction of various counter-terrorist measures, 
between the need to provide group security, while protecting individual freedoms. This 
balance should be carefully considered, otherwise counter-terrorist measures may 
undermine the very freedoms they are introduced to protect. On the other hand, excessive 
political restrictions and controls, unnecessary paperwork and bureaucracy, can severely 
impact on command flexibility, speed of response and operational effectiveness. At its 
worst, such factors can actually expose both practitioners and the public to additional risk. 
Such wider operational effectiveness can also be impacted by the level of political influence 
and the resilience of the general public.   
 
 
